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Abstract: This dissertation is an investigation into the practice of peer-to-peer file-
sharing and the litigation campaign targeting individual file-sharers carried out by the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) from 2003 to 2008. The competing 
conceptualizations of social relations which motivate the conflict over peer-to-peer file-
sharing are explored using a combination of Autonomist Marxist theory and structuration 
theory. Peer-to-peer file-sharing is framed as part of the social system of commoning 
stemming from the recent ascendancy of immaterial labor within that sector of the 
economy dedicated to the production and distribution of informational and cultural 
goods. The RIAA litigation campaign is framed as a reaction to the emergence of new 
forms of social relations which are seen by the content-producing industries as subversive 
of revenue streams premised on commodity exchange in informational and cultural 
goods. The history of the RIAA litigation campaign is presented in detail with careful 
attention given to those instances in which defendants and other interested parties fought 
back against RIAA legal actions. The acts of resistance within the legal arena affected the 
ultimate potential of the litigation campaign to control the spread of file-sharing 
activities. Subsequent legal campaigns which have been based on the RIAA litigation 
 vii 
model are also examined. These later file-sharing cases have been met with similar forms 
of resistance which have likewise mitigated the impact of legal efforts to combat file-
sharing. In addition, a survey of file-sharers is included in this research as part of an 
attempt to understand the relationship between legal actions targeting peer-to-peer 
systems and individual file-sharers and the technological and social development of peer-
to-peer systems. This research argues that file-sharing litigation has proven ineffective in 
turning back the flood of file-sharing and may have increased the technological 
sophistication and community ties among file-sharers. In the end, the conflict over peer-
to-peer file-sharing is cast as a manifestation of a larger dynamic of capitalist crisis as 
content-producing industries attempt to come to terms with the contradictory tendencies 
of immaterial labor and the production of common pools of digital resources. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
OVERVIEW 
Recent technological developments have destabilized the system of property on 
which many content-producing industries have long relied. Intellectual property, the 
essential ingredient for large-scale capital-intensive media production, is being 
undermined by new modes of informational and cultural production and distribution 
which are multiplying and thriving in networked environments. The barriers to entry 
which once kept competitive forces at bay are now being eroded by new technologies 
capable of radically reducing the marginal costs of production and distribution. No longer 
are the content-producing industries assured of rents issuing from vast storehouses of 
intellectual properties. Nor are they guaranteed the competitive advantage which high 
economic input costs allow. Yet the greatest threat to the content-producing industries 
may come not from a sudden onslaught of unbridled competition but from everyday 
people who are no longer satisfied to play the role of the mere consumer. The social 
practices of creativity and sharing which have taken root in networked environments 
frustrate the content-producing industries‘ ability to commodify the artifacts being 
circulated there. Moreover, as the content-producing industries come to view the 
emerging digital commons as a potential threat to existing business models, considerable 
resources are being mobilized in an effort to bring the commons back within the capitalist 
logic of accumulation. However, there is also a counter-mobilization of resources in 
defense of the commons. This conflict is likely to exert significant influence on the 
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trajectory of capitalist development in the sphere of informational and cultural production 
and distribution. 
TOPIC, SIGNIFICANCE, AND PURPOSE 
Between 2003 and 2008 somewhere around 30,000 to 40,000 people were 
targeted with civil suits by the world‘s four largest record companies (Universal Music 
Group, Sony Music Entertainment, EMI, and Warner Music Group). These companies, 
represented by their media trade organization the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), pursued a litigation campaign in which suits were filed against 
individuals in U.S. district courts alleging copyright infringement (Beckerman, 2009). 
Most of these cases ended with default judgments since the accused seldom mounted 
legal defenses. Default judgments often resulted in awards amounting to more than 1000 
times the actual damages. In those cases where the accused attempted to negotiate 
settlements the amounts were often in excess of 2000 times the actual damages 
(Beckerman, 2008). The prospect of a costly and protracted legal defense and the 
potential for extremely high statutory damages deterred the vast majority of defendants 
from challenging their accusers in court. This makes it difficult to assess the cumulative 
guilt or innocence of the tens of thousands of individuals accused of copyright 
infringement while using peer-to-peer networks. Many of the underlying facts in these 
cases have gone unchallenged or are obscured from view. However, there are a small 
number of cases in which the defendants have decided to fight back. Moreover, the 
litigation has not stemmed the growth of file-sharing activities on the Internet. If 
anything, the litigation has increased the antagonism between the recording industry and 
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those who continue to develop and use peer-to-peer file-sharing systems. It is these 
instances of resistance to the recording industry‘s attempts to eradicate the file-sharing 
commons which are the focus of the current research project.  
 Though the RIAA is the public face of the litigation campaign, there are hundreds 
of affiliated record companies in the organization which have not been party to the 
proceedings (Beckerman, 2008). And while it is certainly in the best interests of the 
RIAA for individuals to either acquiesce or settle, beginning in 2005 a number of 
defendants challenged what many considered to be groundless lawsuits. First in New 
York, then in Seattle, then in Michigan—people accused of copyright infringement for 
sharing files of recorded music over peer-to-peer networks began seeking out legal 
representation (Baldas, 2005). In some cases it was argued that the plaintiffs could not tie 
an IP address to a specific individual user. In 2007 the first successful defense against the 
RIAA‘s so-called ―driftnet‖ approach
1
 occurred. What's more, the future of the litigation 
campaign itself was cast in doubt after the court awarded attorneys‘ fees to the defendant 
in the case, (Bangeman, 2007, February 7). A stream of other cases around the same time 
raised additional legal questions: (1) did simply making available copyrighted material 
over peer-to-peer networks constitute infringement if distribution was not proven 
(Bangeman, 2007, April 10)?; (2) were high statutory damages unconstitutional 
(Delahunty, 2006)?; and (3) what was the legality of the investigatory practices used by 
the RIAA (Fisher, 2007)? Then in the summer of 2009 individual defendants were dealt a 
series of setbacks. First, a federal jury ruled against Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a 32-year-
                                                 
1 This refers to the RIAA‘s practice of using the discovery phase of a case against the holder of an ISP 
account to discover the identity of the alleged copyright infringer, after which the original case is dropped 
and another case is filed with the named defendant. 
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old Minnesota mother of four, and awarded Capitol Records $1.92 million in damages 
(Wilkowske, 2009). The following month another federal jury awarded Sony BMG 
Music $675 thousand in its case against Boston University graduate student Joel 
Tenenbaum (Lavoie, 2009). However, in both cases the respective district court judges 
intervened and lowered the damages, prompting a continuation of both cases. These 
cases, along with a number of other successful challenges to the RIAA litigation 
campaign, serve as useful windows into the social tensions arising out of the process of 
commodifying informational and cultural goods. 
The outcome of this conflict will affect not only copyright law but the means by 
which informational and cultural goods are produced and distributed in society. Until 
now, the significance of the practices of individual file-sharers has not received adequate 
analysis. Structural approaches start with the law as the primary unit of analysis and 
rarely venture substantially outside of the institutional forums in which law is practiced. 
Consequently, these approaches have done little to identify and explain the complex 
mesh of structures which enable and constrain the activities of human agents with 
competing interests in the sphere of informational and cultural production. Scholarship 
has not adequately addressed those structures which condition the practice of peer-to-peer 
file-sharing. Thus the politics of peer-to-peer file sharing is largely hidden from view. 
Through an investigation of the technological, legal, and social structures implicated in 
the conflict over file-sharing, I intend to map those connections among sites of individual 
experience and social organization which make possible the mobilization and 
coordination of resources as a part of that conflict. The nature of the research is both 
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exploratory and explanatory. I will attempt to shed light on the complex structures 
extending out from the lived experience of individual file-sharers as they confront the 
imposition of the commodity form in their daily lives. As the inquiry extends out from 
where these individuals are located, I will explain how structures function to both 
position the individual as well as open up new possibilities for social organization and 
resistance. I believe that a deeper understanding of the structural dimensions of the 
growing digital commons and the legal struggles occurring as part of the capitalist 
enclosure of information will make possible a more coordinated and coherent challenge 
to existing intellectual property regimes. Therefore, the current research project could be 
characterized as action research, as it is likely to be of value to those who are active in the 
struggle against the commodification of information in the networked environment 
(Marshall, 2006). 
GENERAL QUESTION AND FRAMEWORK 
What competing conceptualizations of social relations provoke conflicts over 
peer-to-peer file sharing? 
It is my intention to avoid framing the analysis either in terms of reified structures 
of constraint on individual behavior (structuralist approach) on the one hand or in terms 
of subjective personal narratives without contextualization (instrumentalist approach) on 
the other. Much of the current literature on copyright law, whether from the political 
economy tradition, mainstream economics, or critical legal studies, is in the structuralist 
vein. These analyses seek to explain social organization as the product of a functional 
equilibrium or as the result of an inner logic of capitalism. The current project will 
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instead highlight the contingent nature of intellectual property regimes which are 
themselves the product of interactions among human agents with competing interests. 
Therefore, copyright law is conceptualized as a recursive process in which the law is both 
the means and the outcome of the conflict between copyright holders and those accused 
of copyright infringement. This takes the theoretical framework beyond the normative 
literature of political economy, economics, and law while incorporating alternative 
constructions of Marxian theory and sociology. A middle way is charted through the 
theoretical excesses of both structuralism and instrumentalism by first acknowledging 
individual human agency and then by recognizing that it can inform our understanding of 
structure. This project seeks to map the coordinates of the linkages between the local 
settings of human experience where people confront information commodities and the 
translocal organizations and administrations which affect human behavior through a 
complex field of control and enablement. Once we have a map of these linkages we can 
start to see how these structures function alongside each other, accounting for the 
persistence, transformation, and rupture of a social system based on the commodification 
of information. The conflict over intellectual property and peer-to-peer file-sharing 
illuminates the role of law as a contested space or as a resource for struggle between 
incongruous social systems. 
As with more traditional notions of property, intellectual property and its subsets 
are not static legal categories. As man-made institutions they have developed over time 
and in relation to particular class interests. In commenting on property, the distinguished 
political scientist C.B. Macpherson (2008) observed: 
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How people see the thing—that is, what concept they have of it—is both effect 
and cause of what it is at any time. What they see must have some relation 
(though not necessarily an exact correspondence) to what is actually there; but 
changes in what is there are due partly to changes in the ideas people have of it. 
This is simply to say that property is both an institution and a concept and that 
over time the institution and the concept influence each other. (1) 
In other words, the deployment of legal resources by the possessors of the exclusive 
rights which fall under the header of ‗copyright‘ must be viewed as part of a larger social 
dynamic. The cases brought against individuals by copyright holders are both cause and 
effect of a class dynamic deriving from those property relations specific to the capitalist 
mode of production. That dynamic is struggle. Accordingly, the analysis of law should 
frame copyright as something more than a reification of the dominant class interests. As 
the battles over copyright in the networked information economy have demonstrated, 
intellectual property law has been shaped both by the realization of the limits to affecting 
individual behavior as well as the desire to afford as much protection as possible to the 
copyright holders. 
OUTLINE 
This dissertation will proceed according to the following outline. The second 
chapter further develops the theoretical framework employed as part of this study by 
exploring concepts such as power, resistance, class struggle, the state, technology, and 
social relations. In the third chapter I provide a brief overview of the current status of the 
copyright litigation campaign as well as an overview of the research project itself. 
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Chapter 4 examines the historical, economic, technical, and legal dimensions of both the 
music industry and peer-to-peer technologies. Chapter 5 recounts the history of the RIAA 
litigation campaign targeting individual file-sharers while arguing that the ultimate 
success of the campaign was effectively limited by numerous acts of resistance to the 
recording industry‘s legal actions. Chapter 6 examines the continuing legal actions 
directed at individual file-sharers as additional copyright groups have sought to apply the 
RIAA‘s model of litigation to other areas of content production and distribution. Chapter 
7 explores the world of peer-to-peer file-sharing through survey research conducted with 
a sample of file sharers. In it I investigate the deepening antagonism between the industry 
and file-sharers while considering the impact of litigation on peer-to-peer systems. 
Chapter 8 is a concluding chapter in which I revisit some of the major findings of this 
study with an eye to explaining the trajectory of capitalist development in the sphere of 
informational and cultural production and distribution as the product of a conflict over 




Chapter 2 Review of the Literature 
There is not a significant body of literature which examines the phenomenon of 
peer-to-peer file-sharing from a critical perspective. This is due, at least in part, to the 
widespread adoption of theoretical frameworks which fail to recognize the ways in which 
the class
2
 antagonism influences the trajectory of capitalist development. Much of the 
existing scholarship approaches the subject of peer-to-peer file-sharing as a momentary 
aberration produced by a quick and unanticipated succession of technological 
developments and which can be resolved by institutional adjustments. What‘s more, peer-
to-peer file-sharing has passed under the radar of many critical theorists who are 
seemingly more interested in theorizing the capitalist side of the class relation. 
Conversely, this research project is guided by approaches to Marxism and sociology 
which set it apart from previous approaches. However, as this project proceeds largely 
from a Marxist perspective, it is necessary at the outset to confront the tendencies within 
the political economy tradition which have obscured the significance of peer-to-peer file-
sharing. Although this discussion will only bear upon the subject of file-sharing in the 
abstract, it serves as a point of departure in the development of a more suitable theoretical 
framework capable of acknowledging the significance of the subject at hand. Therefore, I 
offer a critique of the political economy approach to the study of information which is 
followed by a survey of two alternative approaches: Autonomist Marxism and 
structuration theory. I explore the ways in which these two theoretical frames 
                                                 
2 The use of class here differs from common usage where it connotes little more than a group of people 
with some shared characteristic(s). Instead, the current study employs class to indicate a social division 
occurring at the stage in which the development of a social surplus of production allows for the 
expropriation of one class by another.   
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complement each other and contribute to a better understanding of the production of 
information by answering some of the problems presented by the political economy 
tradition. I then compare and contrast this alternative framing to the treatments offered by 
other pertinent scholarship on a series of concepts which lie at the heart of the current 
investigation: power, resistance, the working class, the state, technology, and social 
relations. The relevant contributions of political economists, mainstream economists, and 
critical legal scholars are brought to bear on each of these concepts to demonstrate the 
applicability of the proposed theoretical framework to the subject of peer-to-peer file-
sharing. While there is considerable overlap among these concepts, they are presented in 
this particular order in an attempt to construct a working theory of the social system of 
commoning which will serve as the basis for the current investigation. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Political economists have weighed in from time to time on the debates over 
intellectual property and have tended to view copyright primarily as an instrument for the 
capitalist appropriation and control of culture. These analyses consist mainly of theories 
of class domination wherein law functions as an exclusive tool of the capitalist class. 
While it is true that copyright often serves as a resource for firms in their attempt to 
impose the commodity form, it is also true that there is considerable struggle occurring as 
a part of that process. Oftentimes the struggle over the proper role of copyright is within 
the capitalist class itself (intraclass conflict). For example, this was the case in the 
conflict between U.S. broadcasters and the nascent cable television industry during the 
1970s. At other times, the struggle is between classes (interclass conflict) as was the case 
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when the RIAA sued individuals for alleged copyright infringement. In fact, it is often the 
case that the struggle over the proper role of copyright is characterized by simultaneous 
intraclass and interclass conflicts. In order to understand how and why political 
economists have come to focus their efforts above all on intra-firm conflict3 to the 
exclusion of interclass conflict some background on the history of the political economy 
tradition is required. 
The political economy approach to the study of intellectual property is not as rich 
or well-developed as other areas of political economic analysis. This is due, at least in 
part, to the ambiguous position that information production has held among political 
economy scholars over the years. Two historical tendencies within the tradition are 
responsible for this stunted development. First, Marxism traditionally characterized the 
production of information as unproductive labor. Marxists emphasized the content of 
information and its role in the (re)production of the capitalist ideology. Eventually those 
political economists concerned with the increasing centrality of information production to 
the overall economy began to see it in a different light. Yet despite their recognition of 
the productive capacity of that section of the economy dedicated to the production of 
information, their efforts were stymied by a second problematic tendency. An overriding 
concern with media ownership and social domination blinded them to the existence and 
relevance of working class resistance to the contingent processes of information 
commodification. These historical developments within the political economy of 
communication tradition produced a theoretical predisposition ill-suited to the study of 
                                                 
3 Intraclass conflict and interclass conflict are terms used by Bettig (1996). In the interest of clarity I will 
substitute intra-firm conflict for the former. 
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phenomena like peer-to-peer file-sharing. So that we may come to theorize file-sharing as 
an act of resistance which conditions the trajectory of capitalist development in the 
sphere of information production, we must first contend with these shortcomings of the 
political economy of communication literature in greater detail.  
As that portion of the economy dedicated to the production of information became 
ascendant in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, orthodox Marxist 
perspectives about what constituted productive and unproductive labor initially 
obstructed the analysis of the information commodity. Orthodox Marxists believed that 
the production of information did not contribute to the production of value for capital. 
For example, advertising was not considered productive labor and was instead considered 
a necessary activity for the circulation of commodities—the cost of which was deducted 
from surplus value. In fact, the two most influential American Marxist economists of the 
twentieth century, Baran and Sweezy (1968), viewed the labor involved in the production 
of information as little more than a parasite on the generation of surplus value.  
Dallas Smythe, one of the founding figures of the political economy of 
communication, rejected this characterization of information production and instead 
focused on the economic function of these industries. Smythe (1977) remarked that, ―The 
first question that historical materialists should ask about mass communications systems 
is what economic function for capital do they serve, attempting to understand their role in 
the reproduction of capitalist relations of production‖ (p. 1). Smythe‘s answer was to turn 
the focus of political economy away from the information commodity itself and towards 
the production of audiences for sale to industrial capitalists. In essence, the media 
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artifacts which dissident Marxists like the Frankfurt School had theorized solely in terms 
of the reproduction of capitalist ideology were re-theorized primarily as inducements to 
attract unwitting audience members to view advertisements. And since audiences were 
now coerced into working as mind slaves (Smythe, 1978) the productivity question was 
answered by way of shifting attention to the actions and behaviors of individuals within 
the sphere of consumption. In this sense Smythe brought political economists one step 
closer to recognizing the significance of phenomena like peer-to-peer file-sharing by 
extending Marxian analysis to activities not occurring within the factory walls or on the 
shop floor. However, the way in which Smythe theorized individual subjectivity did not 
accommodate analyses of resistance occurring within these spaces. 
Smythe correctly pointed out that the communication industry operated both in 
the market for programming and in the market for audiences (Mosco, 1996). Up until 
Smythe‘s (1977) seminal article on the audience commodity, political economists were 
predisposed to define their subject as the consumer and their activity as leisure. Smythe 
intentionally blurred the distinction between the spheres of production and reproduction 
by arguing that the activities of the consumers of mass media products were, in fact, 
productive. He referred to this as the blindspot of Western Marxism and argued 
specifically that the real commodity of mass media was not information per se, but the 
audience itself. Thus Smythe (2001) collapsed the distinctions between base and 
superstructure, declaring that all of society had been mobilized as a productive force 
under capitalism. The logic of Smythe‘s argument ran something like this: if all time 
becomes work time under capital, then the worker no longer has labor power to sell. This 
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is because the only time which he chooses not to sell is his leisure time. If his leisure time 
is now productive time, the worker no longer has labor power to sell because he cannot 
choose to withhold a portion of it (Smythe, 1977, p. 7).  
Thus Smythe answered the productivity question while simultaneously 
compounding a second problematic tendency within the political economy tradition. 
Above all capital is a social relation in which the labor of workers is organized to 
multiply and preserve capitalist accumulation (Marx, 1978). As the surplus wealth of 
society is therefore given to the indulgence of the capitalist and not the workers, the 
social relation between capital and labor is antagonistic. However, by demonstrating little 
or no interest in the actual lived experience of audiences Smythe and many subsequent 
political economists have provided a theoretical dead-end for any meaningful analysis of 
capitalist development in terms of the two-sided class relation. Smythe‘s 
conceptualization of the nature of audience labor is erroneous because he proceeds first 
from the assumption of the effective domination of labor in the factory and then extends 
that domination to the domestic sphere. A detailed examination of actual audience 
behavior would reveal a much more complicated and richer subjectivity than the mind 
slaves of Smythe‘s writings. With such an intellectual heritage it is little wonder that 
peer-to-peer file-sharing has not received adequate treatment from the political economy 
of communication tradition. 
Today political economy scholars of communication attempt to uncover the social 
relations congealed in the products of communication, such as newspapers, books, 
videos, television programming, advertisements, motion pictures, Internet content, and 
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even the audience itself. Political economists investigate the ways in which 
communication systems contribute to the development of social hierarchies. Mosco 
(1996) states, ―This would lead the political economist of communication to look at 
shifting forms of control along the production, distribution, and consumption circuit‖ (p. 
25). Generally speaking then, the political economy of communication seeks to advance 
our understanding of the social relations organized around the capitalist production of 
information. Therefore political economic analyses tend to focus on the ownership and 
control of communications industries, highlighting the ways in which this control 
facilitates the reproduction of the class relation both in economic and ideological terms. 
The structuralist formulations of class domination which seemed to flow naturally 
from the audience commodity theory and its progeny of one-sided class analyses of 
communication systems provoked well-deserved criticisms from the cultural studies 
tradition (Grossberg, 1995). In fact, much of the quality work on audience subjectivity 
and resistance to the commodification of information has emerged not from political 
economists, but from cultural studies scholars (Ang 1985; Fiske 2004; Grossberg, 1992; 
Jenkins 2006). Yet despite its shortcomings, the audience commodity theory deserves 
credit for bringing the political economy of communication out of the morass of the 
productivity debate. The audience commodity centers our attention on the activities of 
people in the sphere of reproduction—activities which had previously been dismissed as 
simple leisure. In effect, Smythe broadened the inquiry of political economists to 
encompass activities which have substantial explanatory power for understanding the 
trajectory of capitalist development. Smythe‘s shortcoming was his failure to see the 
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capitalist attempt to restructure activities occurring within the sphere of reproduction as 
an expansion of the terrain for class struggle. 
In truth, not all political economists who study communication subscribe to rigid 
forms of structuralism. For example, Vincent Mosco, a prominent figure in the political 
economy of communication tradition, has stressed the important of recursive 
relationships for political economic analysis. Mosco (1996) asserts that there are four 
ideas which serve as the cornerstones of the political economy tradition—social change 
and history, the social totality, moral philosophy, and praxis. He maintains that each of 
these four ideas can be used to develop a theoretical framework capable of capturing the 
dynamics of the class relation and its effects on capitalist development. Mosco uses social 
change to refer to the dynamic forces responsible for the growth and development of 
capitalism; social totality to refer to the cross-discipline approach of political economy 
(everything from sociology, government, law, education, economics, etc.); moral 
philosophy to refer to the recursive nature of theory; and praxis to refer to the creativity 
and action which is the motive force for human development. Though much of the work 
of political economists in the 20th century has demonstrated a preoccupation with 
exposing the corporate order of the emerging media industries, Mosco provides an 
analytical framework which allows us to decenter the media industries for research 
purposes. By focusing on human subjectivity rather than an abstract corporate order, we 
are able to return some sense of agency and efficacy to the working class side of the 
social relation. 
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 In his indispensable 1996 book, The Political Economy of Communication, Mosco 
refers to three entry points or processes which are relevant to the project of political 
economic analysis—commodification, spatialization, and structuration. Mosco (1996) 
states that these are, ―insertions into the social field that provide a substantive focus for 
thinking about characteristic social practices without suggesting that they provide the 
essential definition that captures the totality of the field‖ (p.10). In other words, these are 
useful starting points for taking up a particular social phenomenon, but they are not 
meant to be a distillation of the political economy tradition. All three of these concepts—
and especially structuration—have informed my approach to the study of the conflict 
over copyright law. 
 Mosco uses commodification in the typical Marxian sense to refer to the 
transformation of use values into exchange values as part of the process of capitalist 
accumulation. Like Smythe before him, Mosco emphasizes commodification in order to 
correct the tendency of some communication scholars to overemphasize the content of 
mass media artifacts. Instead of focusing on the text, political economy focuses on the 
private and state institutions that produce and distribute information commodities as well 
as the ways in which these processes contribute to commodification in other areas. Tied 
to the concept of commodification is spatialization—or the process of overcoming the 
constraints of space and time. Communication research has had an overriding concern 
with issues of spatialization at least since the time of Harold Innis (1951). Typically 
political economists have concerned themselves with the ways in which capital has 
exploited systems of communication to expand its hegemony. Research in this area has 
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centered primarily on the institutional extension of corporate power in the 
communication industries. However, in the study of peer-to-peer networks we see that 
these same communication systems can be used in ways which are antithetical to the 
capitalist enterprise. 
 Mosco cites Anthony Giddens‘s (1986) theory of structuration as the third entry 
point for political economic analysis. According to Mosco (1996), 
―Structuration…describes a process by which structures are constituted out of human 
agency, even as they provide the very ‗medium‘ of that constitution‖ (p. 212). 
Structuration can be seen as a response to the structure/agency problem which has long 
plagued scholars—including some political economists. Structuration theory
4
 deftly 
avoids the most vulgar manifestations of structuralist, institutionalist, and functionalist 
thought. Mosco‘s emphasis on structuration theory is a welcomed development. The 
application of structuration theory within political economic analysis could counteract the 
tendency to engage in one-sided class analyses—though this result is by no means 
guaranteed. 
Consider Ronald Bettig‘s (1996) treatment of copyright law in his book 
Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property. Bettig argues 
persuasively that copyright can function as an instrument of the ruling class (alongside 
ownership over the means of production) to facilitate the accumulation of capital. Bettig 
shows how copyright exacerbates the problem of monopoly capitalism by raising the 
barriers to entry in media markets which are already subject to high levels of 
concentration in ownership. He uses two case studies to make his point: (1) the 
                                                 
4 See page 26 for a more detailed explanation of structuration theory. 
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emergence of the cable television industry and its impact on the filmed entertainment 
industry; and (2) the introduction of the VCR and its impact on the broadcast industry. 
Both of these case studies highlight intra-firm struggle between capitalists as a new 
technology is introduced prior to the establishment of a set of laws governing its use. 
Bettig demonstrates that if the radical potential of the new technology is not swiftly 
contained, there exists the potential for technological bypass of the incumbent industries. 
Thus the state has functioned as an arena of struggle in which copyright holders fight to 
suppress competition from the firms behind emerging communication technologies. 
Much of Bettig‘s analysis is incisive and informing. Yet despite an explicit 
reference to structuration theory, Bettig nevertheless pursues his analysis largely in terms 
of intra-firm conflict. The motion picture industry, broadcasters, and cable operators all 
came into conflict over the proper function of copyright with regard to the retransmission 
of televised broadcasts. The radical potential of a new communication technology was 
suppressed via intra-firm conflict in the legal arena as cable television was methodically 
brought into the general market structure. The intra-firm conflict and the ensuing 
industrial reorganization played out through civil, administrative, and statutory law. 
Likewise, when the VCR was introduced by Sony, media industries moved quickly to 
extinguish the new threat to their intellectual property. Home audiences had suddenly 
been given a degree of control over program scheduling which had long been under the 
exclusive control of broadcasters. By allowing end-users to fast-forward over commercial 
messages this new time-shifting capability threatened to undo the advertising model 
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which undergirded the industry. The conflict eventually unfolded both in a landmark 
Supreme Court case as well as in Congress through a series of ―home recording acts‖. 
Neither of Bettig‘s case studies offers a substantive analysis of end-users as they 
confronted these new technologies. To be fair, the author does acknowledge the 
―pessimism‖ of Marxists who often seem preoccupied with theorizing domination. He 
includes a final chapter on resistance to copyright law in which he mentions various 
examples of interclass struggle including artists sharing access to their creative works, 
artists using copyright to control their messages, digital sampling in music, hackers, 
labor-capital struggles in the entertainment industries, and international conflicts over 
copyright in trade agreements. But as is all too typical of works in political economy, 
these acts of resistance appear largely as an afterthought in a nine page concluding 
chapter of a 276 page book. That being said, by incorporating structuration theory into his 
work Bettig manages to produce an analytical framing flexible enough to accommodate a 
two-sided class analysis of copyright law. 
 The relevant aspect of Bettig‘s work to the current project is not so much his 
framing of capitalist development but his particular analytical approach to law. Like 
Mosco, Bettig (1996) employs structuration theory in his analysis, stating: 
…the task of political economists is to conceptualize economic and social 
structures and then to tease out the ways in which they affect everyday practice. 
The routines of everyday life may result in the reproduction, modification, or 
alternation of these larger social formations. (7) 
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Bettig does follow in the grain typical of most political economists and restricts his 
analysis largely to one side of the class relation—that of intra-firm conflict among 
capitalists—and concludes that structures of constraint are reproduced despite the best 
efforts of dominated subjects. Nonetheless, Bettig does use structuration theory to show 
the contested nature of law as a dynamic process contingent on its own continued 
reproduction through social practices. 
 Also significant for the current research project is Bettig‘s theoretical approach to 
the state. Bettig (1996) enumerates three political economy theories of the state. The first 
of these is the instrumental approach in which the state appears merely as a manifestation 
of the dominant class interests. This theory portrays the state as an instrument of 
domination utilized exclusively by the capitalist class and emphasizes human agency at 
the level of consciousness (as opposed to unconscious structures). In other words, this 
approach highlights the decision-making processes of the captains of industry. The 
second approach is the structuralist approach—usually referred to as either crisis theory 
or capital logic theory. Here the state emerges as a response to the continual economic 
crises that are the result of the contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of 
production. This approach stresses the unconscious structural determinations which 
constrain human activity. The state is continually compelled to intervene in the economy 
in order to stabilize markets ―by reorganizing the processes of production, distribution, 
and consumption‖ (p. 118). 
 The third theory of the state described by Bettig (1996) is the class struggle 
theory. Bettig introduces Giddens‘s critique of structuralist theories of the state in which 
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Giddens argues that structuralism does not account for why government employees, not 
being themselves members of the capitalist class, would consistently intervene on behalf 
of the dominant class interests. So rather than dispense with any notion of human 
subjectivity, the class struggle theory of the state adopts the dialectical approach of 
structuration theory with respect to structural determinations and human agency. Bettig 
(1996) states, ―This theoretical position stresses the dysfunctional, contradictory, and 
contingent nature of state intervention into the economy. Theories in this area see the 
state as a site of interclass and intraclass struggle‖ (p. 120). 
 The political economy tradition has endured numerous vicissitudes with respect to 
its analyses of the production of information. Initially obstructed by the question of 
whether the production of information constituted productive labor, political economists 
were somewhat slow to extend their analysis to the emerging information economy. 
Subsequent analyses recognized the economic importance of information commodities, 
but did so at the expense of foregoing analyses of the lived experiences of people as they 
confronted the commodification of culture and knowledge. The emphasis has been 
primarily on those structures deployed by capitalists as instruments of class domination. 
Yet the work of Mosco and Bettig also points to another way of understanding the 
trajectory of capitalist development in the sphere of information production. Structuration 
theory can accommodate analyses which seek to understand capitalist development as a 
product of class antagonism. 
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AUTONOMIST MARXISM 
The current research project is informed by Marxian analysis. However, I do not 
accept political economy as the sole or natural successor of the Marxist tradition. Instead, 
I draw heavily upon Autonomist Marxism, putting me at odds with much of the political 
economy tradition. The core premises of Autonomist Marxism were developed in Italy 
during the 1960s and 1970s (Wright, 2002). It is called ―autonomist‖ because this variant 
of Marxian analysis focuses on the autonomous activities of workers in the process of 
capitalist development (Cleaver, 2000). It is important to understand the particular way in 
which the term autonomous is used here. As Dyer-Witheford (1999) explains, ―Capital, a 
relation of general commodification predicated on the wage relation, needs labor. But 
labor does not need capital. Labor can dispense with the wage, and with capitalism, and 
find different ways to organize its own creative energies: it is potentially autonomous‖ (p. 
68). In other words, there is an emphasis not only on the revolutionary capacity of the 
working class, but perhaps more importantly, there is an emphasis on the ways in which 
the working class resists and organizes its activities outside of the wage relation. This 
mode of inquiry focuses on those instances where the working class attempts to wrest 




 The notion of an autonomous working class has fresh significance in light of the 
increase in that portion of the economy dedicated to the production of immaterial goods. 
Marx recognized that in the context of traditional large-scale industry it was capital that 
                                                 
5 These instances can include everything from the struggle of indigenous groups like the Zapatistas to carve 
out autonomous zones (Cleaver, 1998), the so-called theft of intellectual property over peer-to-peer 




determined the cooperative arrangement of labor. That is to say, capital brought the 
workers together into the factory, gave them the tools to work with, and determined how 
cooperation among the workers would be organized. However, with the recent 
ascendancy of immaterial labor
6
, now it is the working class rather than capital which is 
increasingly likely to determine the cooperative arrangement. That is to say the 
hegemony of immaterial labor signals a separation of labor power from the explicit 
control of capitalists.  
While both Autonomist Marxism and the political economy of communication 
tradition have acknowledged the significance of immaterial labor to the overall economy, 
the difference between the two approaches lies in their respective treatments of the sphere 
of reproduction.
7
 Mario Tronti (1971), a leading figure in the development of Autonomist 
Marxist thought, introduced his theory of the social factory in which he argued that 
changes in society were occurring as the result of the generalization of surplus value. 
Tronti thought this was a consequence of the historic rise in the organic composition
8
 of 
capital in which production was increasingly reorganized into large-scale machine-based 
industries. Another influential Italian Marxist, Raniero Panzieri (1976), theorized that this 
restructuring was due in large part to the successes of workers in their efforts to shorten 
the workday. In each successive attempt to contain working class struggle in the 
factories, capital was forced to widen and deepen its mechanisms of control until all of 
                                                 
6 Lazzarato (1996) defines immaterial labor as ―the labor that produces the informational and cultural 
content of the commodity‖ (p. 133). 
7 Sphere of reproduction refers to those activities and environments in which workers reproduce their labor 
power. 
8 Organic composition of capital refers to the ratio between constant capital and variable capital. That is to 
say the ratio between the value of materials and fixed costs and the value of labor power. 
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society eventually became identified with the social relations of the factory. Tronti (1971) 
stated, ―When all of society is reduced to a factory, the factory—as such—seems to 
disappear,‖ as does ―labour-power itself as a commodity.‖ Yet unlike Smythe who 
theorized the expansion of capital into the sphere of reproduction as historically grounded 
in working class defeat, the Autonomist Marxists saw the reorganization of society under 
the rules of the factory not as a consequence of working class defeat but rather as a 
consequence of their successes within the factory. In this sense Autonomist Marxists see 
a multiplication of the potentials for crises rather than a solidification of class 
domination. 
Moreover, the expanded terrain for potential crises is explained by Autonomist 
Marxists in terms of a two-sided class analysis. Expanding on the work of Tronti and 
Panzieri, Antonio Negri wrote a seminal paper in 1968 entitled Keynes and the Capitalist 
Theory of the State post-1929 in which he identified the working class as the motive force 
behind capitalist development. This way of explaining capitalist development is the 
fundamental starting point for the theoretical framework employed in the current research 
project. Negri demonstrated that the Keynesian state which emerged from the misery of 
the Great Depression was not the product of a capitalist defeat of the labor movement but 
rather the result of successful working class struggle. Critical scholars associated with the 
Frankfurt School had long theorized the New Deal merely as a capitalist alignment of 
workers‘ qualitative needs with the productive capacity of industry after the Great 
Depression. Negri argued that, in fact, Keynesian policy was a reaction to the success of 
the working class in making higher wages and shorter hours the condition for further 
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capitalist development. Therefore, Keynesian policy manifested as a productivity deal in 
which increases in productivity were tied to increases in wages, thereby harnessing 
working class struggle as a motive force for capitalist development (Cleaver, 2000). This 
is wholly different than proceeding from the assumption of a passive working class 
whose tastes and wants are simply turned on or off by industry when it suits its purposes. 
This is the assumption which drives political economists of communication to look 
almost exclusively to the capitalist side of the class relation to explain the dynamics of 
capitalist development. However, this approach provides us with only a partial 
explanation of the trajectory of capitalist development with respect to the production of 
information. If we understand capital not as an external force independent of the working 
class—but as the class relation itself—then one-sided class analyses suddenly appear 
fetishistic. Class relations appear reified and undue social cohesion and efficacy is 
ascribed to the capitalist side of the class relation. If, however, we conceptualize the class 
relation as dialectical, we are in keeping with not only Autonomist Marxism but also with 
structuration theory which views social structures as both the medium and the result of 




Alongside Autonomist Marxism, structuration theory informs the current 
investigation into copyright and peer-to-peer file-sharing. Anthony Giddens (1986) 
introduced structuration theory in an attempt to overcome the objective/subjective duality 
which had impeded a holistic theorization of society. Structuration suggests that the level 
                                                 
9 See Giddens‘s (1986) discussion of the dialectic of control (pp. 15-16). 
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of analysis is neither the experience of the individual actor nor the social structures which 
constrain the agency of the individual actor. Rather, the analysis centers on social 
practices ordered recursively across space and time. In structuration theory, structures are 
conceptualized as the rules and resources implicated in social reproduction. Therefore, 
structuration requires that the researcher investigate those daily activities whereby social 
structures serve as both the medium and outcome of those activities. Giddens (1986) 
explains: 
The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of 
structuration, is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of 
any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. 
Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive. 
That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually 
recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. 
In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these 
activities possible. (2-3) 
Structuration theory dovetails nicely with the Autonomist Marxist tradition with 
respect to two-sided class analysis. Giddens (1986) has critiqued structuralist approaches 
which fail to treat human agents as knowledgeable. Structuralism fails to appreciate how 
much knowledge individuals actually possess. It also fails to recognize the significance of 
a range of discursive phenomena which have potential explanatory power. Giddens 
(1986) delineates two forms of consciousness which researchers should be aware of: 
discursive consciousness and practical consciousness. Discursive consciousness loosely 
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refers to that which agents can readily put into words while practical consciousness refers 
to that knowledge which agents use to go on with the routines of their daily lives. 
Practical knowledge may be wholly repressed from the consciousness of the agent or 
appear only in distorted form. Neither discursive nor practical consciousness should be 
construed as rigid or mutually exclusive categories. Hence structuration theory mirrors 
Autonomist Marxism‘s stress on investigating the actual experience of workers engaged 
in struggle. Similarly the current project eschews relying solely on jurists or industry 
representatives as the ultimate authorities on the development of either copyright law or 
information production and distribution technologies. The knowledge embodied within 
the peer-to-peer file-sharing community figures prominently in the current research. 
 Autonomist Marxism and structuration theory offer a way out of the rigid 
structuralism of political economy without betraying the spirit of Marxist inquiry. The 
political economy of communication has expanded the field of investigation to 
encompass the sphere of reproduction yet it is still burdened by unrealistic 
representations of capitalist domination over working class subjectivity. While some 
political economists have come to embrace the core assertions of structuration theory and 
recognize the recursive nature of social structures, more work needs to be done to 
produce an analytical framework capable of explaining the trajectory of capitalist 
development as contingent on an antagonistic class relation. With respect to the current 
project, an analytical framework capable of approaching peer-to-peer file-sharing as a 
manifestation of this class antagonism is required. In order to further this objective I next 
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survey some contributions to various theories relating to the concepts of power, 
resistance, the working class, the state (law), technology, and social relations. 
POWER 
Although highly abstract and seemingly removed from much of the work on peer-
to-peer technology and file-sharing litigation, I begin with the concept of power because 
it forms the basis of all social relations. Many forms of Marxist analysis, including 
contemporary political economy, inherited a conceptualization of power from early 
political economists who envisioned power as a zero-sum game in which the existence of 
a class antagonism merely denoted the domination of one class over the other (Hartley, 
2002). In other words, power was conceptualized as subject to scarcity—the only way to 
get it was to take it from someone else. Herein lies the root of political economy‘s rigid 
structuralist theories of class domination. From this perspective power refers to the ability 
of one group to impose its will on the rest of society. According to orthodox Marxists, 
capitalists accomplish this exercise of power in large part by alienating workers from the 
means of production and through the division of labor. The surplus social wealth 
generated by the creative capacity of workers is made to benefit capitalists and not the 
workers. This surplus is channeled back into the processes of production as capital 
continually expands the capacity to organize society around the imposition of work. Thus 
capitalist accumulation becomes the ensnarement of living labor by dead labor. As Marx 
(1990) famously declared ―Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by 
sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks‖ (p. 342).  
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Foucault (1980) famously reversed this conceptualization of power as direct 
domination by theorizing it instead as subject to abundance. Power is not a substance 
possessed by some to the exclusion of others. Rather for Foucault power is a grid of 
social relations characterized by both domination and counteraction.
10
 According to 
Foucault power actually produces subjectivity as opposed to repressing it. All of 
Foucault‘s architectures of power and disciplinary regimes act on a subject who was free 
prior to the application of power and therefore possessing an innate capacity for 
resistance. As Foucault (1982) remarked, ―Power is exercised only over free subjects, and 
only insofar as they are free‖ (p. 221). With this in mind Hardt and Negri (2009) caution 
that domination and resistance are not external to each other: 
We should not think of power as primary and resistance a reaction to it; instead, 
paradoxical as it may sound, resistance is prior to power. Here we can appreciate 
the full importance of Foucault‘s claim that power is exercised only over free 
subjects. Their freedom is prior to the exercise of power, and their resistance is 
simply the effort to further, expand, and strengthen that freedom. And in this 
context the dream of an outside, an external standpoint or support for resistance, 
is both futile and disempowering. (81-82) 
 Although most of Foucault‘s work focuses on the ways in which power is 
exercised over life, there is always an undercurrent of resistance to the administration of 
life. However, as Foucault never fully developed this aspect of his work, it has been left 
to other authors to theorize power as encompassing both domination and resistance. 
                                                 
10 Although resistance is assigned a role in Foucault‘s analysis he never formulated a strategy of resistance 
(see Colin Gordon‘s afterword in (Foucault, 1980)). 
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Hardt and Negri‘s (2009) development of Foucault‘s concepts are instrumental to the 
current study. The authors have expanded on Foucault‘s notion of biopower to theorize 
something they refer to as biopolitics. In their formulation of power, biopolitics is to 
biopower as resistance is to domination. The authors state: 
Our reading not only identifies biopolitics with the localized productive powers of 
life—that is, the production of affects and languages through social cooperation 
and the interaction of bodies and desires, the invention of new forms of the 
relation to the self and others, and so forth—but also affirms biopolitics as the 
creation of new subjectivities that are presented at once as resistance and de-
subjectification. If we remain too closely tied to a philological analysis of 
Foucault‘s texts, we might miss this central point: his analyses of biopower are 
aimed not merely at an empirical description of how power works for and through 
subjects but also at the potential for the production of alternative subjectivities, 
thus designating a distinction between qualitatively different forms of power. This 
point is implicit in Foucault‘s claim that freedom and resistance are necessary 
preconditions for the exercise of power. (58-59) 
Here in this conceptualization of power appears a counterbalance to the tendency of 
political economists to theorize power by emphasizing the ways in which living labor is 
dominated by dead labor. Instead, the current study shifts the focus to the production of 
an alternative subjectivity. As Hardt and Negri have argued, the critical aspect of the 
recent ascendancy of that sector of the economy characterized by immaterial labor
11
 is 
                                                 
11 Hardt and Negri (2000) define immaterial labor as ―labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a 
service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication‖ (p. 290). 
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not the continued reproduction of the capitalist social relation, but the production of an 
explosive new alternative. Biopolitical production exceeds the constraints of capital and 
opens new terrains for potential crisis through the exercise of power in social relations 
existing autonomously from capital. Suddenly peer-to-peer file-sharers appear 
inconsonant with the logic of the capitalist system. They manifest as alternative 
subjectivities so discordant with existing social relations that even many of their 
defenders attempt to conceal their incompatibility with ongoing capitalist accumulation. 
It is also illuminating to see how structuration theory in many respects 
complements this particular conceptualization of power. Structuration theory defines 
power loosely as the ability to achieve outcomes (Woo, 2000). More specifically Giddens 
(1986) says, ―To be able to ‗act otherwise‘ means being able to intervene in the world, or 
to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific state of affairs‖ 
(p. 14). In other words, the emphasis in structuration theory is on the individual‘s ability 
to engage a range of causal powers in the course of their lived experience. An agent 
therefore ceases to be an agent when they lose the ability to exercise some sort of 
transformative capacity. This closely mirrors Foucault‘s argument that power cannot be 
exercised over a wholly dominated subject. 
Furthermore, structuration theory emphasizes both the contingent nature of social 
systems as well as their relative persistence across space and time. Giddens stresses that a 
core component of structuration theory is the duality of structure in which social systems 
are seen as the product of social actions, not as a framework outside of and constraining 
social action (Woo, 2000). Much as Hardt and Negri (2009) observed that power does not 
 33 
occupy a position external to individual agents, the contingency of the reproduction of 
social systems in structuration theory speaks to the intrinsic nature of power. Again 
Giddens (1986) states: 
We should not conceive of the structures of domination built into social 
institutions as in some way grinding out ‗docile bodies‘ who behave like the 
automata suggested by objectivist social science. Power within social systems 
which enjoy some continuity over time and space presumes regularized relations 
of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in contexts of social 
interaction. But all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who 
are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors. This is what I call 
the dialectic of control in social systems. (16) 
RESISTANCE 
Terms like resistance, biopolitics, and the dialectic of control speak to the conflict 
arising as part of the process of commodifying information. However, not everyone sees 
conflict as an inevitable by-product of commodification. Some researchers question 
whether or not peer-to-peer file-sharing constitutes a full-blown rejection of the system of 
commodity exchange. Instead these researchers argue that peer-to-peer file-sharing exists 
simply because it satisfies desires which existing markets do not meet (Cenite, Wang, 
Peiwen, & Chan, 2009). Looking back on the events surrounding Napster, Clay Shirky 
(2001) argues similarly that the civil disobedience on the part of the Napster community 
should not be equated with a rejection of the pricing system. Instead Shirky argues that 
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the civil disobedience of file-sharers is in some way analogous to civil disobedience 
directed at the imposition of highway speed limits: 
…the civil disobedience against the 55 MPH speed limit did not mean that drivers 
were committed to having no speed limit whatsoever, they simply wanted a 
higher one. So it will be with the music industry. The present civil disobedience is 
against a refusal by the music industry to adapt to Internet economies. But the 
refusal of users to countenance per-unit prices does not mean they will never pay 
for music at all, merely that the economic logic of digital data—its replicability 
and replenishability—must be respected. Once the industry adopts economic 
models that do, whether through advertising or sponsorship or subscription 
pricing, the civil disobedience will largely subside, and we will be on the way to a 
new speed limit. (34-35) 
But the notion that consumers are largely concerned with the economic logic of 
nonrivalrous information commodities is somewhat difficult to believe. It is nonsensical 
to assume that the average consumer decides to engage in peer-to-peer file-sharing on the 
basis of an information producer‘s marginal costs or the nonrival character of an 
immaterial commodity. It is likely, however, that peer-to-peer file-sharers are more 
concerned with their own economic circumstances. That is to say, the proclivity to 
engage in peer-to-peer file-sharing has more to do with wage struggles (as do most acts 
of commodity (re)appropriation) than a concern for adherence to abstract economic 
concepts and principles. It is also counterproductive to set the standard for meaningful 
resistance at a complete overthrow of the system of commodity exchange. Moreover, the 
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assertion that people will likely give up on civil disobedience once a new pricing system 
is adopted by the industry is not evidence of public support for a new pricing rationale 
for digital goods. It could also be evidence of a successful campaign for access to goods 
at lower prices—in other words, an increase in real wages. Wage struggles are, after all, 
the archetypical manifestation of the antagonism embedded in the capitalist social 
relation.  
There are other risks associated with analyses of peer-to-peer file-sharing which 
start from the premise that the practice results from a market imperfection.
12
 This 
approach normalizes the market form and treats the phenomenon of peer-to-peer file-
sharing as an aberration. For example, after analyzing the motivations of peer-to-peer file 
sharers, Cenite et al. (2009) conclude that people use file-sharing platforms to satisfy 
desires which current markets fail to meet. The authors assert that the situation would be 
resolved if the industry would make downloading cheaper and more convenient. The 
problem with such analyses is they don‘t tell us much about the structural dimensions of 
peer-to-peer file-sharing which condition alternative social relations. There is no analysis 
of the structural contradictions between peer-based models and client-server models. Nor 
do these analyses investigate the structural dimensions of the legal conflicts between file 
sharers and the content-producing industries. Courtroom battles are ignored. In saying 
this, I do not mean to devalue the work of inquiring into the motivations of file sharers. It 
is certainly important, necessary, and insightful work. I am simply suggesting that the 
                                                 
12 We can think of market imperfection as a scenario in which an industry‘s pursuit of self-interest results 
in the inefficient allocation of resources. 
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study of the stated motivations of file sharers alone is too narrow to give us a complete 
picture of the class antagonism which fuels this conflict. 
In actual fact, I adopt a complete inversion of the above formulation of missing 
markets. As Hardt and Negri (2009) point out, the ascendancy of immaterial labor within 
the overall economy has been accompanied by the simultaneous development, extension, 
and internalization of the commons. That is to say that capital increasingly relies on 
forms of autonomous cooperative arrangements among workers. Therefore, instead of 
seeing the commons as a missing market we may see intellectual property as a missing 
commons. These missing commons are the inevitable result of capitalist crises in which 
there has been a mad rush to privatize everything including land, water, plants, animals, 
humans, and culture. To accept the bourgeois framing of missing markets is to apprehend 
markets as naturally occurring phenomena. Consequently, the bourgeois frame casts 
resistance as a demand for a better functioning market. If we are in keeping with 
Foucault‘s notion of power though, then our starting point should be freedom prior to the 
exercise of power—at which point markets appear as an exercise of power eliciting 
resistance from free subjects. 
The conflict between capitalists and those who create and maintain the digital 
commons stems from an exercise of power over the commons. The reason for the 
predation of the commons is clear. The existence of any alternative system for the 
distribution of resources is potentially a threat to capitalism. Plainly stated, a commons 
which exists autonomously from capital can potentially prevent capitalists from putting 
people to work. In the face of a viable subsistence economy the capitalist must put that 
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commons to use. He can do this in a two ways. He can enclose the commons and subject 
it to the law of private property, bringing it properly within the sphere of production. Or 
he can put the commons to use indirectly, either by gleaning the products of autonomous 
cooperation found there or by using the subsistence economy as a means to lower wages 
via a reduction in the costs of reproducing labor power.  
 With regard to the Internet it is useful to start not from the premise of missing 
markets but from the premise of a missing commons. Scholars (Minar & Hedlund, 2001; 
Barbrook, 2000) have demonstrated that the Internet was originally designed principally 
as a peer-to-peer system. Only with the emergence of the World Wide Web in the 1990s 
and the widespread adoption of the client-server model did markets become feasible on 
the Internet. The transition from a system in which computers connected to the network 
as peers to a system in which millions of client computers connect to a relatively small 
number of servers is symptomatic of an enclosure movement. As Barbrook (2003) states: 
Sharing information is exactly what the net was invented for. Scientists needed 
unhindered access to each other‘s research. Hackers enjoyed writing code 
together. Activists wanted to promote their causes. These pioneers hardwired their 
own social mores into the technical protocols of the net. Unlike media 
corporations, they did not make their living from buying and selling information. 
On the contrary, they were already living within real-life gift economies. (93) 
 This conceptualization of the Internet in general and peer-to-peer systems in 
particular allows us to understand the activity of file-sharing as an act of resistance to the 
enclosure of informational and cultural artifacts. While the act of mounting a legal 
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defense against the RIAA represents a highly visible act of resistance against the exercise 
of power, it is nevertheless important to recognize acts of resistance occurring in less 
visible ways across peer-to-peer networks. In many ways these activities are of even 
more significance than the legal battles themselves. If anything the dogged persistence of 
the digital commons in the face of technological and legal encroachment is testament to 
the limitations of construing technology and law as the sole determinants of human 
agency. As Johns (2009) comments in his examination of copyright piracy over the 
centuries: 
The relation of piracy to doctrines of intellectual property, in particular, must 
clearly be a close one; but piracy cannot be adequately described, let alone 
explained, as a mere byproduct of such doctrines. It is empirically true that the 
law of what we now call intellectual property has often lagged behind piratical 
practices, and indeed that virtually all its central principles, such as copyright, 
were developed in response to piracy. To assume that piracy merely derives from 
legal doctrine is to get the history—and therefore the politics, and much else 
besides—back to front. (6) 
 If intellectual property law is conceptualized as a response to the autonomy 
offered by the digital commons, then the nature of the conflict is not fully captured by 
characterizing it as a consequence of ill-fitting business models or overzealous laws. The 
rise of immaterial labor has allowed for the emergence of phenomena more constructive 
and creative than can be accurately conveyed by the term resistance (Hardt & Negri, 
2009). The creative acts of freedom occurring as part of the digital commons are prior to 
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enclosure, prior to the exercise of power. Much of the conflict over intellectual property 
law is fundamentally a struggle over the control of meaning as people engage in new 
forms of participatory culture while simultaneously challenging the hegemonic control of 
the old industrial economy. Yet whereas the creative and participatory aspects of amateur 
production and distribution of cultural artifacts are readily identifiable and celebrated 
(Jenkins, 2006), the same is rarely said of peer-to-peer file-sharing. Nevertheless peer-to-
peer file-sharing is fundamentally a creative social practice. Barbrook (2000) argues that 
participants in peer-to-peer networks are engaging in cyber-communism whether they 
realize it or not. The argument Barbrook is advancing is that these file-sharers prefer their 
method of giving and receiving information in place of capitalist systems of commodity 
exchange and hierarchical social organization. With this realization in mind we can begin 
to understand peer-to-peer file-sharing in a way which underscores the notion of the 
missing commons. From this viewpoint the typical file-sharer is no longer a pirate. She is 
a steward of cultural artifacts, a producer of meaning, and a maker of community. These 
people are engaged in sharing—a distinctly un-pirate like behavior. It is the capitalist 
who is the pirate, attempting to misappropriate the commons and turn it into a 
commodity. It is the capitalist who steals in order to sell.  
 We may consider peer-to-peer file-sharing partly as a resistance to commodity 
exchange. Again, it is more likely that this resistance derives from the concrete 
conditions of the daily life of the file sharer rather than from some abiding respect for 
abstract economic theory. It may be part of the wage struggle in the same way that theft is 
sometimes used to increase real wages. Yet peer-to-peer file-sharing is not merely theft. 
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There may be no clear link between the economic circumstances of the individual file-
sharer and their decision to engage in file-sharing. It is something more than a purely 
defensive tactic. There is a productive and creative component to file-sharing not 
captured by terms like theft or piracy or even commonplace usage of the term resistance. 
However, Hardt and Negri‘s (2009) discussion of biopolitics deepens the 
conceptualization of resistance to include forms of exodus. They define exodus as ―a 
process of subtraction from the relationship with capital by means of actualizing the 
potential autonomy of labor-power‖ (p. 152). In other words exodus is not a refusal of 
productive activity—it is a refusal of the restrictive way in which capitalists try to 
organize productive activities to produce surplus value. ―It is an expression of the 
productive capacities that exceed the relationship with capital achieved by stepping 
through the opening in the social relation of capital and across the threshold‖ (p. 152).  
 Immaterial labor invests workers with the immediate capacity to subvert the 
processes of capitalist accumulation through exodus. As Hardt and Negri argue, workers 
are equipped with the capacity for resistance by the class relation itself. Workers can 
simply say ―no more‖. The ease with which people can engage in exodus is greater with 
regard to the circulation of cultural or informational commodities than it is for something 
like food or basic services. This is because the costs of establishing a viable commons in 
the networked environment can be lower than the establishment of viable commons in the 
production of say food or housing. This also means that exodus is a viable alternative 
only to the extent that the digital commons is protected from enclosure. This is why some 
capitalists are predisposed to extinguish the commons. It is not about theft; theft loses its 
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essence in the context of nonrival information goods. It is about eliminating an alternative 
system for the management of resources in order to maintain a system of rent premised 
on total control of the means of information production. 
 Although the current project investigates resistance by looking at the social 
practice of peer-to-peer file-sharing, the legal conflicts over copyright stemming from 
this practice also have considerable explanatory power for the trajectory of capitalist 
development. Just as the exodus occurring as part of peer-to-peer file-sharing threatens to 
undermine the processes of capitalist accumulation, a significant legal victory on the part 
of any one of these legal defendants has the potential to disrupt the enclosure movement. 
Therefore, the inquiry must include an analysis of the structural dimensions of both the 
social practice of peer-to-peer file-sharing as well as the conflict occurring within the 
arena of law. 
 Scholars both within the social movement tradition and those critiquing collective 
behavior theory have recognized the potential for an external threat (such as the existence 
of a viable commons or the instigation of a litigation campaign targeting individuals) to 
act as a catalyst for collective action (Staggenborg, 2010; Olson, 1971). In fact, threats as 
much as opportunities, may inspire feelings of collective outrage and urgency.  The 
capitalist class may act collectively out of a shared fear of the commons. File-sharers may 
act collectively out of a shared outrage at file-sharing litigation. Hardt and Negri (2009) 
characterize these feelings of outrage, or indignation, as the raw material of rebellion and 
revolt. Through indignation, people become aware of their own capacity to act against 
oppression. These authors state: 
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The force and resistance that arise from indignation against the abuses and 
dictates of power, however, can appear immediate or spontaneous and thus naïve 
(though not for that reason any less powerful). Indignation is born always as a 
singular phenomenon, in response to a specific obstacle or violation. (236) 
It is not difficult to see how a litigation campaign targeting 30,000 to 40,000 individuals 
for alleged copyright infringement might inspire collective outrage. Outrage shared in 
common becomes the raw material for collective resistance which serves as the basis for 
a collective response to mobilize resources in defense of both the commons and 
individual community members. 
 Resistance of file-sharers in the peer-to-peer network environment and in the 
courtroom may appear radically different. It may appear that the exodus of file-sharers to 
peer-to-peer systems is almost passive when compared to sometimes outspoken 
defendants who have engaged in high profile court cases with eccentric and charismatic 
litigants on either side. It would be a mistake however to characterize exodus in this 
manner. Although peer-to-peer file-sharing occurs largely out of sight from the public 
eye, the withdrawal from commodity exchange is as potent a threat to industry as any. As 
Scott (2002) reminds us, desertion and evasion are highly effective tactics. Scott uses the 
example of the Confederate army, undone in large part by an exodus of poor whites from 
conscription—―a coalition with no name, no organization, no leadership, and certainly no 
Leninist conspiracy behind it‖ (p. 91). 
 Another useful way of theorizing resistance is offered by the writers of the 
Midnight Notes Collective. These authors (2009) argue for a distinction between those 
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forms of resistance which are ―inside‖ and those which are ―outside‖. Although the 
distinction is oftentimes difficult to discern, we can define inside resistance as those 
actions which make demands on those state and private institutions that are normally 
charged with reproducing the labor-capital relation. Outside resistance refers then to the 
communal appropriation of de/non-commodified resources. The authors state: 
The inside struggles are waged primarily within existing institutions and arenas, 
such as the state, corporations, the legal system, traditional civil society, or 
traditional cultural constructs, the goals of which are generally to increase 
working class income, commodity wealth, and power within the system, without 
directly challenging the capitalist organization of society or creating collective 
alternatives to the capitalist system…. By contrast, ―outside,‖ autonomous 
struggles strive to create social spaces and relations that are as independent of and 
opposed to capitalist social relations as possible. They may directly confront or 
seek to take over and reorganize capitalist institutions (a factory, for example) or 
create new spaces outside those institutions (e.g., urban gardening or a housing 
cooperative) or access resources that should be common. They foster collective, 
non-commodified relations, processes, and products that function to some real 
degree outside of capitalist relations and give power to the working class in its 
efforts to create alternatives to capital. (13) 
In the context of the current research then, exodus and peer-to-peer file-sharing may be 
distinguished as outside resistance and the demands being funneled through the legal 
arena may be considered inside resistance. Both forms of resistance may be either 
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complementary or contradictory. The relation between the two forms of resistance is an 
important object of investigation. The degree to which each form of resistance finds 
complementary goals or representation in the other will undoubtedly affect the long term 
prospects for successful struggle. This congruence between inside and outside is 
especially relevant in cases where the peer-to-peer community becomes involved in 
assisting with individual legal defenses as research has shown that the economies of 
online interaction can be leveraged to facilitate the production of physical goods 
(Kollock, 1999). 
THE WORKING CLASS 
Thus far I have not directly addressed the character of the subjectivities which are 
the target of the current investigation into peer-to-peer file-sharing. Because this research 
project is informed by Marxian theory it might properly be asked if the conflict over 
peer-to-peer file-sharing constitutes a form of working class struggle. Political economy 
readings of Marx tend to employ narrow conceptualizations of working class identity. 
The working class most often appears as white male factory workers. As Cleaver (2000) 
notes, ―We can thus see that one great weakness of reading Marx as political economy 
has been to isolate and reduce his analysis to that of the factory‖ (p.44). Nor does 
structuration theory offer any additional insight on this point. For Giddens (1986) the 
working class (at least insofar as the labor movement is concerned) simply constitutes 
one among a number of social movements. On the other hand, the Autonomist Marxist 
tradition has further developed the concept of working class subjectivity in a way which 
allows us to deepen our understanding of class struggle. 
 45 
Generally speaking, the term class has been used by scholars as a means of 
understanding both economic and cultural divisions. As Hartley (2002) states, ―…class 
articulates social to economic positions‖ (p. 28). That is to say that people are divvied up 
based on given sets of economic criteria, and then their class position is used to explain a 
host of phenomena which are not strictly economic in nature. Traditionally, Marxists 
have defined class along the lines of the capitalist mode of production. In early Marxist 
configurations the notion of a working class came to refer almost exclusively to the white 
male factory proletariat. This narrow conceptualization of working class subjectivity 
found its theoretical limits in the 1960s with the emergence of diverse struggles by 
African Americans, students, radical feminists, and welfare rights activists (Cleaver, 
2000). All of these groups were largely invisible to a Marxist tradition which saw the 
working class only as waged workers. 
In the absence of serious treatment by Marxists, new social movement theory 
emerged to explain the nature of new subjectivities engaged in struggle in postindustrial 
society. New social movement theorists argued that these groups differed substantially 
from the old labor movement of the industrial age (Staggenborg, 2010). Alternately, the 
Autonomist Marxist tradition emerged to some degree as a response to both the 
emergence of new subjectivities and new social movement theory. Autonomist Marxists 
incorporated these new forms of subjectivity into their theory of class struggle by 
dispensing with narrow formulations of working class identity. Sexism, racism, and 
nationalism were understood as particular forms of social division which almost always 
found expression in the capitalist wage hierarchy. 
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 However, the Autonomist Marxist tradition did not begin with such a generous 
formulation of the working class. The influential Italian Marxist Mario Tronti, for 
example, confined his theory of the working class to waged employees (Wright, 2002). 
Yet, with the emergence of new social movements and various critiques of workerism
13
 
came a new understanding of people and their roles in both the spheres of production and 
reproduction. Antonio Negri captured some of the concerns expressed by social 
movement theorists in his work on working class subjectivity. Negri (2005) observed 
changes in class composition which he thought were calling forth a new form of working 
class subjectivity. He argued that the hegemony of the mass worker of the Fordist factory 
was giving way to the socialized worker. This new proletariat was disseminated 
throughout society and functioned as a basis for capitalist accumulation as much by their 
productive activity in the domestic sphere as in the traditional factory. Negri saw 
increasing levels of exploitation by capitalists of the mental labor and cooperative social 
arrangements of the socialized worker, but he also saw increasing potential for crises and 
rupture of the capitalist system. 
Hardt and Negri (2004) further developed this broad notion of working class 
subjectivity into a concept they refer to as the multitude. The authors conceive of the 
multitude as ―all those who work under the rule of capital and thus potentially as the class 
of those who refuse the rule of capital‖ (p. 106). This conceptualization of working class 
subjectivity is distinct from previous incarnations in that it is not premised on exclusions. 
It is more akin to the anti-globalism slogan, ―one no, many yeses‖. Not surprisingly it has 
                                                 
13 This is usually a negative term describing Orthodox Marxists‘ preoccupation with industrial workers to 
the exclusion of all other social groups. See Wright (2002). 
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been roundly criticized for being an excessively vague and politically impotent concept. 
Yet diversity should not be mistaken for a lack of politics. An inclusive understanding of 
the working class as those who stand against capital allows us to expand the reach of the 
inquiry to encompass the activities of innumerable people who confront capital in a 
variety of settings and to analyze these confrontations as possible instances of resistance. 
In this sense resistance could just as easily appear as a shared file on a peer-to-peer 
network as a wrench in the works. 
 The multitude refers to people inserted into the social relations of capitalist 
production regardless of race, gender, or any other basis of identity. The concept requires 
us to not get hung up on identity to the extent that it obscures what is common across a 
great variety of class struggles. It is capitalism which seeks to exploit difference in the 
service of the division of labor. The generalization of difference into a single social 
relation premised on alienation from the means of production is the instrument with 
which capital places the productive capacity of human creativity at its own disposal. 
Giddens (2008) elaborates: 
Bourgeois society makes for a far broader realisation of human productive 
capacities than was feasible in previous periods of history. But this is only 
rendered possible by the formation of an increasingly numerous class of 
propertyless wage-labourers: bourgeois society universalises class relationships 
around a single class division, between bourgeoisie and proletariat. (45) 
  This is a fundamental point of departure from many critical studies approaches to 
identity and one which requires explicit explanation here. From the Marxian perspective, 
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the working class is an identity which seeks to destroy itself. Hardt and Negri (2009) 
explain: 
This communist proposition is not as paradoxical as it first appears, since 
revolutionary workers aim to destroy not themselves but the identity that defines 
them as workers. The primary object of class struggle, in other words, is not to 
kill capitalists but to demolish the social structures and institutions that maintain 
their privilege and authority, abolishing too, thereby, the conditions of proletarian 
subordination. (332) 
By eliminating, transcending, or modifying the structures which facilitate the degradation 
of the multitude into a working class, those subjectivities engaged in class struggle 
produce new social and institutional arrangements which exceed the constraints of 
capitalism. 
 None of this however is to argue for the political superiority of economic class 
struggle as compared to struggles based on gender, race, etc. The point is to avoid 
becoming so invested with a particular identity that it becomes an impediment to 
liberation from the capitalist social hierarchy. To be sure, Marxists are as guilty as 
anyone of excessive engagement with the politics of identity. At various points in history 
Marxists have glorified images of the working class and celebrated workers to the 
exclusion of other groups. The theoretical transformation from the mass worker to the 
socialized worker to the multitude represents an attempt to recognize the role these 
various struggles play as part of the class struggle against the social divisions which are 
constantly mined by capital. The critique that the multitude is a politically useless 
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concept since it lacks a basis in rigid notions of identity simply falls flat. The increased 
reliance on immaterial labor in the post-Fordist period produces a new subjectivity which 
is radically open and plural. Yet capitalists are also pushed to exploit this new 
subjectivity and its autonomous forms of cooperation. Therefore, the multitude is a 
subjectivity borne a political creature. 
 The diversity of subjectivities implied by the multitude who are engaged in class 
struggle requires us to investigate each instance of struggle. With respect to intellectual 
property law, Johns (2009) has argued that copyright piracy is something that can only be 
defined through historical specificity. Johns also cautions against relying exclusively on 
juridical documents. As he puts it, to do so would be to get the history and the politics 
―back to front‖ (p. 6). Similarly, the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism asserts 
that the productive forces of society serve as the basis for the development of legal 
institutions. That is to say that the real subject of intellectual property law is not 
information commodities, but the social relations produced by the creation of the legal 
subject as a possessor of things. Therefore we can achieve a better understanding of the 
nature of the conflict over intellectual property law through an analysis of particular 
subjectivities engaged in particular historical struggles. 
 Unfortunately the subjectivities inhabiting peer-to-peer networks are elusive. The 
boundaries of a community of file-sharers would be difficult to map. The expansion of 
the terrain of struggle beyond the factory walls makes it impossible to identify class 
struggle with the waged working class as was done before. Moreover, the participants to 
struggle in the post-Fordist era don‘t always imagine themselves as engaging in class 
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struggle despite being firmly ensnared in capitalist social relations (Kelley, 1996). Even 
the external threat of RIAA litigation and the collective outrage it inspires may not result 
in an easily identifiable social subject united in struggle. And even if a social movement 
were to materialize, there is normally a period of latency during which the new collective 
identity is forged (Staggenborg, 2010). In truth, the relatively porous and fluid boundaries 
implied by immaterial labor in general and peer-to-peer networks in particular mitigate 
against the reification of any such identity. Instead, a general refusal and diffuse anger at 
the social factory serve alongside autonomous arrangements of cooperation as the 
common resource around which this multiplicity of singularities coordinates their 
struggles.  
THE STATE 
Generally speaking, the Marxist tradition has viewed the rise of the modern state 
as coinciding with the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the vestiges of feudal society. 
In his early writings Marx (1978b) saw the state as a product of the development of the 
productive forces at a given historical moment: 
The production of ideas, of conception, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear 
at this stage as the direct efflux of their mental behaviour. The same applies to 
mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, mortality, 
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. (154) 
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In other words, the bourgeois state emerges from the material circumstances of a 
particular stage in the development of the productive forces. As much as the modern state 
was born out of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudalism, its form was shaped by 
the demands of the new economy. Of course the notion of material or economic 
conditioning of ideas finds its most deterministic expression in the base-superstructure 
model. Marx discussed the link between the state and the material conditions of 
production in his polemical Communist Manifesto (1978c) where he states:  
…the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of 
the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, 
exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. (475) 
From the above quotation we see that the state appears as little more than a tool of 
the dominant class interests. Marx was especially critical of governments like the United 
States (France and Great Britain also) where the dominant ideology saw the highest goal 
of the state as the protection of private property. In the bourgeois state freedom was 
grounded in ownership of private property. The legal subject is defined as a possessive 
individual in relation to other possessive individuals. This legal formalism further bound 
the individual to another set of informal laws by naturalizing the capitalist structuring of 
society through social divisions. Hardt and Negri (2009) state: 
The relationship between capital and law defines a paradoxical power structure 
that is at once extraordinarily abstract and entirely concrete. On the one hand, 
legal structures are abstract representations of social reality, relatively indifferent 
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to social contents, and on the other, capitalist property defines the concrete 
conditions of the exploitation of labor. Both are totalizing social frameworks, 
extending across the entire social space, working in coordination and holding 
together, so to speak, the abstract and concrete planes. (22) 
 If, however, we are to take seriously Foucault‘s assertion that power is only 
exercised over free subjects, we must not leave the analysis of law and the state here. We 
may deepen our understanding of law by recognizing it as a product of the class relation, 
contingent on discourse and social practice for its continued reproduction. The work of 
Bernard Edelman (1979) provides such a basis for a Marxian theory of law which might 
transcend the more vulgar forms of economic determinism. Edelman believed that law is 
a form of the presentation of the subject. In other words, law constitutes the very subject 
to which it is referring. A right exists only because the law acknowledges it. The law 
actively creates the bourgeois subject; it is not a passive recognition of an already pre-
existing subjectivity. In bourgeois society the creation and conferral of rights by law is a 
fundamental component of the organization of society under the capitalist mode of 
production. In conceptualizing the legal subject as the possessive individual, the law sets 
commodity circulation in motion. The individual is now capable of self-alienation; she is 
able to bring her own labor power to the market and put it up for sale. The notion of 
possessive individualism which undergirds the system of private property makes the 
capitalist mode of production possible. More importantly, it functions simultaneously to 
diminish the legal recognition of alternative (non-market) systems of value.
14
 
                                                 
14 This is similar to Boyle‘s (1996) argument that the author paradigm diminishes the public‘s appreciation 
of the commons. 
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The significance of Edelman‘s analysis for the current study is his emphasis on 
the active and contingent production of a legal subject capable of self-alienation. This 
theory of the recursive nature of the production of the bourgeois legal subject also has 
much in common with structuration theory. Giddens (1986) conceives of the modern 
state as encompassing the reflexive monitoring of its own institutions. Accordingly, 
structuration theory approaches law as a set of rules which are the enduring features of 
social relations which have some sense of permanence across space and time. These rules 
are recursively produced by the social activities of knowledgeable actors. Moreover, it 
should not be assumed that these abstract rules (i.e. codified law), ―are the most 
influential in the structuring of social activities‖ (p. 22). Therefore, the researcher should 
investigate not only the ways in which law—conceived  of as social practice—is 
recursively ordered through not only social activities occurring within official legal 
forums (institutional discourse) but outside those forums (non-institutional discourse) as 
well. This has led other scholars applying structuration theory to the analysis of law to 
expand their field of inquiry. For example, Woo (2000) expanded her investigation of 
copyright cases involving computer programs to include phenomena occurring beyond 
the confines of the courtroom.
15
 
The contingent reproduction of the bourgeois legal subject is a result of the law 
itself being a product of the class relation. This means that the structures implicated in 
this recursive process are objects of contention. That is to say these structures, 
conceptualized as rules and resources, are employed by parties with competing interests. 
                                                 
15 Woo (2000) investigated social variables including the background of the defendants, the political 
appointment of the presiding judge, the size of litigating firms, available financial resources, etc. 
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In this sense we can then conceptualize the state, and law in particular, as another terrain 
of struggle. Negri (2005) has argued that there is no relative autonomy of the state in the 
period of real subsumption
16
 and that the state embodies the strength of the collective 
capitalist class. While it is true that capital enjoys a hegemonic position within the state, 
it would be misleading to assert that the state is the exclusive purview of the bourgeoisie. 
It should not be assumed that crisis is extinguished within the state. Here it is worth 
quoting Hardt and Negri (2009) at length: 
Governance, of course, serves to maintain the ruling powers and support the 
interests of capital, but it never succeeds in solving the crisis and bringing it to an 
end. In fact processes of negotiation and struggle are constantly reopened on the 
terrain of governance. In some respects, then, governance is analogous to the old 
terrain of trade union struggles, and indeed, some authors propose confronting the 
current forms of governance with the models of negotiation and agreement of 
labor law. When the old labor leaders used to say, ―There is no end to 
negotiations,‖ they never questioned the ultimate hegemony of capital but still 
appreciated the importance of the struggle. We should not underestimate the fact 
that governance is an open space of conflict and struggle between (sovereign) 
powers and (social) counterpowers. (348) 
Therefore with regard to the concept of the state, the current study adopts a 
position not unlike Bettig‘s (1996) class struggle theory of the state in which the state is 
                                                 
16 Real subsumption refers to a development of the labor process predicated on relative, as opposed to 
absolute, surplus value. With the real subsumption of labour under capital, this development takes place in 
the technological process—raising the productivity of the labor process rather than lengthening the working 
day. 
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conceptualized as an arena for intra-firm and interclass struggle. This is done to avoid the 
more structuralist approach to the state and law which is characteristic of the political 
economy tradition. In her discussion of structuralist approaches to law Woo (2000) states 
that, ―Structuralism focuses on the structural constraints of the system and tries to explain 
why the structures reinforce class domination and inequalities‖ (p. 18). This way of 
conceptualizing the state is characteristic of many Marxist analyses which view the state 
as the warden of irreconcilable class antagonisms wherein the state emerges as an 
instrument of capitalist coercion to contain crises. While I don‘t dispute the hegemony of 
capital within the state, I do maintain that law is also to some degree a resource for 
counter-hegemonic struggle. 
TECHNOLOGY 
The commonplace definition of technology is often simply the application of 
scientific knowledge to some productive end. However, the Marxian approach to 
technology entails investigating why particular labor processes take on particular 
technological forms. This in turn means giving consideration to both the productive 
forces and the social relations of production. Here productive force refers to the union of 
the means of production
17
 with labor which conditions social, political, and intellectual 
life processes. The social relations of production refer to that social organization which is 
consistent with a particular mode of production. Consequently, this approach requires a 
detailed examination of the ways in which particular technologies are employed. Harvey 
(2006) states: 
                                                 
17 The tools and raw materials used in the process of production. 
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When Marx speaks of ‗technology‘ he means the concrete form taken by an actual 
labour process in a given instance, the observable way in which particular use 
values are produced. This technology can be described directly in terms of the 
tools and machines used, the physical design of production processes, the 
technical division of labour, the actual deployment of labour powers (both 
quantities and qualities), the levels of co-operation, the chains of command and 
hierarchies of authority and the particular methods of co-ordination and control 
used. (99) 
The implication is that through the conditioning of material being capital 
conditions social being. As Marx (1978c) notes, ―The bourgeoisie cannot exist without 
constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of 
production, and with them the whole relations of society‖ (p. 476). This is the historical 
materialist view of technology—one in which technology plays a fundamental role in the 
production and reproduction of real life which in turn has significant implications for the 
way in which society is ordered. Writing in the nineteenth century, Marx‘s primary 
emphasis was on the ways in which capitalists employed technology in large-scale 
industry to disempower workers both by deepening the division of labor and by 
alienating workers from the instruments of labor. It is worth quoting Marx (1990) at 
length on this point before proceeding: 
Modern industry never views or treats the existing form of a production process 
as the definitive one. Its technical basis is therefore revolutionary, whereas all 
earlier modes of production were essentially conservative. By means of 
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machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is continually transforming 
not only the technical basis of production but also the functions of the worker and 
the social combinations of the labour process. At the same time, it thereby also 
revolutionizes the division of labour within society, and incessantly throws 
masses of capital and of workers from one branch of production to another. Thus 
large-scale industry, by its very nature, necessitates variation of labour, fluidity of 
functions, and mobility of the workers in all directions. But on the other hand, in 
its capitalist form it reproduces the old division of labour with its ossified 
particularities. We have seen how this absolute contradiction does away with all 
repose, all fixity and all security as far as the worker‘s life-situation is concerned; 
how it constantly threatens, by taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch 
from his hands the means of subsistence, and, by suppressing his specialized 
function, to make him superfluous. (617-618) 
In part because of Marx‘s emphasis on the deployment of technology as an 
instrument of domination by capital, a great deal of critical scholarship has construed 
technological artifacts in a deterministic manner. That is to say technology is regularly 
seen as an objective and external force with deterministic impacts on social structures. 
Marxists and political economists have thoroughly examined the role of technology in the 
processes of class decomposition (Postman, 1993; Noble, 1977). The problem with this 
view is that it mischaracterizes technology as settled artifacts embedded with structures 
which are available to only one side of the class relation. Orlikowski (1992) states: 
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The limitation here is the selectivity with which the notion of human agency is 
applied, where only managers or technology designers have the authority and 
means to shape the technology. Human agents such as workers using the 
technology are portrayed as relatively powerless, and their actions and cognitions 
as determined by the technology. (402) 
Other scholars have challenged deterministic conceptualizations of technology. 
Scholars in the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) school, for example, have 
theorized technology as the product of social interactions rather than as the determinant 
of social interactions (Bjiker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987). With this approach comes an 
emphasis not so much on the structures embedded in technological artifacts but rather on 
the social structures which are responsible for the continual (re)design and modification 
of technology. According to these scholars, technology is interpretively flexible. 
Therefore SCOT seeks to discover the meanings ascribed to various technologies by 
different social systems. However, with most of the emphasis on the initial moments of 
technological development and on the dimension of signification, this tradition cannot 
sufficiently explain the role of technology with respect to the exercise of power in 
capitalist society. 
 Consequently, I draw an analytical distinction between the technological artifacts 
themselves and their actual use. In one sense technology demonstrates a degree of 
persistence across time and space. It is socially conditioned, but transcends the 
experience of any given individual or any particular moment in time. In other words, 
technology has a certain materiality which makes it identifiable. In another sense though, 
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technology can be experienced differently either by diverse individuals or by the same 
individual at different points in time. The overall set of social structures available to 
people in different locations or different times can affect which particular structures are 
selected for use by individuals engaged with technology (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). In 
other words technology has a social dimension in addition to its materiality. Orlikowski 
(2000; 2007) has referred to this duality variously as technology-in-practice or 
sociomateriality. From this perspective, technology is seen as a fluid sociomaterial 
arrangement where everyday activities are inseparably tied to materiality. Orlikowski 
(1992) comments on this analytical distinction: 
In defining my concept of technology, I restrict its scope to material artifacts 
(various configurations of hardware and software). I wish to sustain a 
distinction—at least theoretically—between the material nature of technology and 
the human activities that design or use those artifacts….the analytic decoupling of 
artifacts from human action allows me to conceptualize material artifacts as the 
outcome of coordinated human action and hence as inherently social. It also 
facilitates my framing of the role of technology in terms of a mutual interaction 
between human agents and technology, and hence as both structural and socially 
constructed. (403) 
Although Giddens never applied structuration to the study of technology, Orlikowski‘s 
approach nevertheless has parallels to structuration theory. Technology is the product of 
human agency both in terms of its original design and subsequent usage. It is in a 
recursive relationship with human agents as it is continually physically and socially 
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developed through human interactions. As a consequence of these interactions social 
practices are conditioned by technological usage. Importantly, technology is not a 
determinant of human agency as human agency exists prior to and is required for the use 
of technology. And given that our concept of a particular technology tends to become 
reified and its connection to human agents obscured by fetishism, the emphasis here is on 
usage rather than on the artifacts themselves. 
Orlikowski (1992) has suggested that human interaction with technology should 
be analyzed along two dimensions: design and usage. DeSanctis and Poole (1994) 
describe the normative dimension of a technology‘s design as the spirit of the technology. 
The authors state that ―Spirit is the general intent with regard to value and goals 
underlying a given set of structural features‖ (p. 126). It informs people of the proper way 
to interact with a technology. However, the authors caution that the intent of the 
designers can never be fully realized in the spirit—it can only be reflected. DeSanctis and 
Poole stress that it is essential that researchers attempt to ascertain the structural features 
and spirit of a technology before attempting to analyze its usage or appropriation. 
Normative influence is not restricted to the design of a technology however. 
Through repeated interaction with a technology certain meanings and behaviors become 
reified among groups of users. There are different phases occurring as part of the 
adoption and appropriation of a technology. During these phases the meanings ascribed 
by group members are influenced by previous adopters (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). Users 
draw upon interpretive schemes to communicate meaning while interacting with 
technology. These structures of signification inform and condition the interaction with 
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technology (Orlikowski, 1992). In this way the unreflective use of technology by 
members of a group may perpetuate group norms and function as a structure of 
domination. 
Inasmuch as the use of a particular technology may be subject to normative 
influences it is important to consider the ways in which a technology may be used to 
subvert those influences. Structuration theory is dialectical in nature and therefore 
construes the recursive ordering of social practices as a contradictory process. The 
recursive ordering of technology may include acts of sabotage, avoidance of use, and the 
development of informal practices which are unfaithful to the intent of the designers 
(Orlikowski, 1992). Users actively choose which structures to enact through their 
interaction with technology. They may circumvent inscribed ways of using a particular 
technology or invent new ways of using a technology which may or may not be faithful 
to the original intent of the designers (Orlikowski, 2000). In other words, these acts of 
subversion are not merely cases of the destruction or negation of a technology. As Negri 
(2005) says, ―Sabotage is innovation‖ (p. 79). These social practices often entail the 
development of patterns of technological use which create new cooperative 
arrangements. Furthermore, these new cooperative arrangements may not be the preferred 
designs of capitalists.  
Any Marxian analysis of technology is decidedly political in nature. The analysis 
of a given technology must consider for whom a technology was developed, how it was 
intended to be used, who has access to the technology, and how it is actually used in 
everyday practice. What's more, the sociomateriality of any given technology is situated 
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within overlapping social systems (Orlikowski, 2000). Each social system may be 
characterized by an asymmetry of resources. This asymmetry is likely to change as 
continual interaction with a technology produces new structures for agents to draw upon 
(DeSanctis, 1994). In this way recurring interaction with a technology may either 
reaffirm the subordination of agents or undermine it. Furthermore, social systems may 
stand in contradistinction to one another. Particular patterns of technological use by one 
social system may undermine the emergence or maintenance of an alternative social 
system. This is what Marxists have in mind when they refer to the domination of dead 
labor over living labor. The continued technological revolution of bourgeois society 
continually disempowers workers by deepening the division of labor and by alienating 
workers from the instruments of production. Yet we have also seen that workers may 
activate technological structures to subvert the bourgeois technological revolution. 
Cleaver sees this dual character of the dynamic between dead and living labor 
occurring as part of the social factory. Accordingly Cleaver (1981) asserts that 
technology be seen as the: 
…organization of ‗social‘ production because in contemporary capitalist society 
technology has been mobilized for social control not only in the factory but in the 
organization of the larger social sphere where life is shaped as labor power 
through housework, school work, church work, and recreational work. (¶ 5) 
Cleaver makes two statements regarding the political dynamics occurring as part of the 
organization of social production. First, both capitalists and the working class wield 
technology as a weapon in the organization of production and consumption. And second, 
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technological development occurs within and is shaped by the larger political struggle. 
This means that technology insomuch as it is implicated in the organization of social 
relations is itself a product of class struggle. The resultant crisis of technology is 
sociomaterial in nature. As technology raises productivity levels
18
 there is both an 
increase in production and a reduction in work. The crisis of technology is one in which 
capital needs to continue to put people to work (socio) but is undermined by its own 
growing productive capacity (material) while at the same time people begin to demand 
that capital deliver on the technological promise of more for less work. People are 
increasingly seeking to control the surplus of social wealth while capitalists scramble to 
create new systems of control in order to maintain the imposition of work. This crisis 
manifests both in the sphere of production (as capital seeks out new avenues for 
investment in production) and in the sphere of reproduction (as capital seeks to arrange 
leisure activities around the consumption of commodities). 
 This same dynamic of class struggle is occurring as part of the conflict over peer-
to-peer file-sharing. Copyright law functions in part to stabilize capitalist hegemony in 
the sphere of production. Ever-expanding copyright protections are principally an attempt 
to ensure the continual flow of rent to capitalists. This entails both the protection of 
property from competing producers and the maintenance of the social division between 
consumers and producers. Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies are an 
additional means whereby firms may ensure that leisure activity is defined by the 
consumption of digital commodities. In practice intellectual property law works in 
                                                 
18 Rising output per hour of labor. 
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conjunction with DRM to maintain control over both spheres. In either case, the existence 
of alternative forms of cooperative production and distribution must be extinguished.  
 We have also seen that the ascendency of immaterial labor has separated labor 
power from the immediate control of capital. This is why the expansion of the processes 
of production from their original location in the factory into the sphere of reproduction is 
marked by an increase in the potential for crisis. It is not that all of society has fallen 
under the dominion of capital—quite the contrary. Class struggle in the networked 
information economy constitutes a struggle over the arrangements of cooperative social 
practices and the resources produced therein. As Marx demonstrated, technological 
development revolutionizes social relations. And technologies like the Internet and peer-
to-peer systems can have a radical impact on social relations. As much as technology can 
contribute to the domination of subordinated classes, it can also provide a path for 
subversion. With respect to the current study these systems have provided a path for the 
decommodification of information. 
PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS 
 Peer-to-peer systems are implicated in the restructuring of social relations. 
Accordingly, our definition of peer-to-peer technology must take into account its 
sociomateriality. Shirky (2001) defines peer-to-peer as a class of applications that take 
advantage of resources at the margins of the Internet. These resources included storage 
capacity, cycles, content, and people. Given that these resources are connected to the 
Internet in a somewhat unstable, inconsistent, and unpredictable manner, peer-to-peer 
technology must (according to this definition) function outside of the Domain Name 
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System (DNS). Therefore, these systems are fundamentally different from the centralized 
client-server model. Shirky offers the following simple litmus test for defining peer-to-
peer technologies: ―(1) Does it allow for variable connectivity and temporary network 
addressing?; (2) Does it give the nodes at the edges of the network significant 
autonomy?‖ (p. 23). According to Shirky, if one can answer yes to both of these 
questions then the technology is peer-to-peer. 
 Alternately, Oram (2001) defines peer-to-peer technology with an eye to the 
history of communication technology. Peer-to-peer technology is an older form of 
communication architecture which includes everything from IP routing to Usenet to early 
telephone systems. Initially, the Internet was chiefly a peer-to-peer system. All of the 
computers connected to the network functioned as both servers and clients. As Minar and 
Hedlund (2001) have shown, the widespread adoption of the client-server model with the 
rise of the World Wide Web represents a fundamental break with the spirit of Internet 
technology. After all, the original goal of ARPANET was to share computing resources 
across the United States ―not in a master/slave or client/server relationship, but rather as 
equal computing peers‖ (p. 4). Peer-to-peer technology therefore functions much as the 
Internet was originally designed and before it was so thoroughly commercialized. 
 Even if these authors are correct in their assessment of the initial spirit of Internet 
technology, it does not necessarily tell us anything specific about contemporary peer-to-
peer technology. For that we need to look at peer-to-peer technology in the context of 
file-sharing. To that end Hong (2001) demonstrates how in order for peer-to-peer 
technology to be viable it must be designed with particular limiting factors in mind. First 
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among these is the problem of free riding. Hong asserts that the essential characteristic of 
peer-to-peer systems is communication. Therefore a significant decline in system 
performance would actually be reflective of a peer-to-peer system devolving into 
something more akin to the client/server model. If this happens, individuals who 
contribute to the system may be compelled to withdraw. Therefore ―system designers 
must take into account the impact of free riding on performance and devise strategies to 
encourage higher rates of community participation‖ (p. 206). This conclusion is not 
unlike scholarship on other forms of peer-based production. Reid‘s (1999) analysis of 
Multi-User Dungeon online games also demonstrates how cooperation can effectively be 
programmed into the fabric of the system. 
 The dependence of peer-to-peer technology on communal participation for the 
provision of a public good results in a particular technological structuring which 
recursively conditions the production of new communal social relations. In other words, 
file-sharing technology is not defined as much by the digital files which are traded there 
(material) as by the social relations formed by interactions with the technology—
interactions which produce a community of users (socio). As Reid‘s work on MUDs 
demonstrates, communities have been forming around various Internet resources for 
some time. Peer-to-peer file-sharing technology enhances social interactions by allowing 
for the intelligent management of resources among community members (Oram, 2001). 
Research has found that the giving and receiving of content over peer-to-peer networks 
fosters a sense of virtual community as fluid groups form around common interests and 
the mutual production and sharing of knowledge (Cenite, 2009). Moreover, online 
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communities rarely exist exclusively in virtual space. Research has demonstrated that 
virtual communities often spill out into the real world as networks are used to build and 
enhance communities while also serving as a basis for collective action (Kollock, 1999). 
The links between online community and real world collective action are explored as part 
of the current research project. Some of the social interaction facilitated by peer-to-peer 
technology has been directed toward the mobilization of physical resources as part of the 
legal defense of individuals accused of copyright infringement. As Oram (2001) reminds 
us, the use of peer-to-peer technology can be overtly political, as a tool of resistance.  
SOCIAL RELATIONS 
A central tenant of this research project is that the phenomenon of peer-to-peer 
file-sharing is rooted in a social system of commoning which is antithetical to commodity 
exchange. So inimical are these practices of sharing to the logic of capitalist 
accumulation that peer-to-peer file-sharing has few, if any, defenders in either the private 
or public spheres. Even those who come to the defense of individual file sharers do so 
while deftly avoiding outright attacks on the regime of private property. Nevertheless, the 
threat of peer-to-peer file-sharing stems from its potential to reorder the social relations in 
the context of information production. Therefore, it is necessary to explore both of the 
system of intellectual property and the system of commoning to understand what is at 
stake in the larger context of this particular conflict. 
Everyday usage of the term property tends to obscure the particular social 
relations which are concomitant with social systems based on private ownership. The 
practical or common sense view of property construes it as a thing or artifact. To the 
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extent that social relations are acknowledged the discussion is typically limited to the 
physical occupation or temporary possession of a physical artifact to the exclusion of 
everyone else. As Marx (1990) expounded in great detail, the circulation of commodities 
encourages the adoption of this particular way of viewing property. It is a perspective 
which sees property almost exclusively in terms of its materiality. Legal treatments of 
property fair little better. Law construes property primarily as a right to exclusive 
possession. From this perspective the private sphere is thought to function as a bulwark 
against the tyranny of the state. This is paradoxical given that the private sphere of 
property would not exist unless the public sphere of law called it into being. The notion 
of property as an enforceable claim to some use or benefit of something always implies 
the active participation of the state (Macpherson, 2008). Once we acknowledge the role 
of the state in the creation and maintenance of systems of private property our definition 
of property takes on a social dimension in addition to the material dimension. An uneasy 
legal balance must be sought between private and public interests. Property is an 
entitlement, a privilege conferred by the state. This entitlement can be either individual or 
common in character. A single individual may be granted a right to the exclusive use of 
some resource or a group of individuals may be granted access to a resource. In the 
context of intellectual property law we might similarly distinguish between an individual 
right to the exclusive use of a copyrighted text and a public right of access to that same 
text either through fair use or as a part of the public domain. In short, the balancing of 
property interests among opposing parties results in a particular set of social relations 
among those parties. 
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Under the modern bourgeois state neither the public nor private sphere constitutes 
a commons. With so much attention given to the tedious balancing of public and private 
interests, the speciousness of this dialectical arrangement is overlooked. That private 
property is the antithesis of the commons is a fairly straightforward observation—but the 
unspoken political reality of the bourgeois public sphere is that it too serves as an 
indispensable component of the capitalist regime of private property. A commons cannot 
be produced and maintained by a bourgeois state so far removed from the control of the 
citizenry. Hardt and Negri (2009) comment on the speciousness of the dialectic between 
public and private by stating: 
The seemingly exclusive alternative between the private and the public 
corresponds to an equally pernicious political alternative between capitalism and 
socialism. It is often assumed that the only cure for the ills of capitalist society is 
public regulation and Keynesian and/or socialist economic management; and, 
conversely, socialist maladies are presumed to be treatable only by private 
property and capitalist control. Socialism and capitalism, however, even though 
they have at times been mingled together and at others occasioned bitter conflicts, 
are both regimes of property that exclude the common. (ix) 
This somewhat puzzling pronouncement requires that I develop a more vibrant definition 
for the commons than what has generally been discussed thus far. Accordingly this 
section will attempt to do so by juxtaposing two social systems: the social system of 
commodification and the social system of commoning.  
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THE SOCIAL SYSTEM OF COMMODIFICATION 
As we have already seen, the social system of commodification is ripe with 
contradictory tendencies. Various attempts to resolve these contradictions have at times 
placed more weight on either the private sphere or the public sphere. Of those approaches 
which have placed greater emphasis on the private sphere as a means to overcome 
cyclical crisis, neoliberal economic doctrine has been the most predominant. And 
although neoliberal doctrine has enjoyed a high degree of influence—both as a matter of 
intellectual convention and actual policy—its polarizing nature has elicited a response 
from those who would instead afford the public sphere greater weight. In the following 
pages I survey some of the more pertinent contributions by economists and legal scholars 
to this debate in the area of information production and intellectual property. My intent is 
to demonstrate how both of these approaches are in the service of the social system of 
commodification as both seek to rescue capital from its own internal inconsistencies. 
There has been considerable disagreement among mainstream economists over 
the most effective way of incorporating immaterial labor within the capitalist framework. 
The problematic nature of information commodities has called into question the proper 
role of the state. Many economists see little or no job at all for the state in the realm of 
intellectual property while others see a considerable role for the state in the management 
of information production and distribution. The privatization and enclosure of resources 
is often associated with a set of neoclassical economic theories (collectively referred to 
by critics as neoliberalism) which emphasize a limited role for government and an 
expanded role for the private sector. Neoliberalism as an economic doctrine of 
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privatization and globalization began its hegemonic rise in the 1970s and matured under 
the Reagan Administration, perhaps reaching its worldwide zenith sometime in the 
1990s. Initially a response to the crisis of Keynesianism, adherents of neoliberal doctrine 
sought to devalue labor power, reconstitute wage hierarchies, and roll back the gains of 
organized labor (MidnightNotes, 2009). In many respects these policies represent a return 
to 19th century bourgeois economics. 
There are a number of assumptions shared by most neoliberal economists. They 
assume that competition for resources and market-share is inherently beneficial for 
society. There is general agreement that the benefits and effects of competition are best 
understood in terms of price (Graham, 2006). These economists also maintain that when 
competition is allowed to function free of state interference, it will be inherently efficient 
and yield the best possible outcome. The only economic role for the state is to promote 
and enforce competition. Typically, neoliberalism relies heavily on the police powers of 
the state to enforce the exclusionary rights of private property. Harvey (2005) asserts that 
strong individual property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of the free market 
and trade are the hallmarks of the neoliberal state as it is thought that these institutional 
arrangements are the best suited to guarantee individual freedoms. Harvey states: 
The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between 
juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the 
individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. 
The state must therefore use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve 
these freedoms at all costs. By extension, the freedom of businesses and 
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corporations (legally regarded as individuals) to operate within this institutional 
framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good. (64) 
Private enterprise within a competitive market is considered the institutional arrangement 
most likely to produce economically efficient outcomes, and the greatest amount and best 
overall distribution of wealth in society. In practice, the hallmarks of neoliberal policy 
have been the relocation of the means of production, the deterritorialization of capital, 
expanded labor markets, the dissipation of the welfare state, and the establishment of new 
regimes of private property (MidnightNotes, 2009). 
 The global enactment of neoliberal doctrine represents another chapter in the long 
history of enclosure movements. These enclosure movements typically have involved the 
extinguishing of established or traditional rights of access to physical resources. The 
creation and maintenance of private property regimes as a part of this process has been 
met with resistance and bloodshed. Despite the extraordinary resistance of indigenous 
peoples, the process of enclosing physical resources is a relatively straightforward matter. 
However, the unique characteristics of information commodities are responsible for some 
disagreement regarding the value of enclosing nonphysical resources. In the pages that 
follow I introduce some of the seminal contributions to that debate while further 
developing the argument that both private and public sphere approaches to information 
production and distribution are intended to help capital overcome its periodic crises. 
Information Enclosure Debate 
Fritz Machlup (1962) was one of the first economists to recognize the increasing 
significance of that sector of the economy dedicated to the production of information. 
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Machlup realized that information was a valuable input and output of the production 
process. Until then, economists had generally assumed conditions of perfect information 
in which buyers and sellers possessed full knowledge of the market and were aware of all 
buying and selling opportunities. Machlup argued that under certain conditions this was 
simply the most efficient and expedient course of action for an economist to take. The 
choice to make a particular variable exogenous rather than endogenous was a matter of 
relevance to the economist. However, Machlup pointed to the rise in the ratio of the 
economy dedicated to the production of information and argued that economists could no 
longer safely make such assumptions. Information, after all, was often an endogenous 
variable which could have dramatic effects on the rate of productivity. As capitalism 
expanded and the division of labor deepened, Machlup saw an increase in that portion of 
labor which was dedicated to so-called ―brainwork‖ (p. 6). He argued that the first half of 
the twentieth century had been characterized by a dramatic increase in immaterial labor: 
This change involves a continuous increase in ―knowledge-producing‖ workers 
and a relative decline in what use to be called ―productive labor.‖ The changing 
employment pattern now shows such a rapid trend toward the use of more 
brainpower relative to the use of physical strength or physical skills that a serious 
problem of employability of less-educated members of the labor force arises. (12) 
In other words, economists were busy analyzing agriculture, mining, steel production, 
transportation, retailing, and the production of all sorts of goods and services. Yet they 
were simultaneously neglecting to analyze the production of knowledge and its 
implications for the economy.  
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 Machlup was concerned that the production of knowledge was largely unguided 
by market mechanisms because it was offered to consumers at no charge. Yet he did not 
support notions of property in the intellectual domain. Machlup believed that notions of 
property rights in immaterial goods simply obscured the unpalatable reality of conferring 
monopolistic control over the production of information. From his perspective, the grant 
of a government sanctioned monopoly over some type of knowledge resource was likely 
to distort prices rather than serve as their basis. Machlup was also dismissive of the idea 
of granting intellectual property protections as an inducement for production. Instead, he 
argued that competition and the fear of technological obsolescence would serve as 
inducements for continued production. Furthermore, Machlup believed that patents were 
more likely to benefit the larger incumbent industries and stifle competition by 
discouraging the entrance of new firms. In light of the ideological commitment by many 
contemporary neoliberal economists to unfettered markets free from government 
intervention, Machlup‘s strong skepticism of intellectual property regimes was prescient. 
Though Machlup‘s work was influential, the neoclassical approach to information 
commodities was also influenced by an earlier, more radical critique of intellectual 
property law. Economist Arnold Plant (1974; 1974b; 1974c) wrote several exceptional 
articles during the 1930s in which he questioned the theoretical basis for both patent and 
copyright law. Plant (1974) argued that economics did not provide a justification for the 
establishment of monopolistic price controls in the area of invention. Similarly, he argued 
that despite the widely held belief that authorship depended upon the conferral of a 
copyright monopoly to create the necessary economic incentive to produce, there was 
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little economic reasoning to support that contention. He disagreed with those advocates 
of intellectual property regimes who held that the bestowal of property rights would make 
invention and authorship pay better.  
Plant questioned the validity of the economic incentive to produce embodied in 
both patent and copyright law. Pointing to the potential for patent deadlocks, Plant argued 
that it was possible for patents to stifle innovation either by raising the cost of inputs or 
by directing inventors and competing firms into areas where they were less likely to 
infringe on a patent. By playing it safe, these competitors were unlikely to refine and 
improve upon the existing technology. Accordingly, he maintained that it was doubtful 
that patents would direct innovation in the best possible direction (Plant, 1974).  He also 
took a similar position on copyright law which he felt was likely to discourage 
productivity. Plant thought that copyright served to prolong the individual author‘s 
income from works he or she had already published. By insulating the individual author 
from pressures to create out of economic necessity, Plant (1974c) believed that not only 
was copyright protection unnecessary, but that it was likely to reduce the aggregate 
output of authors over their lifetimes. He also pointed to those authors who wrote without 
any hope of remuneration. In fact, many authors demonstrated a willingness to pay for 
the opportunity to be published. 
A common argument advanced by publishers is that the monopolistic control 
made possible by copyright law allows them to increase their prices. This in turn allows 
them to cover their losses on the majority of the books they publish which do not cover 
their expenses. Therefore, it is the unknown author who benefits from these higher prices, 
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and the total store of knowledge is increased as a result. Instead of seeing the overall 
benefit to society argued by the publishers, Plant argued against indiscriminate 
publishing. He freely admitted that without copyright protection publishers would no 
doubt decrease the number of books that they chose to publish. Competition would have 
the effect of lowering the receipts from their most successful publications—leaving little 
left over to engage in risk-taking on behalf of unknown authors. But Plant argued that 
there are opportunity costs associated with letting unmarketable authors continue to 
expend their efforts on writing. He made a similar argument for the prolific yet 
unsuccessful inventor whose main employment seemed to be nothing more than the 
acquisition of patents. Plant (1974c) stated, ―What is generally overlooked by the more 
enthusiastic advocates of these schemes is the alternative output which the resources 
would have yielded in other employment‖ (p. 72). 
The basic premise behind Plant‘s arguments is that in all other areas economists 
have assumed that monopolies tend to direct the use of resources to less-preferred 
utilizations—to less socially beneficial utilizations. If this is so, what does it say about 
intellectual property regimes? By enabling businesses engaged in technological 
innovation or publishers producing creative works to capture artificially high receipts, 
intellectual property law increases the volume of risk-taking. Plant argued that there was 
little reason for the public to encourage indiscriminate risk-taking free from the 
constraints of competitive forces. According to Plant, intellectual property law is less 
efficient than the market for the allocation of resources. In commenting on the 
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compounding effects of copyright on resource allocation and individual productivity 
Plant (1974b) stated: 
More authors write books because copyright exists, and a greater variety of books 
is published, but there are fewer copies of the books which people want to read. 
Whether successful authors write more books that they otherwise would is a 
question of ‗the elasticity of their demand for income in terms of effort‘—they 
may prefer now to take more holidays or retire earlier. Some of them are in any 
case well advised to write different books—instead of writing what they would 
otherwise want to say or have to say, they find it more remunerative to write the 
sort of thing for which the demand conditions are most appropriate for ensuring 
the maximum monopoly profit. (80) 
Plant (1974) noted that the peculiarity of patents and copyrights was that, unlike 
typical property rights which arise out of the need to manage scarce resources, 
intellectual property served to create a scarcity of resources. What‘s more, where we 
might have expected interference in the system of private property to be aimed at 
preventing an increase in prices resulting from monopolistic control, in the case of 
intellectual property law the intervention was aimed at creating monopolistic distortions 
in the pricing system. Plant believed that the systems of copyright and patent were not 
only responsible for the inefficient management of information resources but that the 
systems were unnecessary to secure the production of inventions and creative works. The 
acquisition of intellectual property rights was only secured at the cost of foregoing 
competitive markets. Plant believed that if competition were allowed to function in the 
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place of government intervention it would become unlikely that any single entrepreneur 
would be able to influence prices by restraining output. Additionally, a competitive 
market would pressure entrepreneurs to put their resources to work in the maximization 
of income, thereby yielding the greatest aggregate product. As the market approached the 
conditions of perfect competition, the production of information would take place at the 
lowest cost per unit produced. Plant challenged the advocates of intellectual property to 
explain how a system of monopoly which allowed producers to raise prices by restricting 
output would yield a greater general usefulness. 
This is a damning and powerful critique of intellectual property regimes. It is 
quite difficult to argue against the price distortions caused by monopoly and the rent-
seeking behavior it engenders. Yet Plant‘s argument is premised on one basic assumption 
which undermines his advocacy of a market-based approach to information production. 
In order to achieve an efficient outcome, systems of private property must be 
characterized by a level of diffusion that prevents any one single owner to influence the 
price of the property they own. In other words, Plant‘s argument for market competition 
as the better regulator of the production of information only holds in the absence of high 
levels of concentration of ownership. However, most sectors of information production, 
even in the 1930s, from radio to television to publishing, are not remotely analogous to 
an environment of perfect competition. This is why Plant (1974) noted that a significant 
amount of government regulation was directed at discouraging the concentration of 
ownership which would allow one entity to affect prices. Yet this really does not solve 
the central economic dilemma.  Policymakers were aware of the problematic nature of 
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government granted monopolies in information, and this is why the grants were of a 
limited duration. But Plant criticized even the durational aspect of patent and copyright 
law, calling attention to their arbitrary nature (Plant 1974, p. 51). Ultimately, Plant‘s 
proposed solution—the abolition of copyright and patent law—would only displace 
efforts to discourage concentration of ownership to another terrain. There is little reason 
to believe that the prohibition of monopolies in information alone would function 
effectively to counteract the steady march toward concentrations in ownership. In any 
case, both schemes—whether intellectual property law or antitrust law—require 
government intervention in the sacrosanct terrain of the market. 
Landes and Posner (2003) have built on the innovative work of Plant to further 
develop a critique of contemporary intellectual property regimes. William Landes is a 
professor of law and economics at the University of Chicago Law School, as is Judge 
Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Chicago Law 
School is well known for developing an economic approach to the analysis of law known 
as law and economics. The law and economics movement shares many of the 
fundamental assumptions of neoliberalism including an emphasis on limiting the role of 
the state, understanding price to be the best measure of value, and assuming that free 
markets are inherently efficient. Generally speaking, the law and economics movement 
represents a reversal of the relationship between the state and the market. At its most 
extreme, the law and economics movement asserts that the government exists solely to 
facilitate the functioning of the market and in any other endeavor government 
intervention constitutes the creation of an illegitimate system for the management of 
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resources to the corrupt benefit of special interests. As Purdy (1998) laments, anyone 
who accepts these basic premises ―already has one shoulder on the mat when he 
subsequently tries to make a case for government regulation…‖ (¶ 6). 
With respect to intellectual property law, the law and economics approach 
exemplified by Landes and Posner (2003) demonstrates a flexibility which distinguishes 
the approach from a strict ideological adherence to absolutist notions of property rights. 
Landes and Posner temper their approach to intellectual property law by formulating a set 
of economic criteria to apply to different branches of intellectual property law in an 
attempt to determine the optimal level of protection. Their general approach is to 
determine the minimum level of protection to afford different types of intellectual 
property according to the likely level of output obtained with or without the recognition 
of property rights. The authors then suggest that intellectual property rights be extended 
only to those areas where output would likely be suboptimal without them. After 
subjecting the different forms of intellectual property to the rigors of their economic 
models, the authors still arrive at a set of conclusions which are not far removed from 
those drawn by Plant seventy years previous. 
As with Plant, Landes and Posner (2003) begin their analysis by acknowledging 
the role played by the legal institution of private property in the management of scarce 
physical resources. They assert that, in general, there is not a sufficient concentration of 
ownership in physical commodities to permit a single owner to significantly affect the 
market price. Conversely, intellectual property law produces scarcity in information 
goods, the beneficiary of which is made the owner of the entire supply of a product for 
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which there may be no easily obtainable substitute. In this sense we can say that 
intellectual property rights produce scarcity while physical property rights manage 
scarcity.  
Landes and Posner (2003) then proceed to elaborate on the functions of property 
law as it relates to the management of scarcity. The economic function of property law is 
to substitute a market transaction for a legal transaction. Rather than settling disputes 
over property in the courts, well-defined property rights allow individuals to enter into 
contract with each other without the direct intervention of the state. Such a system of 
private property is preferable to the state allocation of resources in terms of economic 
efficiency as long as the costs of property rights are lower than the costs of state 
management of resources. However, there are costs associated with maintaining all 
systems of private property, and it is the goal of Landes and Posner to determine what 
level of intellectual property protection is the most efficient. To this end the authors 
survey the types of costs associated with the maintenance of private property rights. 
First there are transaction costs that are incurred when property is transferred from 
one party to another. Since transaction costs rise with the number of contracting parties, 
property rights are oftentimes more efficient than attempting to establish individual 
contracts with all parties. The transaction costs associated with intellectual property tend 
to be higher relative to physical property because of the difficulty of identifying 
intellectual property. This is because it has no unique physical expression. For example, 
imagine the difficulty of transferring the rights to an image, like the Mona Lisa, for 
reproduction. The sale of the original painting would be relatively simple. Yet selling just 
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the right to make copies of the original, the idea of the Mona Lisa as opposed to the 
actual painting itself, is considerably more complex and costly to transact without a set of 
well-defined property relations to fall back on. 
Another cost associated with systems of property rights is the result of obtaining a 
property right solely for the purpose of charging rent. Rent seeking allows the owner to 
generate a return over and above the cost of generating the return. In other words, it is 
pure profit and well worth the costs incurred to obtain the rent (Landes & Posner, 2003). 
So great is the potential reward that the rent is often nothing more than deadweight in 
terms of social cost. In such a case, there is no social benefit derived from the behavior. A 
good example of this phenomenon is the so-called cybersquatting which plagued the 
burgeoning World Wide Web in the 1990s. Landes and Posner (2003) warn that the 
nature of intellectual property law, when seen as little more than a grant of monopoly 
over a particular resource, is likely to induce significant levels of rent seeking behavior 
which do not serve to increase the general welfare of society. These costs represent a 
countervailing force to the typical economic incentive justification for intellectual 
property regimes. 
A third cost of property rights results from the effort to secure property—the cost 
of protection. These costs are incurred not only by both the police and the courts in their 
attempts to enforce laws against trespass and theft, but also by the property owners 
themselves as they erect fences both to protect and demarcate their property (Landes & 
Posner, 2003). The authors point out that the maintenance of these systems only make 
economic sense when the benefits of securing property exceed the costs of protection. 
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And in the case of intellectual property, these costs can be significant. It is no easy task to 
erect a fence around a piece of information. In the absence of specialized legal protection, 
it may be almost impossible to prevent misappropriation and free-riding. Even 
discovering that information has been misappropriated can be costly simply because the 
act of appropriating an immaterial good can be difficult to detect. In any case, property 
rights in information tend to incur higher costs in all of these areas—transaction costs, 
rent seeking, and the cost of protection—relative to physical property. It is the function of 
intellectual property law then to reduce these types of costs. This is why intellectual 
property rights impose strict limitations on the recipient of an informational good which 
would not apply to the typical recipient of a physical good19. 
In order to determine the appropriate level of intellectual property protection, 
Landes and Posner (2003) attempt to balance the costs incurred by the establishment of 
property rights against the costs incurred by the producers of intellectual property. In 
doing so, the authors attempt to balance the costs of property against the costs of creating 
the economic incentive to produce. They begin by investigating the costs of production. 
With respect to copyright law, Landes and Posner (2003) identify first the cost of creating 
the work, otherwise known as the cost of expression. It consists primarily of the cost 
incurred by the author in time and effort and by the publisher in editing and preparing the 
manuscript for publication. These costs are fixed in that they generally do not vary with 
the volume of production. The second set of costs is the variable costs—the expenses 
                                                 
19 Limitations such as the limited duration of protection and the various guarantees of public access to 
information are intended to keep input costs at acceptable levels. 
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incurred during the actual copying process. The variable costs do increase with the 
number of copies produced.  
In those areas where fixed costs are likely to be low, the authors argue that there 
is little reason for strong intellectual property protection (Landes & Posner, 2003). 
Likewise, in those instances where the costs of duplication are substantial, intellectual 
property restrictions may be unnecessary to prevent the misappropriation of information 
commodities. Where fixed costs are likely to be high, some degree of intellectual 
property protection may be necessary to ensure that fixed costs are recovered. The 
concern is that in those areas where variable costs are low there may be an inducement 
towards rent seeking. In other words, when the marginal cost is approaching zero, the 
grant of monopoly privilege allows the owner to restrict output and effectively insert a 
wedge between price and marginal cost. The previously mentioned costs of maintaining 
property protections in this scenario appear as a deadweight loss to society. Furthermore, 
in the absence of competitive forces which would drive the price down toward marginal 
cost, the positive price charged to a consumer might cause them to seek out substitute 
goods that have a positive marginal cost. Under these circumstances, the cost of 
supplying the substitute goods would also be a deadweight cost to society. These 
deadweight costs must be weighed against the costs of denying the producer of 
intellectual property recourse against those who would misappropriate the information 
commodity. 
Landes and Posner (2003) admit that in a system absent of intellectual property 
protection the price of a book, for example, will eventually be bid down to the marginal 
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cost of copying. Under such circumstances, it is entirely possible that the creative work 
may never be produced in the first place because neither the author nor the publisher 
would be likely to recoup their fixed costs. However, according to the authors there are a 
number of factors which would limit misappropriation even in the absence of intellectual 
property protections. In the case of copyright, Landes and Posner seize upon a similar 
argument advanced previously by Plant (1974). The argument is that copying takes time, 
so there will always be a period of time during which the original producer has a jump on 
the competition. However, in the context of digital media distributed across networks, the 
interval during which the publisher will be insulated from competition is likely to be so 
short that this argument is of little relevance. One of the more interesting factors 
mentioned by Landes and Posner (2003) which might limit misappropriation in the 
absence of intellectual property regimes is encryption. In the case of copyrighted 
materials, encryption can provide even stronger levels of protection than property rights. 
Encryption has the added benefit to the owners of copyrighted material of bypassing the 
limitations of copyright protection such as fair use and limited duration of protection. 
However, encryption may also reduce the value of an information commodity by 
preventing consumers from sharing. In other words, the ability to make copies may be a 
value which is sought out by consumers. 
 Landes and Posner (2003) recognize that the cost of expression has fallen in 
many areas of information production (desktop publishing, digital media production, 
etc.). There has also been a drop in the variable costs for many forms of intellectual 
property—especially those amenable to distribution via digital networks. Yet similar 
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technological developments (encryption which relies on digitization) have allowed 
intellectual property owners to raise the costs of copying. Intellectual property systems 
oftentimes work in tandem with these technological restrictions to raise the cost of 
expression. The cost of expression to authors of creative works increases under these 
conditions due to the increased transaction costs. Stated another way, the increased costs 
of acquiring the relevant raw materials which are to be incorporated into the creative 
work, whether protected by patents or copyrights, translates into an increase in the costs 
of the economic inputs to production which may contribute to decreased levels of 
innovation or creative output. 
Ultimately, the authors draw a set of conclusions very similar to that of Plant. 
Having based their conclusions on a growing body of empirical studies, they argue that 
there are grounds for considerable skepticism of the likelihood for intellectual property 
systems to produce efficient outcomes. With respect to the patent system, for example, 
the authors (2003) state, ―…incremental increases in patent protection are unlikely to 
influence inventive activity significantly and incremental reductions might actually 
enhance economic welfare‖ (p. 327). Noting the historical progression of the expansion 
of intellectual property rights, the authors argue that economic analysis does not show 
that increased levels of intellectual property protection have improved economic welfare.  
Debate over a Public Right to Information 
We have seen that from the neoliberal perspective the role of the state would be 
significantly curtailed. Yet if neoliberal doctrine reached its zenith in the 1990s only to be 
discredited in the first decade of the 20th century, it is possible that we are now 
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witnessing a resurgence of the interventionist state. Perhaps there was little reason to 
believe in the resolve of neoliberals to limit the intervention of the state in the first place. 
As a matter of historical fact, the conferral of property rights in information increased 
dramatically over the course of the twentieth century. With respect to copyright law, this 
increase has been both in terms of its scope and duration. And while we have already 
surveyed the various critiques against state intervention, other scholars have critiqued 
intellectual property regimes for their tendency to confer excessive property rights in the 
private sphere while simultaneously degrading public access to informational and cultural 
goods. Legal studies scholars have advocated instead that the state function as a mediator 
of crisis by setting aside some resources for common use. The public would be given 
some enforceable claim to those resources but the extent and quality of this claim is a 
matter of considerable political dispute.  
Historically, there was a steady increase in the economic function of governments 
across the globe beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century (Samuelson, 
1964). In the United States, a significant increase in the active engagement of the state in 
capitalist planning came in the wakes of the October Revolution of 1917 and the Great 
Depression. The implications of 1917 loomed over capitalism as normal cycles of boom 
and bust took on a more sinister and revolutionary appearance. In commenting on the 
historical rise of the interventionist state Negri (1968) states: 
Working-class political revolution could only be avoided by recognizing and 
accepting the new relation of class forces, while making the working class 
function within an overall mechanism that would ―sublimate‖ its continuous 
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struggle for power into a dynamic element within the system. The working class 
was to be controlled functionally within a series of mechanisms of equilibrium 
that would be dynamically readjusted from time to time by a regulated phasing of 
the ―incomes revolution‖. The state was now prepared, as it were, to descend into 
civil society, to continuously recreate the source of its legitimacy in a process of 
permanent readjustment of the conditions of equilibrium. (13) 
During this time, Keynes produced his theory of effective demand in an effort to find 
equilibrium in the balance of power between the classes. The Keynesian project become 
one in which increases in productivity were strapped to increases in wages, thereby 
attempting to fold the class dynamic back into the capitalist framework. A deal was 
struck between the employed and the employer with the state acting as the mediator. This 
Keynesian vision of the state as the mediator of conflict persisted until the ascendency of 
neoliberal doctrine in the 1970s. Not until the financial crisis of the first decade of the 
21st century did the interventionist state return to the U.S. political stage. 
 As we have seen, the neoliberal approach to property in information was 
characterized largely by rhetorical attacks on the theoretical basis of intellectual property. 
Notwithstanding neoliberals‘ discomfort with notions of property in information, in 
actual practice there has never been any real deviation from the establishment of private 
property regimes in the production of information. All the same, the establishment of 
property rights in information has not been a straightforward affair. As Becker and Vlad 
(2003) state: 
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Property is something of value, and it can be transferred, that is, bought and sold. 
If copyright merely reflected property rights, it would rest with the copyright 
holder exclusively. But copyrighted works often are created to communicate 
something to others. It is the nature of this type of property that it can be 
transmitted to more than one person without using up the product. The receiver 
does not possess the product in the same way as someone who owns a piece of 
land. Copyright is designed to protect a form of intangible property. (5) 
Copyright and other forms of intellectual property therefore require the state play a far 
more active role in the management of nonphysical resources than is the case with 
physical resources. The exclusivity of property rights in physical goods cannot be carried 
over to the realm of immaterial goods in any simple manner. The nonrival character of 
information commodities has made the rationalization of property rights in information a 
much more complicated affair. 
 Just as limiting the reach of the state into the private sphere constitutes a strategy 
for the extinguishing of crisis within capitalism, so too does the attempt to use the state to 
as a means to strike an uneasy balance between public and private interests. As already 
mentioned, seeking an elusive balance between public and private interest is beset with 
particular difficulties in the realm of information production. On the one hand capitalists 
need enough control over the products of immaterial production to be able to extract 
value from them. On the other hand too much control results in monopolies and excessive 
rents which increase economic input costs and threaten continued capitalist expansion. 
Yet no matter what form this balance between public and private interests takes the 
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primacy of property rights is never truly challenged. In this sense the establishment of a 
public right of access to information is circumscribed within the capitalist system and 
therefore part of the social system of commodification. 
 The commodification of information would not be possible without the complex 
array of relationships made possible by the various institutions charged with creating and 
enforcing tort law, criminal law, contract law, property law, constitutional law, 
administrative law, and statutory law. Oftentimes these legal institutions provide a 
normative function; at other times they may disrupt the process of capitalist 
accumulation. The laws which have supported the creation and maintenance of the 
information commodity have a long history dating back to the Middle Ages. The 
establishment of property rights in information for the purpose of providing an economic 
incentive for its production can be traced alternately to the Venetian Patent Act of 1474, 
the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624, the petition of the English Stationers‘ 
Company to Parliament in 1643, the Statute of Anne in 1710, the patent and copyright 
clause of the U.S. Constitution of 1787, and the U.S. patent and copyright statutes of 
1790 (Landes & Posner, 2003). Markets in information are inherently prone to collapse 
due to the peculiar difficulties associated with commodifying information. In the 
American legal context this has meant that copyright and patent law have served as an 
arena of struggle between competing interests over the imposition of the commodity 
form. Historically, U.S. intellectual property law has channeled the processes of 
production in some directions and not in others simply because the resulting commodity 
was more amenable to intellectual property protections (Boyle, 1996); at other times the 
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development of entire industries has been either facilitated or retarded by the 
concentration of extensive intellectual property holdings (Bettig, 1996).  
 Many contemporary legal studies scholars who deal with intellectual property law 
have been influenced by the tradition of Critical Legal Studies which emerged in the 
1970s. This group of legal theorists attempts to expose the incoherence, contingency, and 
political character of law. The underlying message of critical legal scholars is that law is 
politics (Mensch, 1990). According to this perspective, rights are constructions of society 
and not independent of it. Government action is the very foundation of any system of 
rights, and therefore property rights are not naturally occurring—they are nothing more 
than government-conferred privileges (Stein, 2006). And the courts, employing their 
newly discovered power of legal indeterminacy and flexibility, oftentimes act on behalf 
of the interests of those individuals or groups vested with significant amounts of property 
and power. In many ways, Critical Legal Studies mirrors the work of political economists 
in that there is an implicit recognition that law functions within a particular historical and 
social context. By obscuring power and social relations through a smokescreen of 
objectivity and quasi-science, law serves to legitimate and enforce those relations (Unger, 
1986). Whereas the law and economics movement seeks to anchor these social relations 
within an unregulated private sphere, the critical legal studies tradition validates these 
same social relations by advancing a program designed to ameliorate the excesses of the 
market which would otherwise stoke revolutionary fervor. 
  Jessica Litman is an influential scholar of copyright law who has explored in 
detail the tension between public and private interests which arise from the process of 
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commodifying information. According to Litman (2006), as soon as information becomes 
valuable, there is an almost overwhelming urge to extract value from it. In the ensuing 
rush to convert information into property, the public is forced to give up varying degrees 
of access to information and varying degrees of privacy. To Litman‘s eye, the problem is 
that the public is not being consulted in this process, nor are their elected representatives 
willing or capable of evaluating the terms of the arrangement. At the heart of her thesis is 
the so-called balance of copyright. Litman‘s contention, shared by many copyright 
scholars, is that the Founding Fathers intended for there to be a balance between the need 
to provide economic incentives for the producers of creative works and the need for 
public access to information which is a basic requirement of a democratic republic. 
Therefore, when seen from this historical perspective, copyright cannot simply be 
equated with property in physical goods. According to Litman (2006), copyright is better 
described as a bundle of rights which includes the right to reproduce the work, the right 
to create adaptations, the right to distribute works to the public, and the right to perform 
or display works to the public. These rights are subject to a number of notable limitations 
including the doctrine of first sale (the copyright owner has no right to control the 
distribution of a copy after it has been sold) and fair use (copying is allowable in a 
number of circumstances including parody, quotation, classroom use, and home 
videotaping).  
An important component of Litman‘s work is her attention to the legislative 
history of copyright law. Rather than focusing strictly on the statutes themselves, Litman 
analyzes the historical context in which the legislation was written. She documents 
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Congress‘s increasing reliance over the course of the twentieth century on informal 
conferences convened by copyright industry representatives to draft the relevant 
legislation. These conferences have been controversial for a number of reasons—the most 
problematic of which has been the lack of public representation. The industry has 
essentially been writing the legislation with little or no public input. Moreover, 
Congressional representatives have lacked both the political will and the expertise to 
adequately represent the public interest. This means that the historical process of 
legislating copyright, culminating in the 1976 Copyright Act, has tended to represent only 
one side of the balance of copyright. According to Litman (2006), the public‘s right to 
access has been steadily eroded since the process began in 1905. She also argues that in 
more recent years, the information producing industries have increasingly focused their 
efforts on making the Internet safe for copyright. Framing policy debates both in terms of 
rescuing economic incentives from large-scale infringement and as a matter of 
international competitiveness, these industries have had considerable success in creating 
information policy where access is premised more and more on the ability to pay. This 
belief in the steady erosion of the original premises of copyright law over the years is 
shared by other scholars like Vaidhyanathan (2001). The basic premise is that the crisis 
of immaterial production is not a crisis of capitalism itself. Rather, these scholars believe 
that a restoration of the historical balance of private and public interests via a relaxation 
of intellectual property protections will resolve the current crisis. 
Litman also draws attention to the transformation in the social dimension of 
copyright law as new technologies bring everyday people into increasing contact with 
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copyrighted materials. Copyright law, until recently, primarily mediated the relationship 
between authors and publishers. However, the Internet has presented a situation where 
end users are increasingly confronted with copyrighted content. And with the emergence 
of desktop publishing and networked distribution over the Internet, everyone is now 
potentially an author and a publisher. Benkler‘s (2006) work also touches upon recent 
technologies which condition social interactions in ways which are likely to result in 
conflicts with copyright holders. Benkler observes that there has been a transition from 
the proprietary processes of information production characteristic of industrial forms of 
organization to forms which are more decentralized and non-proprietary in nature. He 
attributes the displacement of proprietary forms of production by more cooperative and 
collaborative forms to a new stage in the development of the information economy which 
he refers to as the networked information economy. Benkler states that: 
What characterizes the networked information economy is that decentralized 
individual action—specifically, new and important cooperative and coordinate 
action carried out through radically distributed, nonmarket mechanisms that do 
not depend on proprietary strategies—plays a much greater role than it did, or 
could have, in the industrial information economy. (3) 
 Consequently, the incumbents of the old industrial information economy have 
reacted with increasing alarm at the rise in the role of individual and nonmarket 
production of information. Benkler (2006) argues that a wide range of laws and 
institutions—from telecommunications, copyright, and international trade regulations, to 
the laws governing technological standardization—are being mustered to the defense of 
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the old economy. Like Litman, Benkler believes that when law has intervened in its 
regulatory capacity, it has done so primarily to the benefit of those desiring proprietary 
enclosure. This phenomenon is of particular concern to Litman (2006) who argues that 
the increased likelihood of people confronting copyrighted content as part of the 
networked environment effectively constitutes an increase in their burden under the law. 
Furthermore, Litman maintains that due to the arcane and complex nature of copyright 
law, particularly as it has developed over the course of the twentieth century, the public 
has very little understanding of how copyright functions. These concerns have played out 
in a highly visible manner in the legal confrontations between peer-to-peer file-sharers 
and copyright holders. 
Despite the potential for enclosure Benkler (2006) argues that there is a 
countervailing tendency towards commons-based approaches to the production of 
information. Although the historical development of communication systems has been 
characterized by the concentration of the means of information production into the hands 
of the few as well as by the commercialization of the distribution of information, Benkler 
argues that the Internet can be seen as a reversal of these trends. Formerly, the economic 
character of production was one of extremely high initial outlays of capital accompanied 
by relatively low marginal costs. However, Benkler emphasizes the contemporary 
decentralized capital structure of the production and distribution of information which 
has fueled the growth of the Internet. The economies of scale which were responsible for 
having muted the transmission of cultural artifacts—except by those with the necessary 
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concentrations of capital—are in the process of being displaced by the emerging 
networked information economy.  
A core characteristic of Benkler‘s networked information economy is the 
declining costs of information production, primarily in the areas of computation, 
communication, and data storage. He argues that these decreases in cost have allowed the 
means of production to become increasingly distributed throughout society. Moreover, 
the fact that individuals now have the capacity (enabled principally by digitization and 
the Internet) to create cultural artifacts and share them with millions of people across the 
globe at very little cost, has meant that the nonmarket sector of information production 
has increased in importance relative to proprietary modes of information production. 
Additionally, the flourishing nonmarket sector of information production has led to a 
robust ethic of open sharing and collaborative activity. Benkler sees a number of benefits 
arising from this development, including increased levels of autonomy for individuals, 
new avenues for participation in the information-producing environment, and the 
emergence of a self-reflective and more critical culture. 
Conversely, Litman (2006) cautions that current technologies have equipped 
copyright holders with new methods of extracting value from information. She identifies 
copyright as one of a number of tools which works in conjunction with various 
technologies to facilitate the maximum amount of value extraction from information 
resources. Similarly Lessig (1999) draws attention to the combined use of technology and 
law to regulate human behavior and activities. He does this by emphasizing four distinct 
constraints which operate together (though they function differently): law, social norms, 
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the market, and architecture. This broad view of regulation is fundamental to his 
formulation of code—the set of constraints which operate in digital networks to shape 
human behavior and relations. 
Lessig (1999) critiques previous discourses which characterized cyberspace as a 
libertarian utopia, a common theme in the 1990s. He confronts the notion that cyberspace 
is a place beyond the reach of government control, arguing instead that left to itself, 
cyberspace will become a ―perfect tool of control‖ (p. 6). Careful to distinguish between 
perfect and effective control, Lessig believes that the Internet allows for something which 
approaches perfect control. Generally speaking, he divides code into two categories: East 
Coast code and West Coast code (p. 53). East Coast code refers to the statutory law 
enacted by Congress in Washington, D.C. It is a code written in words which directs 
people how to behave. West Coast code, conversely, is the code that computer 
programmers enact by embedding instructions into the hardware and software which 
make up the network. Lessig, like Benkler (2006), uses the concept of ―layers‖ to inform 
his analysis of code in the context of online communication. The bottom layer is the 
physical layer of the network: the computers and the wires which link them together. The 
middle layer is referred to as the logical layer: it consists of the protocols (like TCP/IP) 
and the software which make the hardware function. The top layer is the content layer: it 
is what is actually being communicated across the network. Lessig theorizes the effect 
that each layer may have on the other layers depending on how they are controlled. In 
essence, he is arguing that each layer could be constructed as privately owned or 
organized in a commons (Lessig, 2001). Currently the physical layer of the Internet has 
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essentially been privatized. The upper two layers—the logical and content layers—are a 
mixed assortment of private and public organization. Lessig claims that private control at 
the physical layer causes tension at the logical and content layers and that this tension 
affects incentives for innovation. In addition, this tension displaces the commons of the 
Internet in favor of commercial architectures of control. Lessig (1999) makes a 
compelling argument that code, construed as a form of privatized law, will eventually 
preempt intellectual property law. In other words, intellectual property owners are 
increasingly inclined to rely on technological deterrents to prevent the misappropriation 
of information goods—deterrents not burdened by fair use or other legal provisions for 
public access to information. 
Similarly Boyle (1996) has argued that the legal system‘s approach to intellectual 
property is above all utilitarian—choosing to commodify information in some instances, 
while refusing to do so in other instances. But in doing so, the legal system must also 
provide a rationalization as to why a system premised on granting monopolies to produce 
economic incentives for production does not simultaneously diminish the public domain. 
Boyle‘s thesis is that the legal system accomplishes this objective through an unconscious 
appeal to a romantic notion of authorship. The legal system thereby provides a rationale 
encompassing both economic efficiency and social justice. He asserts that the author is 
positioned between the public and private sphere in an attempt to resolve a contradiction 
of classical liberalism. He describes the contradiction in the liberal tradition in terms of 
the liberal state‘s commitment to the free flow of information on the one hand and its 
commitment to private property on the other.  According to Boyle, the appeal to the 
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author paradigm bridges the divide between private and public by allowing the author to 
take from the common pool of ideas and add to it some amount of originality, 
transforming it into a unique expression belonging to the author alone. Yet there is also 
an implicit recognition that this new expression adds to the general pool of knowledge 
and ideas, thereby contributing to the aggregate social welfare. This conceptual 
distinction between expression and idea functions as a convincing resolution to the 
public/private paradox of the liberal state. The author paradigm allows the tensions 
between private property and the public domain to be recast as a natural balance of 
interests. Boyle‘s critique of the author paradigm is that it provides a moral and 
philosophical justification for the enclosure of the commons, ―giving the author property 
in something built from the resources of the public domain…‖ (p. 57). Consequently, the 
public‘s appreciation of the commons as a resource for future creators is diminished. 
Ultimately Boyle critiques the use of the author paradigm for its concomitant tendencies 
to create excessive property rights and to confer them on the wrong people. Boyle also 
emphasizes the contradictory economic pressures exerted on the information commodity. 
On the one hand, the preoccupation with economic efficiency pushes us to create 
information flows which are fast and costless. On the other hand, the preoccupation with 
economic incentives pushes us in the complete opposite direction—to grant monopolies 
to the producers of information in order to restrict output. It is therefore unsurprising that 
the economic analyses of intellectual property law have failed to generate a unitary 
conceptualization of the information commodity. 
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Still, if the creation of intellectual property rights introduces a host of transaction 
costs which are likely to mitigate against economic efficiency—a point of general 
agreement among both neoliberals and critical legal scholars—some type of resolution 
must be pursued. To this end Boyle (1996) offers some minor reformist policy 
recommendations such as limiting the duration of copyright to an arbitrary twenty years; 
a redistributive taxation proposal; and a periodic government auditing of intellectual 
property—none of which really help him escape the indeterminacy of the utilitarian 
approach to commodifying information. Litman‘s (2006) approach to finding a resolution 
has been to hearken back to a romanticized past when the balance of copyright was in 
equilibrium due to the effective regulation of industry by the state. This preferred balance 
of copyright has also been characterized by Vaidhyanathan (2001) as ―thin‖ copyright 
protection, or ―just strong enough to encourage and reward aspiring artists, writers, 
musicians, and entrepreneurs, yet porous enough to allow full and rich democratic speech 
and the free flow of information‖ (p. 5). Benkler‘s (2006) answer to the dilemma of 
balancing private and public interests involves the creation of a structured commons as a 
part of the networked information economy. He asserts that property, along with contract, 
constitutes the core institutional component of markets and liberal society.  Property 
rights enable the efficient management of scarce resources. Yet while he concedes the 
necessity of property rights in goods subject to scarcity, Benkler points out that property 
rights, by design, constrain the activity of individuals with respect to those resources. 
Conversely, a commons is structured to enable action that is not based on the exclusive 
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control of resources. Benkler argues that we are well-advised to consider this alternative 
approach to information resources because of the nonrival character of information. 
In a similar manner, Lessig also asserts (2001) that a commons created and 
maintained by the state can function to contain the spread of architectures of control. 
Consequently, these theories of the commons are something which deserves careful 
attention here. Because Lessig expends more effort developing his notion of the 
commons, my attention here is directed at his work. Generally speaking, Lessig argues 
that liberty and freedom in cyberspace will not come from the absence of state activity 
and regulation. Despite his general skepticism of government intervention, Lessig asserts 
that government has an important role to play in the establishment and maintenance of a 
commons. Although his reasoning is somewhat circuitous, Lessig asserts that this 
government protected commons will serve to limit the intrusiveness of the state. His 
general point is that code, both East Coast and West Coast, can function as a type of 
architecture, determining the possible scope and range of human activity. Moreover, 
when the architecture of the Internet is left in the hands of private enterprise, this 
architecture can become a type of privatized law. 
  Alternately, the creation and maintenance of a commons by the state can function 
as a safeguard against these commercial architectures of control. To support his 
argument, Lessig (2001) describes the government‘s intervention into the telephone 
network during the twentieth century in considerable detail, emphasizing the importance 
of common carriage to the emergence and growth of the Internet (p. 45). Because AT&T 
was prevented from controlling the Internet at the logical layer, the government had, in 
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effect, created a commons on the network. In other words, because the government had 
erected barriers to private property and ownership, the Internet was free to develop 
without commercial constraints on networking practices (like peer-to-peer). In effect, 
Lessig‘s approach to defining the commons is to describe it as a resource which anyone 
can use without the need to obtain permission from anyone else. If in some cases 
permission is needed, he argues that it should be granted in a neutral fashion. 
Lessig (2001) frequently refers to the Internet as an innovation commons (p. 40) 
where innovators can develop and deploy new applications or content without the 
permission of others. He speaks of both commercial innovation as well as cultural 
innovation—though his emphasis is squarely on the notion of commercial innovation (the 
idea of cultural innovation is never fully developed). Lessig‘s emphasis on innovation is 
significant. By focusing on innovation he limits his analysis almost exclusively to the so-
called productive uses of the commons. In other words, his commons is construed 
primarily as a resource from which capital is free to draw. Lessig (2001) states that ―free 
resources, or resources held in common, sometimes create more wealth and opportunity 
for society than those same resources held privately‖ (p. 86). Here Lessig is seeking a 
middle ground—to balance public and private control. When a resource has more value 
because of its openness and being held in common, then it makes the most sense to him 
to treat it as a commons. Like the law and economics scholars of the neoliberal economic 
tradition, Lessig‘s approach to the balance of interests is premised on economic 
efficiency. In other words, the terms of the debate are the same for both sides, whether 
they support increased authority for the private sphere or the public sphere. What is 
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implicit in Lessig‘s conceptualization of a state-supported commons is that value is being 
constructed within a capitalist framework. This is why Lessig like many in the reformist 
camp is explicit in his denouncements of peer-to-peer file-sharing. Non-market systems 
of value do not enter into Lessig‘s analysis in any meaningful way despite his cryptic 
allusion to cultural innovation. A rhetorical focus on innovation allows Lessig to keep the 
terms of the debate safely within the capitalist framing. 
The indeterminacy of Lessig‘s approach to resolving the contradiction of 
immaterial production is underscored by his constant vacillation between his adherences 
to private property on the one hand and property held in common on the other. At some 
points Lessig (2001) seems preoccupied with vocalizing his support for free-market 
values, proclaiming, ―I am fanatically pro-market, in the market‘s proper sphere‖ (p. 6), 
while at other points he obliquely seems to acknowledge his own complicity in 
subverting the market.  For example, in the introduction to The Future of Ideas Lessig 
(2001) says that he is ―disgusted‖ by his friends who possess pirated DVD collections (p. 
xvii). Yet in the same book he admits to having pirated music off of Napster without 
paying for it—though he sheepishly claims that it constitutes only about five percent of 
his music (p. 194). Lessig‘s befuddled approach to property stems in large part from his 
refusal to confront the politics of property head-on. He incorrectly conflates personal 
property (his house and car) with corporate ownership of the means of production 
(Microsoft‘s source code), reasoning that society has equal interest in allowing both 
parties to keep it to themselves.  
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Ultimately the failure of Lessig‘s approach to the commons is that it defines the 
commons primarily by its utility to capital. The choice between two approaches—
commons-based or proprietary—is simply a matter of transaction costs and the desired 
level of efficiency. The choice is not one between capitalism and something else. In truth, 
most of the authors surveyed here seek a more efficient incorporation of nonproprietary 
forms of production into the market system. All of the various formulations and 
rationalizations of legal scholars with regard to the appropriate role of the state in the 
establishment of a legal basis for the exchange of information commodities are founded 
on the desire to find stability for the capitalist organization of society. While these 
authors all recognize the growing schism between capital‘s increased reliance on 
immaterial production on the one hand and the degradation of capital‘s control over that 
production on the other, none seek to rupture the basic social relation. Whether they pine 
for a return to a historical balance of copyright or look forward to new innovations in 
copyright law, their vision of the commons is politically impotent. As Coleman and 
Dyer-Witheford (2007) explain: 
The reformers, on the other hand, aim at an accommodation between commons 
and capital. The Creative Commons initiative, for example, argues that cultural 
production under digital conditions requires a relaxation of copyright regimes, 
and protection of the role of audiences and sources, not just authors, in creative 
processes. Heretical as this may sound in an era of neoliberalism, Creative 
Commons does not challenge the market system, but rather proposes greater 
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formal assimilation within that system of users and adapter, recognized primarily 
as commercial agents and digital property holders. (947) 
A social system of commoning cannot be delineated by its usefulness to capital. The 
economic and legal studies literatures simply lack the creative vision for the type of 
commons conceived as a part of the current study. 
SOCIAL SYSTEM OF COMMONING 
It is tempting to draw parallels between the contemporary social system of 
commoning and other historical antecedents. While this can be a useful exercise, it is 
important not to hearken back to some romanticized vision of the historical commons. As 
Neeson (1996) reminds us, ―Common-field villages did not house serenely self-
regulating democratic communities‖ (p. 320). Where parallels are evident it is useful to 
invite comparison but not with the intent of resurrecting a utopian agrarianism for the 
digital age. While the social system of commoning is not always easy to separate from 
the social system of commodification, there are structural dimensions which vary. 
Whereas the latter has formal institutions and codified laws demonstrating considerable 
temporal persistence and visibility, the former is fluid and ephemeral and sometimes 
rather difficult to pin down. Further complicating matters is the fact that the system of 
commodification is constantly attempting to either eliminate or assimilate the system of 
commoning. Therefore in this section I reveal how the social system of commoning is 
differentiated from commodification and how it serves as a platform for resistance. 
  As I have mentioned already, I proceed from the position that the alternative 
between public and private is a false distinction. The attempt to resolve the tension 
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between the public and private spheres is synonymous with the attempt to resolve the 
contradictory processes of capitalist accumulation. In the context of the production of 
information, these contradictory processes manifest as a paradox between the capitalist 
drive to privatize resources and wealth and its drive to expand the commons (Hardt & 
Negri, 2009). That is to say the capitalist project of creating an innovation commons is 
nothing more than an attempt to continue the expansion of the capitalist system itself. 
Conversely, the social system of commoning is ultimately incompatible with 
commodification in any guise.  
Although there can be considerable overlap between social systems, it is easy 
enough to differentiate the commons from the commodity form. Coleman and Dyer-
Witheford (2007) define the commons as resources which everyone in a specific 
community is free to use while commodities are resources exchanged for profit under 
conditions of privatized possession. Yet this is not enough to give us a commons which is 
substantially different from Lessig‘s innovation commons. In one sense the capitalist 
commons appears as the wealth which past generations have produced—both in terms of 
the dead labor embodied in technological artifacts as well as the vast pools of finance 
which capital has at its disposal (MidnightNotes, 2009). Capital accesses the commons to 
activate technological and financial structures for the purpose of restructuring society to 
maximize the extraction of value. Conversely, the social system of commoning involves 
the sharing of resources outside of the normal processes of commodity exchange. It 
restructures society in such a way as to make it more difficult for capital to extract value. 
Therefore, each of these examples corresponds to a differing set of social relations rather 
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than referring to pools of resources. This is why Linebaugh (2008) believes that ―To 
speak of the commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at best and dangerous 
at worst…‖ (p. 279). Linebaugh understands the commons as a ―customary activity, not 
as a thing or resource‖ (p. 79). This is why, like Linebaugh, I keep the word in its verb 
form: commoning. 
Hardt and Negri (2009) develop the concept of the commons along two further 
dimensions. The first aspect includes all ―the common wealth of the material world—the 
air, the water, the fruits of the soil, and all nature‘s bounty…‖ (p. viii). The second aspect 
(and more significant according to the authors) includes ―those results of social 
production that are necessary for social interaction and further production, such as 
knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects, and so forth‖ (p. viii). Broadly 
speaking, the authors‘ distinction between the material and the social loosely mirrors the 
previous discussion of the sociomateriality of technology. Hardt and Negri emphasize the 
social dimension of the commons to show that the commons represents a paradox for 
capital. Access to the common pools of knowledges, codes, and communication networks 
is essential to the networked information economy. Yet in order to extract value from 
these commons capital is compelled to attempt to glean value from autonomous social 
interactions or pursue a program of privatization—both of which diminish the value of 
the commons. Hardt and Negri state: 
Here we run into the first contradiction, because the intensive and extensive 
strategies of control both destroy the common, the former segmenting or draining 
the common bases of production and the latter privatizing the common results. 
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The productivity of biopolitical labor is reduced every time the common is 
destroyed. Consider, for example, the production of scientific knowledge, a very 
specialized field but one that shares the basic characteristics of the biopolitical 
production as a whole. For scientific knowledge to be produced, the relevant 
information, methods, and ideas, which result from past scientific activity, must 
be open and accessible to a broad scientific community, and there must be highly 
developed mechanisms of cooperation and circulation among different 
laboratories and researchers through journals, conferences, and the like….The 
segmentation and expropriation of the common, however, inevitably destroy this 
virtuous cycle such that capital becomes increasingly a fetter on biopolitical 
production. (145-146) 
 It is crucial to understand that the social system of commoning is not merely a 
mirrored response to capitalism. Commoning is a way of arranging cooperative social 
interactions with the potential to exist autonomously from capitalist social relations. In 
other words, commoning is representative of an alternative social system, not merely a 
reaction to commodification. Commoning produces its own subjectivities. The 
sociomaterial character of commoning implies that technological artifacts form the 
material basis for the production of new social subjects. They are mutually constitutive. 
As the authors of the Midnight Notes (2010) put it, ―…a commons without a consciously 
constituted community is unthinkable‖ (p. 3). Furthermore, the cooperative practices of 
sharing exist prior to the exercise of power by capital. When enclosure occurs, when the 
system of private property interrupts commoning, the social relations inevitably change 
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(Neeson, 1996). In the event of an enclosure, the autonomy of subjectivities engaged in 
commoning gives way to social relations premised on alienation and hierarchical 
dependence. 
But enclosure is never complete. History shows that there is always resistance. In 
the context of immaterial labor the resistance of the multitude is grounded in commoning. 
Resistance occurs around material resources as people struggle for control. Yet the 
struggle for control is not limited to material resources. People take advantage of the fluid 
and ephemeral social organizations which are themselves the product of commoning in 
the networked environment. The true volatility of the immaterial paradox for capital is 
the production of these new subjectivities. Capital no longer exclusively reproduces its 
own social relation—a relation premised on both alienation from the instruments of 
production and dependence on hierarchical social divisions. In the context of biopolitical 
production capital increasingly produces an open social relation. Hardt and Negri (2009) 
state: 
Capital previously has held together within itself labor-power and the command 
over labor, or in Marxian language, it has been able to construct an organic 
composition of variable capital (the wage labor force) and constant capital. But 
today there is a growing rupture within the organic composition of capital, a 
progressive decomposition of capital in which variable capital (and particularly 
biopolitical labor-power) is separating from constant capital along with its 
political forces of command and control. Biopolitical labor tends to generate its 
own forms of social cooperation and produce value autonomously. In fact the 
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more autonomous the social organization of biopolitical production, the more 
productive it is. Capital thus has ever more difficulty creating a coherent cycle of 
production and synthesizing or subsuming labor-power in a process of value 
creation. (150) 
The subjectivities of the social system of commoning are a collective threat to capital, 
equipped with both the autonomy and the means necessary for liberation. As biopolitical 
production exceeds the constraints placed on it by capital and takes the form of 
commoning, capital must enlist into its service the very insurgency it seeks to contain. 
 We have already seen that Hardt and Negri discuss the first dimension of the 
commons in terms of natural resources like land, water, and air. Similarly Linebaugh 
(2008) speaks of common rights as being grounded in particular ecologies; ―…how will 
this land be tilled? Does it require manuring? What grows there?‖ (p. 45). With an eye to 
the sociomaterial dimension, we might say that these are the material aspects of the 
commons. But what of the networked environment? It is not a natural resource like land, 
water, and air. Technology is artifactual. In commenting on technological artifacts, 
Marxists often refer to the dead labor embodied in technology and the ways in which it is 
deployed against living labor. This does not mean that the materiality of the artifact has 
been negated. After all, even land, water, and air become defined as such only through 
human interaction with the material world. Human agents enact the structural features of 
natural resources which bring them into relation with humankind as land or water. In the 
same way biopolitical commoning in the networked environment is grounded in a 
particular ecology. The Internet and peer-to-peer networks are comprised of various rules 
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and resources. Human agents define these technologies through commoning by enacting 
particular structural features of the technology. 
 The Internet, in effect, functions as a particular ecology locked in a recursive 
relationship with people engaging in commoning. Like Hardt and Negri, sociologist and 
Internet scholar Richard Barbrook (2000) has taken note of capital‘s increased reliance on 
collective forms of organization. Barbrook argues that the cooperative arrangements 
adopted by online communities are undermining the capitalist system. Barbrook (2003) 
says that ―Information is for sharing not selling. Knowledge is a gift not a commodity. 
The net is a strange and novel form of mass communication‖ (p. 91). Moreover Barbrook 
argues that the social practice of sharing is a component of the spirit of the technology: 
Sharing information is exactly what the net was invented for. Scientists needed 
unhindered access to each other‘s research. Hackers enjoyed writing code 
together. Activists wanted to promote their causes. These pioneers hardwired their 
own social mores into the technical protocols of the net. Unlike media 
corporations, they did not make their living from buying and selling information. 
On the contrary, they were already living within real-life gift economies. (93) 
Therefore, a fundamental difference between the social systems of commodification and 
commoning is the way in which informational and cultural artifacts are circulated. In the 
social system of commodification, there is no intrinsic social structure connecting buyers 
and sellers of commodities after the initial exchange has taken place.
20
 That is to say that 
there is no further obligation between the parties to exchange commodities. This is in 
                                                 
20 For this example robust and competitive markets are assumed. Market imperfections, such as 
monopolies, could produce coercive relations between buyers and sellers. 
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contrast to the gift economy of commoning in which the exchange of goods involves a 
general obligation to repay the gift at some other time. Gifts are exchanged between 
individuals who are engaged in interdependent relationships rather than dependent 
relationships (Kollock, 1999). That is to say, the exchange of informational and cultural 
artifacts as part of commoning may serve as the basis for the formation of genuine 
communities. This is in contrast to the exchange of commodities which tends to obscure 
social interconnectedness and facilitate the deepening of the division of labor. As Kollock 
(1999) states: 
In a gift economy, benefits come from improving the ―technology of social 
relations‖ by, for example, increasing the range and diversity of one‘s social 
network. In commodity economics, the benefits come from making improvements 
in the technology of production. Thus, gift economies are driven by social 
relations while commodity economies are driven by price. (222) 
 The particular way in which commoning relates to the formation and maintenance 
of online communities is of particular concern. This is especially so in light of the 
critique by Mancur Olson of collective behavior theory. Olson (1971) argued that the 
assumption by collective behavior theorists that individual members of a group would act 
to further the common interests of the group was incorrect. Immaterial goods are nonrival 
and non-exclusive in nature. Such goods are often referred to as public goods. Public 
goods are nonrival to the extent that their consumption does not lessen someone else‘s 
ability to consume the same good. They are non-exclusive to the extent that it is difficult 
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to exclude individuals from the enjoyment of a good. This is why Olson argued that the 
provision of public goods tends toward suboptimal results due to freeriding: 
…the amounts of the collective good that a member of the group receives free 
from other members will further reduce his incentive to provide more of that good 
at his own expense. Accordingly, the larger the group, the farther it will fall short 
of providing an optimal amount of a collective good. (35) 
Olson‘s influential critique challenges the very premise I have advanced here regarding 
the mutually constitutive nature between commons (material) and commoning (social). 
His critique can be partially answered by re-invoking the previous discussions of the 
spirit of technology, including both the Internet in general and peer-to-peer systems in 
particular. These technologies have cooperation in their bones so to speak, as a 
fundamental structural component of their design. Moreover, the social system of 
commoning occurring in the networked environment is characterized by a radically 
different economy of social action than the one which informed Olson‘s critique. The 
costs and benefits of social action in the networked environment simply do not 
correspond to the production of physical public goods. Kollock (1999) states: 
The fact that online communities exist in a network of digital information means 
that there are significant changes in the cost of producing public goods, in the 
value of public goods, and in the production function of a public good, i.e. the 
relationship between the amount contributed toward a public good and the 
proportion of the public good produced. (224) 
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A reduction in the costs of participation to something approaching zero can have 
profound behavioral effects which change the essential nature of the logic of collective 
action. Again, Kollock (1999) states: 
The fact that many digital public goods can be provided by a single individual 
means that in these cases there are no coordination costs to bear and that there is 
no danger of being a sucker, in the sense of contributing to a good that requires 
the efforts of many, only to find that too few have contributed. Thus, an important 
category of costs is eliminated, as is the fear of contributing to a lost cause. And 
while the fact that something has the quality of a public good has usually meant 
that it might be difficult to motivate individuals to produce it, in the case of a 
privileged group21 the fact that one‘s solitary contribution becomes a public good 
can actually serve as a positive motivation for the person to provide it—there is 
the hope that it will be seen by and benefit a potentially huge audience. (226) 
 Still, there is another answer to Olson‘s critique, one which places emphasis on 
the social interactions occurring as part of commoning. Staggenborg (2010) argues that 
Olson focuses on material incentives to the exclusion of focusing on less tangible 
incentives for contributing to the group. Individual decisions about how much to 
contribute to the group are not made in isolation but rather by people positioned within 
social networks. That is to say that the failure of Olson‘s theory is the failing of bourgeois 
economics in general—the assumption of a rational self-interested individual. Whereas 
the social system of commodification is premised on the impersonal and alienating 
                                                 
21 Olson (1971) defines a privileged group as one in which each of its members have an incentive to see 
that the collective good is provided (pp. 48-50). 
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exchange of commodities, the social system of commoning fosters meaningful 
relationships and the creation of communities, or in Barbrook‘s (2000) words, a social 
commons. 
Researchers have identified these less tangible and collective rewards for 
contributing to online communities (Kollock, 1999; Wellman & Gulia, 1999; Cenite et 
al., 2009). Some community members are motivated by reciprocity—the expectation that 
they will receive useful goods in return for their contributions. Others are motivated by 
prestige—the likelihood that their contributions will be noticed by the community and 
they in turn will receive recognition for their efforts. Others are motivated by efficacy—
the sense that their contributions may produce meaningful changes in the community. 
Another possible motivation is group solidarity, a motivation which has been explored 
more fully by sociologists in the context of general systems of gift exchange and social 
movements (Giesler, 2006; Staggenborg, 2010). Gifts and contributions to groups 
produce systems of social solidarity which stand in relief to the alienated self-interest of 
commodity exchange. Online gift economies are further characterized by generalized 
exchange among community members in which the reciprocation of a gift does not 
necessarily come from the original recipient of the gift but rather from other members of 
the community (Kollock, 1999). The normative influence of the community ensures the 
continued production of informational and cultural artifacts which are then made 
available to community members as needed. Wellman and Gulia (1999) assert that: 
Norms of generalized reciprocity and organizational citizenship are another 
reason for why people help others online. People who have a strong attachment to 
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the organization will be more likely to assist others with organizational problems. 
Such norms typically arise in a densely knit community, but they appear to be 
common among frequent contributors to distribution lists and newsgroups. People 
having a strong attachment to an electronic group will be more likely to 
participate and provide assistance to others. (177) 
Commoning itself, as a social activity, produces the structures necessary for the 
formation of a community. In commenting on the historical commons Neeson (1996) 
states: 
Each usage of common waste created a sense of self: it told commoners who they 
were. Each usage had other meanings too. Every communing economy provided 
the materials for small exchanges—gifts of things like blackberries, dandelion 
wine, jam, or labour in carrying home wood or reeds. Some were given for good 
reason, others for no particular reason at all. But they were all significant because, 
in peasant societies, gifts helped families with little other reason for contact to 
make connection with each other, and through connection to establish a kind of 
safety net. (180) 
The safety net in peasant society existed outside of the market, as a subsistence 
economy affording the community a limited degree of autonomy. The contemporary 
social system of commoning is also a safety net. Yet this pool of digital resources is not 
bounded by the strictures of subsistence. There is unlimited digital surplus here, a surplus 
which can be put at the disposal of building community and resisting enclosure. The 
commoning of informational and cultural artifacts which constitutes peer-to-peer file-
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sharing provides the (im)material and social structures necessary for the formation of a 
community of file sharers. As we have seen, virtual communities rarely exist exclusively 
online. Therefore the current research project analyzes the social system of commoning 
in terms of not only the practice of sharing digital artifacts in networked environments 
but also in terms of the mobilization of real world resources in defense of community 
members targeted by the litigation campaign. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study begins with the individual file sharer as the primary target of the 
investigation. I intend to map those connections among sites of experience and social 
organization which have informed the ways in which these people have confronted the 
information commodity in the peer-to-peer network environment and in the legal arena. I 
attempt to shed light on the complex structures extending out from the lived experience 
of these individuals as they confront the imposition of the commodity form. As the 
inquiry extends out from where these individuals are located, I will explain how 
structures function to both position the individual as well as open up new possibilities for 
social organization and resistance. 
 The individual peer-to-peer file sharer is not a dominated subject. This study 
rejects theories of dominated subjectivities as both unrealistic and of little explanatory 
value. The subjectivities inhabiting the peer-to-peer environment exist a priori to the 
exercise of power. Through exodus they have left the social relations of commodity 
exchange and have established a new set of social relations. The freedom of new and 
alternative ways of relating to fellow members of the peer-to-peer community constitutes 
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a creative—not reactionary—act. On the other hand, the forces of coercion which seek to 
produce a subjectivity based on both an alienation from the sociomaterial instruments of 
production and an insertion into a hierarchical system of social division constitute an 
exercise of power which is subsequent to the social system of commoning. This is why it 
is more appropriate to speak of missing commons rather than missing markets in the 
modern bourgeois state. There is nothing natural about the alienation and hierarchical 
social division of commodity exchange. 
 The resistance of peer-to-peer file sharers to the coercive exercise of power by 
those seeking to commodify information manifests both as exodus from the commodity 
relation for the purpose of establishing new social relations, and in the mobilization of 
resources in support of the legal defense of particular group members who have been 
threatened by litigation. Therefore we can speak of peer-to-peer file-sharing in the 
context of a contemporary class struggle against an exercise of power seeking to establish 
social relations based on commodity exchange. The shape and form of this class struggle 
is the product of a particular moment in the development of the productive forces. The 
recent ascendancy of immaterial production has necessitated that capital rely on a unity 
of the means of production and labor existing outside of its direct means of control. 
Because these subjectivities are no longer assembled by capital within the factory walls, 
previous notions of working class identity will not suffice. The multitude of singularities 
which comprise the peer-to-peer community are, however, made common through their 
collective resistance and establishment of a new form of social relation. Moreover this 
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resistance and creativity is grounded in a common pool of technological artifacts and 
practice. 
 The social system of commoning is ultimately not compatible with the social 
system of commodification. Critiques of existing intellectual property regimes should not 
automatically be read as critiques of the social system of commodification. Critiques 
which support either the withdrawal of the state from the private sphere or its increased 
intervention therein are most often directed at rescuing the social system of 
commodification from its own inconsistencies and self-destructive tendencies. Therefore, 
the current theoretical framework is distinguished from previous approaches in that it 
does not proceed from the assumption that the social system of commoning is an 
aberration from naturally occurring markets. Instead, it proceeds with a recognition of the 
creative and dynamic social relations of commoning among the multitude of 
subjectivities engaged with cultural and informational resources in the peer-to-peer 
networked environment. Consequently, the conflict between copyright holders and peer-




Chapter 3 Design and Methodology 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
What competing conceptualizations of social relations motivate conflicts over peer-to-
peer file-sharing? 
This research project entails an investigation of the litigation campaign pursued 
by the recording industry through its media trade organization the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) and the practices of file-sharers in the peer-to-peer file-
sharing community. The extensive litigation campaign targeting tens of thousands of 
individual defendants is a recent and unique phenomenon. Copyright law historically 
mediated the relationship between publishers and authors. Suits filed en masse against 
individual defendants alleging copyright infringement is historically novel. The 
emergence of contemporary file-sharing networks has presented the owners of 
intellectual property with a serious challenge. The behaviors and practices thus far 
enabled by the networked environment have allowed for the emergence of a digital 
commons where everyday people are sharing, reappropriating, and creating new 
informational and cultural artifacts irrespective of the law. As such these practices 
collectively represent an alternative system of value contradictory to the established 
capitalist mode of production. The struggle occurring within the legal arena is a struggle 
over the containment of these practices. It is a struggle between, on the one hand, a 
system based on private property and continued control over the instruments of 
information production and distribution, and on the other hand, a system based on the 
commoning of informational and cultural resources. Moreover, the law is being utilized 
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as a resource by both sides in this struggle. As of yet there has been no systematic 
academic investigation of these cases or their effect on the practice of file-sharing. 
OVERALL APPROACH AND RATIONALE 
The legal conflict between copyright holders and individual defendants has its 
origins in the everyday/everynight practices of people as they confront information 
commodities in the networked environment. This study explores the rules and resources
22
 
which function to constrain and enable these practices, leading from the individual‘s 
initial contact with information commodities all the way to their eventual legal 
confrontation with copyright holders. The aim is to analyze the social systems which 
condition these practices through an investigation of their attendant structures. By 
establishing where the coordinates of these structures overlap, this study seeks to 
demonstrate how these social systems are recursively ordered as these structures bring the 
social activities of individuals into coordination with the activities of others (Smith, 
2006). How individual file-sharers come into conflict with copyright holders and how 
they proceed in that conflict is conditioned by a complex mesh of recursive social 
relations. Moreover, in the final act of resolving these legal conflicts, these structures 
influence the shape of the conflict in future legal cases.  
                                                 
22 In structuration theory Giddens (1986) regards structures as the ―rules and resources recursively 
implicated in social reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems have structural properties in 
the sense that relationships are stabilized across time and space. ‗Structure‘ can be conceptualized 
abstractly as two aspects of rules—normative elements and codes of signification. Resources are also of 
two kinds: authoritative resources, which derive from the co-ordination of the activity of human agents, and 
allocative resources, which stem from control of material products or of aspects of the material world‖ 
(xxxi). 
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I examine the structural environment of legal rules and interpretations which have 
informed particular legal conflicts over peer-to-peer file-sharing. Textual analysis of the 
relevant court documents and news coverage is conducted with the intent of 
contextualizing individual cases within the overall history of peer-to-peer litigation. I 
attempt to identify those structures which have helped or hindered defendants as they 
attempt to resist the imposition of the information commodity. Exploring the 
circumstances under which these structures are reproduced helps us understand their 
contingent nature and inform future attempts at resistance. In addition to file-sharing 
litigation, I analyze the community of file-sharers to determine the rules/resources which 
inform and enable their engagement with informational and cultural goods. After 
identifying the rules/resources implicated in the coordination of file-sharing activities, I 
analyze the social meanings embedded in these structures with an eye to explaining how 
the ongoing litigation targeting individual file-sharers has impacted the community of 
file-sharers. 
PREVIOUS APPLICATION OF STRUCTURATION THEORY TO COPYRIGHT LAW 
It should be noted that this research project does not represent the first application 
of structuration theory to the analysis of copyright law. Jisuk Woo‘s (2000) study on 
copyright law and computer programs influenced the current research design. In her work 
Woo examined how judicial actors, including defendants, plaintiffs, and judges, 
interacted during strategic communication activities, and how these interactions 
influenced the structure of copyright law. Woo analyzed the decisions and legal 
arguments used in all of the U.S. federal court cases between 1987 and 1993 involving 
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copyright protection of computer programs. She utilized news discourse analysis as part 
of her methodological approach to the examination of individual court cases. Her analysis 
began with the pre-existing structural rules and resources which constitute the law and 
moved toward an examination of how the interactions between the litigants and the 
judges work to reproduce or transform copyright law. 
 Woo‘s study is informative as far as legal analyses go, but her research design 
differs from the current approach in that it does not allow for an in-depth investigation of 
the activities occurring outside of the courtroom. She made good use of discourse 
analysis and categorized the framing of legal arguments as follows: (1) author versus 
copyright holders; (2) public interest versus private property rights; and (3) the work 
versus the author. She also analyzed social influences on law by investigating the types of 
resources available to individual litigants and judges. These resources included legal 
resources (the ability to gather and communicate information effectively), money 
resources (the ability to recruit and prepare specialized lawyers and experts), and status 
resources (the ability of a programmer to cast him- or herself as an author). In addition, 
Woo analyzed judges as potential resources by considering the political nature of their 
appointment to the bench. However, her analysis of the factors occurring outside of the 
courtroom was more circumscribed than the typical Marxian approach would specify. 
Her conclusions were derived principally from the analysis of courtroom argumentation 
and the applicable legal precedents and statutory law. She made no attempt to see if the 
actual views of litigants corresponded with the strategic communications of their 
attorneys. Furthermore, because her field of inquiry did not include cases which focus on 
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the actions of end-users of computer programs, the ways in which law shapes and is 
shaped by the everyday/everynight activities of end-users was unexplored. For that 
reason, there is limited direct applicability in her research design with respect to the 
current study. That being said, Woo‘s research is useful as a general guide to the 
development of the current research project. 
STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
The current study investigates the competing understandings of file-sharing as 
examples of distinct social systems. Giddens (1986) conceptualizes social systems as, 
―The patterning of social relations across time-space, understood as reproduced practices. 
These social systems should be regarded as widely variable in terms of the degree of 
‗systemness‘ they display…‖ (p. 377). Sewell (1992) expands on Giddens‘s concept and 
states: 
By ―social systems‖ Giddens means empirically observable, intertwining, and 
relatively bounded social practices that link persons across time and space. Social 
systems would encompass what most social scientists mean by ―societies‖ but 
would also include social units greater (e.g., the capitalist world system) or more 
limited (e.g., the neighborhood community) in scope than the nation-state. Social 
systems, according to Giddens, have no existence apart from the practices that 
constitute them, and these practices are reproduced by the ―recursive‖ (i.e., 
repeated) enactments of structures. (6) 
I have already identified the two social systems which give voice to the 
competing understandings of file-sharing. On the one hand there is the social system of 
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commodification which views file-sharing as an act of theft and a threat to continued 
capitalist expansion. On the other hand there is the social system of commoning which 
views file-sharing as an exodus from commodity exchange for the purpose of establishing 
a new form of social relation. 
Structures as sets of rules/resources have a particular relation to these social 
systems. As Sewell (1992) asserts, ―Structures are not the patterned social practices that 
make up social systems, but the principles that pattern these practices‖ (p. 6). Structures 
are virtual in the sense that they are socially produced and do not exist concretely in time 
and space. They are instantiated in action.  Therefore, Giddens (1986) maintains that 
social systems must be analyzed with an eye to both their social and system integration. 
Social integration refers to the reciprocity of practices between actors in circumstance of 
co-presence (direct encounters) and system integration refers to reciprocity between 
actors or collectivities across expanses of time and space (lacking co-presence). Giddens 
(1986) analyzes these dimensions of social systems in terms of time-space distanciation, 
or ―The stretching of social systems across time-space, on the basis of mechanisms of 
social and system integration‖ (p. 377). These concepts are useful in the assessment of 
peer-to-peer communities. To what extent can we speak of a virtual community of peer-
to-peer file-sharers? Are there principles which translate into shared practices among 
peer-to-peer file-sharers? How are these principles affected by the alternative forms of 
co-presence characteristic of networked environments? If there is a community here, how 
do we define its boundaries?  
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 Giddens (1986) asserts that there are three structural dimensions of social 
systems: signification, domination, and legitimation. By signification we mean that 
structural dimension in which meaning is produced through discursive practice. 
Domination refers to that structural dimension in which power originates from the control 
of resources. Legitimation refers to that structural dimension in which moral order is 
produced through societal norms, standards, and values. Giddens (1986) illustrates the 
three structural dimensions in a table reproduced here in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1: Three Structural Dimensions of Social Systems 
Structure(s) Theoretical Domain Institutional Order 
Signification Theory of coding Symbolic orders/modes of discourse 
Domination Theory of resource 
authorization 








It should be noted that these three types of structures are separable only analytically. 
Structures of signification always bear some connection to domination and legitimation 
on so on. These three dimensions can be applied to both the social system of commoning 
 127 
and the social system of commodification. These two social systems along with their 
structural dimensions are presented in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: Structural Dimensions of Commodification and Commoning 
Social System Signification Domination Legitimation 


















The Constitution of 
the United States of 
America, statutory 





Supreme Court of 
the United States  
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Table 3.2 (continued) 


















artifacts (p2p client 
applications), 
copyright blogs, p2p 
websites 
Copyright Clause in 
The Constitution of 
the United States of 




case law (Fair Use, 





 As structures are considered virtual in structuration theory—existing only as 
memory traces or as moments of instantiation during social activity—they could not exist 
without language. Therefore it is imperative that structures of signification be explored. 
The resources of language and their utilization are contingent on a given set of social 
relations. As Hartley (2002) notes, ―Discourses are the product of social, historical and 
institutional formations, and meanings are produced by these institutionalized discourses‖ 
(p. 74). Accordingly, the discourses of each social system under investigation must be 
analyzed. The range of possible meaning is defined in part by each social system‘s mode 
of discourse. It is fairly easy to see how the discourse of private property precludes 
alternative systems of social value. What is less obvious is the range of meanings 
conditioned by the discourse of gift economies. For that reason, much of the current 
investigation centers upon the meanings that the peer-to-peer community assigns to 
various aspects of file-sharing. 
 Domination requires a somewhat more extended explanation here. Domination 
refers to that structural dimension in which power originates from the control of 
resources. Giddens theorizes that there are two further dimensions to these resources: 
allocative and authoritative. Giddens (1986) explains, ―Allocative resources refer to 
capabilities—or, more accurately, to forms of transformative capacity—generating 
command over objects, goods or material phenomena. Authoritative resources refer to 
types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or actors‖ (p. 33). 
Dissatisfied with Giddens‘s explication of allocative and authoritative resources, Sewell 
(1992) offers the following: 
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Resources are of two types, human and nonhuman. Nonhuman resources are 
objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that can be 
used to enhance or maintain power; human resources are physical strength, 
dexterity, knowledge, and emotional commitments that can be used to enhance or 
maintain power, including knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, 
controlling, and propagating either human or nonhuman resources. Both types of 
resources are media of power and are unevenly distributed. But however 
unequally resources may be distributed, some measures of both human and 
nonhuman resources are controlled by all members of society, no matter how 
destitute and oppressed. Indeed, part of what it means to conceive of human 
beings as agents is to conceive of them as empowered by access to resources of 
one kind or another. (9-10) 
 We can use the allocative and authoritative dimensions of resources to deepen our 
understanding of the social system of commoning. Let me begin first with allocative 
resources. We can say that the re-appropriation and making available of digital files over 
peer-to-peer networks constitutes a form of digital poaching analogous to the historical 
acts of resistance to the enclosure of the terrestrial commons. These acts of theft were 
justified by commoners as assertions of customary right (Coleman & Dyer-Witheford, 
2007). Still, the pool of resources in the digital commons encompasses much more than 
just a collection of MP3 files. There is an authoritative aspect to the digital commons as 
well. As the circumstances surrounding the legal defenses of the individual defendants in 
these copyright cases demonstrate, the peer-to-peer community, lawyers, and public 
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interest groups are all mobilized in some capacity to resist the entertainment industry‘s 
efforts to enclose the digital commons. 
 Part of what defines the boundaries of a social system is the prevalence of 
normative elements or structures of legitimation. Once again, it is important to remember 
that ‗social systems‘ should not be used to designate sets of social relations that are 
always clearly differentiated from others. In other words, there may be considerable 
overlap between social systems. Specialized institutions
23
 develop within social systems 
to produce a shared moral order. These may appear as a set of structural constraints (rules 
and sanctions). They may just as easily appear as a set of structural enablements 
(resources and rewards). Therefore, with respect to the social system of commodification 
the investigation centers upon those legal structures which facilitate the imposition of the 
commodity form. With respect to the social system of commoning the investigation 
centers not only on those same legal structures but on the social norms established among 
peer-to-peer file-sharers. 
SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The preceding discussion of the three structural dimensions of social systems allows me 
to deepen and focus the investigation through the development of the following 
subsidiary research questions: 
Social Systems 
How do end users engage with the social system of commoning? 
                                                 
23 Giddens (1986) defines institutions as ―…chronically reproduced rules and resources‖ (p. 375). 
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Does the social system of commoning have definable boundaries? 
Does the peer-to-peer file-sharing community demonstrate reflexive self-regulation? 
What is the nature of social and system integration
24
 within the peer-to-peer file-sharing 
community and what is its impact on social solidarity? 
Signification 
What meanings do file-sharers and jurists discursively assign to file-sharing? 
What meanings do file-sharers and jurists discursively assign to the economic exchange 
of information commodities? 
How do the meanings differ across social systems? Are they oppositional?  
Where do these meanings come from? 
Domination 
What are the authoritative resources deployed by the peer-to-peer file-sharing 
community? 
What are the allocative resources deployed by the peer-to-peer file-sharing community? 
How is the control of various allocative and authoritative resources implicated in the 
social system of commoning and the social system of commodification? 
Legitimation 
What are the institutions which produce the norms, values and standards in each social 
system? 
                                                 
24 See page  
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How do these institutions function to produce the norms, values and standards in each 
social system? What are the rewards and sanctions? 
Do these structures of legitimation overlap? Are there shared norms, values and standards 
across social systems? Are there oppositional norms, values and standards? 
SITE AND POPULATION SELECTION 
I provide a historical analysis of file-sharing litigation. This analysis includes 
discussions of the various legal actions taken against peer-to-peer developers as well as 
litigation targeting a number of individual defendants. Cases involving individual 
defendants or cases involving joinder of large numbers of defendants were selected based 
on precedent significant to the overall litigation campaign. For example, two cases in the 
RIAA litigation campaign resulted in jury trials. The cases are Capitol v. Thomas (2009) 
and SONY BMG Music v. Tenenbaum (2009). As a part of the research design I 
conducted interviews with litigants and provided an analysis of the legal arguments in 
each case. They are politically significant cases—meaning they are extremely influential 
in both formal legal and popular discourses. The Thomas and Tenenbaum cases have set 
legal precedents which will affect the shape of the conflict in future cases. Additionally, 
the cases are well-known to those who are involved with or familiar with the copyright 
infringement campaign. Jammie Thomas of Capitol v. Thomas received widespread 
media attention as her case was the first to make it all the way to a jury trial. Thomas is a 
Native American mother of four from Minnesota who was ordered to pay close to $2 
million following a retrial of her case. The intense media coverage of this case centered 
not only on the incredibly high damages awarded to the plaintiffs, but also on the 
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celebrity status of her attorney, Kiwi Camara, who took her case pro bono. Joel 
Tenenbaum is a Boston University graduate student who was ordered to pay plaintiffs 
$675,000 for illegally downloading 31 music files. A high-profile website 
(www.joelfightsback.com) was launched on Tenenbaum‘s behalf as Charles Nesson, a 
member of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, has 
guided a team of Harvard law students who provided Tenenbaum‘s defense. All of the 
relevant court documents for each of these cases are available through the website of a 
prominent New York attorney named Ray Beckerman who is involved in much of the 
peer-to-peer litigation. This made accessing the necessary materials for the textual 
analysis of the institutional discourse a relatively easy affair.  
In addition to these court cases I also utilized a number of peer-to-peer file-
sharing websites as a platform from which to solicit participants for both interviews and 
an online survey. These sites include p2pNet.net, TorrentFreak.com, WePirates.org, 
P2PTalk.org, Systema.in, InstantIdiocy.com, and IDTorrent.org. I gained access to a 
population of file-sharers from which I drew a sample of 346 online survey respondents.  
Interviews were conducted using Skype/email and the online survey was conducted using 
SurveyMonkey. As this research project is limited to mapping those structures which 
condition the activities of people extending out from the local to the larger social totality, 
it was not necessarily my intent to draw a sample from which generalizable conclusions 
could be drawn. I am not concerned here so much with personal biographies or with 
generating analytical categories of file-sharers—though the sample certainly serves as a 
solid basis for the generation of such categories. Instead it is my hope that this research 
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project provides a map of the coordinates of the intersecting structures implicated in the 
struggle between the competing visions of peer-to-peer file-sharing. The real target for 
analysis is the social system of commoning more so than the community of peer-to-peer 
file-sharers. That is to say that this project is more concerned with technology-as-practice 
and its intersection with other legal and economic institutions than it is with making 
generalizations about a specific community of peer-to-peer file-sharers. 
DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS 
Survey Research 
One component of this research entails an investigation of the 
everyday/everynight practices of the individual file-sharers which bring them into contact 
with information commodities. A second component of this research entails an 
investigation of the mobilization of legal resources in defense of individual file-sharers. 
An investigation of these two dimensions allows me to analyze the structures through 
which this legal conflict with the copyright holders is shaped and made possible. 
Accordingly this research includes survey research of individual file-sharers. This 
component of the project entailed the use of an online questionnaire posted to 
SurveyMonkey.com. The objective of the survey was to gather data to facilitate the 
development of categories of file-sharing practices along the structural dimensions of 
signification, domination, and legitimation. These categories will serve as the foundation 
for future survey research on file-sharing. In addition, the online survey served as an 
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initial point of contact with potential future interviewees. Preliminary questions are 
presented below. 
Possible Survey Questions for File-Sharers 
Signification (symbolic orders/modes of discourse) 
What is peer-to-peer file-sharing? Describe for me how peer-to-peer file-sharing works. 
How do you do it? 
Why do you use peer-to-peer file-sharing? When do you use it and for what purpose? 
How do you contribute to the peer-to-peer community? How do you decide when and 
how much to contribute? 
How did you decide to share songs using peer-to-peer technology? 
When would you use a pay service like iTunes? 
What is copyright? What function does it serve? 
What did you know about copyright when you started peer-to-peer file-sharing? 
Did you think you were breaking the law? 
How did participating in peer-to-peer file-sharing affect your views about copyright? 
Do you feel like you own the songs you have acquired through peer-to-peer file-sharing? 
When do you own music? What should someone be able to do with a song once they own 
it? 
How much control should the artists have over their songs? How about the fans? 
Is it fair to call the peer-to-peer community pirates? Are they criminals? 
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Domination (The mobilization of authoritative and allocative resources) 
How did you first hear about file-sharing? 
What do you need in order to start file-sharing? What technology do you need? 
How did you learn to do it? Did anyone help you? Who? Did you read about it? Where? 
How do you hear about new music? Do you tell others about the music you enjoy? 
Is there an online peer-to-peer community? Do you feel like you belong? Do you have 
friends in the community? 
How do you communicate with people in the peer-to-peer community? What sorts of 
things do you talk about? 
Do you have friends in the physical offline world who are also members of the peer-to-
peer file-sharing community? 
What groups or individuals have been the most sympathetic to your case? Who has not? 
Who has helped you fight the RIAA‘s lawsuit and how have they helped you? 
What did you know about the other people targeted by the RIAA? Did you have contact 
with any of these people? 
What are the most important resources you have had in your legal defense? 
What do your friends and family think about your case? 
What do you think the final outcome of the RIAA‘s attempt to stop copyright 
infringement in peer-to-peer networks will be? Why? 
Legitimation (Standards, Values and Norms) 
Do we need copyright law?  For what? Does copyright law need to change? If so, in what 
way? 
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Do you think copyright law is too restrictive? In what way? What types of 
copying/sharing should be allowed? 
Should peer-to-peer file-sharing be made illegal? What reasons would you give? 
What position does the RIAA take on peer-to-peer file-sharing? What do you think of the 
RIAA? What is the function of the RIAA? Had you ever heard of them before your case? 
Why do you think the RIAA sued you? 
What has the RIAA mischaracterized about you or your case? 
How did you come to decide to fight the RIAA‘s lawsuit? Why didn‘t you just take the 
initial settlement? 
What issues were at stake in your case? 
How would you have liked the courts to decide? 
What do you think about the size of the damages in your case? Generally speaking, what 
do you think a fair level of compensation would be for individual songs? 
Who do you think has more control over songs—the RIAA or the artists? 
How should musicians feel about peer-to-peer file-sharing? Are there benefits for them? 
What effect has this experience had on your expectations for the future? 
Analysis of File-Sharing Litigation 
A second component of the research project involves an analysis of the legal 
arguments made as part of the actual litigation in each case. Many of these texts are 
included as part of Appendix 2. The use of these statutes, court documents, and legal 
opinions entailed the creation of analytical categories for the various framings of legal 
arguments used therein. These categories are (1) legitimate versus illegitimate uses of 
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communication systems; (2) legitimate versus illegitimate uses of informational and 
cultural goods; and (3) legitimate versus illegitimate use of court resources. These 
categories are interrelated, but not necessarily mutually exclusive. Similarly Woo (2000) 
developed three analytical categories for her textual analysis of the framing of legal 
arguments. These included (1) authors versus copyright holders; (2) public interest versus 
private property rights; and (3) authorship versus work. Because her categories were 
developed for court cases which turned on issues pitting authors against publishers, these 
categories have limited applicability for the current study. Accordingly, the categories 
developed herein turn more on the issue of infringement itself and the applicability of 
copyright law to private individuals.  
 As to the specific types of court documents which will be used as a part of this 
content analysis, I consider both primary and secondary sources. The reports of cases 
generally tend to be reflective primarily of the judges‘ opinions and legal reasoning. 
These reports are only indirectly representative of the arguments made by the plaintiffs 
and defendants. Therefore my analysis includes the briefs filed by each litigant. 
Furthermore, because of the high profile nature of each of these cases, a number of 
amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the courts. These too inform the analysis as many 
of these briefs were filed by organizations who claim to be advocates of the digital 
commons. Generally speaking, I examine all of the available court documents and consult 
secondary sources when available. 
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LIMITATIONS 
The current research project is limited to the extent that it is primarily exploratory 
and explanatory in nature. Therefore, the current research project will have very little to 
offer in the way of generalizability. Although much of the emphasis in this research is 
directed at social institutions which coordinate social practices, this should not be read as 
a type of structuralist analysis. The situatedness of the individual actors as well as the 
contingent nature of the practices which are (re)created and expressed through the very 
structures which are the target of analysis prevent me from arriving at any universal 
conclusions. That is simply not the intent. As Giddens (1986) explains: 
That there are no known universal laws in social science is not just happenstance. 
If it is correct to say, as I have argued, that the causal mechanisms in social 
scientific generalizations depend upon actors‘ reasons, in the context of a ‗mesh‘ 
of intended and unintended consequences of action, we can readily see why such 
generalizations do not have a universal form. For the content of agents‘ 
knowledgeability, the question of how ‗situated‘ it is and the validity of the 
propositional content of that knowledge—all these will influence the 
circumstances in which those generalizations hold. (345) 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I do not intend any part of this research to have negative legal consequences for any of 
the individual defendants or file-sharers used as a part of this study. With regard to 
ongoing cases or those awaiting appeal, I have been in contacted the respective legal 
counsels to ensure the legal well-being of their clients is maintained. With regard to the 
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individual file-sharers used as part of this study I have kept their identities anonymous 
whenever it is pertinent to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, I hope to provide a clearer picture of the social tensions 
around copyright law as they pertain to the targeting of individual file-sharers. First, I 
hope to get a better picture of the knowledgeability (both discursive and practical) of file-
sharers with respect to their everyday confrontations with information commodities. Each 
social system (commodification and commoning) employs a particular mode of 
discourse. An examination of the meanings embedded in the discursive and routine 
practices of individual file-sharers should begin to unearth this particular structural 
dimension of the social system of commoning. Second, I would like to illuminate the 
structures of domination which have enabled individuals to create and maintain a digital 
commons as well as to defend themselves in their conflict with copyright holders. In 
other words, how has the mobilization of both authoritative and allocative resources 
transformed the nature of the conflict? And third, I hope to shed light on the structures of 
legitimation which produce the values, norms and standards of the social system of 
commoning. The ultimate aim of this research project is to shed light on the differing 
understandings of file-sharing exhibited by competing social systems. After a close 
examination of the structural dimensions of the social system of commoning, I hope to 
establish the existence of a set of social relations centered on the practice of online 
commoning which actively resist the ongoing processes of commodification. 
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Chapter 4 Histories of Commodification and Commoning in the 
Production and Distribution of Music 
 In 1971 the distinguished Marxist historian E. P. Thompson wrote an article 
entitle ―The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century‖ in which 
he attempted to articulate the underlying principles informing the actions of commoners 
engaged in food riots during the 18th century. In contrast to the traditional depiction of 
the riots as a product of angry and uncontrolled mobs, Thompson established empirically 
the existence of a complex belief system which informed the actions of rioters as they 
intervened in the market system. Thompson referred to the ideas and values which 
sustained the commoners‘ belief system as a moral economy. In this context the moral 
economy refers to the interplay between non-capitalist cultural attitudes and economic 
activity, often manifesting as popular resistance to capitalist social divisions. According 
to Thompson, the moral economy of 18th century English commoners figured 
significantly in thousands of uprisings against the merchant class and nascent bourgeois 
institutions. The notion of a moral economy has subsequently been employed by other 
scholars like James Scott (1977) who analyzed the moral economy of peasant rebellions 
in Southeast Asia. The concept of a moral economy has proven useful to scholars 
attempting to uncover the politics of social phenomena which may at first glance appear 
to be unguided by anything more than a mob mentality at one extreme or pure self-
interest at the other. 
There is certainly a temptation to de-politicize peer-to-peer file-sharing by 
ignoring the social cohesion among file-sharers or by portraying them as purely 
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opportunistic individuals simply taking what has been made freely available to them. Yet 
it would be a mistake to overlook the underlying social system of commoning which 
conditions the practice of file-sharing. To understand the antagonism between 
commodification and commoning in the context of file-sharing we are required to 
investigate the logic of each social system—including the political economy which 
informs the activities of content-producers and communication industries and the moral 
economy which informs the activities of peer-to-peer file-sharers. That is to say that an 
analysis must be made of the historical development of the competing conceptualizations 
for the structuring of social relations. This is not a history in which some previous, more 
authentic form is displaced or appropriated by capitalism as commodification pushes out 
commoning.  Nor is this a history of revolutionary social practices explicitly designed to 
overthrow the existing social relations of capital. At times these competing forms of 
social relations have intermingled and co-existed; at other times they have come into 
open conflict. And despite the recent historical predominance of social relations 
predicated on the capitalist logic of accumulation, the social relations of commoning have 
always existed as potentialities or openings—even when it appeared that the only 
allowable or possible social relations were those of capital. 
The antagonism between the commoning and commodification of information is 
grounded in a long and complex history which predates the current conflicts over peer-to-
peer file-sharing. The purpose of the current chapter is to survey that history with an eye 
to contextualizing the belief systems of the file-sharers detailed later in this dissertation. 
Bearing in mind that structures are the rules and resources organized as properties of 
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social systems, it is necessary to show where commodification and commoning are 
structurally divergent. Therefore, this chapter begins with an overview of the structural 
dimensions of the social system of contemporary mass media and the social system of 
digital commoners. This is followed by an analysis of the development of the U.S. music 
industry in which I emphasize how the structural dimensions of signification, domination, 
and legitimation are implicated in the reproduction of the social system of 
commodification. In short, this section demonstrates how the music industry has 
attempted to bring the circulation of informational and cultural goods within the logic of 
accumulation through a steady increase in the scope and duration of intellectual property 
rights. The music industry has played a pivotal role in the historical development of 
copyright law and the economic development of the production and distribution of 
informational and cultural goods. The second half of the chapter is devoted to an 
historical overview of the structural development of peer-based communication on the 
Internet. Specific attention is given to the structural displacement of the peer-based model 
of communication by the client/server model. This is followed by an analysis of the 
technical and legal dimensions of the emergence of peer-to-peer file-sharing systems like 
the Napster, Gnutella, and FastTrack networks.
25
 
ECONOMICS OF MASS MEDIA 
 The current economic landscape of the mass media is characterized by the 
dominance of a relatively small number of very large and powerful media conglomerates. 
                                                 
25 Because the BitTorrent protocol did not feature significantly in the RIAA litigation campaign, it is not 
considered in detail here. Chapter 6 considers recent technological and legal developments with BitTorrent. 
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Croteau and Hoynes (2001) have identified four broad developments in the structural 
trends of the media industry since the 1980s which have precipitated the current 
economic landscape. First, firms have experienced growth as major media corporations 
have been caught up in a wave of mergers and acquisitions beginning in the mid-1980s. 
Second, there has been horizontal and vertical integration as firms have moved into 
various media platforms and strata of economic production.  Third, corporations have 
pursued a program of globalization to exploit economies of scale and expand sales into 
secondary and overseas markets. And finally, there has been an increase in the 
concentration of ownership as single firms acquire more and more holdings within a 
market. The upshot of these trends is a 21st century media market characterized by 
oligopoly.
26
 For example, the U.S. motion picture industry is dominated by six 
corporations which account for over 90 percent of the industry‘s revenues. Likewise, the 
U.S. music industry is dominated by four corporations which account for almost 90 
percent of all music sales (McChesney, 2004). Moreover, that sector of the U.S. economy 
dedicated to the production of copyrighted entertainment commodities has become 
increasingly vital to the overall economy. The RIAA states that based upon U.S. 
Department of Commerce statistics, the copyright industries account for six percent of 
the nation‘s GDP (Bender & Wang, 2009). The International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA)
27
 found that between 2004 and 2007 the real growth rates of the core 
                                                 









 were more than twice that achieved by the U.S. economy as a 
whole, accounting for $889.1 billion dollars, or 6.44% of the U.S. GDP in 2007 ("IIPA‘s 
New Economic Study Reveals the Copyright Industries Remain a Critical Driving Force 
in the U.S. Economy," 2009). 
All four of the broad economic developments in the media landscape cited by 
Croteau and Hoynes (2001)—growth, integration, globalization, and concentration—are 
reflective of a desire on the part of capital to stabilize markets in entertainment 
commodities. Critics of these economic developments have pointed to the deleterious 
effects on consumer choice and the diversity of voices in the media landscape 
(McChesney, 2004). Yet other scholars have argued that the large size of these firms and 
the concentration in ownership has not reduced the variety of entertainment commodities 
available to consumers (Compaine, 2004; Hull, 2004). Mainstream economists often 
point to the plethora of available media outlets as evidence of a robust marketplace with 
plenty of everything for everyone. Critics of this perspective have responded that an 
increased number of media outlets does not necessarily correspond with diversity. For 
example, Croteau and Hoynes (2001) emphasize that ―More content does not necessarily 
mean different content‖ (p. 81). Likewise, Bagdikian (2000) acknowledges the large 
number of media outlets but argues that the ―large numbers deepen the problem of 
excessively concentrated control‖ as ―each owner controls ever more formidable 
communications power‖ (p. 222). 
                                                 
28 IIPA defines the ―core‖ industries are those copyright-related industries whose primary purpose is to 
produce and/or distribute copyright materials. 
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 A firm‘s decision to pursue a strategy of growth through mergers and acquisitions 
represents an exodus from intra-firm relations premised on market competition. In theory, 
the movement is away from a market characterized by perfect competition in which no 
firm is large enough to independently affect prices in any meaningful way and toward a 
market characterized by monopoly in which there is a single producer of a good with no 
other firms producing close substitutes. This affords the sole producer considerable 
control over pricing. In practice however, most real world markets (including those for 
entertainment commodities) are instead subject to imperfect competition—neither 
perfectly competitive nor monopolistic (Samuelson, 1964). A strategy of growth through 
the accumulation of market share therefore reflects an attempt to move toward the 
monopoly end of the spectrum in order to avoid the coercive forces of competition. Once 
a sufficient market share is achieved, the firm is less susceptible to the coercive exercise 
of power by both competing firms and labor, giving it greater leverage over the rate of 
capital accumulation.
29
 This is the position advanced by Noam (2006) who argues that 
the communication industries underwent economic concentration around the time of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Many of these firms initiated a series of acquisitions 
and mergers to re-stabilize markets after deregulation decreased barriers to entry. 
Growth through acquisitions and mergers is often part of a larger strategy in 
which a firm attempts to become more horizontally and vertically integrated in the hopes 
of reaching new markets and achieving greater efficiencies in production. Doyle (2002) 
explains that ―A horizontal merger occurs when two firms at the same stage in the supply 
chain or who are engaged in the same activity combine forces‖ (p. 22). Horizontal 
                                                 
29 Here the rate of capital accumulation simply refers to the proportion of surplus value realized by capital. 
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integration allows a firm to increase its market share and obtain economies of scale. In 
the media industry this desire to exploit economies of scale has produced an explosion in 
media outlets as firms expand into secondary and foreign markets. These secondary 
markets allow firms to reach larger audiences and generate more revenue. Most of the 
large media conglomerates are transnational corporations which operate internationally 
through a decentralized management structure. 
Conversely, Doyle (2002) explains the logic behind vertical integration as a desire 
to control a supply chain in which: 
…the activities of an industry are ordered in a sequence which starts ‗upstream‘ at 
the early stages in the production process, works its way through succeeding or 
‗downstream‘ stages where the product is processed and refined, and finishes up 
as it is supplied or sold to the customer. (18) 
A firm‘s desire for increased market share drives it to expand into other stages of the 
production process. Vertical integration insulates incumbent industries from competitive 
forces by raising the barriers to entry. Negotiating deals with outside companies at every 
stage in the supply chain causes firms to incur higher transactions costs. For example, the 
ability of large motion picture companies to capitalize on the lowered transaction costs 
associated with ownership of the entire vertical supply chain (from studio facilities to 
exhibition outlets such as theatres or television channels) puts smaller independent 
motion picture companies at a tremendous disadvantage. This amounts to an exodus of 
capital from the coercive forces of competition. A vertically integrated firm can allocate 
resources internally and apart from typical market relations (Coase, 1993). In much the 
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same way as people engaging in class struggle sometimes opt out of the social relations 
of capital, firms engage in an exodus from market relations by withdrawing from the 
marketplace and establishing their own internal systems of resource allocation. Individual 
firms often find competition inefficient and incompatible with their own program of 
accumulation and opt instead for direct control over the means of production and 
distribution. In this sense individual firms contribute to a structural order of domination 
in which allocative resources (fixed capital) and authoritative resources (variable capital) 
are mobilized in such a way as to bring the material and social world within the capitalist 
logic of accumulation. 
 Yet as much as vertical integration is testament to the unprecedented control of 
large media conglomerates over the mode of information production and their ability to 
insulate themselves from the coercive forces of competition, it is simultaneously a sign of 
their vulnerability to disruption. Every point along the vertical supply chain is dependent 
on the proper functioning of all the other stages. For example, the successful delivery of a 
motion picture DVD to an audience is dependent on control over the physical distribution 
of the DVD, the manufacture of the DVDs, the production of the content, and the 
procurement of the necessary financing to cover the production budget. If there is 
disruption at any one of these stages the entire flow is threatened. Doyle (2002) 
emphasizes the potential threat to a media company that would arise should a competing 
firm gain control over all the substitute inputs or facilities at a point upstream in the 
integrated flow. The threat to the company is equally grave if labor or even audiences 
leverage control at any stage in this flow. That is to say, it doesn‘t necessarily take a 
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competing firm to create a disruption. Intellectual property law acts as the cement which 
holds the entire chain together. Should the means of information production and 
distribution become dispersed throughout society and the laws which govern information 
commodities become unable to keep pace with these technological developments, then 
the ability of a company to control the processes of production becomes indeterminate. 
Such is the disruptive potential of peer-to-peer technologies. 
ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS 
 The notion that peer-to-peer file-sharing has been disruptive to the existing 
business models of the entertainment industries is a widely held sentiment among both 
academics and members of the business community (Bainwol, 2009; Pouwelse, 
Garbacki, Epema, & Sips, 2008). Yet as Vaidhyanathan (2003) reminds us, the conflict 
over peer-to-peer file-sharing is about much more than movies and songs. Rather, peer-
to-peer communication has altered the basis of exchange for social relations, cultural 
production, and political activity. Madden (2009) asserts that the repercussions of peer-
to-peer file-sharing extend far beyond the motion picture and music industries: 
…patients are sharing peer-to-peer expertise on coping with medical conditions 
and are engaged in efforts to gain free access to vaulted personal health records, 
citizens are networking to increase oversight of politicians and are demanding 
unfettered access to government data. Even online daters—one of the few 
segments of the internet universe willing to pay at the gates of the walled 
garden—are circumventing the paid services and connecting directly via free 
social networking sites. (5) 
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While the disintermediation made possible by contemporary peer-to-peer systems 
may appear novel or revolutionary, it is important to bear in mind that all technological 
advances are accommodated by pre-existing social formations (Winston, 1998). 
Vaidhyanathan (2003) acknowledges the long history of peer-to-peer communication by 
stating: 
This is very old. What we call p2p communicative networks actually reflect and 
amplify—revise and extend—an old ideology or cultural habit. Electronic peer-to-
peer systems like Gnutella merely simulates [sic] other, more familiar forms of 
unmediated, uncensorable, irresponsible, troublesome speech; for example, anti-
royal gossip before the French Revolution, trading cassette tapes among youth 
subcultures such as punk or rap, or the distribution of illicit Islamist cassette tapes 
through the streets and bazaars of Cairo. (4) 
In other words, peer-to-peer file-sharing is grounded in previous moral economies. Our 
understanding of the contemporary conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing may be 
enhanced by an investigation of the values and ideas which have accommodated previous 
technological advances in peer-based communications like ham radio or electronic 
bulletin board systems. Though a detailed examination of peer-based communication is 
beyond the scope of the current study, a brief overview of the salient trends in the peer-
based technologies of the Internet is warranted. Such an investigation requires that we 
acknowledge where peer-to-peer networks, when considered as technologies-in-practice, 
have facilitated both commoning and commodification. 
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Peer-to-peer file-sharing is informed by moral economies which predate 
digitalization. As with contemporary peer-to-peer systems, the technological predecessors 
of current file-sharing systems were often characterized as piracy. This is a misleading 
metaphor at best. Seafaring pirates stole in order to sell their spoils while peer-to-peer 
file-sharers share cultural artifacts. That being said, even if one was to accept this 
metaphor, a distinction must still be drawn between commercial piracy and domestic 
piracy. Whereas commercial piracy may take the form of back alley shops churning out 
pirated copies of DVDs for sale on the black market, domestic copying rarely results in 
economic exchange. And as Johns (2009) argues, the initial emergence of domestic 
copying ―terrified the culture industries in their formative years of the mid-twentieth 
century more than prior piracies‖ not because it resulted in black markets full of 
substitutable goods, but ―because it implied a radical decentralization of cultural 
production‖ (p. 432). Johns traces these early instances of domestic copying back to the 
introduction of magnetic tape in the 1940s and the appearance of small fan communities 
of jazz and opera aficionados. These amateur connoisseurs of music quickly came into 
conflict with the recording industry because of their conflicting sets of values. The record 
labels saw music as a means to the realization of profit while fans saw themselves as the 
stewards of precious cultural artifacts. The uneasy relation between capitalism and art 
drove these dedicated fan communities to begin home copying as a means to keep 
culturally valuable yet commercially unprofitable music in circulation long after the 
record labels had lost interest in producing new copies while remaining disinclined to 
relinquish monopoly control over their intellectual properties. By 1982 the recording 
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industry estimated its losses due to home copying enabled by magnetic tape at $2.85 
billion per year, with $1.13 billion coming from copying of content already owned by the 
individual copier and the rest coming from the copying of content borrowed from other 
sources (Hull, 2004). 
 While the moral economy of contemporary peer-to-peer file-sharing can be seen 
in these early instances of home copying, it has also been informed by the values and 
ideas of the digerati and hacker communities. These groups advocated belief systems 
premised on sharing, access to information, and technological/scientific progress. Again 
Johns (2009) traces the origins of the moral economy of the early Internet pioneers back 
to an era pre-dating digitalization when radio amateurs still inhabited the electromagnetic 
spectrum and ―phreakers‖ exploited the telephone network for their own amusement. 
Each of these groups constituted self-conscious communities that came into legal conflict 
with the radio and telephone trusts. Johns describes values and ideas inherited by early 
computer hackers thusly: 
At a time when computers were still largely the preserve of specialist technicians, 
these young virtuosi held a basic commitment to direct ―hands-on‖ experience in 
order to produce their hacks. Emulating the communities of radio amateurs and 
phone experimenters, they insisted on the importance of freedom to engage 
directly with the technology itself. Accessing technologies and sharing the 
resulting knowledge was in their view essential for technical and even social 
progress. (474) 
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But it would also be a mistake to simply equate the interests of the digerati with 
those of peer-to-peer file-sharers.  As Barbrook and Cameron (2001) have argued, the 
development of the Internet has been informed by the competing visions of both the anti-
corporate do-it yourself (DIY) cultures of the New Left and the libertarian free market 
utopianism of the New Right. These authors have referred to this as the ―Californian 
Ideology‖ which ―…simultaneously reflects the disciplines of market economics and the 
freedom of hippie artisanship‖ and is ―…made possible only through a nearly universal 
belief in technological determinism‖ (p. 367). Barbrook and Cameron assert that the 
rhetoric of free markets, uninhibited flows of information, and inevitable technological 
progress functioned to obscure the gift economies of amateurs and hobbyists which were 
also a precondition for the eventual corporate takeover and restructuring of the Internet. 
For these reasons we cannot cleanly equate the re-emergence of peer-based 
communication in the form of contemporary file-sharing applications with resistance to 
capitalism. The interests of CEOs and software developers are not necessarily those of 
peer-to-peer file shares. The current crop of peer-to-peer file-sharers is made up of not 
just the digerati, but everyday people whose daily concerns may have very little to do 
with notions of scientific and technological progress or industrial restructuring. Many 
peer-to-peer file-sharers possess a limited technical proficiency which extends little 
further than their ability to interact with the client software. 
The commitment to free flows of information is common among those individuals 
who design and market peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms. Generally speaking, the anti-
incumbents of industrial restructuring tend to favor unfettered access to information as a 
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matter of market entry. However, the commitment of peer-to-peer file-sharers to the free 
flow of cultural artifacts is not derived from the coercive forces of capitalist competition 
but from the antagonistic social relation of capital. On the one hand, the digerati seek 
unhindered access to free flows of information in order to keep economic input costs low 
and to accelerate the capitalist logic of production. On the other hand, peer-to-peer file-
sharers seek unhindered access to free flows of information to lower the transaction costs 
of noncommercial production and distribution of informational and cultural artifacts. 
Benkler (2006) argues that recent technological developments have enhanced the 
autonomy of individuals to engage in peer production, to do more for and by themselves, 
and in loose commonality with others—outside of the market sphere. Generally speaking, 
Benkler defines autonomy as ―the relative capacity of individuals to be the authors of 
their lives‖ within the constraints imposed by physical and social circumstances (p. 141). 
Benkler‘s networked information economy therefore represents the emergence of a ―new 
set of technical, economic, social, and institutional relations‖ which facilitate greater 
levels of individual autonomy (p. 130). Benkler is describing the structural dimensions of 
the moral economy of peer-to-peer file-sharing. However, the capacity to actively 
participate in the authoring and distribution of culture is often a goal of both anti-
incumbent firms and peer-to-peer file-sharers, although the shared objective is purely 
accidental. The interests of upstart capitalists are only aligned with peer-to-peer file-
sharers to the extent that they can exploit the moral economy of file-sharers for profit. As 
we will see shortly, the historical tendency for successful anti-incumbent firms is to raise 
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the barriers to entry and push for strengthened intellectual property protections once they 
have achieved sufficient market share. 
CONFLICTING RATIONALES 
The conflict between the social systems of commodification and commoning 
emerges from the latter‘s emphasis on greater levels of autonomy in the processes of 
cultural production and distribution and the former‘s drive to harness that creativity for 
the purpose of increasing the rate of capital accumulation. The traditional economic 
model adopted by the mass media required that media products be constructed as finished 
goods meant solely for consumption by paying customers (Fiske, 2004). Information 
commodities were constructed as finished goods even though the mass media blatantly 
relied on the unacknowledged labor of audiences who actively interpreted and circulated 
the messages they received from the culture industries. Today new spaces have been 
opened for active engagement with information commodities where people reappropriate, 
remix, transform, and redistribute cultural artifacts. There is more structural flexibility 
today than in previous periods. In fact, capital has demonstrated considerable success in 
harnessing the creativity of these cooperative social arrangements. But the free labor of 
audiences always includes an explosive tendency towards ever greater levels of 
autonomy which in turn compel capitalists to exert considerable coercive power to 
circumscribe the entire process within the logic of accumulation.  
Because media artifacts are by nature cultural goods the process of commodifying 
them requires a fairly complex and contingent set of structures. Doyle (2002) states: 
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Feature films, television broadcasts, books and music are not merely commercial 
products but may also be appreciated for the ways they enrich our cultural 
environment. Many cultural goods share the quality that their value for consumers 
is tied up with the information or messages they convey, rather than with the 
material carrier of that information (the radio spectrum, CD, etc.). Messages and 
meanings are, of course, intangible. So media content is not ‗consumable‘ in the 
purest sense of this term. (12) 
Cultural goods are often public goods with extremely low marginal costs.
30
 The essential 
value derived from these goods is not tangible and is not used up during consumption. 
This in turn means that it is sometimes very difficult to exclude people from these goods. 
The inability of firms to control the use of public goods then speaks to the difficulty of 
harnessing the free labor of audiences in a way which is consistent with the capitalist 
mode of production. That is to say, in the context of media commodities, the failure to 
control public goods is the failure of capitalists to convert the leisure activity of the 
working class into unwaged work. 
It is absolutely critical for the entertainment industries to ensure the continued 
alienation of cultural goods from consumers because the failure to do so is a failure to 
constitute the working class as a consumer class. And though in the past various 
technological advances have occasionally threatened the ability of these industries to 
extract a price in exchange for access to cultural goods, industrial restructuring has thus 
far prevented these potential crises from toppling the system. Yet the combination of 
                                                 
30 Marginal cost for media firms refers to the cost of supplying a media good or service to one extra 
customer. 
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digitalization and networking represent an unprecedented challenge for the entertainment 
industries (Doyle, 2002). To better understand this challenge I now turn to the historical 
development of the music industry to show how it reacted to previous encounters with 
technological development and crises of control. 
THE U.S. MUSIC INDUSTRY 
What people commonly refer to as the music industry is actually composed of 
three distinct though interrelated types of business:  the recording business, the 
publishing business, and the live performance business. In the discussion that follows, all 
three aspects of the music industry will be addressed with particular attention given to the 
recording and publishing components. The intention of the following section is to 
demonstrate how the historical development of the industry and related technology has 
been conditioned by the economic imperative to commodify informational and cultural 
goods on the one hand and resistance to those processes on the other. Following Hull‘s 
(2004) example, we can divide the historical survey of the music industry into five 
periods. First was the period in the second half of the 19th century during which the 
pertinent technologies emerged. This was followed by a period during which the 1909 
Copyright Act helped lay the foundation for the commercialization of music production. 
The next period saw the near death and rebirth of the industry as it passed through the 
Great Depression and into the postwar period. Then in the mid-1950s the emergence of 
Rock and Roll dramatically transformed music into a mass industry. And finally with the 
introduction of the compact disc in 1982, the music industry enjoyed a period of 
unparalleled economic success for almost two decades before the advent of new 
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communication technologies and practices eventually challenged the industry‘s 
hegemonic position.  
Origins of the U.S. Music Industry 
The origins of the recording industry can be traced back to Thomas Edison who in 
1877 introduced a cylindrical prototype of the modern phonograph. According to Starr 
(2004), Edison initially envisioned his ―talking machine‖ as serving both entertainment 
and business needs. But after a brief surge of interest a stable market failed to materialize. 
The technology lay dormant during the remainder of Edison‘s initial patent. Things 
changed in 1887 when a former associate of Bell Telephone, Emile Berliner, improved 
upon the device‘s original design by replacing Edison‘s horizontal cylinder with the more 
familiar platter or disc. As Hull (2004) notes, Berliner‘s ―music machine‖ improved upon 
Edison‘s ―talking machine‖ primarily by making it vastly easier to make copies of the 
original recordings, ―…thereby opening up much greater possibility for a mass-produced 
item for the general population‖ (p. 17). Berliner‘s business, the Berliner Gramophone 
Company, would give rise to the famous Victor Talking Machine Company in 1901.
31
 
Not to be undone by his competition, Edison improved upon his own design in 1888, still 
expecting the device to be used primarily by businessmen for dictation. His improved 
device soon found a market as an entertainment medium though in a manner similar to 
the kinetoscope. As Starr (2004) explains, by 1890 Edison‘s phonograph ―was enjoying a 
wave of popularity‖ (p. 299) as an early coin-in-the-slot prototype of the modern day 
                                                 
31  The Victor recording label was eventually acquired by RCA in 1929. 
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jukebox in hotel lobbies, train stations, and storefront parlors which would later be home 
to Edison‘s kinetoscopes. 
Edison began offering his cylinders for sale to the public as early as 1889. In the 
1890s cylinder recordings were sold primarily via mail order directly from the record 
label.
32
 But as the century came to a close the price of phonographs dipped and people 
began purchasing them for domestic entertainment. Increased sales of phonographs in 
turn stimulated sales for recorded music. In 1895 the first brick and mortar record store 
opened its doors in Philadelphia. By 1899 sales of phonorecords (both cylinders and 
platters) had reached an estimated annual rate of 3,750,000 units. Within ten years the 
estimated annual sales of phonorecords increased by more than sevenfold to 27,500,000 
with over 1.3 million phonographs sold (Hull, 2004). Moreover, by the close of the first 
decade of the 20th century the recording industry could already be characterized as an 
oligopoly as just three firms enjoyed a powerful patent monopoly over recording and 
playback technology—Edison, Victor, and Columbia. However, these three labels would 
see their patent monopolies come to a close in 1917 at which point other labels began to 
emerge. 
At the turn of the 20th century the music publishing industry was also selling 
millions of copies of sheet music. According to Hull (2004), at the close of the first 
decade of the 20th century publishers could potentially sell as many as two million sheet 
music copies of a hit song. ―Even though sound recordings were catching on in 1920 and 
accounted for about $3 million dollars of publishing revenue, sheet music sales still 
                                                 
32 Record label refers to a company whose brand and trademark is used as part of the manufacture, 
distribution, and promotion of recorded music performances. 
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accounted for more than $16 million, about 88 percent, of publishing income‖ (p. 70). 
This was the legendary period of Tin Pan Alley—the name given to the concentration of 
publishers in New York City at the turn of the century. Hundreds of small publishers 
would ride a wave of commercial success as vaudeville thrived and the public became 
obsessed with popular music. Not until the Great Depression would music publishers see 
their sales decline as the recording industry eclipsed and eventually dwarfed the 
publishing industry. It is worth noting that at this point in the history of the music 
industry a substantial component of its economic fortunes was premised on amateur 
performance. Everyday people performed their own renditions of popular songs while 
seated at pianos surrounded by friends and family. In this sense there is considerable 
continuity between the consumers of published music in the early years of the 20th 
century and the Remix culture of the 21st century as both groups actively engage(d) with 
cultural artifacts through appropriation, transformation, production, and distribution. 
The Copyright Act of 1909 helped to lay the foundation for the development of a 
commercial music industry both by establishing copyright in the mechanical reproduction 
of music and by creating a statutory limit to the royalties owed by recording companies to 
publishing companies. Significantly, the 1909 Act did not establish copyright in recorded 
music—something that would not be instituted until 1972. Although the publishing 
industry was still considerably larger than the recording industry in 1909, the recording 
industry had become large enough that it began to draw the ire of publishers whose 
revenue depended on the sale of licenses for access to their catalog of compositions. As is 
the case in many burgeoning industries the anti-incumbent firms of the music industry 
 162 
were resistant to intellectual property regimes. Specifically, the record labels were 
initially resistant to the expansion of copyright to the music business as they realized the 
cost of negotiating individual licenses with publishers could dramatically increase their 
input costs. Therefore, the 1909 revision to the Copyright Act sought to secure the 
position of both publishers and labels by giving the mechanical right to publishers while 
simultaneously constraining publishers‘ control over the labels‘ input costs by subjecting 
the establishment of rights in mechanical recordings to a system of compulsory 
licensing.
33
 Consequently, by the end of the 1920s the music industry had become a 
relatively stable business with annual sales of about $75 million (Hull, 2004). In essence 
the 1909 revision attempted to dampen the impact on the publishing industry while 
facilitating an orderly restructuring of music consumption in the home to recorded music. 
The early stabilization of the industry was nearly derailed during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. As the twenties came to a close, another interested party 
emerged to potentially affect the course of the music industry—broadcasters. The 
intervening years between the passage of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications 
Act of 1934 were witness to a period of struggle in which the nascent commercial 
broadcasting industry took control of the electromagnetic spectrum (McChesney, 1993). 
Unsurprisingly, the broadcasting industry was also initially resistant to the establishment 
of copyright in recorded music since this would potentially increase their own input costs. 
Furthermore, and with little hint of irony, the record companies themselves made an 
unsuccessful attempt to petition the courts to prevent broadcasters from playing their 
                                                 
33 After having licensed the initial use of a copyrighted work compulsory licensing compels the copyright 
holder to grant the further use of that copyrighted work to others provided they pay a statutory license fee 




 Still, as sheet music sales declined to a low of $2 million in 1933 with the onset 
of the depression, performance revenues from broadcasting kept the publishing industry 
afloat throughout the economic downturn (Hull, 2004). In fact, publishing revenues from 
both radio play and jukeboxes would maintain publishers into the 1940s. Nevertheless, 
the publishing industry had entered into a period of long decline and would never fully 
regain their former position. By the mid 1950s publishers were looking for new sources 
of revenue as their sales declined in large part due to the displacement of the piano from 
the domestic sphere by radio and television. 
The recording industry, on the other hand, with no equivalent revenue source like 
publishing rights, went through significant restructuring after retail sales of phonorecords 
plummeted in the 1930s. Edison Records closed down in 1929 after the initial market 
crash. In the same year Victor was bought out by the Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) and became RCA Victor. Yet despite the occasional shuffling of top tier 
companies, the recording industry remained an oligopoly well into the 1950s. The 
postwar period saw a dramatic increase in consumer spending which stimulated sales of 
radios, televisions, phonographs, and records. According to Hull (2004), sales of 
playback equipment and recordings grew from $5.5 million in 1933 to $189 million in 
1950.  
The return of a stable market for the recording industry in the post-war period was 
accompanied by various technological improvements including the 45-rpm single, the LP 
(long play) record, and later stereophonic sound. These technological advances presented 
a challenge to the recording industry in terms of standardization. In order to confront 
                                                 
34 See Whiteman and RCA vs. WBO Broadcasting, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). 
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these technical issues the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) was 
established in 1952 ostensibly to administer specifications for the optimal playback of 
vinyl records. It is fair to say that the RIAA, like the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), was borne out of an attempt to standardize the content and delivery of 
information commodities free from government interference. And in a manner very 
reminiscent of the MPAA, after 1951-1952 the RIAA took an early and aggressive 
interest in promoting copyright for recorded music as a means of combating the forms of 
commercial piracy which had accompanied the technological development of 
reproduction and playback systems. Johns (2009) states: 
The RIAA would both lobby for copyright and intervene in its own right to deter, 
prevent, and detect piracy….It hired its own agents, who operated largely outside 
public oversight or control, and used any legal tools it could think of. (444-445) 
The emergence of rock and roll in 1955 forever changed the recording industry. 
During the early 1950s, new recording artists and new labels had emerged but did little to 
challenge the oligopolistic structure of the industry. The explosion in consumer demand 
in the wake of the birth of rock and roll however, brought about greater levels of 
competition as dozens of independent labels tried to keep pace with demand. Record 
sales increased sharply by 44 percent from 1955 to 1956 and the independent labels‘ 
chart share increased to 76 percent in 1958 (Hull, 2004). All told, record sales probably 
more than tripled in the years between 1950 and 1960. Although the sudden success of 
independent labels in the 1950s started to erode the oligopoly of the big record labels, the 
industry was soon transformed by large corporations into a mass medium characterized 
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by high levels of economic concentration and the modern branch distribution system.
35
 
As Hull (2004) observes, ―By 1972 the top five labels controlled only 31.4 percent of the 
album charts, but the top five corporations controlled 58.2 percent of those charts‖ (p. 
124). 
Corporate control over the music industry would continue unabated during the 
1980s. The introduction of the compact disc in 1982 proved to be an economic boon for 
the industry well into the 1990s. The phenomenal growth in CD sales was a product of 
both increased spending on new recording artists as well as catalog-replacement sales. 
But the industry ran afoul of the federal government in the mid-1990s when the FTC 
charged the largest record companies with conspiring to keep prices artificially high. In 
the years leading up to the accusation, intense price competition among retailers had 
caused the retail price of a CD to drop to as low as $9.99 in many stores 
(Ghosemajumder, 2002). Alarmed by the dramatic drop in prices, the record companies 
began threatening to withhold co-op advertising money from retailers who advertised 
CDs for sale below a threshold price. As Hull (2004) explains: 
If a retailer advertised the product for sale below that price, then the label might 
go so far as to stop all advertising funds for all product from the distributor for a 
period of time (WEA‘s policy), or just cut off funds for that particular record 
(BMG‘s policy). Theoretically the store could still sell a recording for less than 
                                                 
35 According to Hull (2004), a ―Branch distributor sells only the labels manufactured by its corporate 
owner or other labels that the parent company has agreed to distribute. The branch distribution companies 
are: WEA (Warner Music Group), UMVD (Vivendi-Universal), Sony Distribution (Sony Music 





, just not advertise that price using money that the label had provided. 
(183) 
The record industry insisted that the policy was meant to insulate smaller stores from 
unfair price competition by larger retail chains that often used low-priced CDs as a loss 
leader to stimulate sales of other merchandise. Unconvinced, the FTC issued an order 
against the big five record labels—Time Warner, Sony, Bertelsmann, EMI, and 
Universal—for violating antitrust law. It was estimated that these companies, which 
controlled 85% of the recording industry‘s $13.7 billion in domestic sales, had extracted 
approximately $500 million in illegal earnings over a four year period (Croteau & 
Hoynes, 2001; Ghosemajumder, 2002). 
The political and deregulatory climate of the 1980s and 1990s had favored 
mergers and acquisitions among media corporations. It was during this period toward the 
end of the 20th century when the current media and entertainment conglomerates began 
to exhibit high levels of growth and economic concentration. By the turn of the 21st 
century the big five record companies which had been targeted by the FTC for 
anticompetitive practices distributed 95% of all music carried by record stores in the U.S. 
(Croteau & Hoynes, 2001). Domestic sales of recorded music topped $14.3 billion in the 
year 2000 (Hull, 2004). And despite the incredible volume of domestic sales, none of 
these companies were actually based in the United States.
37
 Moreover, the major record 
labels accounted for 70% of worldwide music sales between 1997 and 2001 (Hull, 2004). 
                                                 
36 Minimum advertised price. 
37 Warner Music Group was owned by Canadian AOL-Time Warner; Universal Music Group was owned 
by French Vivendi Universal SA; Sony-BMG was jointly owned by the Japanese Sony Corporation and the 
German Bertelsmann, A.G. EMI Ltd. was based out of the United Kingdom. 
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Currently, the music industry exhibits high levels of economic concentration and vertical 
integration in all three of its component areas—recording, publishing, and live 
performance. Despite the relatively high number of recording labels, almost all of the 
independent labels are distributed by a branch of one of the majors.  In terms of 
publishing, each label typically has its own affiliated publishing company. The three 
largest music publishers are themselves part of three of the largest recording 
conglomerates—EMI, Warner, and Universal. And though the live performance 
component of the music industry is not given explicit consideration here, there is 
considerable horizontal and vertical integration in this area as well.
38
 
Economics of the Music Industry 
Major music companies are now subsumed within the structure of large media 
conglomerates. Typically, these media conglomerates hold interests in various media 
markets such as motion pictures, television, video games, book and magazine publishing, 
and consumer electronics.  A conglomerate‘s music division is usually further subdivided 
into publishing companies and record companies. Each of these units earns rents from 
copyrights in composition and recordings respectively. The record division can be further 
subdivided into recording, manufacturing, and distribution companies. The record labels 
are often branded and marketed as companies with separate identities from the parent 
corporation. Typically, the manufacturing arm is charged with manufacturing for all of 
the conglomerates‘ record labels. The distribution company usually distributes all of the 
                                                 
38 Polygram, CBS Records, and MCA Records have all entered into the promotion business to varying 
degrees. 
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conglomerate‘s labels and even contracts with additional independent labels desiring 
distribution. Broadly speaking this system typifies the model of vertical integration. 
As Hull (2004) explains, there are three revenue streams which make up the 
economic model of the music industry. Typically income can be derived from the 
utilization, recording, and performance of a song. These three sources of income 
correspond with the music publishing, music recording, and live entertainment industries. 
Although Hull rightly includes the live performance component as part of the economic 
model for the music industry, the focus here is on publishing and recording since they are 
more closely related to the conflicts occurring as a result of the practice of peer-to-peer 
file-sharing. The publishing revenue stream begins when a songwriter, musician, or band 
writes a song. Once a publishing company acquires the rights to the song, the publisher 
can generate income by licensing the use of that song in recordings, broadcast, sheet 
music, and various other adaptations. The recording revenue stream typically begins 
when a recording artist or artists sign a contract with a record label to record a song or 
songs. The master recording is then sent to the manufacturer where a given number of 
copies are assembled for sale. The distributor supplies the finished product to retailers 
who markup the wholesale price and make the recording available for sale to the public. 
Copyright and the Music Industry 
The relationship between copyright law and the music industry differs in some 
fundamental respects from other industries like motion pictures. To understand these 
differences, it is useful to review in brief the development of some of the core tenants of 
copyright law. As Litman (2006) cautions, it is not very instructive to equate copyright 
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with notions of absolute rights of property. The actual ―bundle‖ of rights which comprise 
copyright protections has been a product of complex interactions among industries, 
governments, academics, lawyers, writers, musicians, and everyday people. Scholars of 
copyright often stress that copyright generally amounts to a grant of monopoly control for 
a limited duration to private interests for the purpose of providing an economic incentive 
for the production of informational and cultural goods in exchange for universal public 
access to those goods once the duration of exclusive control has expired. The Copyright 
Act of 1790 set the original duration of copyright protection at 14 years with the 
possibility for an additional 14 year renewal. As for the composition of the ―bundle‖ of 
rights, Vaidhyanathan (2001) explains that it includes: 
…the exclusive right to make copies, authorize others to make copies, create 
derivative works such as translations and displays in other media, sell the work, 
perform the work publicly, and petition a court for relief in case others infringe on 
any of these rights. (20-21) 
These rights can be transferred if one party decides to contract with another. The 
Copyright Act of 1976 stipulated that creative works are vested with protection the 
moment they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. The 1976 Act also stipulated 
that the duration of copyright protection would be extended to the life of the author plus 
fifty years. This duration was again extended to the life of the author plus 70 years
39
 with 
passage of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. 
 In contrast to other categories of creative works, when analyzing recorded music 
one must give consideration to both copyrights in composition and in mechanical 
                                                 
39 For a discussion of corporate authorship see paragraph on the Copyright Act of 1909 below. 
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reproduction. The composition rights to songs are often transferred to publishers who 
then license the various utilizations of the song or songs. These uses may include radio 
and jukebox play, pubic performance—even a license to record the song. The mechanical 
right covers the right to reproduce recorded performances of songs. Significantly, 
copyrights in recorded music were not recognized until 1972 whereas motion pictures, 
for example, have enjoyed copyright protection since 1912. 
 The Copyright Act of 1909 is remembered primarily for doubling the duration of 
copyright terms from 14 to 28 years (renewable for another 28 years) and for extending 
copyright to mechanical reproductions. However Vaidhyanathan (2001) argues that 
perhaps the most significant change was the creation of a new definition of corporate 
authorship. This was particularly significant for the recording industry as most recorded 
music is authored and released as works ―made for hire‖ (Hull, 2004). That is to say, 
most commercially recorded music is created as the intellectual property of the record 
label which signs the artists to a recording contract. A couple of interesting developments 
for music commodities flow from this change in the law. First, since corporations do not 
have a lifespan analogous to a human author, the duration of copyright protection is 
longer for corporations—95 years from the initial release or 120 years from the initial 
recording, whichever ends first. However, since the composition copyright is usually 
established by an individual author or songwriter, the composition and recording 
copyrights will likely not expire at the same time. Second, since the recording copyright 
is typically owned by the record label as a ―work for hire‖, the recording artist or artists 
do not enjoy any termination rights. Termination rights were established under the 1976 
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Copyright Act allowing authors to terminate transfers of copyright so that they or their 
heirs could recapture the copyright after a period of time. As Hull (2004) explains: 
The theory is that when authors initially bargain away their copyrights for long 
periods of time, the value of the copyrights is not known because they have not 
stood the test of the marketplace, and for that reason beginner authors are not in a 
very good bargaining position with publishers and labels. (39) 
Under current law, musicians are generally unable to recapture the value of their recorded 
performances while the record companies are entitled to capture rents from these 
recorded performances for the entire duration of the copyright term. 
 An important limitation of copyrights in mechanical reproduction is the 
compulsory license system established by the Copyright Act of 1909. Both pianola 
manufacturers and record labels were resistant to the idea of negotiating individual 
licenses for particular songs from music publishers and petitioned Congress to establish a 
compromise licensing system. The resulting compulsory licensing system stipulated that 
once the holder of a copyright for a particular musical composition has licensed another 
party to make a mechanical reproduction of that song, then other parties that also wish to 
record the same song may do so provided that they too compensate the holder of the 
composition copyright. Congress established a statutory rate for these compulsory 
licenses which has been adjusted at various points over the years. Compulsory license 
fees are collected by an affiliate of the RIAA called Sound Exchange. As long as the 
publishers receive payment either at the statutory rate or a negotiated rate, they cannot 
petition the government to prohibit the sale of the reproductions. 
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 Recorded music is subject to yet another limitation in that recordings are not in 
the list of works for which copyright law affords protections to public performance and 
public display. Copyright law narrowly confines the protection of recorded music to 
reproduction, distribution, and derivative works. The inability of the recording companies 
to secure these performance rights has been the result of intense opposition from the 
broadcasting industry. The broadcast of recorded music generally only activates 
copyrights in composition, which accounts for part of the interest record labels have in 
starting their own in-house publishing companies. The recording industry did eventually 
manage to secure some very limited rights to public performance of recorded music over 
the Internet. Copyright protection was expanded to include the right to control the 
performance of recorded music in digital audio transmissions as part of the Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995. But this act exempted traditional 
broadcasters by applying only to digital transmissions that were not over the air for use 
by radio and television broadcasters. As Hull (2004) explains, ―Streaming by Webcasters, 
interactive music services, and background music services are subject to licensing. 
Noninteractive services, such as most Webcasters, is subject to a compulsory license, but 
interactive services must negotiate directly with the record companies for rights‖ (p. 54). 
 One final difference in the relation between copyright law and the music industry 
is the limited application of the doctrine of first sale. As Litman (2006) explains, the 
doctrine of first sale states that a ―…copyright owner has no right to control the 
distribution of a copy of a work after she has sold that copy. The buyer can keep it, loan 
it, rent it, display it, or resell it to others‖ (p. 17). However, with regard to recorded music 
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commodities, the purchaser can resell but not rent the item. Rental of sound recordings is 
specifically prohibited in the Record Rental Amendment of 1984. This limited 
application of the doctrine of first sale resulted when record companies petitioned 
Congress for protection from a practice which they felt abetted home copying and created 
a deleterious effect on sales. All of these examples—from the absence of termination 
rights to compulsory licensing to the limited application of the doctrine of first sale—
demonstrate how copyright law has been shaped by the industry and policymakers to 
serve primarily the interests of the record labels. Contrary to any notion of some grand 
balance of interests between the public and private spheres, the relationship between 
copyright law and the music industry exposes the many ways in which the law has been 
expanded and strengthened to accommodate private interests. Moreover, the recurring 
adaptation of copyright law in the interest of improved commodification has only 
accelerated in the face of a rapidly changing technological environment. 
New Threats to the Music Industry 
As previously mentioned, it did not take long after the development of magnetic 
tape technology for the recording industry to sound the alarm about the threat of home 
copying. The RIAA quickly identified home copying as a bigger threat than commercial 
piracy and claimed revenue losses in the neighborhood of a billion dollars (Johns, 2009). 
The industry was equally alarmed when consumer digital recording equipment appeared 
on the market in the late 1980s. The recording companies feared that the perfect copies 
made possible by digital reproduction would lead to the unauthorized and uncontrollable 
circulation of countless copies of recorded music. The industry fought to prevent the 
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importation of these devices for fear of rampant piracy. Subsequently, Congress passed 
the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992. As Litman (2006) explains: 
Protracted negotiations among record companies, composers, music publishers, 
performers, and consumer electronics manufacturers yielded a complex 
agreement ultimately enacted as the AHRA. In return for technical and monetary 
concessions, copyright owners agreed that they would abandon both their 
attempts to prevent the sale of digital recording devices and their controversial 
and unenforceable claims against consumers for private copying of recorded 
music. The law contains an explicit provision prohibiting suit against consumers 
for creating noncommercial digital or analog copies of musical recordings. In 
return, device manufacturers agreed to pay a royalty on every digital recording 
device or digital tape sold. The royalties were to be distributed among composers, 
music publishers, record companies, and performers, according to a formula that 
was both complex and maddeningly vague. (59-60) 
The producers of blank digital audiotapes were required to pay a 3% royalty and 
the manufacturers of digital audio recorders were required to pay a 2% royalty. The act 
also required the incorporation of Serial Copy Management System controls in the 
manufacture of digital audio equipment to prevent consumers from making copies of 
copies. Despite the recording industry‘s legislative victory against the consumer 
electronics industry, the industry‘s initial problems with the replacement of analog with 
digital technology would be exacerbated a few short years later as increasing numbers of 
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people flocked to the Internet where digital music files were quickly becoming the 
common currency of exchange. 
INTERNET COMMUNICATION MODELS 
Common usage of the word Internet usually conveys something more than the 
purely technical definition of a global system of interconnected networks and the 
information transmission protocols which bind them together. The term can summon 
forth ideas concerning everything from commerce, participatory democracy, surveillance, 
community, identity theft, predation, to learning. There are so many ways of 
understanding the phenomenon it would be a fool‘s errand to try and pinpoint a singular 
moral economy of the Internet. It would be misleading to directly equate the Internet, 
when considered as a technology-in-practice, with the belief system informing the social 
system of commoning. While online gift economies certainly represent a particular vision 
of how the Internet should be implicated in social relations, competing visions have 
always existed alongside it. In the following section I attempt to map the historical 
development of the Internet in general and peer-based systems in particular and their 
intersections and divergences with the social system of commoning and the social system 
of commodification. 
Scholars can point to shifts in the hegemonic ideas and values which have 
informed the development of the Internet. For example, Vaidhyanathan (2003) alludes to 
the shift from an early Internet (which he refers to as Internet 1.0) to the ascendancy of 
another vision for the Internet (Internet 2.0) which was concomitant with the arrival of 
the World Wide Web in the mid 1990s. During the Internet 1.0 era a small number of 
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users with a high degree of technological proficiency, operating mainly out of 
universities and other research institutions, worked on large and expensive mainframe 
computers linked together through the early Domain Name System (DNS). The 
introduction of hypertext, graphical browsers, low-cost and relatively easy-to-use 
personal computers, marked the explosive beginnings of the Internet 2.0 era during which 
large numbers of people streamed onto the network. 
This movement from one hegemonic vision of the Internet to another was 
representative of a change in social relations to the extent that, as DeSanctis and Poole 
(1994) say, ―…technology presents an array of social structures for possible interpersonal 
interaction…‖ (p. 125). As people flooded onto the Internet in the 1990s, the social, 
technological, economic, and legal structures of the Internet were altered to accommodate 
enormous and sudden growth. As with the industrial restructurings of the music industry, 
particular interests would prevail in the restructuring of the Internet as it transitioned 
from early peer-to-peer systems to predominantly client/server
40
 systems. More recently, 
peer-to-peer models have once again surfaced as different interests became dissatisfied 
with the client/server model for various reasons. These interests do not form a unified 
front in intent or purpose. In the pages that follow I will attempt to trace the major 
historical developments of the Internet as it moved from a peer-based to a client/server 
model. I will give particular attention to the interplay between technological, economic, 
and legal structures before attempting to show in the second half of this dissertation how 
the interaction of these structures are instantiated in practice of commoning. 
                                                 




In the late 1950s the Department of Defense reacted to the successful launch by 
the Soviets of the Sputnik satellite by establishing a new agency called the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
41
 The new agency was tasked with supplying the 
DoD with a continuous flow of technological options to help the Department adapt to the 
changing global environment. In 1969 the agency deployed the world‘s first functioning 
packet-switching network, ARPANET, with the general intent of allowing for the remote 
sharing of computing resources over a robust and decentralized network. The major 
obstacle which ARPA had to overcome was the creation of a common communications 
protocol recognizable by a variety of specialized networks and mainframe computers. As 
Minar and Hedlund (2001) observe: 
The challenge for this effort was to integrate different kinds of existing networks 
as well as future technologies with one common network architecture that would 
allow every host to be an equal player. The first few hosts on the ARPANET—
UCLA, SRI, UCSB, and the University of Utah—were already independent 
computing sites with equal status. The ARPANET connected them together not in 
a master/slave or client/server relationship, but rather as equal computing peers. 
(4) 
A key component of the Internet‘s early design therefore was the adoption of the protocol 
suite known as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). These 
common internetwork protocols made it possible for most networks to be connected 
                                                 
41 The agency was later renamed DARPA for Defense. 
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together regardless of their specific characteristics. Thus the Internet was originally 
designed as a peer-based system, or as the authors state, ―…as a medium for 
communication for machines that share resources with each other as equals‖ (p. 4). 
 Goldsmith and Wu (2006) have emphasized that this early peer-to-peer system 
was unprecedented because it was open, minimalist, and neutral. They explain: 
It was open, because it was willing to accept almost any kind of computer or 
network to join in one universal network-of-networks. IBM mainframes, AT&T 
networks, the U.S. Defense Department, and, eventually, personal computers 
could now all interconnect. It was minimalist, because it required very little of the 
computers that wanted to join. Becoming part of the Internet was like joining the 
Unitarian-Universalist church—the central dogma was not very demanding. 
Finally, it was neutral between applications. Some networks, like the telephone 
network, were specifically designed for a given purpose (in the case of the 
telephone network, talking). The Internet treated e-mail, downloads, and every 
other type of early application the same. This allowed new and better applications 
(like e-mail, the World Wide Web, and peer-to-peer technology) to evolve and 
replace the old. (23) 
This early approach to Internet communication resulted in a near-universal adoption of 
the peer-based model. 
As the number of hosts on the network began to grow into the thousands, the 
Domain Name System (DNS) was created to facilitate the sharing of data across the 
largely peer-to-peer Internet (Minar & Hedlund, 2001). Initially users circulated a text 
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file periodically which mapped domain names to IP addresses.
42
 However, with the 
sudden explosion in the number of hosts connected to the network the DNS evolved as a 
peer-based hierarchical naming system. IP address queries were first directed to the 
nearest name server. The queries were then directed further up the hierarchy, all the way 
to the root server, until the desired information was located. The answer to the query 
would then be sent back down the hierarchy of name servers to the original requestor, and 
was cached on each server along the way. In this way, each name server was updated as a 
part of the process, functioning both as a server and a client.  
Client/Server Model 
The success of this early peer-based system of internetworking protocols and 
information management also meant that the Internet itself quickly became an arena of 
struggle for the normative framing of the technology. The original open, minimal, and 
neutral design of the network allowed competing interests to populate the network and 
articulate their particular vision of how the structural features of the Internet should be 
ordered. Even the peer-based model which had made these competing articulations 
possible could be challenged. The peer system which was established as part of 
ARPANET was the dominant model of interworking until the advent of the World Wide 
Web in 1994. In the early years of the Internet, hosts were typically assumed to be 
connected to the network in a fairly predictable manner. They were assigned permanent 
IP addresses and coordinated by the original DNS system. With the sudden influx of 
                                                 
42 IP address or Internet Protocol address refers to the numerical identifier assigned to devices on a 
network using the Internet Protocol for communication between nodes. 
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people onto the Internet due to the combined success and popularity of hypertext, web 
browsers, and the availability of cheap dial-up modems and personal computers, early 
peer-based models were increasingly displaced by more centralized communication 
systems. As Taylor (2005) explains: 
This created a second class of connectivity because PCs would enter and leave the 
network frequently and unpredictably. Further, because ISPs began to run out of 
IP addresses, they began to assign IP addresses dynamically for each session, 
giving each PC a different, possible masked, IP address. This transient nature and 
instability prevented PCs from being assigned permanent DNS entries, and 
therefore prevented most PC users from hosting any data or network-facing 
applications locally. (24) 
The decision by Internet Service Providers to periodically assign users new IP 
addresses (dynamic IP addressing) rather than permanent IP addresses (static IP 
addressing) was a significant development in the transition from a peer-based to a 
client/server model of the Internet. The original design of the Internet had not equipped 
the network to handle an unlimited number of IP addresses. The solution to this dilemma 
was therefore to ration IP addresses. Typically, an ISP assigns dynamic IP addresses 
through a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server. Although dynamic, 
these IP addresses do not necessarily change with each new session and are typically 
assigned for relatively long periods of time, simply renewing upon expiration. However, 
with regard to the large scale management of shared resources, the impact was 
considerable. The choice to go with dynamically assigned IP addresses meant that 
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existing systems of peer-based communication became untenable. What developed 
instead was a client/server model for resource management and distribution in which 
clients request services or content from servers. Taylor (2005) again explains: 
In this architecture, clients connect to a server using a specific communications 
protocol (e.g., TCP) to obtain access to a specific resource. Most of the processing 
involved in delivering a service usually occurs on the servers, leaving the client 
relatively unburdened. Most popular Internet applications, including the World 
Wide Web, FTP, telnet, and email, use this service-delivery model. (29) 
 An advantage of the client/server model is that the computational requirements of 
the client are often negligible. But the server also becomes an unequal peer. That is to say 
that in the client/server model the personal computer of the home user does not share 
resources on the network in any substantial manner. The system becomes increasingly 
centralized as content and service provision is located on a relatively small number of 
large servers which administer resource to the rest of the network. As Vaidhyanathan 
(2003) describes: 
Thus began Internet 2.0, in which increasingly personal computers allowed their 
users to receive and consume information, but allowed limited ability to donate to 
the system. This extension of the network cut off personal computers from the 
server business. Most users donated information only through e-mail. And it 
became clear that while the internet once seemed like a grand bazaar of 
homemade goods and interesting (albeit often frightening) texts generated through 
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community dynamics, it would soon seem more like a shopping mall than a 
library or bazaar. (3) 
REVIVAL OF PEER-TO-PEER 
The desire to correct the imperfections of an early Internet which was not 
designed for commerce led to the development of technological structures which would 
facilitate centralized control and credentialed systems of limited access.
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 However, the 
displacement of early peer-based systems by client/server systems was complicated by 
the continual development of new peer-based systems. Individuals have used a variety of 
mediums over the years to share information commodities. Ghosemajumder (2002) 
explains that since the advent of the Internet people have transitioned from physical 
diskettes to a variety of online forums to share cultural and informational content. Early 
home computer owners set up Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) in the 1970s. Some of these 
BBSs were used to share business and entertainment software. As the peer-to-peer model 
was increasingly displaced by the client/server model many of these sharing activities 
were relocated to FTP
44
 sites. Eventually, FTP sites were supplanted by the contemporary 
wave of peer-to-peer applications. These newer peer-to-peer systems were characterized 
by faster transfer speeds allowing for the sharing not just of software but music and 
motion pictures as well. 
Scholars like Lessig (1999) and Benkler (2006) have written extensively on the 
deleterious effects of centralized systems of controlled access on everything from 
                                                 
43 This has been thoroughly discussed by Lessig (1999). 
44 File Transfer Protocol is a standard networking protocol used to copy a file from one host to another on 
a TCP/IP-based network. 
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technological innovation, to freedom of expression, to cultural production. On the other 
hand, the decentralized structure of peer-to-peer systems and the collective power of 
large groups of people engaging in file-sharing constitutes a real threat to existing 
business models premised on the client/server relationship (Pouwelse et al., 2008).That 
being said, there are a number of technological disadvantages to the client/server model 
which have caused dissatisfaction among users leading to the adoption of more efficient 
systems for resource management and distribution. The most significant limitation of the 
client/server model has been the bottleneck at the server level due to poor scalability. As 
the number of clients increases exponentially relative to the number of servers, the load at 
the server level can become inefficient or even unmanageable. In contrast to this, peer-to-
peer systems typically exhibit much better scalability.  In these systems content and 
service is shared across a network in which every host acts as both a client and server. As 
Yu, Hong, & Xue (2006) note: 
In contrast to the traditional server-client model of content distribution, the P2P 
technology has the advantage as [sic] low cost of hardware deployment, more 
scalable to accommodate a large number of users and amount of content, more 
fault tolerance for content being shared by multiple sources, and less time 
required to download a given data file. (1) 
The upshot of the limited scalability in client/server systems is that the 
client/server model is poorly suited for uploading large amounts of content to centralized 
servers. In other words, despite the fact that most of the Internet‘s content is created on 
PCs at the margins of the network, the Internet has been structured to facilitate easy 
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downloading of content while making uploading needlessly difficult and slow. That being 
said, it is important to note that there are a number of disadvantages to peer-to-peer 
systems as well. For example, Shirky (2001) observes that centralized databases are a 
more efficient and rapid means of handling search queries as compared to other 
decentralized systems. Shirky also observes that centralized systems are better equipped 
to handle market transactions where it is necessary to calculate supply and demand at a 
single point time in order to produce an accurate and stable pricing system. Furthermore, 
Dornfest and Brickley (2001) caution that the new protocols associated with 
contemporary peer-to-peer file-sharing applications could threaten the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol system by disrupting the established system of data location and retrieval. These 
authors comment that ―Loosening the hyperlinks that bind all these various resources 
together threatens to scatter hay and needles to the winds‖ (p. 191). 
Contemporary Peer-To-Peer Systems 
Peer-to-peer file-sharing applications seemingly stormed onto the scene at the 
outset of the 21st century. However, Pouwelse et al. (2008) pinpoint the resurgence in 
peer-based communications a few years earlier in 1997 with the appearance of 
Slashdot.org. The authors observe that Slashdot was ―the first large-scale case of user-
generated content and user-controlled moderation‖ (p. 704). Nevertheless, contemporary 
peer-to-peer file-sharing software is more generally associated with the release of Napster 
in 1999. Since then, the popularity of various file-sharing platforms has grown 
tremendously. By 2003 it was estimated that up to 60% of total Internet traffic might be 
attributed to the bandwidth consumption of peer-to-peer file-sharers (Tsoumakos & 
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Roussopoulos, 2003). There has been considerable debate about the actual percentage of 
Internet traffic attributable to peer-to-peer activity. More conservative estimates of file-
sharing activity have placed the level closer to 35% (Yu et al., 2006). Either way, there is 
a consensus that these platforms became widely popular in the first decade of the 21st 
century. 
 Generally speaking, the purpose of peer-to-peer platforms is to facilitate 
interaction and cooperation among individuals who wish to share resources with each 
other. Contemporary peer-to-peer file-sharing applications must perform two functions: 
(1) provide a search function that allows peers
45
 to locate the desired content among the 
participating peers; and (2) provide a download function that allows a user to download 
the desired content (Xia & Muppala, 2010). A number of approaches have been taken by 
various peer-to-peer applications to accomplish these functions in a network environment 
characterized by highly transient peers and relative instability.  
Taylor (2005) asserts that distributed systems
46
 can be characterized as falling 
somewhere on an axis between centralized systems and decentralized systems. The 
typical client/server model could be described as a centralized system while a peer-to-
peer system like Gnutella could be described as a decentralized system. Centralized 
systems tend to have a low number of servers relative to the number of clients and do not 
scale very well. Conversely, decentralized systems tend to adopt greater redundancy as a 
part of both the search function and the storage of content while exhibiting greater 
                                                 
45 Taylor (2005) states that a peer ―is when a device acts as both a consumer and provider of information‖ 
(p. 4).  
46 Taylor (2005) defines a distributed system as ―a collection of independent computers that appears to its 
users as a single coherent system‖ (p. 2). 
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capacity for scalability. Taylor describes the search and storage functions of distributed 
systems as resource discovery and resource availability. The approach taken to either 
resource discovery or resource availability can be centralized or decentralized. For 
example, the modern DNS system could be described as a centralized approach to 
resource discovery while Gnutella‘s search function
47
 could be described as 
decentralized. With regard to resource availability, a client/server model like Hulu.com or 
NetFlix.com could be characterized as a centralized approach while Gnutella could be 
characterized as decentralized.
48
 Taylor further defines distributed systems in terms of 
resource communication. Resource communication can be categorized as either brokered 
or point-to-point (peer-to-peer) communication. Communication in a brokered system is 
passed through a central server—meaning that individual peers do not have direct 
knowledge of each other. Napster was originally structured as a brokered system of 
communication. Resources in point-to-point systems are connected directly between the 
sender and the receiver, meaning that the peers are aware of each other‘s location in the 
network. Most of today‘s peer-to-peer applications operate in this vein through what 
Tsoumakos and Roussopoulos (2003) refer to as unstructured networks in which peers 
connect to each other in an ad hoc fashion. 
Copyright and Peer-To-Peer Systems 
Around the time of the meteoric rise and fall of Napster in 2001, the music 
industry started voicing its concerns about the pernicious effects of peer-to-peer file-
                                                 
47 See discussion on page 201. 
48 See discussion on page 201. 
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sharing software (Eliashberg, 2005; Hull, 2004). By 2007 the RIAA reported a decline in 
album sales in excess of 150 million units (McBride & Smith, 2008). That trend would 
continue the following year with Nielsen reporting a further annual decline in album sales 
of 14% (though this was accompanied by a small increase in the number of albums sold 
digitally) (Madden, 2009). This led the RIAA to assert in 2009 that it had lost billions in 
revenue over the previous decade and a half (Chad & Schultz, 2009). The drop in sales 
was evidently not restricted to just the recording industry as the RIAA also reported a 
significant decline in the sale of DVDs (Peoples, 2009). As Doyle (2002) states: 
Record companies have been amongst the first to bear the brunt of peer-to-peer 
networking but they are by no means alone in their vulnerability. The same sort of 
risk exists for any sector or firm whose product can be reduced to bits and bytes. 
This includes all forms of media output including text-based, audio, and 
audiovisual and multimedia. Any information that can be reduced to a digital 
format and put into a computer file can be swapped and shared. (156) 
However, scholarship on the actual effects of peer-to-peer file-sharing on the 
entertainment industry has been mixed (Bender & Wang, 2009; Cenite, et al., 2009; 
Ghosemajumder, 2002). Some scholars have suggested that peer-to-peer file-sharing is 
likely to increase sales of digital commodities—especially where music is concerned. 
Others have attributed declining sales not to peer-to-peer file-sharing but to the general 
economic downturn.  
A pivotal moment in the history of peer-to-peer file-sharing and the music 
industry was the development and widespread adoption of the MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 
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(MP3) file format. MP3 files allowed audio data to be compressed into sizes small 
enough for relatively easy transmission over the Internet. A compression algorithm made 
it possible to decrease the file size to one tenth its original size. Users could then 
download near-CD quality music files in seconds or minutes as compared to hours. The 
recording industry‘s initial response to the popularity of the MP3 format in the late 1990s 
was to attempt to kill the format altogether. According to Litman (2006): 
…the industry was determined to elbow both illegal trafficking in MP3 files and 
legitimate distribution of music in MP3 format out of the online market. Record 
companies insisted that MP3 was a tool for pirates, and that all or at least most of 
the MP3 files sitting on consumers‘ hard disks were pirated recordings. Bands 
who posted MP3 files on their Web pages were ordered to take them down or lose 
their recording contracts. When the first portable MP3 player came out, the 
recording industry filed suit to stop it. (155) 
Eventually their attempt was scuttled by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
which shot down the industry‘s lawsuit against the manufacturer of the Rio portable MP3 
player. With the legal path cleared for the technology other manufacturers were quick to 
introduce their own MP3 players. 
 Notwithstanding their failed attempt to kill the MP3 format, the recording 
industry managed to score a number of legislative victories in the late 1990s. One such 
victory came with the passage of the No Electronic Theft Act (NET Act) in 1997. This 
federal law provided for the criminal prosecution of individuals who engaged in 
copyright infringement when the value of the copyrighted materials exceeded $1000—
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even when no monetary profit or commercial benefit was derived from the infringement. 
As Ghosemajumder (2002) observed, the act ―closes what was referred to as the 
―LaMacchia Loophole‖
49
 and allowed law enforcement agencies to pursue those who 
facilitate piracy on a commercial scale but without monetary gain‖ (p. 10). In effect, the 
Net Act made peer-to-peer file-sharers liable in both criminal and civil courts (Cenite et 
al., 2009). As Drumm (2003) observes, ―Civil lawsuits are ineffective against individuals 
with few assets. Criminal prosecutions provide intimidation and appropriate punishment 
for the illegal activities‖ (p. 186). 
 Another major legislative accomplishment for the copyright industries was the 
passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). The DMCA was part 
of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright and Performances and 
Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act in which the United States implemented the 
requirements of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. Whenever the United States enters into an 
international intellectual property agreement, the provisions of the agreement generally 
do not become part of U.S. law until Congress enacts implementing legislation (Shapiro, 
2003). In addition to bringing U.S. law into accord with WIPO, the DMCA criminalized 
the production of technological devices or software used to circumvent the digital rights 
management (DRM) systems which control access to copyrighted materials. In effect, the 
legislature decided that regulating the behavior of end users would be too difficult a task 
and that the more effective approach would be to regulate the code that made those 
                                                 
49 The LaMacchia Loophole refers to the unsuccessful prosecution of MIT student David LaMacchia in 
United States v. LaMacchia for allegedly facilitating massive amounts of copyright infringement but 
without any intent of financial gain. The case was dismissed after the court reasoned that criminal law did 
not apply to non-commercial copyright infringement. Subsequent to the decision, Congress passed the NET 
Act to close the loophole. 
 190 
behaviors possible (Lessig, 1999). Consequently, the DMCA encouraged the use of 
digital encryption technologies in the production and distribution of information 
commodities based on a pay-per-view model. In framing the DMCA both Congress and 
the copyright industries reasoned, somewhat absurdly, that since the transmission of 
information over the Internet was premised on the copying of files from node to node, 
every transmission of copyrighted information amounted to an act of copyright 
infringement—unless the transmission was given the explicit endorsement of the 
copyright holders. Therefore, the DMCA was written in overly broad terms so as to 
foreclose the possibility of future loopholes. As Litman (2006) observes: 
The DMCA is long, internally inconsistent, difficult even for copyright experts to 
parse and harder still to explain. Most importantly, it seeks for the first time to 
impose liability on ordinary citizens for violation of provisions that they have no 
reason to suspect are part of the law, and to make noncommercial and 
noninfringing behavior illegal on the theory that that will help to prevent piracy. 
(145) 
An important component of the DMCA was the inclusion of the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act which limited the liability of online service 
providers who transmit, link, store, or cache copyrighted files shared by their customers. 
The limited liability was available to eligible service providers but was not extended to 
broadcasters, cable operators, or satellite television services that did not operate 
interactive digital networks (Middleton, 2003). The act protected ISPs from monetary 
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damages under specified circumstances for copyright infringement occurring over their 
networks.  
Another significant (though lesser-known) piece of legislation passed in 1999 also 
served as a key component of the recording industry‘s arsenal in their legal attacks on 
peer-to-peer file-sharers. The Digital Theft Deterrence And Copyright Damages 
Improvement Act increased the available statutory damages for copyright infringement. It 
has been utilized by juries in both the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases. As 
Oppenheim (2010) explains: 
Statutory damages are currently set by copyright law at a minimum of $750 per 
work infringed up to $30,000.  And, if the infringement is found to be willful, the 
ceiling goes up to $150,000.  In certain situations, a defendant can seek to be 
deemed ―an innocent infringer‖ and have the floor decreased from $750 to $200 
per work infringed.  Over the years, the law has developed a number of factors 
that should be considered in determining what the statutory damages should be, 
such as: the value of the work infringed, the harm caused, the benefit to the 
defendant, the need for deterrence, and the willfulness of the defendant‘s 
infringement.  It is left to a jury to decide how to balance these factors and what 
damages to assess. (¶ 2) 
 The high ceiling for statutory damages has figured prominently in both of the file-
sharing cases which have gone to trial. 
The legislation passed at the end of the 20th century served as the foundation of 
the RIAA litigation campaign against peer-to-peer file-sharing. The single-mindedness of 
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the recording industry‘s lobbying efforts against emerging decentralized systems of 
distribution might, at first glance, seem like a succession of desperate acts in the face of a 
technological inevitable. Yet industrial restructuring resulting from technological 
development has often accommodated incumbent industries. Far from inevitable, 
technological development itself is shaped by conflicts between old and new players. 
Peer-to-peer technologies may still be brought neatly into the existing order. Moreover, 
the disruptive potential of peer-to-peer file-sharing varies from system to system. 
Therefore, individual peer-to-peer platforms must be analyzed to see where there is 
commonality and divergence with both the social system of commoning and the social 
system of commodification. 
Napster 
Sean Fanning, a teenage college student living in Boston, was a big fan of MP3 
files. But Fanning had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the available means of 
locating and downloading music from the Internet. Consequently, Fanning authored 
software which allowed users to share MP3 files from their hard drives with other users. 
Fanning christened his company Napster
50
 and released the application in June of 1999. 
Napster‘s initial success in terms of adoption was spectacular. Almost immediately 
Napster began raising millions in venture capital. In 2000, just one year after Napster‘s 
initial release, a Pew study found that nearly one in four adult Internet users had 
downloaded music files, and 54% of them had used Napster to do it (Madden, 2009). 
Napster would eventually boast 80 million users downloading 3 billion songs every 
                                                 
50 Napster was allegedly a nickname Fanning earned due to hygiene issues. 
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month (Drumm, 2003). Another study estimated that at Napster‘s height in April of 2001, 
30 million Americans had downloaded music online—or about 29% of all adult Internet 
users. Moreover, 53% of Internet users ages 12 to 17 had downloaded music 
(Ghosemajumder, 2002). Although peer-to-peer file-sharing was around to stay, 
Napster‘s phenomenal success proved to be short-lived. It only took a little over a year 
for Napster to wind up in court after being sued by a bevy of record labels and 
composers. The plaintiffs alleged that Napster was guilty of contributory copyright 
infringement as it had allowed millions of people to share music without first purchasing 
it. 
General Operation of Napster 
Napster allowed users to connect to its peer-to-peer network and publish to its 
servers a list of content that users were willing to share from their hard drives. Users were 
also able to search for content made available from other computers on the network and 
then to download that content onto their hard drives at no charge (Doyle, 2002). Taylor 
(2005) describes this process in slightly more detail. First users connected to the Napster 
server and registered themselves to join the network. The main server received a list of 
MP3s that the user was willing to share and added them to the list of songs residing on 
the central database. When a user performed a search, Napster scanned the database on its 
main server and returned the addresses of the peers that had the desired content. The user 
would then connect directly to one of the peers with the desired content and begin to 
download the file without any further intervention from the host unless communication 
was disrupted. Taylor states: 
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Napster is P2P because the Napster peers bypass DNS and because once the 
Napster server resolves the IP addresses of the PCs hosting a particular song, it 
shifts control of the file transfers to the nodes. However, Napster is an example of 
brokered P2P for the same reasons. (37-38) 
Legal Challenges 
In 2000 the RIAA sued Napster under the DMCA (A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.) 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for contributory 
and vicarious copyright infringement. The plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction to 
stop the transfer of music files immediately. Napster invoked fair use, substantial non-
infringing use, and the First Amendment in its defense. The court found that Napster 
could be held liable for contributory and vicarious infringement and granted the 
preliminary injunction. Napster in turn appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit which issued a stay of the lower court‘s injunction pending its decision. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court‘s findings on contributory and vicarious 
infringement in February of 2001. 
 As Middleton (2003) explains, contributory infringement is found when a party 
has knowledge of copyright infringement and contributes to it in some meaningful way. 
In order to be held liable for contributory infringement, a party must first be aware of an 
act of direct copyright infringement. But the district court did not require that Napster 
have actual knowledge of specific acts of direct copyright infringement and instead 
required that Napster have actual knowledge that copyright infringement was occurring 
among its users. In its defense Napster argued that it did not have specific knowledge of 
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actual acts of direct copyright infringement because it was unable to distinguish 
copyrighted files from non-copyrighted files. The district court rejected this argument. In 
addition, with regard to the second requirement of contributory infringement, the district 
court found that Napster contributed to the acts of copyright infringement in a meaningful 
way because the company provided the client application (which both connected peers 
and facilitated the downloading of content) and because Napster maintained a centralized 
database for locating copyrighted materials on users‘ hard drives. 
 Vicarious liability on the other hand, is found when a party has the right and the 
capacity to supervise an infringer‘s behavior and also benefits from the copyright 
infringement (Middleton, 2003). Both courts stated that Napster was likely engaging in 
vicarious infringement. The courts found that Napster benefitted from copyright 
infringement because Napster used the ability to infringe copyright as a draw to increase 
its subscriber base. The courts reasoned that because Napster‘s profitability depended on 
increasing this subscriber base there was indeed a benefit. With regard to Napster‘s right 
and ability to control the actions of those users who were infringing copyrights, the courts 
found that Napster could be held liable. Though the Ninth Circuit departed somewhat 
from the lower court by acknowledging the limited capacity of Napster to distinguish 
copyrighted materials from non-copyrighted materials, the court reasoned that the search 
function available to users was equally available to Napster. Therefore, Napster was 
capable of searching for infringing files just as easily as were the plaintiffs. 
 There are a couple of additional points about the relationship between Napster and 
copyright law which should be emphasized. First, Napster did not qualify for the safe 
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harbor provisions of the DMCA which were designed primarily to protect ISPs from 
liability in copyright infringement cases. The safe harbor provisions are codified in 
Chapter 5 §512 of the DMCA. Generally speaking, these provisions protect an ISP in the 
following situations: (1) as long as the transmission of infringing materials over the 
network is transitory and not made publicly available by the ISP; (2) the ISP has no direct 
knowledge or financial interest in linking to the infringing material; and (3) the ISP has 
no actual knowledge of the infringing material stored by users on its network. These 
provisions were enacted as part of the previously discussed Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act. However, as Napster and other peer-to-peer 
platforms do not qualify as ISPs, there is no safe harbor available to them in the DMCA.  
 With specific regard to the case, although Napster claimed substantial non-
infringing use as part of its defense, the court did not fully analyze the non-infringing 
uses of Napster because the case involved a preliminary injunction to prevent further 
downloading of the plaintiffs‘ copyrighted works. The court only ruled that the plaintiffs 
were likely to succeed in demonstrating contributory infringement (Drumm, 2003). 
Substantial non-infringing use was a key component of the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in 
the 1983 Sony Betamax case.
51
 If a manufacturer of a particular technology could 
demonstrate substantial non-infringing use
52
 they could not be held contributorily liable. 
Yet there were key differences between the Betamax and Napster cases which likely 
                                                 
51 Universal City Studios and Walt Disney filed suit against the Sony Corporation of America, 
manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder, alleging copyright infringement. The plaintiffs argued 
that Sony was contributing to copyright infringement by selling recorders which allowed home users to 
record and copy plaintiffs‘ televised motion pictures. The case was filed in the federal district court in Los 
Angeles where Sony won but lost on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. The case then went to the Supreme Court 
who reversed the lower court decision finding that Sony was not liable for copyright infringement. 
52 The Supreme Court looked to patent law for guidance and found that a manufacturer of a good with a 
substantial non-infringing use cannot be held contributorily liable for copyright infringement. 
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would have mitigated against this particular defense. The courts noted that whereas Sony 
had little knowledge or control over the behaviors of Betamax users, Napster knew or had 
reason to know of its users‘ infringing activities. But it is also important to note that the 
plaintiffs in the Betamax case failed to demonstrate that the video recorder threatened a 
developed market. There was no other existing system for the sale of televised 
information commodities in place. Conversely, Napster was seen as a considerable threat 
to both radio play and the sale of physical music commodities like CDs. As Drumm 
(2003) comments on the difference, ―[in Napster‘s case] The user could transmit an exact 
duplication of the file while still retaining the original….Betamax cassettes were analog 
and there was a loss of quality from one generation to the next‖ (p. 172). 
 Significantly, both courts ruled that Napster users were themselves engaging in 
commercial activities despite the fact that they were sharing files without any financial 
remuneration. That is to say the courts considered the sharing of music files over the 
Napster network a commercial activity even though no money was being exchanged 
among the users. Without access to the Napster network, the coercive social relations of 
commodification ensured that users would be forced to purchase CDs to obtain the 
benefits that Napster offered for free. As Drumm (2003) explains: 
The district court found, and the appellate court agreed, that Napster users were 
using the copyrighted works for commercial purposes. The district court stated 
that when a user sends a file to another anonymous user, it is not for personal use 
and that Napster users are getting something for free which normally is not free. 
(166) 
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The court arrived at this determination while giving consideration to Napster‘s fair use 
defense. The so-called purpose and character element of fair use law required that the 
district court determine whether the allegedly infringing use is commercial in nature. 
Moreover, there is no requirement to demonstrate a direct economic benefit to the 
defendant. As Gorman and Ginsburg (2006) state, ―Rather, repeated and exploitative 
copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a 
commercial use‖ (p. 838). These authors also note that commercial use includes the 
repeated and exploitative unauthorized copying with the intent to avoid the expense of 
purchasing authorized copies. The court, in effect, made illegal the exodus from the 
social relations of commodification in the realm of information production and exchange. 
The courts‘ finding of commercial copyright infringement weighed against 
Napster‘s fair use defense. The Ninth Circuit reinstated the injunction in March of 2001. 
In July of 2001 Napster shut down its services in order to comply with the injunction. 
The company agreed to pay a settlement of $26 million in September of that year 
(Borland, 2001, September 24). After a bankruptcy court blocked the sale of Napster to 
media giant Bertelsmann in 2002 for $85 million, Napster was forced to liquidate its 
assets (Evangelista, 2002). In the years since the company‘s demise, the Napster brand 
and logo has changed hands between Roxio and BestBuy, but the subscriber rate has 
never come close to approaching previous levels. 
Gnutella 
In the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit decision on Napster peer-to-peer technology 
underwent some permutations which resulted in the continued viability of file-sharing. A 
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new generation of peer-to-peer networks was created and maintained by a variety of 
interests. Some were intent on profiting from what they believed was the inevitable 
industrial restructuring of the production and distribution of informational and cultural 
goods. Others however, were not solely motivated by the search for profit. Gnutella 
emerged in early 2000 during a second wave of peer-to-peer file-sharing technological 
development. Moreover, Gnutella was a service often considered to be the first purely 
decentralized peer-to-peer network (Drumm, 2003). 
 In March of 2000 Tom Pepper and Justin Frankel were working for a software 
company founded by Frankel three years earlier called Nullsoft. The company produced 
the well-known Winamp Media Player application before being purchased by America 
Online in 1999. According to Taylor (2005), Pepper and Frankel developed Gnutella in 
just under fourteen days and released it as an experiment before their bosses at AOL told 
them to kill the project. According to Pepper, they had developed Gnutella primarily as a 
means to share cooking recipes (Kan, 2001). The name Gnutella is a neologism derived 
from GNU and Nutella. The Free Software Foundation‘s GNU General Public License is 
a license which works in conjunction with copyright law to require that any source code 
licensed with GPL is always available to others to modify as they wish, as is any code 
that is derived from GPL-protected code (Lessig, 1999, 2001). GNU itself is a recursive 
acronym for ‖Gnu‘s Not Unix‖. Nutella is a wonderfully delicious hazelnut-chocolate 
spread made by the Italian confectioner Ferrero. As Gnutella‘s name implies, the 
software was released under the GNU General Public License by Pepper and Frankel 
after AOL quashed the project. According to Taylor (2005): 
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Just as Gnutella was about to disappear, open source developers intervened and 
Bryan Mayland reverse-engineered Gnutella‘s communication protocol and 
released the findings on the http://gnutella.nerdherd.net. This site hosted the 
protocol documentation but also hosted a link to Gnutella‘s Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) channel #gnutella, which had a massive response and significantly affected 
the future development. (102) 
 By 2005 the Gnutella network boasted a population of 1.81 million users (Mennecke, 
2005, June 2). And in 2007 Gnutella had become the most popular file-sharing network 
on the Internet, accounting for around 40 percent of the market (Bangeman, 2008, April 
21). 
General Operation of Gnutella Implementation 
As Kan (2001) explains, Gnutella is not a branded software like Napster or 
iTunes. Rather, Gnutella is a communication protocol used by various Gnutella-
compatible applications to access the Gnutella peer-to-peer network. These Gnutella 
applications include well-known names like BearShare, LimeWire, Morpheus, Qtella, 
and Phex—each of which constitutes a virtual network of continuously changing nodes 
and pathways. There is no centralized resource communication in which transmissions 
are brokered through a central point or server. Unlike client/server systems, hosts
53
 in the 
Gnutella network act as both clients and servers. Accordingly, they are referred to as 
servents, an amalgamation of client and server. Peers join the Gnutella network by 
connecting to other peers (hosts) already on the network. Peers are typically connected to 
                                                 
53 A host is a computer connected to a network. 
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three or four other nodes. Gnutella uses point-to-point resource communication in which 
the connection between any two nodes is created in an ad hoc fashion. Two nodes may be 
on the network simultaneously, but the communication between the two may not be 
accomplished in a conventional or stable manner. As Kan says, ―…once you connect 
with one host, you‘re in. Your Gnutella node mingles with other Gnutella nodes, and 
pretty soon you‘re in the thick of things‖ (p. 97). 
Much has been made of the fact that the peer-to-peer networks which were 
developed in the wake of Napster‘s legal defeat increasingly relied on decentralized 
communication. Recall that Napster‘s brokered resource communication required users to 
connect to a centralized index located on one of Napster‘s servers in order to perform 
search queries before eventually being directly connected to another peer where the 
desired content was located and available for downloading. Gnutella, on the other hand, 
relied on a system in which resource discovery, availability, and communication are all 
decentralized. At least that‘s how it works in theory. But as Taylor (2005) cautions, 
―Decentralized networks are inherently self-organizing and so it is not only possible but 
indeed very likely that strong servers of information…could easily turn a decentralized 
network into a semi-centralized one‖ (pp. 13-14). To understand the limits of Gnutella‘s 
capacity to function as a decentralized system of commoning a deeper investigation into 
the operation of the network is required. The details of Gnutella‘s operation are 
significant not only for their technical merit, but also because they help unearth the 
values and goals underlying the technology‘s structural features. 
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Taylor (2005) provides a useful description of the technical operation of Gnutella. 
Generally speaking, Gnutella is a networking protocol for a distributed search. 
Implementations of Gnutella, like LimeWire or Bearshare, provide client-side interfaces 
through which a user can perform a search query, view the returned results, and initiate a 
download. At the same time that all of this is going on, the interface also allows the user 
to accept queries from other users, checking to see if content desired by other peers is 
available, and to initiate an upload if appropriate. This is the duel client and server 
function to which the term servent refers. 
 In order for a user to join the network and perform these tasks a series of steps 
must be undertaken. First the user connects to the Gnutella network by locating a host 
already on the network. In the early days users would often locate a host using a realtime 
online text messaging system like Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Alternately, users may 
locate available hosts through a cache like GnuCache or by pinging possible hosts. Once 
a potential host is located, a ―connect‖ message is sent to the host to request admission to 
the network. If the host responds by accepting the request, the user can complete the 
connection and join the network by opening a TPC/IP connection to the other peer. The 
user then makes their presence known on the network by pinging the neighbor peer who 
passes the message on to their neighbors and so on.  
In order to initiate the discovery process, the user sends out a search query to 
neighboring peers who forward the query to their neighbors and so on. Each servent that 
receives the query searches its local files and returns a query response based on the 
results of the local scan. The query response is directed back across the network along the 
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initial path it took when leaving the original user. Significantly, servents who pass the 
message along do not cache the query responses. Each pass from one peer to the next is 
known as a hop. Queries do not get passed across the network endlessly or a flooding of 
the network would result and overwhelm the system. A restriction referred to as time to 
live (TTL) is placed within the query to limit the number of transmission iterations. 
Moreover, to make sure that each node does not serve the same query repeatedly, 
messages also contain unique identifiers. After a positive query result is returned to the 
initiator of the query, a direct connection may be established between two servents in 
order to carry out a download. Nevertheless, each hop adds not only to the total 
bandwidth usage but also to the time needed to perform a query (Hong, 2001). This 
means that the scalability of the network is extremely dependent on the communal 
participation of network peers. That is to say if the network grows by adding peers who 
do not share sufficient amounts of content, the overall performance of the network 
degrades with increasing size. The scalability of the network therefore is conditioned by 
resource availability. 
 A free-rider is a peer on the network which downloads files from other peers but 
does not make content available for upload by other peers—thus becoming a mere client 
on the network. Peer-to-peer networks which do not provide incentive mechanisms for 
sharing are more vulnerable to free-riding problems (Xia & Muppala, 2010). Taylor 
(2005) indicates that around 70 percent of Gnutella users share no content at all. If 
Gnutella were a truly decentralized network, every peer on the network would potentially 
share as much as it consumes. Since there is a divergence here between theory and 
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practice, Gnutella has ordered its structural features with this limitation in mind. To scale 
with the rapid growth in its user population, Gnutella has adopted a two-tier overlay in 
conjunction with more efficient search mechanisms (Rasti, Stutzbach, & Rejaie, 2006). 
The virtual network was divided into two levels consisting of a small top-level overlay of 
ultrapeers and a bottom layer of leaf peers. This means that instead of treating all nodes 
equally, the top layer of ultrapeers is charged with routing search queries and responses. 
As Rasti et al. (2006) explain: 
The two-tier architecture attempts to dynamically maintain the following two 
properties in order to scale with the number of peers while ensuring short pairwise 
distances between peers as they join/leave the system: (i) a proper balance 
between ultrapeers and leaf peers, and (ii) a well-connected top-level overlay 
where each ultrapeer has a configured number of neighbors. (1) 
 In effect, what Gnutella has done is to adopt a centralized/decentralized topology 
to achieve sufficient scalability as its user-base has increased. The top-level peers 
function as caching servers which are somewhat similar to Napster‘s brokered system of 
centralized indices. Rather than simply propagate queries across the entire network, 
ultrapeers consult their own databases before directly connecting peers. This results in a 
much more efficient use of bandwidth on the network. Taylor (2005) comments on this 
centralized/decentralized approach by saying: 
It is interesting to note that both Gnutella and Napster converged towards a 
centralized/decentralized topology, even though they came from completely 
different sides of the coin. Gnutella started its life as a decentralized system and 
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Napster started its life as a centralized search architecture, with brokered 
communications. However, Gnutella inserted super-peers and Napster duplicated 
its centralized search engines for scalability, both resulting in a similar design 
topology…. (127) 
FastTrack 
The FastTrack protocol and Kazaa peer-to-peer system were created by an 
Estonian programmer named Jaan Tallinn while working at a software development firm 
he cofounded called Bluemoon. Tallinn partnered with Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis 
to release Kazaa through a Dutch company called Consumer Empowerment in March of 
2001(Levine, 2004, December 20). Kazaa was wildly successful in its early years. Kazaa 
is sometimes characterized as a decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing system. Also 
coming in the wake of Napster‘s legal battles, Kazaa offered music fans a viable 
alternative to Napster. Unlike Napster however, Kazaa users were not limited only to 
trading music files. Kazaa supported the sharing of music, movies, photos, and text 
documents. By the summer of 2002 Kazaa had grown larger than Napster at its peak and 
by 2004 Kazaa was the most downloaded piece of software in history (Goldsmith & Wu, 
2006). At the height of its success, Kazaa had more than 4 million simultaneous users 
("Kazaa site becomes legal service," 2006, July 27) and was estimated to have been 
downloaded onto about 140 million computers ("How Skype and Kazaa changed the 
net," 2005, June 17). 
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General Operation of FastTrack Implementation 
Zennström credits Kazaa‘s early success to its dependability and user-interface, 
but its success was more likely related to its capacity for scalability ("How Skype and 
Kazaa changed the net," 2005, June 17). Despite having emerged before the FastTrack 
protocol, Gnutella‘s networks were collapsing within months of release due to the flood 
of search queries which accompanied the exponential growth of its user base (Goldsmith 
& Wu, 2006). Gnutella eventually addressed these problems with the introduction of the 
previously discussed two-tier overlay system of ultrapeers and leaf peers. However, 
Kazaa had the initial advantage in the peer-to-peer market because it began with a 
centralized/decentralized topology. Kazaa‘s programmers created a top-level layer of 
peers chosen by Kazaa called supernodes. Like Napster‘s centralized indices, the 
supernodes maintained indices of users‘ shares in order to facilitate search queries. 
Supernodes also handled data flows and connections among other network peers. Unlike 
Napster, but similar to Gnutella, these supernodes were not under the direct control of 
Kazaa. As Drumm (2003) explains: 
While not the first decentralized P2P network, Fast Track excelled by using 
supernodes, which act as temporary indexing servers and add stability to the P2P 
network. This supernode remains outside the control of the company and is 
incorporated into the client software, which at that time was Kazaa. The 
supernode is the most centralized part of the Fast Track network, and 
consequentially, the most vulnerable. It acts as a relay between computers, 
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directing one computer‘s request to the corresponding computer. This is the main 
reason the supernode was left outside the control of the company. (173) 
Notwithstanding the implementation of its two-tier layer system, the health of the 
Kazaa network (like Gnutella) was still contingent upon the amount of freeriding. A 
study conducted in 2003 of the average sharing ratio demonstrated that the typical Kazaa 
user consumed much more than she contributed (Pouwelse et al., 2008). The study found 
that a minority of users (22.5%) were responsible for most of the bandwidth donations. 
Another potential weakness for the Kazaa network is FastTrack‘s use of the UUHash 
hashing algorithm to expedite checksumming of very large files. A hash function like 
UUHash takes a variable-length input and returns a fixed-length output which is typically 
smaller in size (Waldman, Cranor, & Rubin, 2001). Hash functions can dramatically 
reduce the time it takes to perform search queries by streamlining the process of data 
comparison. But the FastTrack protocol‘s use of UUHash resulted in a weak overall 
hashing system. According to Mennecke (2005, June 2), the copyright industry was able 
to exploit this weak hashing system to introduce counterfeit and corrupt files onto the 
network. He explains that ―Since UUHash hashes a file at predetermined integers, 
whoever wishes to corrupt a network only has to make sure the proper integers are 
hashed according to correct standards, while the rest of the file can be polluted‖ (¶ 9). 
 Unfortunately, many of the technical details about the FastTrack protocol remain 
largely unknown because, unlike Gnutella, the FastTrack protocol was not released as an 
open-source project. A number of distinct and mutually incompatible peer-to-peer 
systems are based on the FastTrack protocol. Popular implementations of the FastTrack 
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protocol included Kazaa, Morpheus,54 Grokster, and iMesh. The fact that FastTrack is 
administered as an intellectual property diminishes its characterization as a decentralized 
system. In fact, the system is centralized enough that Morpheus was successfully shut out 
of the system in February of 2002 for failure to pay licensing fees. The centralized 
economic structuring of the FastTrack system also gave the copyright industry something 
to target in court. 
Legal Challenges 
In November of 2001 the Dutch Wing of the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) successfully sued Kazaa. Two months later, in an attempt 
to avoid the hefty fines imposed by the courts, Kazaa was sold to Sharman Networks, and 
because the new owner was outside the jurisdiction of the Dutch court, the court could 
not force Kazaa to suspend its operations (Drumm, 2003). The company did its best to 
make itself a difficult legal target—Sharman Networks was an Australian company but it 
was legally incorporated in the nation of Vanuata—a group of islands off the coast of 
Australia in the South Pacific (Ghosemajumder, 2002). In March of 2002, the 
Netherlands Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision anyway, holding that 
individual users, not Kazaa, were the ones liable for copyright infringement. 
 In October of 2001, just seven months after Kazaa‘s initial release, the RIAA filed 
a lawsuit against three FastTrack systems—Kazaa, Grokster, and MusicCity (Goldsmith 
& Wu, 2006). In January of 2003 the United States District Court in Central California 
moved the lawsuit forward by granting jurisdiction, reasoning that because over 21 
                                                 
54 Morpheus used many different peer-to-peer protocols over the years. 
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million Americans use Kazaa, there were significant business interests at stake in the 
United States (Drumm, 2003). The defendants assembled a team of accomplished 
attorneys along with lawyers from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
55
 Kazaa‘s 
defense was premised on the notion of substantial non-infringing use which had been 
cited in the Betamax case. Furthermore, the defense argued that unlike Napster, this 
newer generation peer-to-peer system did not have control over the activities of its users. 
Two months later the court accepted the Betamax defense and granted summary 
judgment for the defendants. The judge reasoned that technological innovation should not 
be impeded by overly strict adherence to copyright principles. The RIAA quickly 
appealed and the case went to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
where the court again found in favor of the defendants based on the substantial non-
infringing use defense and the need to encourage technological innovation even at the 
expense of incumbent industries. 
 In 2005 the case came before the Supreme Court as MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd.—Sharman Networks had been dropped from the case because of their 
extraterritorial status. To the surprise of many, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed 
the lower courts and found that Grokster and other companies operating on FastTrack 
networks could be held liable for copyright infringement. Unlike the lower courts, the 
Supreme Court did not rely on the Betamax case and opted not to reexamine substantial 
non-infringing use. Instead the Court reasoned that by licensing other companies to use 
the FastTrack protocol Kazaa had, in effect, induced others to commit copyright 
                                                 
55 Goldsmith and Wu (2006) describe the EFF as an organization that intervenes through political 
participation, litigation, education, seminars, and various other means to defend the Internet from the 
interference of territorial governments. 
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infringement and could be held liable for contributory infringement. After the decision 
Grokster reached a settlement with the plaintiffs for $50 million, giving them up to 20 
years to collect the money. The settlement required Grokster to stop engaging in either 
direct or contributory copyright infringement and to cease distributing peer-to-peer file-
sharing software (Garrity & Butler, 2005). 
 With the legal path cleared for the copyright industries to hold other peer-to-peer 
systems liable, Kazaa and Sharman Networks scrambled to find alternative economic 
models to keep themselves afloat. Kazaa had long courted advertising revenue by 
allowing companies to advertise within the software‘s user interface. In 2003 Kazaa 
partnered with Altnet and Streamwaves and began delivering 30 second samples of songs 
to Kazaa users. Altnet paid Kazaa to feature its songs at the top of the returned results for 
search queries. Kazaa users could then follow a link to a music streaming service 
conveniently offered by Streamwaves (Healey, 2003). The arrangement was an attempt 
by Kazaa to extend and highlight the software‘s non-infringing uses. As Drumm (2003) 
observed: 
Sharman contends that Kazaa users have downloaded over 57 million legal, free 
copy-protected promotional materials. Trying to shed the image that P2P 
networks are the black markets of the 21st century, Kazaa is partnering up with 
companies to release non-copyrighted products over the Kazaa network. (177) 
 Kazaa‘s search for alternative business models became increasingly desperate as 
it faced the prospect of no longer being able to license usage of the FastTrack protocol. 
At one point the company even proposed using the network to create a large-scale 
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parallel processing computer without first informing its users (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). 
The apparent failure to arrive at a sustainable business model eventually led Kazaa to not 
only accept less-reputable advertisers but to also integrate malware
56
 into their software. 
The spyware and adware incorporated into Kazaa‘s installation angered many users. 
Unsurprisingly, the network began to shrink and by 2005 there were only about 2-3 
million users (Mennecke, 2005, June 2). The following year Kazaa settled a lawsuit with 
the big four record labels—EMI, Sony BMG, Universal Music, and Warner Music—for 
$100 million. The combined impact of corrupt files (from weak hashing), malware, the 
emergence of newer peer-to-peer networks, the legal fallout from the Grokster case, the 
$100 million settlement against Kazaa, and the targeting of individual users as part of the 
RIAA litigation campaign made the outlook bleak for the once impressive FastTrack 
network. 
LITIGATING AGAINST INDIVIDUAL USERS 
Although the copyright industries had scored a number of important legal 
victories there was a concern that the industry (and the law) would always lag behind 
new technological capacities for distributing cultural and informational goods online 
without the authorization of the copyright holder. Consequently, the RIAA began looking 
for another legal tactic to stem the flow of unauthorized access. And so began the 
industry‘s campaign against individual file-sharers. In 2002 the RIAA took advantage of 
the DMCA‘s provision requiring ISPs to reveal the identity of alleged copyright 
                                                 
56 Malware is short for malicious software and generally refers to any software which infiltrates a computer 
system without the user‘s consent.  
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infringers after the copyright holder has obtained a subpoena from a federal district court. 
The RIAA‘s use of subpoenas soon created a rift between copyright holders and Internet 
service companies. ISPs chafed at the potential costs of complying with the large number 
of subpoenas (Gruenwedel & Garrity, 2002). Undeterred, the RIAA obtained subpoenas 
targeting ISPs such as Verizon Communications, Charter Communications, and Pacific 
Bell Internet Services (Olsen, 2003, October 6). Both Charter and Verizon challenged the 
RIAA‘s demands in court. The companies lost at the district level but the appellate courts 
ruled that the ISPs should not be required to turn over any information about their 
customers. The courts based their decisions on a section in the DMCA dealing with ISP 
compliance with subpoenas in cases of transitory communication. The courts found that 
the section on transitory communication did not apply in the case of peer-to-peer file-
sharing because the transmissions were not stored on equipment owned and maintained 
by the ISPs. The information was not being made publicly available by the ISPs. Thus the 
lower court decisions were reversed. As Drumm (2003) explains: 
Verizon argued that section 512 does not apply to ISP‘s who act as conduits for 
P2P networks. Their rationale is based on the structure of the P2P system. 
Verizon supplies its customers with a connection to the Internet. Customers who 
use P2P software access copyrighted files from other user‘s computers. Verizon is 
not hosting any of the copyrighted files on its servers. (182) 
In response to the courts‘ decisions, the RIAA initiated a new program to stem the flow 
of unauthorized access to copyrighted materials—the so-called John Doe lawsuits.  
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 Armed with increased statutory damages under the Digital Theft Deterrence and 
Copyright Damages Improvement Act and with the support of the IFPI (Koranteng, 
2004), the RIAA turned its sights to individual file-sharers. On September 8, 2003, the 
RIAA fired its opening salvo against individual file-sharers by filing 261 lawsuits 
(Bruno, 2008). In doing so, the RIAA demonstrated its willingness to ignite a contentious 
legal debate and long-term public relations battle to ensure the continued stream of 
revenue from its monopolies on intellectual property. As Goldsmith and Wu (2006) state: 
The consumers were an easy target. The vast majority lacked the legal resources 
to defend a lawsuit, and almost certainly had violated U.S. copyright law. But 
why would an industry want to attack its customers? The recording industry, it 
seemed, preferred to be feared than loved. Said Cary Sherman, the RIAA‘s 
president, ―The public has been educated and re-educated and re-educated again,‖ 
and ―when your product is being regularly stolen, there comes a time when you 
have to take appropriate action.‖ As advertising consultant Lee Kovel put it, 
―They want to make a statement and strike fear. They don‘t care about PR.‖ (114) 
 From the beginning, the FastTrack system appeared to be the RIAA‘s primary 
target as the overwhelming majority of individuals facing litigation had used these 
networks (Mennecke, 2005, June 2). The RIAA hired Maryland-based MediaSentry
57
 to 
look for copyrighted songs being shared by individuals on peer-to-peer networks like 
Kazaa. The company downloaded suspect files, and then presented those downloads as 
evidence in court of copyright violation (McBride, 2009). As Butler (2008) describes: 
                                                 
57 In addition to the RIAA, MediaSentry was employed by the MPAA and the IFPI. 
 214 
The company collects the list of music files the user is sharing, identifies songs 
that belong to RIAA-member companies and downloads the files. MediaSentry 
also collects very detailed text logs as evidence of its activities throughout the 
entire process. The ISP associated with an IP address is easy to identify. The 
American Registry for Internet Numbers, a nonprofit organization, provides the 
information via a search on its Web site. MediaSentry sends the information to the 
RIAA, which has staff that listen to each downloaded file to verify the identity of 
the song. The RIAA notifies the ISP to preserve the evidence connected to the ISP 
address. The record companies then file a lawsuit naming ―John Doe‖ as the 
unnamed defendant. Once they file the suit, the labels may then have the court 
issue a subpoena for the ISP to identify the registered user for the IP address. That 
person then replaces John Doe as the defendant. (¶ 27-30) 
The RIAA sent tens of thousands of these notifications to ISPs beginning in 2003. 
Then in 2005, the RIAA announced that it would be targeting college students for 
copyright infringement and began notifying universities of alleged illegal activities 
occurring on their networks (Holland, 2005, April 23). In 2007 the RIAA started sending 
pre-notification letters to universities, asking university officials to distribute the letters to 
the as-of-yet unidentified students who were the actual targets of impending litigation. 
These letters offered students a chance to settle claims before being sued (Butler, 2007). 
Typical settlement offers to college students and members of the general public 
demanded $4,000 from the accused in order to head off a lawsuit ("Keeping pirates at 
bay," 2009). But there was resistance to the RIAA‘s campaign. Defendants began 
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fighting back, judges overturned rulings and reduced settlement fees, and public opinion 
turned against the recording industry. The RIAA would struggle significantly to maintain 
the viability of its litigation campaign in the face of this counterinsurgency. 
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Chapter 5 The RIAA Copyright Litigation Campaign Targeting 
Individual File-Sharers 
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) litigation campaign 
targeting individual file-sharers was enormous both in terms of the sheer number of 
people targeted and the personal misfortune left in its wake. Yet the enormity of the 
campaign should not be misconstrued as evidence of perfectly choreographed domination 
by large music firms over hapless file-sharers. The ultimate outcome of the litigation 
campaign was a product of both the RIAA‘s efforts and the efforts of those who worked 
against it. By acknowledging this somewhat obvious state of affairs we come to 
understand the trajectory of capitalist development in the sphere of music production and 
distribution as a consequence of the struggle among competing interests. In this chapter I 
will demonstrate how the resistance of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), college 
students, university administrators, and a small band of lawyers and their clients imposed 
limits on the effectiveness of the RIAA campaign. Beginning with the first wave of 
subpoenas issued to ISPs in the summer of 2003 to the cessation of the litigation 
campaign in 2008 and continuing on with the ongoing Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum 
trials,
58
 this chapter provides a detailed history of the RIAA litigation campaign through 
the lens of struggle as various interested parties sought to activate different structural 
features of the law for their own benefit. As part of this process the courts were required 
at certain points in the campaign to take positions on: (1) the legitimate or illegitimate 
uses of communications systems; (2) the legitimate or illegitimate uses of the courts; and 
                                                 
58 Jammie Thomas-Rasset was initially sued in 2006 and Joel Tenenbaum in 2007. 
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(3) the legitimate or illegitimate uses of informational and cultural goods. Ultimately, I 
contend that the legal conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing was conditioned as much by 
resistance to the litigation campaign as it was by the desire of the RIAA to manage the 
impact of file-sharing. 
PROLOGUE: THE SUPPRESSION OF THE RADICAL POTENTIAL OF PEER-TO-PEER 
PLATFORMS 
Chapter 4 was, in part, a history of the recording industry‘s initial attempts to 
contain the disruptive potential of emerging file-sharing applications by suing 
commercial peer-to-peer innovators. It is a story of intra-firm struggle and industrial 
restructuring. First Napster was targeted by the recording industry in December 1999, 
followed by Scour, Aimster, AudioGalaxy, Morpheus, Grokster, Kazaa, iMesh, and 
LimeWire (EFF, 2007). Napster was sued by the RIAA in the U.S. District Court in 
Northern California for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement (Macavinta, 
1999, December 7). Scour, like Napster, was a brokered peer-to-peer platform utilizing a 
central index of files available for downloading (Borland, 2001, October 3). Because 
Scour allowed users to share movies in addition to music the RIAA was joined by the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) in their suit in 2000 against Scour in 
federal district court in New York (Greene, 2000, July 24). Aimster was another peer-to-
peer file-sharing platform which allowed users to create ―buddy lists‖ much like those 
used by AOL Instant Messenger. Aimster users could then share files with a select group 
of people. The RIAA filed suit against Aimster in federal district court in New York in 
May of 2001 (Borland, 2001, May 25). AudioGalaxy was a peer-to-peer platform which 
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benefitted from the migration of users in the wake of Napster‘s demise. Despite the 
company‘s efforts to voluntarily filter copyrighted music from its network, the RIAA 
filed suit against AudioGalaxy in 2002 (Mariano, 2002, June 18). Morpheus (Streamcast) 
and Kazaa (Sharman) were part of the second wave of post-Napster peer-to-peer 
networks and were defendants in the previously discussed MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd. case lasting from 2003-2005.
59
 iMesh was an Israeli-based peer-to-peer 
company incorporated in Delaware and targeted by the RIAA in 2003 (Borland, 2003, 
September 19). In 2005 Free Peers Incorporated, distributor of the BearShare application 
operating on the Gnutella protocol, received a cease-and-desist notification which 
eventually resulted in a settlement with the RIAA (SlyckTom, 2006, May 5). And in 
2006 Limewire touched off a four year legal battle with the RIAA after rejecting a cease-
and-desist notification making the Gnutella-based network one of the last holdouts 
against the recording industry (Mennecke, 2010, May 12). These last three cases—iMesh, 
Bearshare and Limewire—overlapped with the initiation of the RIAA litigation campaign 
against individual file-sharers and are indicative of the industry‘s continued willingness 
to target the developers of commercial peer-to-peer platforms. All of these companies 
settled with the RIAA, usually to the tune of tens of millions of dollars.
60
 However 
impressive this string of legal victories over commercial peer-to-peer platforms may 
seem, it alone was insufficient to curb the tide of file-sharing. The RIAA was beset with a 
host of jurisdictional problems and technological challenges, rendering this legal strategy 
ineffective. Downed peer-to-peer networks were quickly replaced by newer alternatives; 
                                                 
59 Sharman Networks was eventually dropped from the list of defendants. 
60 iMesh settled for only $4.1 million; Kazaa settled for $100 million (Mennecke, 2010, May 12). 
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offshore companies dodged legal enforcement; and the relative ease with which a reserve 
army of programmers and hobbyists developed newer and more sophisticated peer-to-
peer systems all but guaranteed the dogged persistence of file-sharing (EFF, 2007). 
 Despite the perception that the recording industry scored a major legal victory in 
the Grokster case, a close reading of the opinion authored by Justice Souter reveals that 
the case did not explicitly address whether or not the Betamax safe harbor provisions 
applied to Grokster.  That is to say, even though the Court unanimously held that 
Grokster could be held liable for copyright infringement,
61
 there was no clear change 
from the substantial non-infringing use precedent established in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal Studios, Inc. In fact, the concurring opinions offered by Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer split on the matter. With no clear legal path established by the courts to prevent 
outright the development of new peer-to-peer platforms and faced with increasingly 
decentralized peer-to-peer networks and legions of file-sharers (numbering somewhere in 
the neighborhood of 60 million in the U.S. alone), a strategy based exclusively on the 
targeting of the distributors of commercial peer-to-peer platforms was no longer viable 
(Mennecke, 2007, February 28). Consequently, the RIAA changed targets in the summer 
of 2003. 
ACT 1: DMCA SUBPOENAS 
There were warning signs of what was to come. For several years previous to 
2003 the RIAA had been endeavoring to educate the public about the illegality of sharing 
                                                 
61 The Supreme Court found the defendants liable on the basis that they induced copyright infringement by 
distributing their software with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright. Because of this ruling, 
inducement now sits alongside the principles of vicarious and contributory as a third doctrine of copyright 
infringement. 
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music over peer-to-peer networks (RIAA, 2003, September 8). Then in the spring of 2003 
the RIAA sued four university students under the DMCA without first notifying 
universities officials (Kaplin & Lee, 2006). The RIAA accused the students of running a 
Napster-like service that indexed and executed searches for MP3 files on their college 
networks. The RIAA alleged that the students distributed 27,000 files, 500,000 files, 
650,000 files, and over 1 million files respectively (Dean, 2003, April 5). Within a month 
the students each settled with the record companies, with settlements ranging between 
$12,000 to $17,500 (Bowman, 2003, June 25; Graham, 2003, September 10). Clearly the 
RIAA meant the suits as a warning. Matt Oppenheim (Dean, 2003, April 5), RIAA senior 
vice president of business and legal affairs, stated at the time: 
This round of suits is intended to send a message to other students who are 
engaging in this type of behavior….You cannot expect to infringe until you get a 
cease-and-desist letter and then stop and assume that life will go on. (¶ 3-4) 
Then in late April the RIAA took the novel step of tapping into the chat functions of both 
the Kazaa and Grokster networks to issue warnings to users that they were in violation of 
federal copyright law (Bowman, 2003, June 25).
62
 Oppenheim (Graham, 2003, 
September 10) commented ―We sent instant messages to every person we sued, warning 
them this would happen if they continued. They should‘ve known this was illegal‖ (¶ 21). 
 In June 2003 the RIAA announced that it would be launching a massive litigation 
campaign targeting individual peer-to-peer file-sharers. The organization indicated that it 
would be scanning the public directories of peer-to-peer networks to ascertain both the 
                                                 
62 The RIAA used the chat functions built into the user interface of Grokster and Kazaa to send automatic 
messages to thousands of individuals they believed were sharing copyrighted files. The message warned 
users that they were breaking the law. 
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files that people were sharing and the IP address from which the files were being shared. 
They would then serve the relevant ISPs with subpoenas to identify the account holders. 
The subscribers would then be named in subsequent suits filed in federal district courts 
starting as early as August (Bowman, 2003, June 25). During this initial execution of the 
file-sharing litigation campaign, the RIAA relied on a controversial provision of the 
DMCA that allowed them to issue subpoenas to ISPs for the purpose of identifying file-
sharers without judicial oversight (Roberts, 2004, January 21). Under the provision 
copyright holders were able to subpoena an ISP in order to obtain the names and 
addresses of persons they believed to be infringing their copyright. The subpoena 
provision found in § 512(h) of the DMCA permitted court clerks to issue such subpoenas 
without a judge‘s signature (Dean, 2003, September 17). The copyright holder simply 
had to provide the court clerk with three items: (1) a notification of the copyrighted 
work(s) under dispute; (2) the proposed subpoena directed to the ISP; and (3) a sworn 
declaration that the intent of the subpoena was only to identify the alleged copyright 
infringer (Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, 
Inc., 2003). This lack of judicial oversight provoked one of the first legal tests to the 
RIAA legal strategy.  
 In July of 2002 the RIAA served Verizon with a subpoena pursuant to § 512(h) of 
the Copyright Act in an effort to link IP addresses to account holders. Verizon refused to 
comply with the subpoena, arguing that they were protected under the ISP safe harbor 
provisions of the DMCA. In January 2003 a federal district court rejected Verizon‘s 
argument, ordering the company to disclose the names of the subscribers in question. 
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Meanwhile, the RIAA served Verizon with a second DMCA subpoena. Verizon 
immediately moved to quash the second subpoena on the grounds that the court, acting 
through the court clerk, lacked jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to quash 
and again ordered Verizon to disclose the identities of the subscribers. Verizon appealed 
both orders to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit where the two 
cases were consolidated into one (Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. 
Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 2003). Verizon was not alone in its unhappiness with the 
subpoenas—Charter Communications and Pacific Bell Internet Services also challenged 
the RIAA in court. However, with the initial defeat of Verizon at the district court level 
the RIAA seized the opportunity to begin issuing subpoenas to ISPs. More than 1500 
subpoenas were issued between August and September 2003, allowing the RIAA to begin 
compiling a list of the names of individuals to target in court (EFF, 2007). 
On September 8, 2003, the RIAA, representing five multinational firms, filed 
lawsuits against 261 individuals for alleged copyright infringement over peer-to-peer 
networks including Morpheus, Kazaa, and Grokster ("Not-so-Jolly Rogers," 2003, 
September 10). The barrage of lawsuits marked a significant change in the RIAA‘s legal 
strategy to contain the threat of file-sharing. A RIAA Press Release (RIAA, 2003, 
September 8) announced the commencement of the litigation campaign: 
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) announced today that its 
member companies have filed the first wave of what could ultimately be 
thousands of civil lawsuits against major offenders who have been illegally 
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distributing substantial amounts (averaging more than 1,000 copyrighted music 
files each) of copyrighted music on peer-to-peer networks. (¶ 1) 
RIAA president Cary Sherman further stated, ―Our goal is not to be vindictive or 
punitive. It is simply to get peer-to-peer users to stop offering music that does not belong 
to them‖ (Borland, 2003, September 8). 
 Perhaps sensing the potential public backlash for its apparent willingness to target 
its own consumers, the RIAA did not announce the names of any of the litigants in the 
initial press release. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the media from discovering the 
identities of many of the targeted individuals as the suits were a matter of public record. 
Public outrage was swift. One of the 261 individuals sued by the RIAA was 12 year old 
honor student Brianna LaHara from New York. Brianna‘s picture was featured on the 
front page of the Daily News (Sangha, Furman, & Gearty, 2003). Brianna‘s mother, 
Sylvia Torres, became the first person to settle with the RIAA, paying the record labels 
$2,000 (Graham, 2003, September 10). A follow-up story in the Daily News (Kennedy, 
2003, September 11) documented the anger: 
Furious music lovers nationwide flooded 12-year-old Brianna LaHara of 
Manhattan with donations yesterday to help pay off her debt to the recording 
business. From $3 pledges for the Help Brianna fund to $1,000 offers, hundreds 
of people wanted to help pay the $2,000 settlement between Brianna and the 
Recording Industry Association of America. "The whole deal with going after the 
actual consumer - and the fact that it's a 12-year-old girl with a single mother who 
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lives in the projects - well, these people have no decency," said Taylor Finley, a 
California film student who started the Help Brianna fund. (¶ 1-3) 
Then in an inexplicable move, the RIAA either misread this early outpouring of anger or 
thought they could still win the public sentiment when they encouraged the young girl to 
issue a public apology through RIAA offices:  "I am sorry for what I have done. I love 
music and don't want to hurt the artists I love‖ (Rose, Mechlovitz-Rosen, Seigel, & 
Sangha, 2003, ¶ 2). 
 Public anger was not limited to Brianna‘s case alone. It was fueled by press 
coverage and public sympathy for others caught up in the initial round of lawsuits 
including a 71 year old grandfather from Richardson, Texas; a star football player at the 
University of Colorado-Boulder; and a 49 year old California woman unemployed since 
being injured on the job two years previous. While the public might have sympathized 
with an industry bringing lawsuits against commercial copyright pirates offering 
unauthorized goods on the black market there seemed to be less patience for an industry 
indiscriminately suing music fans. And the bad press wasn‘t confined to just those cases 
in which vulnerable or upstanding individuals were ensnared in the litigation—there were 
also cases wherein the RIAA targeted the wrong individuals. Among the first 261 cases 
was Sarah Ward, a 66 year old retired schoolteacher from Boston whom the RIAA 
alleged traded heavily in hip-hop artists like Snoop Dogg (Graham, 2003, September 10; 
Schwartz, 2003, September 25). Though the case against Ms. Ward was quickly dropped, 




It is impossible to determine how many innocent individuals may have been 
caught up in the RIAA driftnet and forced to settle because of the prohibitively high cost 
of mounting a legal defense (EFF, 2007). 
The RIAA litigation campaign was unprecedented in that it marked the first time 
that copyright law had been brought to bear on individuals on a mass scale (Borland, 
2003, September 8). Until that point, litigants in copyright disputes were likely to be 
commercial actors of some sort. The legal action initiated by the RIAA dramatically 
raised the legal burden of millions of everyday people. In a move to temper the public 
reaction to the campaign, the RIAA launched the so-called Clean Slate Program, a kind 
of amnesty program, to coincide with the commencement of the mass litigation. From the 
original September 2003 RIAA press release (RIAA, 2003, September 8): 
At the same time, the RIAA announced that the industry is prepared to grant what 
amounts to amnesty to P2P users who voluntarily identify themselves and pledge 
to stop illegally sharing music on the Internet. The RIAA will guarantee not to sue 
file-sharers who have not yet been identified in any RIAA investigations and who 
provide a signed and notarized affidavit in which they promise to respect 
recording-company copyrights. "For those who want to wipe the slate clean and to 
avoid a potential lawsuit, this is the way to go," said Mitch Bainwol, RIAA 
Chairman and CEO. "We want to send a strong message that the illegal 
distribution of copyrighted works has consequences, but if individuals are willing 
                                                 
63 In one such case a defendant was targeted despite not having been a subscriber to the subpoenaed ISP at 
the time of the alleged file-sharing ("RIAA Drops Another Case In Chicago Against Misidentified 
Defendant," 2007, May 3). In another case the RIAA misidentified a defendant based on a spelling error 
("RIAA Drops Wilke Case in Chicago," 2006, October 13). 
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to step forward on their own, we want to go the extra step and extend them this 
option." (¶ 2-4) 
The amnesty program was something of a sham however. Clean Slate required 
participants to acknowledge in writing that they had shared music files over the Internet 
before removing the files from their computers. And though the RIAA stated that it 
would not assist copyright holders in suing individuals who participated in the program, 
the major-label members of the RIAA reserved the right to file suit (as did the publishers 
and recording artists). As senior intellectual property attorney for the EFF Fred von 
Lohmann (2003, September 10) wrote in the Los Angeles Times, ―…once you have come 
forward, you are more vulnerable to a lawsuit, not less‖ (¶ 3). After months of criticism 
the RIAA killed Clean Slate in 2004 after a paltry 1,108 people had participated in the 
program ("Music Biz Kills Amnesty Program," 2004, April 19).
64
 
The end of the first stage of the RIAA litigation campaign was precipitated by a 
couple of things. First was a blistering round of criticism from Congress which at this 
stage in the litigation campaign was displeased with RIAA tactics. As early as August of 
2003, members of Congress had expressed concern about the RIAA‘s impending 
litigation campaign. Republican Senator Norm Coleman of  Minnesota, chairman of the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, asked the RIAA to provide detailed 
information about the 900 DMCA subpoenas it had sent various ISPs around the country. 
Senator Coleman requested copies of the subpoenas, a description of the standards the 
RIAA used to file for a subpoena, and a description of the investigatory process the 
                                                 
64 The RIAA stated that it would continue to honor the terms of the program for the people who had 
participated ("Music Biz Kills Amnesty Program," 2004, April 19). 
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RIAA employed in building their cases against alleged file-sharers. Coleman—an 
admitted file-sharer at one point in his life—expressed concern about the effects such a 
campaign may have on both consumer privacy and district court dockets (Dean, 2003, 
August 1). In September of 2003, the Senate Commerce Committee convened a hearing 
on the DMCA subpoena process with a panel including RIAA president Cary Sherman, a 
representative from Verizon, and a representative from SBC Communications. SBC by 
this time had filed a lawsuit against the RIAA alleging that the subpoenas served to its 
Pacific Bell Internet Services subsidiary violated consumer privacy and were filed in the 
wrong jurisdiction (Dean, 2003, August 1, 2003, September 17). Verizon and SBC both 
thought the RIAA should be required to file individual lawsuits against each alleged 
copyright infringer and to obtain a judge‘s order before asking any ISP to turn over 
subscriber information. In sum, the ISPs argued that the DMCA subpoena process lacked 
judicial oversight and was ripe for abuse by the RIAA. Conversely, the RIAA argued that 
the DMCA was a carefully crafted compromise in which ISPs were granted liability 
immunity for ―the rampant piracy on their networks,‖ and in exchange the ISPs were 
obligated to help copyright holders identify alleged infringers (Dean, 2003, September 
17, ¶ 3). William Barr, vice president and general counsel for Verizon, asserted however 
that ―Congress hasn‘t given this power to the federal government to investigate terrorism. 
Why should the record industry—private citizens—have this unfettered subpoena 
authority to reach the most sensitive information people have?‖ (Gross, 2003, September 
17, ¶ 9). Members of the Senate were sympathetic to the ISPs. Republican Senator Sam 
Brownback of Kansas introduced a bill called the Consumers, Schools, and Libraries 
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Digital Rights Management Act of 2003 which would have prevented copyright holders 
from compelling ISPs to turn over subscriber information without first filing a civil 
lawsuit. Though Brownback‘s bill was eventually stalled in committee, the RIAA did 
alter its tactics in the face of tough Congressional criticism.  
Congressional resistance to the RIAA litigation campaign proved short-lived 
however. It is likely that at this early stage in the litigation campaign the ISPs had been 
more successful in framing the debate as a matter of privacy instead of piracy. Much of 
the discussion in Washington had long emphasized the value of competition across 
industries and in previous confrontations the interests of copyright holders were often 
seen as an impediment to further innovation. However, the RIAA (and the copyright 
industries more generally) were quick to realize the importance of framing the discussion 
in terms more amenable to their interests and moved forward with lobbying efforts. As 
we will see shortly, the RIAA was eventually successful in shifting the discourse back to 
piracy as copyright holders and ISPs confronted each other along the structural dimension 
of signification. Still, the concerns expressed by Congress and ISPs regarding the undue 
burden placed on the court system by the RIAA‘s litigation campaign were never really 
answered and so the issue persisted. 
As the RIAA readied its second wave of lawsuits against an additional 204 
alleged file-sharers, the trade association decided it would be better to provide these 
individuals with some warning of the impending legal action—the so-called pre-litigation 
letters. RIAA president Cary Sherman (Borland, 2003, October 17) stated:  
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We take the concerns expressed by policy makers and others very seriously. In 
light of the comments we have heard, we want to go the extra mile and offer 
illegal file-sharers an additional chance to work this out short of legal action. (¶ 2) 
Unlike the initial wave of suits, this time around the RIAA offered those accused 
of copyright infringement a chance to settle before the suits were actually filed. The 
association asserted that the pre-litigation notice gave those individuals desiring an 
immediate settlement the opportunity to do so while giving individuals wishing to contest 
the accusation the opportunity to make their concerns known. The letters informed 
recipients of the potential $750 minimum in statutory damages for each act of 
infringement and warned them not to attempt to eliminate any evidence of wrongdoing. 
The letters concluded by stating that the RIAA would file suit unless the recipient 
responded within 10 days.  
 The pre-litigation letters were a modest (if meaningless) concession which did 
little in the way of addressing the concerns of critics. Undaunted, the RIAA thereupon 
began filing suits on a weekly basis. Yet, the DMCA subpoena controversy had not 
played out completely. On December 19, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reversed the lower court order against Verizon. Verizon had 
opposed the RIAA‘s first subpoena to compel the ISP to turn over subscriber information 
because Verizon argued § 512(h)(6) did not apply to an ISP acting merely as a conduit 
for individuals using peer-to-peer applications. Verizon resisted the second RIAA 
subpoena based on an argument that § 512(h) violates the First Amendment. The appeals 
court agreed with Verizon‘s interpretation of the DMCA ISP safe harbor provision but 
 230 
did not rule on the constitutional question. The court remanded the case back to the 
district court to vacate its order to enforce the first subpoena and to grant Verizon‘s 
motion to quash the second subpoena. In doing so the appeals court reasoned that the 
authors of the DMCA had not envisioned the advent of peer-to-peer file-sharing, nor had 
they ―draft[ed] the DMCA broadly enough to reach the new technology when it came 
along‖ (Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, 
Inc., 2003). While somewhat sympathetic to the plight of the RIAA, the judges in the 
case thought that it was not the province of the courts to rewrite the DMCA to fit the new 
technological milieu. With one decisive blow the appellate court had brought to a close 
the first phase of the RIAA litigation campaign against individual file-sharers. The 
Supreme Court later denied a writ of certiorari to the RIAA, effectively giving the 
appeals court the final word. Still, in the period during which the lower court decision 
stood, more than 3,000 subpoena requests to ISPs were issued and almost 400 lawsuits 
were filed (Mark, 2004, October 12). And as the EFF (2007) observed, ―Even though the 
RIAA had used illegal tactics to pursue these lawsuits, none of the defendants who paid 
received any money back‖ (p. 5). 
ACT 2: JOHN DOE SUBPOENAS 
On January 21, 2004, the RIAA returned with a third round of lawsuits against an 
additional 532 people accused of copyright infringement—marking a transition in the 
tactics used by the RIAA to pursue alleged file-sharers. This was both the largest group 
of defendants targeted and the first lawsuits since the court of appeals had ruled that the 
RIAA‘s use of the DMCA subpoena process was illegal (Schwartz, 2004, January 21). 
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Consequently, the RIAA modified its approach by filing ―John Doe‖ lawsuits that 
identified defendants only by the IP addresses turned up during the investigation 
(Roberts, 2004, January 21). John Doe lawsuits are a somewhat common type of 
litigation for cases involving computer networks in which the plaintiffs identify 
defendants only by the numerical label assigned to a particular device participating in a 
computer network. In the case of a peer-to-peer file-sharer the numerical label is typically 
assigned to a subscriber by an ISP. Therefore, the RIAA grouped 532 cases into 4 
lawsuits against a number of ISPs—three filed in New York and one in the District of 
Columbia. The suits were filed in courts close to where the ISPs were headquartered but 
not necessarily anywhere near where the defendants resided. The RIAA petitioned the 
courts to issue subpoenas to the ISPs to compel them to provide subscriber information 
based on the IP addresses they had obtained. 
Some critics viewed this modified approach as a genuine improvement over the 
DMCA subpoena process because it introduced judicial oversight into the process (EFF, 
2007). However, there were still a number of very real problems with the new approach. 
New York City attorney Ray Beckerman (2008, April 9) wrote a comprehensive 
introduction to the litigation process utilized by the RIAA. His article is the basis for the 
description that follows. As mentioned previously, a group of John Doe lawsuits were 
filed in the location of the corporate headquarters of the ISP associated with the IP 
address turned up during the RIAA‘s investigation. The grouping of these ―John Does‖ 
into a single lawsuit (a legal procedure known as joinder) was the first problematic 
component of the process. The consolidation of large numbers of defendants caused some 
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legal experts to express concern about the administrative burden this process placed on 
the federal district courts (Schwartz, 2004, January 21). The basis for joining all of the 
―John Does‖ into a single case was also questioned. Furthermore, there was the matter of 
jurisdiction. The ―John Does‖ themselves may live many hundreds or thousands of miles 
from the court in which the cases were filed. The RIAA was aware that many of the 
defendants did not live in the state where the cases were filed and were therefore not 
subject to the court‘s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the RIAA would make a motion for a 
discovery order without giving notice to the defendants. This allowed the RIAA to take 
immediate discovery
65
 by authorizing the issuance of subpoenas to the ISP to compel 
them to turn over subscriber information. Without any form of prior notice the ―John 
Does‖ were effectively denied the opportunity to be heard in connection with the motion. 
They were not provided with the details of the actual suit or the court‘s basis for granting 
the ex parte discovery order and the subpoena. 
This put the defendants at a severe disadvantage right from the start. ―John Does‖ 
received a letter from their ISP informing them that an order had already been granted 
against them along with copies of the ex parte
66
 discovery order and subpoena. In other 
words, instead of receiving notice that the RIAA was applying for an order against them, 
defendants were informed of the court order only after it had been decided against them 
in their absence. Because ex parte proceedings are somewhat controversial, there were a 
                                                 
65 Immediate discovery is defined as compulsory discovery without delay, at a party‘s request, of 
information that relates to the litigation (Garner, 2006). 
66 Ex parte indicates that the plaintiffs have communicated to the court without giving notice to the other 
parties to the suit. 
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few instances in which the RIAA‘s tactics were called into question by the courts.
67
 Once 
the ―John Does‖ received the notification letter they typically had about two weeks to file 
a motion to quash the subpoena. Yet finding a suitable attorney under these 
circumstances would be extremely difficult. Since the notification did not provide any 
details about the nature of the actual lawsuit, only attorneys who were already familiar 
with the RIAA litigation process would be of any use to the defendant. Unsurprisingly, 
these lawyers were few and far in between. Further complicating matters was the problem 
of state jurisdiction. Attorneys are typically licensed to practice in only a handful of 
states. So the defendant was tasked with finding an attorney in the state where the lawsuit 
had been filed in a very short amount of time in order to make a motion to quash the 
subpoena. In light of these circumstances, the most likely outcome was a default 
judgment for the plaintiffs at which point the ISP disclosed the subscriber information 
behind the IP address. With the subscriber‘s personal information in hand, the RIAA 
would drop the suit against ―John Doe‖ and mail the named defendant a settlement offer.  
If the defendant ignored or refused the settlement offer, the RIAA would file suit in the 
district court where the defendant resided. In those cases where defendants ignored both 
the settlement offer and the lawsuit, plaintiffs would typically receive default judgments 
with statutory awards of $750 per alleged copyright infringement. 
This ―John Doe‖ process was how the RIAA litigation campaign was carried out 
from 2004-2008. By the end of 2004 the RIAA had filed 7,437 lawsuits; by the end of 
2005 the RIAA had filed 16,087 lawsuits. After the total reached 17,587 in February of 
                                                 
67 See Capitol Records v. Does 1-16 in which a judge rejected the RIAA‘s application because there was 
no basis for the ex parte character (Beckerman, 2008, April 9). And see Interscope Records v. Does 1-17 in 
which another ex parte motion was rejected. 
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2006 the RIAA stopped publicizing the number (EFF, 2008). By the end of the campaign 
the RIAA had filed lawsuits against somewhere between 18,000 and 35,000 individuals. 
The imprecise number is due to the fact that the RIAA filed suits against numerous 
individuals twice—once as ―John Doe‖ and then again as a named defendant (Anderson, 
2009, July 8). Most of the cases were settled for amounts ranging between $3,000 and 
$11,000. Although the plaintiffs were either the official or unofficial victors in the vast 
majority of these cases, there was still considerable resistance to the lawsuits which 
would determine the limits to the effectiveness of the RIAA‘s litigation campaign. One 
such pocket of resistance stemmed from the RIAA‘s decision late in the litigation 
campaign to target university students across the country. 
ACT 3: PRE-DOE SETTLEMENT OFFERS 
In February of 2007 a letter from the RIAA to an ISP was leaked. The letter 
revealed that the RIAA was attempting to change its litigation policy to include a pre-Doe 
settlement option (Beckerman, 2007, February 13; Buskirk, 2007, February 13). The 
RIAA had begun asking ISPs to assist them in contacting subscribers whom they 
suspecting of illegally sharing files. In doing so the RIAA was attempting to keep the 
cases out of the courts. The ISPs were asked to contact the ―John Does‖ on behalf of the 
RIAA to inform them that legal action was imminent. Recipients of these notifications 
were also told that if they went ahead and turned themselves in to the RIAA to initiate the 
settlement process, the amount would be discounted to $1,000. The leaked letter also 
made mention of an upcoming RIAA web site to facilitate these early settlements—
www.p2plawsuits.com. 
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On February 28, 2007, RIAA chairman and CEO Mitch Bainwol, RIAA president 
Cary Sherman  and RIAA general counsel and vice president Steven Marks hosted a 
press conference call in which they announced a new anti-piracy initiative aimed 
primarily at college students (Mennecke, 2007, February 28). The call began with a 
discussion of financial losses and layoffs in the recording industry and the alleged link to 
file-sharing among college students. Then the RIAA officials announced the 
implementation of the already-underway pre-Doe settlement process. They did not 
disclose any information regarding the amount of the settlement discount.  They also 
made it clear that although the new initiative was directed primarily at university 
students, it was being put into practice nationwide with private ISPs as well. An RIAA 
press release (RIAA, 2007, February 28) announced: 
The recording industry today launched a new and strengthened campus anti-
piracy initiative that significantly expands the scope and volume of its deterrent 
efforts while offering a new process that gives students the opportunity to avoid a 
formal lawsuit by settling prior to a litigation being filed. The Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), on behalf of the major record companies, today 
sent 400 pre-litigation settlement letters to 13 different universities. Each letter 
informs the school of a forthcoming copyright infringement lawsuit against one of 
its students or personnel. The RIAA will request that universities forward those 
letters to the appropriate network user. Under this new approach, a student (or 
other network user) can settle the record company claims against him or her at a 
discounted rate before a lawsuit is ever filed. (¶ 1-2) 
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The stated focus of the initiative was deterrence and education on college 
campuses.  The RIAA alleged that over half of the population of college students 
engaged in illegal downloading and were responsible for 1.3 billion illegal downloads of 
music in 2006 (RIAA, 2007, March 21). RIAA president Cary Sherman summarized by 
stating: 
Because we know that some audiences – particularly campus music downloaders 
– can sometimes be impervious to even the most compelling educational 
messages or legal alternatives, these new efforts aim to help students recognize 
that the consequences for illegal downloading are more real than ever before. (¶ 
10) 
Also confirmed in the RIAA press release was the launch of www.p2plawsuits.com 
which ―serve[d] as an informational resource for individuals facing a lawsuit‖ (¶ 11).  
One commentator (Mennecke, 2007, February 28) remarked on the RIAA‘s 
announcement that day: 
The RIAA classified this new initiative as a "win, win, win situation", meaning a 
win for the person caught, a win for "ourselves" (the RIAA), and a win for the 
university. Although the content of this new pre-lawsuit letter has not been 
released, it's doubtful the student will feel like much of a winner after receiving it. 
(¶ 7) 
Additional RIAA press releases followed on a monthly basis, each announcing the 
number of pre-Doe settlement letters and the number and names of the universities 
receiving them: 400 letters to 13 different universities in February of 2007; 405 letters to 
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23 universities in March; 413 letters to 22 universities in April; 402 letters to 13 
universities in May; 395 letters to 19 universities in June;  408 letters to 23 universities in 
July; 503 letters to 58 universities in August; 403 letters to 22 universities in September; 
411 letters to 19 universities in October; 417 letters to 16 universities in November; 396 
letters to 22 universities in December; 407 letters to 18 universities in January 2008; and 
in February of 2008, one year into the education and deterrence initiative, the RIAA 
supplied the final monthly press release for the thirteenth wave of pre-settlement letters—
401 letters to 12 universities (RIAA, 2007, April 11, 2007, August 16, 2007, December 6, 
2008, February 21, 2007, February 28, 2008, January 10, 2007, July 18, 2007, June 8, 
2007, March 21, 2007, May 02, 2007, November 15, 2007, October 18, 2007, September 
20).  
The weight of such a massive legal action spurred resistance among both students 
and administrators. In conjunction with the launch of the education and deterrence 
initiative, the RIAA renewed its college newspaper advertising campaign, featuring full-
page advertisements designed by college students. These ads encouraged students to 
download music from authorized services and informed them of the legal risks to 
downloading music from peer-to-peer networks (Roach, 2007). The initial RIAA press 
release (RIAA, 2007, February 28) stated: 
The RIAA has also developed an educational advertising campaign targeted for 
university newspapers. Incorporating concepts developed by marketing students 
enrolled in RIAA-EdVenture Partners classes, the ads will continue to appear in 
campus newspapers across the country in the coming weeks….These educational 
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efforts build upon the RIAA‘s launch last fall of an orientation video for use by 
universities available at www.campusdownloading.com. (¶ 11) 
For the most part however, students ignored the pre-Doe litigation letters. By March of 
2007, the RIAA indicated that 71 percent of students contacted through the initiative had 
not turned themselves in (Fisher, 2007, March 26). One student who received a pre-Doe 
litigation letter stated that he did not respond because they offered no proof of the alleged 
infringement. ―It‘s like receiving blackmail. ‗We know what you did, pay us‘ is the 
message, but they don‘t really know me or what I‘ve done‖ (¶ 3).  
In addition to student cooperation, the effectiveness of the RIAA‘s deterrence and 
education initiative also hinged on the willingness of universities to go along with the 
policy. Since the pre-Doe litigation letters were sent before the initiation of a formal 
lawsuit, universities were under no legal obligation to forward the letters to students. The 
response of universities to the RIAA‘s initiative varied—ranging from outright refusal to 
assist the RIAA in delivering the letters to students, to penalizing students upon receiving 
the notices (EFF, 2007). Some of the schools cooperating with the RIAA were more 
aggressive than others: Michigan State University forced two-time offenders to watch 
anti-piracy videos produced by the RIAA and three time offenders faced possible 
suspension; Ohio University required two-time offenders to face suspension or probation; 
and the University of Tennessee terminated Internet access for two-time offenders until 
the students brought their computers to a facility to have peer-to-peer software deleted 
from their machines (Cheng, 2007, February 22). Yet many schools were less than 
enthusiastic about cooperating with the RIAA. During the first two waves of pre-Doe 
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settlement offers, the University of Wisconsin refused to comply with the RIAA‘s 
request. A spokesman for the UW system stated, ―But this latest wrinkle—to pass along 
nonlegal correspondence for a settlement offer—is a different animal, one where we 
don‘t see the university, as a public institution of higher education, having a role‖ (Butler, 
2007, ¶ 4). UW sent its students an email reminding them of the ―appropriate use 
guidelines‖ but refused to forward settlement letters on behalf of the RIAA. Brian Rust, 
communications manager for the UW Division of Information Technology, stated 
(Penzenstadler, 2007, March 19) ―These settlement letters are an attempt to short circuit 
the legal process to rely on universities to be their legal agent‖ (¶ 1). Likewise the 
University of Maine opted not to forward the pre-litigation letters to its students. 
Moreover, UM went the additional step of refusing a request from the RIAA to produce 
the names of students with whom the organization was attempting to settle (Reaves, 
2007, March 26). Students at the University of Maine School of Law took up the fight 
against the RIAA on behalf of their fellow students, asking the court to have the John 
Doe lawsuit filed against 27 University of Maine students thrown out and to bar the 
RIAA from filing such suits in the future (Bangeman, 2008, April 2).
68
 In Oregon too, the 
state attorney general stepped in on behalf of the University of Oregon to contest the 
RIAA initiative by supporting a motion to quash subpoenas in a file-sharing case 
involving 17 students (Bangeman, 2007, November 29). And in Boston, U.S. District 
Judge Nancy Gertner delayed an attempt by the RIAA to subpoena the names of students 
at Boston University until she could perform an in-depth review. Though Boston 
                                                 
68 At issue was the RIAA practice of grouping numerous ―John Does‖ into a single lawsuit. The court 
eventually found in favor of the plaintiffs (Arista Records LLC. Et al. v. Does 1-27, 2008). 
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University itself was not directly involved in the lawsuit or the legal defense (their 
students hired private attorneys to quash the request), the case did raise the issue of 
student privacy protections (Levenson, 2008, April 4). 
The response at most universities was decidedly more neutral than these previous 
examples. Regardless of the position taken by a particular administration, the constant 
stream of pre-litigation letters increased the administrative and financial burden on 
universities and fostered resentment among the schools (D'Andrade, 2008, August 11). In 
some respects the experience at the University of Texas at Austin was typical of the 
response among large public universities to the RIAA education and deterrence initiative. 
I discussed the RIAA litigation campaign at length with Thomas Butler, assistant director 
of Legal Services for Students (LSS) at the University of Texas at Austin (T. Butler, 
personal communication, August 18, 2010). The University of Texas took something of a 
impartial stance with regard to the litigation. The university generally assumed the role of 
an ISP and designated an individual within its IT department as the contact person for 
alleged DMCA violations. Accordingly, the pre-Doe litigation letters were sent to the IT 
department which then forwarded the notices to the students. When a student chose to 
ignore the pre-litigation settlement offer, the RIAA would file a subpoena seeking the 
student‘s identity from the university. This subpoena was directed to the Office of Legal 
Affairs which then forwarded it to the IT department. After large numbers of students 
began pouring into the Legal Services for Students office, LSS had the Legal Affairs 
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office forward the notices directly to LSS.
69
 In this way LSS would coordinate with the 
IT department and Legal Affairs to immediately contact targeted students and offer legal 
assistance.  
The burden placed on the University of Texas was significant. At the height of the 
litigation campaign the LSS office took on additional staff to handle the volume of 
students. On two occasions LSS was forced to hold group meetings with students because 
the RIAA had targeted so many students at once. Occasionally the RIAA would 
announce a wave of lawsuits during an academic calendar break and the students would 
return to school with very few days left in the settlement period. On one such occasion 
LSS secured an extension of the settlement period on behalf of the students. LSS and 
coordinating departments were also involved in student outreach during this time to warn 
students of the RIAA litigation campaign. LSS had articles in the student newspaper The 
Daily Texan whenever possible; LSS gave numerous talks on peer-to-peer lawsuits across 
the campus; LSS addressed student groups, dorms, and greek organizations; LSS was 
featured on a separate link on the Dean of Students website; LSS was featured in a notice 
included as part of the student orientation packet; and the Vice President of Student 
Affairs sent out a mass email to students on the first day of class warning them of the 
litigation campaign. The IT department was burdened by the additional work of matching 
IP addresses to student information whether as part of the pre-litigation process or as part 
of a subpoena. And the students and their families were burdened by the stress of 
potentially being sued in federal district court. Oftentimes, with the permission of the 
                                                 
69 Legal Services for Students was established in 1970 at the University of Texas and staffs attorneys 
licensed to practice law in the state of Texas. LSS provides high quality legal services to students and 
protects them from predatory practices. 
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students, LSS would meet with their clients and their parents simultaneously. Students 
and their families most often felt compelled to settle with the RIAA for fear of potentially 
derailing a successful academic career. 
It is important to recognize that even though the University of Texas did not 
systematically challenge the RIAA litigation campaign like some other schools did, there 
were resources mobilized on behalf of students. At the very least the office of Legal 
Services for Students raised campus awareness of the litigation campaign and helped 
hundreds avoid a costly default judgment by settling or, in some cases, even negotiating 
for a lesser settlement. Moreover, there was considerable coordination across the country 
as various student legal services at different universities worked together to deal with the 
RIAA‘s initiative. I discussed this effort with Robin Unander, President of the University 
Student Legal Services Association—Western Region (R. Unander, personal 
communication, February 14, 2011). There are two associations which serve U.S. 
university student legal services offices. The first is a national organization—the 
University Student Legal Services Association—which is a subcommittee of the National 
Legal Aid & Defender Association. The second is a regional organization called the 
University Student Legal Services Association—Western Region. This organization 
invites universities west of the Mississippi River to join. Member universities hail from 
states like Texas, Louisiana, Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington. During the 
RIAA litigation campaign the national organization used its listserve to keep members 
up-to-date on recent interactions with the RIAA and with the relevant published court 
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opinions. The regional organization went so far as to invite the RIAA to its annual 
January conference in Lake Tahoe in 2008. Ms. Unander recounted the event: 
The Western Region had a conference in 2008 in Tahoe, and the RIAA 
representatives were invited to attend. They agreed to come, and we agreed to be 
nice to them….The representatives were very professional and cordial, and 
provided us with a lot of info about how they are able to determine infringements 
and why they do what they do. It was pretty eye opening. 
The University Student Legal Services Association—Western Region also hosted 
litigants who had successfully challenged the RIAA at subsequent conferences. All of the 
members of the organization, including the University of Texas at Austin, were not in 
favor of fighting the RIAA to protect student identities. They believed the best option for 
students was to convince them to settle at the earliest stage possible unless there was no 
way their computer was used to share files—regardless of the particular user of the 
computer. 
 One last interesting point about the response of universities to the RIAA 
education and deterrence initiative is that despite Harvard University having chosen not 
to disclose student records to the RIAA, the RIAA never followed up with a subpoena to 
Harvard. Many in the legal community suspected that the RIAA was afraid to take on 
Harvard (T. Butler, personal communication, August 18, 2010). Some attributed the 
RIAA‘s reluctance specifically to a public letter released by Charles Nesson and Jonathan 
Zittrain from the Berkman Center at Harvard Law School which sharply challenged the 
RIAA‘s legal tactics (D. Rosenbaum, personal communication, August 6, 2010). Ms. 
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Unander indicated that at the Tahoe conference the RIAA representatives were asked 
why they didn‘t pursue Harvard. They failed to provide a meaningful response.  
 As the RIAA moved forward with its education and deterrence program, Congress 
again weighed in on the litigation campaign. This time however, the RIAA benefitted 
from a sustained lobbying effort on Capitol Hill through which the recording industry had 
managed to elevate theft of intellectual property as a fundamental issue of political 
concern. The public nature of university network infrastructure also mitigated against 
previous complaints about privacy. In May of 2007, Congress, led by Republican 
Representative Lamar Smith of Texas, the ranking member of the House Judiciary 
Committee, threatened 20 universities with unspecified repercussions if they failed to 
demonstrate what they were doing to inhibit the spread of file-sharing on their campuses 
(Triplett, 2007, May 2). A bipartisan group of representatives serving on judicial and 
education House committees sent a letter and a survey to each of the 20 schools. The 
universities were required to report back to the group at the end of the month. Two 
months later college officials were successful in a lobbying effort to defeat a Senate 
proposal which would have required some universities to invest in anti-piracy 
technologies. Administrators feared that schools which failed to demonstrate compliance 
with the measure might be denied federal funds. Their success was short-lived however, 
as a similar proposal was introduced in the House two weeks later (Read, 2007, October 
19). The language was contained in a proposed amendment to the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 and was entitled the College Access and Opportunity Act of 2007. Though the 
proposed bill died unceremoniously in committee, the Senate and the House voted to 
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reauthorize the Higher Education Act in 2008 and included provisions requiring 
universities to provide students with access to authorized music downloading services 
and to invest in network filtering systems to inhibit the spread of file-sharing on their 
campuses (Paul, 2008, August 1). The bill was a direct result of a focused lobbying effort 
by the RIAA and MPAA and passed the House with a wide margin and with bipartisan 
support in the Senate. There were no explicit repercussions outlined in the bill for those 
schools that failed to comply with the bill‘s provisions—but many in the academic 
community feared that the insertion of penalties in the future was likely. 
ACT 4: THE ACCUSED 
Despite the fact that most of the people targeted by the RIAA either settled or had 
default judgments awarded against them, there were important instances in which 
individuals decided to fight back against the RIAA in court. These cases determined, in 
part, the limits to the potential of the RIAA litigation campaign. I have already mentioned 
that in several cases the RIAA targeted the incorrect person and wrongly accused them of 
copyright infringement. In a related case Candy Chan was sued by the RIAA in 2005 
despite having no knowledge or significant experience with computers. Chan did have a 
13 year old daughter however, and the RIAA argued that Chan was indirectly liable for 
her daughter‘s alleged file-sharing activities. After taking Ms. Chan‘s deposition, the 
RIAA asked the court to add Chan‘s daughter Brittany as a defendant (Beckerman, 2005, 
September 16; Newton, 2010, January 31). The attorney for Ms. Chan argued that 
Brittany was a minor and needed to have a guardian ad litem appointed to protect her 
interests. A motion was made for summary judgment on behalf of Ms. Chan and the 
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judge granted the motion, dismissing the case against Ms. Chan with prejudice. The judge 
however, declined to award Ms Chan with attorney‘s fees. The RIAA‘s case against 
Brittany fell apart when the case against her was dismissed after the RIAA refused to pay 
for the appointment of a guardian (Priority Records L. L. C., v. Brittany Chan, 2006). The 
Chan case was not over though. In September of 2007, Ms. Chan brought legal action in 
Michigan state court against the plaintiffs in the original lawsuit for abuse of process and 
violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).
70
 The 
RICO Act has been mentioned in a number of RIAA cases. Ms. Chan argued that Priority 
Records and their attorneys attempted to extort money from her by continuing to threaten 
her daughter with further litigation despite the case against Ms. Chan having been 
dismissed with prejudice. Ms. Chan also argued that the record companies were utilizing 
the courts for purposes other than to redress their claims of copyright violations (Newton, 
2008, July 7). The court dismissed Ms. Chan‘s claims on procedural grounds and 
declined to rule on the matter of extortion or abuse of process. But Brittany (with her 
father‘s help) went on to lodge a complaint against MediaSentry, the investigatory arm of 
the RIAA, questioning the legality of conducting an investigation in Michigan without an 
investigator‘s license. This prompted an investigation by the Michigan Department of 
Labor and Economic Growth which in turn encouraged Michigan college students and 
colleges to follow suit and lodge complaints (Newton, 2009, February 5, 2009, February 
7). The state subsequently passed a law that specifically required computer forensics 
groups to be licensed (Timmer, 2008, September 5). MediaSentry faced similar 
                                                 
70 RICO is a federal law providing for extended criminal penalties and a civil complaint for acts performed 
by criminal organizations. 
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investigations in North Carolina, Oregon and Massachusetts (EFF, 2008). The same 
charge was raised in Lava v. Amurao wherein the defense argued that MediaSentry‘s 
testimony should be barred because they failed to obtain a private investigator license in 
New York as required by state law (Bangeman, 2008, February 3). Although the judge in 
this particular case rejected the defense‘s argument, it did not stop defendants in Oregon, 
Texas, and Florida from challenging the RIAA‘s investigatory practices on the same 
grounds. After becoming a frequent target for civil-rights advocates, the RIAA ditched 
MediaSentry quietly in late 2008 (McBride, 2009).
71
 
Making available: the right of distribution in copyright 
Other significant legal questions were raised as individuals fought back against 
the RIAA in court. One of those issues was whether or not simply placing a file in a 
shared folder violates the copyright holder‘s right of distribution. The so-called making 
available issue was raised in Elektra v. Barker in New York wherein the judge ruled that 
an offer to distribute a file on a peer-to-peer network constituted an infringement of the 
right of distribution. Yet on the same day that the New York judge handed down that 
decision, a Massachusetts judged ruled differently in London-Sire v. Doe, holding that 
―merely exposing music files to the internet is not copyright infringement‖ (Lohmann, 
2008, April 2, ¶ 1). In reasoning that distribution and publication were not synonymous, 
the Massachusetts court placed further pressure on the investigatory process used by the 
RIAA. MediaSentry, being employed by the RIAA, could not effectively prove an 
alleged file-sharer had engaged in distribution since the copyright holder is not legally 
                                                 
71 The RIAA stated that it would work with DtecNet Software ApS from Copenhagen moving forward. 
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capable of violating their own right of distribution. In other words, plaintiffs could not 
download their own copyrighted materials from a peer-to-peer network to prove 
copyright infringement. Shortly after the London-Sire v. Doe decision, the U.S. District 
of Arizona denied an RIAA motion for summary judgment against alleged file-sharers 
Pamela and Jeffrey Howell. The court cited the recent ruling in London-Sire v. Doe in 
arguing that the infringement of the right of distribution requires evidence of actual 
dissemination of copyrighted materials (Lohmann, 2008, April 29). Unfortunately for the 
Howells, the court eventually ordered Jeffrey (Pamela was dropped from the suit) to pay 
the labels $40,850 for infringing the copyrights on 54 songs because it was discovered by 
forensic experts hired by the plaintiffs that Mr. Howell had erased his hard drive 
subsequent to being notified by the RIAA (Healey, 2008, September 2). Sanctions, 
including default judgment, may be imposed on defendants who fail to provide or permit 
discovery (Atlantic Recording Corporation, et al., v. Pamela and Jeffrey Howell, 2008). 
The court however, did not rule on the issue of making available. 
Attorney’s fees  
One of the major issues raised in a number of cases (including the Candy Chan 
case) has been the matter of attorney‘s fees. Section 505 of the Copyright Law of the 
United States of America allows for ―the recovery of full costs by or against any party‖ 
and ―may also award a reasonable attorney‘s fee to the prevailing party as part of the 
costs‖. In February of 2005, the RIAA filed suit against Patricia Santangelo, a New York 
mother of five. The RIAA brought the case despite Santangelo being what the judge in 
the case referred to as ―an Internet-illiterate parent, who does not know Kazaa from 
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kazoo, and who can barely retrieve her e-mail‖ (Bangeman, 2009, April 28, ¶ 2). 
Santangelo turned over her hard drive to the RIAA during discovery and their forensic 
investigators discovered Kazaa installed on the machine. Santangelo alleged that the 
software was likely installed on her computer by a friend of her children. The RIAA 
subsequently filed suit against two of Patricia‘s children—20 year old Michelle and 16 
year old Robert (Bylund, 2006, November 3). The RIAA was initially able to obtain a 
$30,750 default judgment against daughter Michelle, but that judgment was later 
overturned. Santangelo‘s children eventually settled with the RIAA for $7,000 total. The 
RIAA eventually dropped the case against Santangelo in April 2006, but not before 
Santangelo had racked up $24,000 in attorney fees. A fundraising campaign provided an 
additional $15,000 on her behalf (Bangeman, 2009, April 28). And in April of 2007 the 
judge in the case denied the RIAA‘s motion to dismiss without prejudice and instead 
dismissed Elektra v. Santangelo with prejudice, making it possible for Patricia 
Santangelo to recover attorney‘s fees and costs (Bangeman, 2007, April 10). Buoyed by 
her victory against the RIAA, Patricia encouraged other victims, ―Don‘t let your fear of 
these massive companies allow you to deny your belief in your own innocence. Paying 
these settlements is an admission of guilt. If you‘re not guilty of violating the law, don‘t 
pay‖ (Newton, 2010, January 31, ¶ 20). 
 The issue of attorney‘s fees also featured prominently in Capitol Records v. 
Deborah Foster. Debbie Foster is an Oklahoma woman sued in November of 2004 for 
copyright infringement. The RIAA alleged that she shared music over a peer-to-peer 
network. Ms. Foster acknowledged being the account holder for the IP address in 
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question, but she insisted she was ignorant of the file-sharing activities. Foster disclosed 
that either her estranged husband or adult daughter may have had access to the account. 
The plaintiffs then amended the lawsuit to include Foster‘s daughter Amanda in addition 
to Ms. Foster, arguing that Ms. Foster was still liable for secondary copyright 
infringement since it was her account. Though the RIAA eventually dropped Ms. Foster 
from the suit and was subsequently successful in securing a default judgment against 
Amanda, Debbie had filed a counterclaim against the RIAA which she refused to drop. In 
July of 2006 the court dismissed both the original suit and the counterclaim, declaring 
Debbie Foster the prevailing party and leaving open the possibility of recovering costs 
and attorney‘s fees (Bangeman, 2007, February 7). The court rejected the allegation of 
secondary copyright infringement because the RIAA had failed to demonstrate that Ms. 
Foster had induced or encouraged anyone to commit copyright infringement. The case 
ended badly for the RIAA in July of 2007, as the court awarded Debbie Foster 
$68,685.23 in attorney‘s fees (Bangeman, 2007, July 16). As with Santangelo, the Foster 
case created problematic precedent for the RIAA. The RIAA would find it increasingly 
difficult to allege secondary copyright infringement against someone simply because 
their name appeared on the ISP account in question. Moreover, the case created a 
potential liability for the RIAA should it chose to pursue such litigation. 
 Tanya Andersen was singled out by Warner Music, EMI, Vivendi Universal, and 
Sony BMG in 2005 and accused of being a massive online distributor of copyrighted 
music. Andersen was a former legal worker and single mother from Oregon living on a 
medical disability pension with her then seven year old daughter Kylee (Newton, 2008, 
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March 17). Andersen was accused by the RIAA of distributing copyrighted music using 
Kazaa—including gangster rap. Andersen flatly denied the charge (Bangeman, 2007, 
June 4). Andersen claimed that she had always disapproved of file-sharing, but when she 
purchased her computer she had a friend help her set it up. According to Andersen, the 
friend installed Kazaa Lite but Andersen never used the software and eventually deleted 
it. She further claimed that the songs the RIAA accused her of distributing were never on 
her machine (Newton, 2010, January 31). Undaunted by her protestations, the RIAA 
continued to pursue Andersen, going so far as to attempt to depose 10 year old Kylee 
(Newton, 2007, March 28). In October 2005 Andersen filed a countersuit against the 
plaintiffs, accusing them of abuse of the legal process, malicious prosecution, 
racketeering and fraud—among other things. In May of 2007, after a forensic expert 
retained by the RIAA failed to locate any evidence of file-sharing on Andersen‘s 
computer, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Andersen had her case dismissed 
with prejudice a month later (Newton, 2007, June 5). The dismissal with prejudice 
effectively exonerated Ms. Andersen and opened the door to a recovery of attorney‘s 
fees. In September of 2007 the RIAA moved to dismiss Andersen‘s countersuit (Newton, 
2007, September 17). In February of 2008, a federal judge in the District of Oregon 
dismissed Andersen‘s litany of complaints against the RIAA, declaring that they were too 
broad. Andersen and her lawyer went on to amend the complaint, as requested by the 
judge, numerous times in their own steadfast pursuit of the RIAA (Bangeman, 2008, May 
5). Andersen and her lawyer attempted to get class-action status on behalf of other 
misidentified defendants swept up in the RIAA driftnet. Then in June of 2008, the RIAA 
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was ordered to pay Andersen a staggering $108,000 in costs and attorney‘s fees (Newton, 
2008, June 25). Just months before the court awarded her costs and attorney‘s fees, 
Andersen (Newton, 2008, February 22) stated: 
It has never been in me to give up fighting because I believe so strongly that what 
the RIAA is doing is so grossly wrong….The people the RIAA are suing are your 
average next door neighbors, sister, mother, and child. It‘s hard to explain to 
people, who don‘t know anything about the RIAA, how devastating these lawsuits 
really are to the average person….I felt violated and felt like I was being treated 
like a criminal for no reason other than they could….You either fight or pay—it 
doesn‘t matter if you‘re innocent—those are your options. For me, paying them 
was not a choice, even if I‘d had the money. I refuse to pay for something that I 
didn‘t do and I told them that from the beginning. I was, and still am, horrified 
that they are doing this to people. It is unbelievably wrong. (¶ 14) 
Jammie Thomas-Rasset 
The two cases which have made it all the way to a jury trial are the Jammie 
Thomas-Rasset and Joel Tenenbaum cases. Though these two cases raise a number of 
important issues—making available, fair use, misidentification, among others—the most 
significant impact of these cases has to do with the size of the statutory damages. 
Copyright law permits copyright holders to collect damages in cases of infringement. 
These damages can be either actual or statutory. Actual damages in cases of copyright 
infringement are based on both the value of lost income to the copyright holder and 
profits accrued to the infringer. Because actual damages are typically difficult to calculate 
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with respect to intellectual property, statutory damages have been included in copyright 
law since the original Copyright Act of 1790.
72
  Matthew Oppenheim (2010, September 
24) explains: 
Statutory damages are currently set by copyright law at a minimum of $750 per 
work infringed up to $30,000. And, if the infringement is found to be willful, the 
ceiling goes up to $150,000. In certain situations, a defendant can seek to be 
deemed ―an innocent infringer‖ and have the floor decreased from $750 to $200 
per work infringed. Over the years, the law has developed a number of factors that 
should be considered in determining what the statutory damages should be, such 
as: the value of the work infringed, the harm caused, the benefit to the defendant, 
the need for deterrence, and the willfulness of the defendant‘s infringement. It is 
left to a jury to decide how to balance these factors and what damages to assess. 
(¶ 2) 
 Jammie Thomas-Rasset (then Jammie Thomas), a Native American mother of 
three from Minnesota, was sent a settlement letter in 2005 by the RIAA which accused 
her of using Kazaa to illegally download and distribute 24 songs. Ms. Thomas-Rasset 
refused the settlement offer and was subsequently sued by the RIAA. The plaintiffs 
claimed that their investigators detected an individual sharing over 1,700 digital audio 
files—including many copyrighted songs belonging to the plaintiffs. The labels issued a 
subpoena to Charter Communications and identified Thomas-Rasset as the account 
holder associated with the IP address in question. They also noted that the Kazaa user 
                                                 
72 Section 2, 1 Stat. 124, 125 of the 1790 Act included a statutory damages provision making an infringer 
liable for ―the sum of fifty cents for every [infringing] sheet which shall be found in his or their possession‖ 
(Sheffner, 2010, August 6). 
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was distributing these audio files under the username tereastarr@KaZaA, a username 
long employed by Thomas-Rasset for a variety of other purposes. The plaintiffs also 
accused Thomas-Rasset of intentionally concealing her activities by fabricating a clean 
hard drive for inspection by the plaintiffs (Virgin Records America, Inc., et al. v. Jammie 
Thomas-Rasset, 2007). Thomas-Rasset denied that she had a Kazaa account and provided 
conflicting answers with regard to the replacement of her hard drive. On October 4, 2007, 
a federal jury ruled that Thomas-Rasset was liable for copyright infringement, awarding 
the plaintiffs $222,000 in damages. The damages amounted to $9,250 for each of the 24 
songs in question. The judge had ruled prior to the jury‘s verdict that the record 
companies did not have to prove actual distribution of the songs and that merely making 
available the songs for download was sufficient to prove infringement (Leeds, 2007, 
October 5). However, the judge in the case, U.S. District Judge Michael Davis, declared a 
mistrial the following year based on the issue of making available. At issue was Jury 
Instruction No. 15 in which Davis had instructed jurors that making available was 
sufficient to prove copyright infringement. Davis later rethought his position and, without 
any encouragement from the litigants in the case, declared that he may have committed a 
―manifest error of the law‖ (Kravets, 2008, September 24). He then ordered a retrial 
despite the protestations of the record companies. 
 In 2009, on the eve of her second trial, the defense attorney for Thomas-Rasset 
abruptly withdrew from the case, allegedly due to nonpayment. It was at this point that 
Camara and Sibley offered their services pro bono to Ms. Thomas-Rasset (Kiwi Camara, 
personal communication, 2010). Professor Charles Nesson of Harvard Law School had 
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suggested to his former student Kiwi Camara that he should take up the case. During the 
second trial the defense focused on a number of issues including the link between Ms. 
Thomas-Rasset and the IP address identified by the RIAA, the formal copyright 
registration for the songs in question, and Thomas-Rasset‘s conflicting testimony 
regarding the hard drive (Anderson, 2009, June 15, 2009, June 16).
73
 Ultimately though, 
the issue of excessive statutory damages took center stage after the jury rejected Thomas-
Rasset‘s testimony and awarded the record companies with a staggering $1.92 million 
verdict—$80,000 for each of the 24 songs in question (Kravets, 2009, June 18). Ms. 
Thomas-Rasset ("Jury rules against Minn mom in download case," 2009, June 18) 
responded to the damage award by stating, ―There‘s no way they‘re ever going to get 
that. I‘m a mom, limited means, so I‘m not going to worry about it now‖ (¶ 7). Then in 
January of 2010, U.S. District Judge Michael Davis slashed the amount of the statutory 
damages awarded to the plaintiffs, reducing the amount by 97 percent to $54,000 
(Sandoval, 2010, January 22, 2010, January 25). Despite the jury having selected an 
award within the legal range for statutory awards, Judge Davis‘s decision to lower the 
amount raised the question of the appropriateness of the extremely high damages. 
Invoking the common law principle of remittitur,
74
  Davis wrote ―The need for deterrence 
                                                 
73 In February of 2005 MediaSentry sent Kazaa user tereastarr@KaZaA an instant message via the Kazaa 
user interface notifying the user that they had been caught sharing copyrighted files. Thomas-Rasset 
allegedly was also notified via a FedEx package sent from her ISP Charter Communications about the 
infringement. One month after the alleged copyright infringement was detected Thomas-Rasset took her 
computer to Best Buy and indicated that there was a problem with the hard drive. Best Buy replaced the 
hard drive under warranty. Thomas-Rasset then produced the new hard drive to RIAA investigators for 
inspection. In her defense, Camara asserted that Thomas-Rasset had never received notice about the 
investigation and was simply replacing the hard drive after her son became angry while playing a video 
game and struck the computer damaging the hard drive (Anderson, 2009, June 15, 2009, June 16). 
74 Remittitur is defined as an order awarding a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that awarded by 
the jury, and requiring the plaintiff to choose between those alternatives (Garner, 2006). 
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cannot justify a $2 million verdict for stealing and illegally distributing 24 songs for the 
sole purpose of obtaining free music. Moreover, although plaintiffs were not required to 
prove their actual damages, statutory damages must still bear some relation to actual 
damages‖ (Capitol Records Inc. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, 2010). Because the court 
relied on the principle of remittitur, the question of the constitutionality of the high 
statutory awards was not reached in this case. Kiwi Camara (K. Camara, personal 
communication, 2010) explained the principles of remittitur and constitutionality in this 
case: 
There are two tests. There‘s what‘s called remittitur which exists in all cases. And 
basically when the jury award is so excessive that it shocks any kind of educated 
person then the judge does what‘s called remittitur which means he says ―well I 
will not give you that. I will give you this lower number or a new trial‖. So that‘s 
what happened in Thomas and [the plaintiffs] said ―well no. We‘ll take a new 
trial‖….The other argument is under the due process clause. And the Supreme 
Court has said that due process is denied when in a civil case a monetary penalty 
is imposed that bears no relation to the harm that was actually done. We take the 
position that that is the case here. The harm that is actually done is the profit 
margin on the number of songs that was downloaded. And the damages are, you 
know, many multiples of that. And not only are they many multiples of that but 
how many multiples varies by orders of magnitude across cases. To take the most 
extreme example Jammie Thomas‘s first trial gets you a six figure verdict. 
Jammie Thomas‘s second trial gets you a seven figure verdict and Jammie 
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Thomas under the judge‘s remittitur gets you a five figure verdict. It‘s entirely 
unpredictable and we think that makes it unconstitutional.   
Judge Davis reached the damage award of $2,250 per song by trebling the statutory 
minimum of $750 per infringement. Ray Beckerman (2010, October 28) commented on 
Judge Davis‘s reasoning thusly:  
Judge Davis declined to decide the constitutional issue at all, for reasons which 
are not clear to me. He then awarded damages which were far beyond the normal 
range of copyright statutory damages. Were he correct in declining to decide the 
constitutional question, his copyright law answer should have been that the 
maximum recoverable was $750 per infringed work, not $2250 per infringed 
work….There is simply no precedent in either (a) copyright law or (b) 
constitutional law for deciding the maximum range of statutory damages as a 
multiple of the minimum statutory damages, as opposed to a multiple of the actual 
damages. (¶ 3) 
 Ultimately, the lowering of the award did little to settle the case. In November of 
2010, after a third trial, another jury awarded the record companies $1.5 million in their 
case against Jammie Thomas-Rasset. The award amounted to $62,500 for each of the 24 
songs in question. RIAA spokesperson Cara Duckworth defended the award as necessary 
to address Thomas‘s ―blatant disrespect for artists, the legal system, and the law‖ (Moya, 
February 2011, 25, ¶ 7). Asked about the jury‘s decision, Camara simply replied 
―Groundhog Day‖ (Anderson, 2010, November 3). Yet the Thomas-Rasset affair is far 
from over, as the case is likely to go up on appeal where another court will decide on 
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both the issue of the proportionality of damages and the constitutionality of the statutory 
damages. 
Joel Tenenbaum 
In 2005, the parents of then 21 year old Joel Tenenbaum received a settlement 
letter from Sony BMG, Warner, Atlantic Records, Arista Records, and UMG Records 
alleging that their son Joel had infringed the copyright of 30 songs by sharing them over 
the Kazaa peer-to-peer network. Joel subsequently sent the record labels a money order 
for $500 and told them he could not afford to pay any more than that. The money order 
was returned. Two years later, in August of 2007, Joel was notified that the record 
companies had filed suit against him. Tenenbaum offered $5,250 for the court settlement, 
but the RIAA refused as they were now asking for $10,500 (Tenenbaum, 2009, July 27). 
Then in the summer of 2008, Tenenbaum received a letter from Harvard law professor 
Charles Nesson offering help. Nesson had been made aware of Joel‘s situation by District 
Court Judge Nancy Gertner who had become increasingly frustrated by the large volume 
of default judgments clogging up the docket as the RIAA essentially used the federal 
courts as a small claims agency (D. Rosenbaum, personal communication, 2010). With 
Nesson now as his attorney, Joel quickly filed a counterclaim against the RIAA, arguing 
that the statute used to sue Tenenbaum, the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright 
Damages Improvement Act of 1999, was unconstitutional (Lipka, 2008, October 31). 
 From the very beginning, the Tenenbaum defense has been characterized by 
eccentricity. Tenenbaum‘s legal defense is itself an outgrowth of Professor Nesson‘s 
class, CyberOne: Law in the Court of Public Opinion, which examines the social factors 
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impacting law. Professor Nesson invited Joel and his mother to come speak to the class 
on the first day of the Fall 2008 semester and then set about assembling a team of law 
students to collaborate in the defense of Joel. They managed to put together a group of 
about half a dozen law students that first semester, with the team reassembling each 
subsequent semester with new members. Harvard Law School requires its law students to 
complete 50 hours of pro bono work before graduation, so the students availed 
themselves of a clinical set up to ensure that they would receive class credit as well as pro 
bono hours for collaborating on the defense. Team Tenenbaum wasn‘t limited to just law 
students however; journalism, computer science, and design students all contributed to 
the effort. Probably somewhere in the neighborhood of two dozen students have now 
worked as a part of the team (D. Rosenbaum, personal communication, 2010). 
 Nesson and his law students immediately recognized that the Tenenbaum case 
was being fought not only in the courtroom but in the court of public opinion as well. 
While the legal case was much more difficult, the battle for public opinion was an easier 
case due to the resentment engendered by the RIAA‘s tactics. Consequently, Team 
Tenenbaum created JoelFightsBack.com as the lynchpin of their communication and 
public relations effort. Debbie Rosenbaum (personal communication, 2010) of Team 
Tenenbaum explains: 
The idea behind it was to allow for a forum. We were getting so many press calls 
and so many random people reaching out to us in various ways who either wanted 
to express support or to yell at us and tell us we were stupid and ignorant and 
ruining society. We really wanted to create a centralized forum for people to get 
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in touch with us and to express their own opinions as well as for us to 
communicate one-to-many. Rather than me having to talk to twenty journalists I 
could post something on JoelFightsBack and/or the Twitter feed and they had the 
information immediately without me having to call each one individually. So the 
idea was kind of multifold. It also seemed appropriate that in a case that was 
fundamentally about new media and the Internet that we have an Internet 
presence…. But the idea is for us is…twofold...for us to communicate with 
journalists and post legal documents and for us to communicate to many…. And 
we welcome dissent on the website just as much as we welcome people who 
pledge undying support and love. The fact that it has generated debate I think is 
part of Professor Nesson‘s [plan]. His underlying purpose in this is that the law 
may not change in the courtroom. It may need to go to the legislature. But unless 
you have people who are demanding change, copyright isn‘t at the forefront of the 
legislature‘s concerns unless you have a lot of people clamoring for it to change. 
In addition to serving as a communications platform the website also has been 
used to raise money for Joel‘s defense. Similar to the way in which file-sharers and 
outraged members of the public came together in the online fundraising efforts for 
Patricia Santangelo, JoelFightsBack has successfully raised thousands of dollars for 
Joel‘s defense. According to Debbie (personal communication, 2010), they have raised 
four or five thousand dollars, mostly in increments of ten and twenty dollar donations. 
She suspects that much of the money comes from file-sharers angry with the RIAA. 
People from all over the world have donated, including a $500 dollar donation from a 
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German tech organization. All of the money has gone towards subsidizing the costs of the 
defense.  Rosenbaum explains: 
…it turns out ordering transcripts of depositions and court documents is really 
expensive. So Professor Nesson has fronted quite a bit of the money. But all of 
the money that we‘ve raised has gone towards subsidizing the legal costs that we 
have so that not all of it comes out of our personal pockets. 
 Another interesting use of JoelFightsBack was an experiment Team Tenenbaum 
carried out in collaborative lawyering. At one point Nesson and his students were 
preparing to file a brief with the court and took the novel step of posting the brief to their 
website and soliciting feedback. The move generated scorn from some in the legal 
community. Again Rosenbaum (personal communication, 2010) explains: 
We were filing something on Joel‘s behalf and…we decided it would be a really 
interesting…to test the wisdom of crowds….So we posted a draft of one of our 
files online and said ―give us feedback‖. You know, ―how would you make this 
better,‖ which is unheard of in the legal community because it violates a million 
different professional rules of responsibility. And there were legal ethics blogs 
that basically were like, ―Professor Nesson and all of his students should be 
disbarred. Any student who is not even barred should not ever be permitted to be 
barred‖. And so yeah we believe in…radical transparency—maybe to an extreme.  
But Professor Nesson just believed that just because it‘s always been done this 
way doesn‘t mean that‘s the way it has to be done. So transparency for him has 
really underscored all of his efforts and all his decisions. It‘s part of his 
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personality but it‘s also part of the approach you have to buy into if you want to 
work on the case. 
 As part of the endeavor to put the RIAA on trial in the court of public opinion, 
Team Tenenbaum filed a motion in January of 2009 to have the court proceedings 
broadcast live over the Internet. Judge Gertner approved the motion. The plaintiffs 
quickly appealed the motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing 
that a webcast could negatively impact public opinion. In a telling moment, the RIAA 
indicated that it feared the proceedings would be re-edited and distributed online, creating 
a PR disaster for the trade association (Newton, 2009, January 21). The court of appeals 
reversed Judge Gertner‘s decision. Rosenbaum (personal communication, 2010) 
commented on the decision and the outpouring of support they had on this particular 
matter: 
…when we were going to go to trial there [were] already cameras in the 
courtroom. We just wanted it to go live over the Internet which the RIAA 
appealed and then the First Circuit overruled Judge Gertner‘s decision to allow it 
to be streamed live over the Internet. And so when it was appealed we were trying 
to solicit as many amicus briefs as we could. And we had the support of the New 
York Times, the AP. EFF really came through and we were connected with them 
then to kind of garner support from related technology organizations which would 
have a vested interest in this case being broadcast live over the Internet. And 
really everybody was on board with it being broadcast live over the Internet 
except for the RIAA. And then the Supreme Court refused to hear it. 
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 Notwithstanding the sporadic support Team Tenenbaum has received from the 
press, the public, and institutions like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the group has 
weathered blistering criticism from many in the legal community for their handling of the 
case. Professor Nesson‘s eccentric approach has put him at odds with many people, even 
those sympathetic to the victims of the RIAA driftnet. In one instance, Nesson published 
a series of email exchanges with dissenting colleagues he had hoped to call as expert 
witnesses for the defense but who rejected his reliance on fair use as part of the defense 
(Saltzman, 2009, April 8). This level of transparency was objectionable to many, 
including noted copyright attorney and blogger Ben Sheffner who commented: 
It's off the charts, in terms of unconventionality of litigation tactics, and I'm being 
kind. The stuff about posting internal discussions with his experts on the merits of 
the case is unheard of. I can't imagine any lawyer on earth revealing that his own 
experts think that his case is seriously flawed. (¶ 8) 
Judge Gertner herself expressed dissatisfaction with Nesson‘s handling of the 
case, citing missed deadlines, rules violations, and his unauthorized tape-recording of 
opposing counsel and the judge at pretrial hearings and legal proceedings (Saltzman, 
2009, December 7). Debbie Rosenbaum (personal communication, 2010) commented on 
Nesson‘s handling of the case: 
He‘s not interested in precedent. So [in] one of the briefs that we filed to the 
appellate court, which is a super respectable court, we didn‘t cite a single case. 
We cited the book of Solomon and the Constitution. And the rest of the legal 
community looked at us and was like ―what the hell are you doing? This isn‘t a 
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joke! You can‘t just file a motion or brief and make an argument based on the 
Bible and the Constitution. You have to cite case precedent and laws.‖ And 
Professor Nesson was disinterested in citing those. 
 Ultimately, the trial ended poorly for Tenenbaum. In July 2009, the plaintiffs 
were awarded $675,000 in damages for the 30 songs at issue. The award amounted to 
$22,500 per song. The defense had suffered a series of setbacks which all but guaranteed 
the verdict: Tenenbaum‘s counterclaim had been dismissed by Judge Gertner; four of the 
defense‘s expert witnesses had been excluded; and the defense was prevented by the 
court from arguing fair use. By now a graduate student of physics at Boston University, 
Tenenbaum indicated after the trial that he did not have the financial resources to pay the 
judgment (Sheffner, 2009, July 31). However, just as in the Thomas-Rasset case, the size 
of the award was immediately called into question by the court. Judge Gertner had 
previously indicated that there would be a post-trial proceeding to determine the 
constitutionality of the size of the award. The defense argued that the statutory award in 
the case amounted to a violation of the due process clause in the 14th Amendment. The 
original counterclaim entered by Tenenbaum contended that the plaintiffs did not file suit 
in order to obtain compensation for any purported injury, but rather to extort a settlement 
from him or make an example out of him. Similarly, the defense later argued that while 
statutory damages in copyright cases had originally served to compensate victims in cases 
where real harm was inflicted but actual damages were difficult to determine, the 
plaintiffs in this case were attempting to depart from this tradition and use copyright 




 Amendment disallowed damage awards that are excessive in relation to the interests 
violated in a particular case (Chad & Schultz, 2009). In July of 2010, Judge Gertner 
invalidated the jury‘s award, reducing it by 90 percent to $67,500—or $2,250 for each of 
the 30 songs at issue. In a move similar to Judge Davis in the Thomas-Rasset case, Judge 
Gertner relied on a trebling of the minimum amount of statutory damages permitted by 
the Copyright Act. But whereas the judge in the Thomas case relied on the common law 
principle of remittitur, Judge Gertner‘s ruling hinged on the constitutional question. As 
Professor Nesson (personal communication, 2010) explains: 
…the issue was crystallized after it had been around the merry-go-round once 
already out in the Thomas case. So what happened was the judge out in the 
Thomas case gets the outrageous verdict, he remits it down, he says to the 
plaintiffs, that is the record labels, ―would you accept this lower verdict?‖ And 
they said no. And so he had to have a new trial. So they‘ve had three trials already 
out there. And they‘re just going around in circles. So Judge Gertner here said to 
them, ―you know if I remit and I say to you ‗would you accept this?‘ Will you 
turn it down?‖ And they basically told her ―yes. That‘s what we‘ll do. We will 
turn it down.‖ She said ―well in that case you leave me no choice but to reach the 
Constitutional question of whether outrageous damages are Constitutional.‖ 
However, not everyone bought in to the judge‘s reasoning. Ben Sheffner (2010, 
August 6) criticized the ruling, stating: 
But Judge Gertner did not treble the amount of actual damages she found ($1 per 
song), but instead trebled the minimum amount permitted under the Copyright 
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Act, or $750…In other words, she did not treble the amount of actual damages; 
she actually multiplied it by 2,250, an act that seems particularly arbitrary, and 
that finds little support in logic or the case law. (3-4) 
This is the point echoed by Ray Beckerman (2010, October 28) who commented that, 
―There is simply no precedent in either (a) copyright law or (b) constitutional law for 
deciding the maximum range of statutory damages as a multiple of the minimum 
statutory damages, as opposed to a multiple of the actual damages‖ (¶ 4).  
The record companies indicated immediately their intention to appeal the 
decision. So the Tenenbaum case is far from over. A few weeks after the decision, a 
playlist of the 30 songs in question was featured on the Swedish file-sharing service The 
Pirate Bay. ―The $675,000 Mixtape‖ was featured next to a picture of ―DJ Joel‖ and the 
caption ―Approved by the RIAA‖ (Saltzman, 2009, December 7).
75
 As for what the future 
holds for Joel‘s defense, Nesson (personal communication, 2010) indicated that the 
defense will hone in on the constitutionality of the statutory damages in the case: 
The story that we will tell will be of a judicial train wreck—judicially created—
when the Supreme Court said the initial assignment by the Congress of the power 
of giving damages to judges would be transferred to juries. The Supreme Court 
had no authority to transfer that authority to juries. Congress never gave that 
authority to juries. They gave it to judges because judges are people of some 
experience and wisdom and kind of know what they are doing. So they gave it to 
judges with complete discretion, wide discretion to apply it to small cases and big 
                                                 
75 The record labels actually asked Judge Gertner to order Tenenbaum to stop promoting illegal file-sharing 
because he had linked to the ―$675,000 Mixtape‖ from JoelFightsBack. Judge Gertner denied the request in 
December of 2009. 
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cases. Leave it to judges to understand which was which. And then the Supreme 
Court takes this power and gives it to juries. Well they had no authority to do that. 
And if they insist that they‘ve done it, they‘ve done it in a way that they wouldn‘t 
allow Congress to have done it had they passed the statute that way in the first 
place. Imagine a statute that allows a private corporate litigant to sue an individual 
who has caused no actual damage and without proving any actual damage collect 
a damage award calculated for purposes of general deterrence and leave it 
completely to a jury to say how much. There‘s no standard. It‘s completely 
arbitrary. It‘s not thinkable that such a statute would in fact be passed. And the 
idea that they interpret this statute to mean this they have to confront the fact that 
it‘s unconstitutional. 
DÉNOUEMENT  
In December of 2008 the RIAA announced the end of its litigation campaign 
targeting individual file-sharers. The RIAA indicated that it had worked out preliminary 
agreements with a number of major ISPs which would cooperate with the trade 
association in copyright enforcement (McBride & Smith, 2008, December 19). Under the 
arrangement, ISPs would forward a series of emails to customers believed to be engaging 
in file-sharing. If they believed the customer was ignoring the warnings, their Internet 
service would be slowed and eventually cut off. And though the RIAA stated that the 
litigation campaign was officially over, they would move forward with existing cases 
while reserving the right to bring suit against egregious file-sharers in the future. Critics 
however wondered whether the bad PR generated around high profile file-sharing cases 
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had factored into the RIAA‘s decision ("Keeping pirates at bay," 2009). Some 
commentators attributed the termination of the litigation campaign directly to the legal 
setbacks suffered by the RIAA in the months leading up to the announcement (Chad & 
Schultz, 2009). Fred von Lohmann (2008, December 19) of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation stated, ―The campaign has been, by any measure, a failure. The lawsuits have 
not reduced unauthorized file-sharing and have not gotten a single artist paid‖ (¶ 3). For 
its part the RIAA responded that while the litigation had not put a stop to file-sharing that 
had never been the goal of the campaign. Instead, the lawsuits were about raising public 
awareness of the illegality of file-sharing. Many of the early comments by RIAA officials 
like president Cary Sherman (Gross, 2003, September 17) seem to support this 
contention:  
Up until recently, people didn‘t even think twice about downloading music, and 
didn‘t even worry about whether it was right or wrong, legal or illegal. The result 
of these lawsuits…has been to inform more people in the space of a week that this 
conduct is illegal than anything we have [done], notwithstanding a multiyear 
education program. (¶ 23) 
When asked for his thoughts on the reasons for the abrupt end to the RIAA 
litigation campaign, Charles Nesson (personal communication, 2010) of Team 
Tenenbaum stated: 
Their campaign from the beginning was conceived and has been executed as an 
education campaign. That is, they are in court but they are in court as a kind of 
stepping stone to the court of public opinion. Their litigation campaign is as much 
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advertising as it is litigation. They wanted to project a message that it‘s not okay 
to share copyrighted music. And they were immensely successful with that. And 
you know people kind of judge what they set about as if their goal was to stop 
downloading. They weren‘t going to stop downloading and they knew it. Their 
goal was to project an idea out into the society that was from their point of view 
in need of articulation. And they did it. So campaign over. 
Likewise, Kiwi Camara (personal communication, 2010), counsel for Jammie Thomas-
Rasset, responded: 
Well they had done the damage. People were aware of the threat and I think the 
people who were going to be deterred by it were deterred by it. Going forward it 
just costs them more money and it gets them no extra deterrence bonus. So I think 
now the question really for the courts is just, ―was that okay?‖ Because if it is 
okay then we‘ll see it again and again by other industries as we‘re already seeing 
with these independent movies. 
CONCLUSION 
The Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases continue to wend their way through the 
legal system as do a number of other file-sharing cases. Though only two out of the 
roughly 35,000 cases have yet to make it to a jury trial, the efforts of a very small group 
of defense attorneys did play a decisive role in the way that the RIAA litigation campaign 
played out—both in the courtroom and in the court of public opinion. Three groups of 
attorneys emerged to take the lead in defending individuals caught up in the RIAA 
driftnet—Ray Beckerman, Camara & Sibley, and Charles Nesson. These attorneys built 
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on the momentum established by the resistance of others—student legal services, law 
students, university administrations, state agencies, member of Congress, and major ISPs.  
At a number of junctures in the litigation campaign the courts were required to 
rule on the legitimate and illegitimate uses of communication systems. This matter arose 
at the outset of the campaign with the first subpoena issued to Verizon in July of 2002. 
The district court first ordered Verizon to comply with the RIAA subpoena requesting the 
identity of its customers. According to the district court‘s interpretation of the DMCA, 
the interests of copyright holders trumped the concerns of ISPs who worried about 
maintaining privacy for their consumers and the costly administrative burden of 
complying with RIAA subpoenas. Verizon was joined in their fight against the RIAA by 
SBC and Charter Communications. And when the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed the lower court order based on the ISP safe harbor provisions 
in the DMCA, the RIAA was forced to change tactics. Likewise, there was conflict over 
the legitimate and illegitimate use of communication systems in the context of university 
networks. Though the responses of universities to the RIAA litigation campaign varied 
widely, the RIAA faced serious resistance by university students, faculty, and 
administrations who all imposed effective limits on the success of the RIAA‘s education 
and deterrence initiative. Schools like the University of Wisconsin and the University of 
Maine at times refused to pass on pre-litigation letters to their students. Even in places 
like the University of Texas at Austin where the university cooperated with the RIAA, 
resources were made available to students in an attempt to blunt the impact of RIAA 
litigation on students and their families. However, it might be equally said that 
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universities which encouraged and facilitated settlements in these cases helped to keep 
the administrative costs of the RIAA to a minimum by keeping these cases out of the 
courtroom. 
Similarly, the conflict over the legitimate and illegitimate use of court resources 
constrained the effectiveness of the RIAA campaign. Right from the start the RIAA‘s 
tactics were challenged by ISPs who saw them as an abuse of the courts‘ jurisdiction. 
Closely tied to the matter of jurisdiction was the joinder of mass numbers of people in 
single court filings. This practice fueled discontent among a number of judges and 
politicians concerned with the choking of the federal court dockets. Equally important 
was the appropriateness of using copyright law to target individual noncommercial 
actors. The ex parte proceedings attracted the attention and sympathy of lawyers, the 
media, and the public to the plight of those caught up in the RIAA‘s driftnet. And in the 
two most prominent cases—the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum jury trials—the 
staggeringly high statutory damages were seen as a gross miscarriage of justice by many, 
including the judges in each case. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the 
antipathy produced by what many considered to be the RIAA‘s abuse of the legal process 
made judges more willing to award attorney‘s fees and costs to defendants. 
Together all of these factors made it no longer cost effective for the RIAA to 
continue with its campaign targeting individual file-sharers. In terms of the appropriate 
use of communication systems the RIAA was forced to sit down with ISPs and work out 
a compromise approach to the enforcement of intellectual property regimes online. With 
respect to the appropriate use of court resources the high cost of the protracted Thomas-
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Rasset and Tenenbaum cases combined with the potential for the award of attorney‘s fees 
and costs to defendants dramatically increased the financial liability of the RIAA‘s 
approach. However, the legitimate and illegitimate use of informational and cultural 
goods was never substantially challenged during this campaign. Any substantial 
recognition of anything other than the rights of the individual possessive subject would 
be to question the very legal foundation of the social relations which define capitalist 
society. Kiwi Camara briefly called into question the registration of copyrights by 
plaintiffs in the Thomas-Rasset case, but this was more a matter of formality than 
substance. And Professor Nesson was prevented from arguing fair use in the Tenenbaum 
case altogether. In effect, the monopoly of control by the plaintiffs in these cases over the 
music in question went unchallenged.  In none of these cases was there a defense of the 
practice of file-sharing. Of all the individuals mentioned here, only Joel Tenenbaum is an 
unrepentant file-sharer. In most of these cases the attorneys reached out to their clients to 
counter what they saw primarily as an abuse of the legal process. And while there is a 
sufficient supply of political and public sympathy for ISPs and the individuals caught up 
in the RIAA driftnet, file-sharers, for the most part, are still an anathema. 
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Chapter 6 File-Sharing Litigation Redux 
The RIAA officially abandoned its litigation campaign in August of 2008 in favor 
of a graduated response program in cooperation with U.S. ISPs  (McBride & Smith, 
2008, December 19). Representatives from the RIAA confirmed this when they informed 
Congress that the organization had ―discontinued initiating new lawsuits in August‖ 
(Beckerman, 2009, May 3, ¶ 2). Yet by May of 2009 it appeared that the RIAA had filed 
over 60 new cases in federal district courts seeking statutory damages against alleged 
file-sharers (Beckerman, 2009, May 3; Newton, 2009, May 11). The apparent 
contradiction may be explained, at least in part, by the RIAA‘s insistence that it would 
continue litigating cases already in progress. In fact, noted IP attorney and copyright 
expert Ben Sheffner indicated that dropping the cases might cause problems for the 
RIAA (Anderson, 2009, March 9). Sheffner observed ―…if they abruptly drop actual 
ongoing suits, the courts will get annoyed at them, and could be sympathetic to motions 
for attorney‘s fees, counterclaims for abuse of process, malicious prosecution suits, and 
the like‖ (¶ 20). RIAA spokesman Jonathan Lamy bizarrely explained the RIAA‘s 
decision to continue with the litigation as a matter of equity among the accused: 
We‘re obviously pleased to transition to a new program going forward but that 
doesn‘t mean we can give a free pass to those who downloaded music illegally in 
the past. How fair would it be to the thousands of individuals who took 
responsibility for their actions and settled their case while others are let off the 
hook? We‘re still in the business of deterrence and it must be credible. (¶ 17) 
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Leaving aside the question of whether or not the RIAA was justified in 
announcing an official end to their litigation campaign while ongoing suits continued to 
work their way through the courts, the mass targeting component of the litigation 
campaign had, by and large, come to an end. But that does not mean that the mass 
targeting of individual file-sharers has stopped with the RIAA‘s efforts. In the pages that 
follow I detail the current status of both file-sharing technology and contemporary legal 
efforts to contain that technology. The BitTorrent file-sharing platform differs from the 
Gnutella and FastTrack protocols in a number of significant ways. Accordingly, an 
overview of the BitTorrent protocol is presented here. This is followed by a discussion of 
the recent wave of litigation targeting BitTorrent users. I conclude by arguing that 
perhaps the most significant impact of the RIAA campaign has been its use by other 
industries as an economic model of litigation to turn a profit from piracy.   
In the aftermath of the RIAA‘s unprecedented litigation campaign the music 
industry found itself in a grim economic environment. According to Nielsen SoundScan, 
physical CD sales declined another 20% in 2010. And while there was a 13% uptick in 
digital album sales it was not remotely enough to make up for the overall decline in sales 
(Moya, 2011, January 7). On the other hand, between 2009 and 2010 the MPAA reported 
an 8% increase in worldwide box office revenue of $31.8 billion. In fact, it was a record-
breaking year and the fifth year in a row in which box office receipts surpassed the 
previous year (Moya, 2011, February 25). The substantial growth in box office revenues 
was also accompanied by an aggressive campaign by the MPAA to combat file-sharing 
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worldwide. Much of the motion picture industry‘s attention has been focused on a newer 
generation of peer-to-peer file-sharing technology. 
About half way through the RIAA litigation campaign it was estimated that peer-
to-peer file-sharing accounted for as much as 35% to 75% of Internet traffic (McDaniel, 
2010, June 10; Yu, Li, Hong, & Xue, 2006). More recently some commentators have 
observed that peer-to-peer file-sharing is declining as a percentage of overall Internet 
traffic. One study indicated that in the final years of the RIAA litigation campaign—
between 2007 and 2009—peer-to-peer traffic decreased 71% as a percentage of overall 
Internet traffic (Ortiz, 2011, February). However, this decline is the result of a rise in 
streaming Internet video as a percentage of overall Internet traffic and not because of any 
decrease in the volume of peer-to-peer traffic (Ernesto, 2010, October 6). In fact, 
according to the Cisco Visual Networking Index, the volume of peer-to-peer traffic is 
predicted to grow to more than 7 petabytes per month by 2014 (McDaniel, 2010, June 
10). In other words, though peer-to-peer may only account for 17% of total Internet 
traffic in 2014 that would still represent roughly double the volume of today‘s peer-to-
peer traffic. The same index predicts regional growth rates in peer-to-peer traffic of 21% 
in North America, 35% in Central Eastern Europe, and 15% in Western Europe. The 
Asia-Pacific region will continue to account for nearly half of the volume of peer-to-peer 
file-sharing traffic. 
BITTORRENT  
Most of the RIAA suits targeted people using either the FastTrack or Gnutella 
peer-to-peer protocols. Today, these protocols have in large part been displaced by the 
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BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. BitTorrent was developed by Bram Cohen in 2001. 
After some limited beta-testing, Cohen presented the protocol at a hacker conference in 
2002 (Thompson, 2005, January). Cohen released BitTorrent under an open-source 
license, making the source code available for others to tinker with and distribute for free 
(Roth & Ryan, 2005, October 31). BitTorrent was quickly embraced by a number of 
content providers (including Blizzard Entertainment—makers of World of Warcraft) and 
Linux distributors as a scalable means for delivering content by decreasing the load on 
central servers and minimizing costs (Xia & Muppala, 2010). During the RIAA litigation 
campaign it was estimated that BitTorrent may have accounted for somewhere between 
one fifth and one third of overall Internet traffic (Roth & Ryan, 2005, October 31; 
Thompson, 2005, January). More recently, Cohen‘s company BitTorrent Inc. announced 
that they have 100 million active monthly users and average over 20 million daily users 
from over 220 countries (Moya, 2011, January 3). 
BitTorrent is a third generation peer-to-peer file-sharing system which differs in 
several key respects from its predecessors. Recall that peer-to-peer platforms like Kazaa 
and Gnutella included a search function designed to locate peers within the network 
possessing a given file. When the desired file was located, a direct connection was 
established between peers and transfer was initiated. A problem for these older peer-to-
peer systems was that most ISPs did not provide their customers with equivalent 
uploading and downloading speeds. Upload rates are typically much slower than 
download rates and produce a bottleneck in file-sharing as uploading peers can only 
provide access to a given file at a fraction of the rate available to downloaders. In other 
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words, sharing a file directly between two peers was inherently inefficient (Thompson, 
2005, January). 
On the other hand, BitTorrent was designed to facilitate cooperation among 
groups of peers using a technique known as segmented downloading or swarming 
download. In this system files are divided up into segments and distributed among peers. 
There is no search function within BitTorrent client applications to locate these segments. 
Rather, peers consult web-based search directories to locate pieces of a desired file. Peers 
that are interested in downloading the same file are then organized into overlay networks 
known as torrents. Rather than producing a bottleneck in access, as more peers join the 
torrent the download rate for all the peers actually increases (Xia & Muppala, 2010). 
While direct transfers between two peers may have been efficient enough for sharing 
MP3 files, the ability of the BitTorrent protocol to more efficiently utilize upload 
capacity makes it an ideal platform for sharing larger files like video and software (Levy, 
2005, November 28). 
BitTorrent is utilized by a variety of organizations and companies as a more 
efficient means of content distribution than centralized client/server systems. In addition 
to Blizzard Entertainment and Linux distributors, BitTorrent has been utilized by 
Activision, Sun Microsystems, and Wikipedia (Ortiz, 2011, February; Roth & Ryan, 
2005, October 31). Although BitTorrent offers considerable advantages, it is not without 
its own problems. For example, the unstable topography of peer-to-peer networks 
requires that publishers provide a stable content source on the network. Since BitTorrent 
users are likely to leave the network once they have completed a download, publishers 
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must consistently provide all the necessary segments to reproduce the file. Moreover, the 
capacity of BitTorrent to transfer large files means that in addition to copyrighted music 
it can also be readily used to share copyrighted video content. 
The RIAA did not target any BitTorrent companies during its barrage of litigation 
against the commercial distributors of file-sharing software. Nor did BitTorrent factor 
into the RIAA litigation campaign targeting individual file-sharers in any meaningful 
way. This has not stopped the MPAA from targeting BitTorrent however. The MPAA 
began legal action against the web-based search directories which BitTorrent relies on as 
early as 2004 (Locklear, 2004, December 14). Yet Bram Cohen and his BitTorrent Inc.
76
 
have thus far avoided any substantial legal entanglement with either the RIAA or MPAA. 
It‘s possible that Cohen‘s careful courting of Hollywood may have worked to his favor 
(Levy, 2005, November 28).
77
 But it‘s more likely that the absence of litigation targeting 
BitTorrent developers is due to the particular way in which BitTorrent is structured. 
Certainly its utilization by prominent companies like Blizzard and Sun helps to establish 
the existence of substantial noninfringing uses.  But this same structure does present more 
opportunistic targets for litigation. BitTorrent was not designed to provide users with 
anonymity and the ease with which IP addresses can be discovered in BitTorrent 
networks has resulted in renewed efforts to target individual file-sharers—though not by 
the RIAA or MPAA. To understand recent legal developments a more detailed 
explanation of the BitTorrent protocol and its functions is required. 
                                                 
76 BitTorrent Inc. is based in San Francisco and is responsible for the ongoing development of the 
BitTorrent protocol. 
77 It was reported that Cohen attended a meeting in 2005 with then MPAA President and CEO Dan 
Glickman. 
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BitTorrent can accurately be described as a distributed file swarming protocol. 
BitTorrent is able to achieve greater efficiency relative to previous peer-to-peer systems 
because users are not required to wait until they have downloaded a complete file before 
they are able to share this content with others. BitTorrent splits files into smaller 
segments and hashes each segment at which point users are able to download individual 
pieces of the file. As soon as a user has downloaded a segment of the file, the user is able 
to immediately begin uploading that segment to other peers who have not yet acquired it. 
All the while the user is able to seek out other peers possessing needed segments and 
begin simultaneous downloads of the missing pieces of the file. The group of peers 
involved in the sharing of the complete file is known as a swarm and the overlay of data 
flowing between the peers is called a torrent (Kelly, 2006, April 13). Users look for files 
with the extension .torrent which have been uploaded to a web server known as a 
BitTorrent index. The torrent file contains integrity metadata about the segments of the 
original file. 
The torrent file also contains information about another type of BitTorrent server 
known as a tracker. A tracker facilitates communication between peers. BitTorrent peers 
contact trackers to locate the IP addresses of other peers who are participating in a 
particular torrent. The tracker answers these requests by sending a list of about 50 
neighboring peers picked randomly from the group of active peers in a given torrent. A 
peer seeking to join a torrent then connects with between 20 to 40 peers from a list of 
about 50 peers returned by the tracker. The peer then establishes bidirectional 
communication to begin sharing a segmented file (Xia & Muppala, 2010). Trackers are, 
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in a sense, the weakest link in the BitTorrent network. A failure in the tracker‘s function 
makes it impossible for new peers to join a torrent and for existing peers to locate each 
other.  Peers in BitTorrent are of two sorts: leechers and seeds. Leechers are peers who 
do not have the complete set of segments for a file and therefore must download these 
parts from other peers. Seeds are peers who have the complete set of the segmented file 
and offer it for download to others. Xia and Muppala (2010) summarize as follows: 
The application is implemented as a hybrid P2P system, with most of the 
interaction directly among the peers, but requiring occasional interaction with a 
server for locating peers. The BitTorrent protocol requires peers to organize 
themselves into an overlay network, with connections among the peers, for each 
file being distributed. This overlay network is called a Torrent. Each file being 
distributed by BitTorrent requires the establishment of separate torrent. Besides 
the peers, a tracker and a web server play an important part in file distribution 
using BitTorrent. 
The tracker is a special infrastructure node which stores meta-information about 
the peers that are currently active within a torrent. Peers interact with the tracker 
using a simple protocol layered on top of HTTP in which a peer sends information 
about the file it is downloading and the port number to the tracker. The tracker 
does not participate in the actual distribution of the file, but only serves the 
purpose of enabling peers to find each other. The peers that are part of a torrent 
can be classified into two types: a seed and a leecher. A seed is a client that has a 
complete copy of the file and remains in the torrent to serve other peers. For a 
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torrent to get started, we need at least one initial seed that provides the entire 
content for download. A leecher is a client that is still downloading the file. (2) 
 As indicated in Chapter 4, the problem of free-riding was significant in both the 
FastTrack and Gnutella peer-to-peer systems. To deal with free-riding BitTorrent was 
designed as an incentives-based file-sharing platform. BitTorrent discourages free-riding 
by incorporating a tit-for-tat approach into its peer selection strategy. Generally speaking, 
a peer participating in a torrent will favor other peers who download to it. In other words, 
peers that are uploading are likely to achieve faster download speeds relative to peers that 
are not uploading. BitTorrent provides another mechanism to promote sharing while 
discouraging free-riding known as choking. Xia and Muppala (2010) explain: 
A peer downloads pieces not only from the seed(s), but also from other peers, 
thereby substantially reducing the load on the seed(s). A peer usually can serve 
four peers simultaneously, and it chooses the best four peers to unchoke and 
chokes other requesting peers. Choking is a temporary refusal to upload, but the 
connections are not closed. (2) 
Optimistic unchoking is a process whereby BitTorrent peers discover other peers 
with faster upload rates. Periodically a peer will choose another peer at random and 
unchoke it to see if it will upload at a faster rate than any of the four peers currently being 
served. If it does, that peer will replace the slowest of the existing peers. Ultimately, 
researchers differ on whether or not these mechanisms function effectively to discourage 
freeriding on BitTorrent networks (Li, Yu, & Wu, 2008; Xia & Muppala, 2010; Yu et al., 
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2006). That being said, BitTorrent is currently the most popular file-sharing system and 
dominates the peer-to-peer landscape. 
 But the success of BitTorrent‘s design has also presented some technical 
difficulties. The recent increase in the volume of peer-to-peer traffic is directly 
attributable to the popularity of the BitTorrent protocol (Çiflikli, Gezer, Özşahin, & 
Özkasap, 2010, October). And BitTorrent‘s attempts to efficiently use the Internet‘s 
dormant upload capacity have translated into headaches for many commercial broadband 
service providers. Because BitTorrent takes up huge amounts of bandwidth in the 
upstream direction, many ISPs would like to slow down the flow of traffic across the 
Internet (Kelly, 2006, April 13). For example, as few as 10 BitTorrent users may account 
for up to 55% of the upstream capacity per neighborhood node (Ellis, 2006, May 7). An 
intervention into these systems is known as traffic-shaping or throttling. A number of 
ISPs have begun quietly limiting the available bandwidth for BitTorrent users. For 
example, Comcast angered many BitTorrent users when it began preventing peers from 
seeding by interjecting peer reset messages into BitTorrent swarms (Ernesto, 2007, 
August 17). As McCullagh (2007, October 19) explains, Comcast surreptitiously 
interfered with file transfers by posing as a peer and then terminating the connection. 
Comcast initially denied the activity but was later exposed (Svensson, 2007, October 19). 
BitTorrent‘s bandwidth consumption brings the interests of copyright holders and ISPs 
into alignment. As ISPs began to consider the legitimate and illegitimate uses of their 
communications infrastructure in the context of swarming downloads, their calls for 
concern about consumer privacy suddenly fell silent. With BitTorrent as a common 
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adversary, the copyright holders and ISPs were quickly able to work out a compromise in 
the shape of the graduated response program. 
RENEWED FILE-SHARING LITIGATION 
Perhaps the most significant impact of the RIAA litigation campaign targeting 
individual file-sharers has been the emergence of mass lawsuits as a means of copyright 
enforcement. Though the RIAA intended their campaign primarily as a means of 
deterrence, the out-of-court settlement component of the campaign was seen by some as a 
potential alternative revenue stream. It was believed that, to some degree, settlement 
money could make up for losses in traditional revenue streams. However, the RIAA‘s 
proclivity to pursue any defendant who ignored a settlement offer was costly—especially 
in the case of the protracted legal battles with Joel Tenenbaum and Jammie Thomas-
Rasset. Still, to the extent that the plaintiffs were able to keep filing mass suits against 
large groups of ―John Does‖ without actually having to set foot in court before reaching a 
settlement, the RIAA litigation campaign demonstrated potential as an alternative 
business model in the minds of some opportunistic lawyers and businessmen. 
Copyright trolls 
With the exception of the ongoing cases stemming from the RIAA litigation 
campaign, there have not been significant numbers of cases filed against individuals for 
allegedly sharing music, video games, or major motion pictures since August 2008. Yet 
more BitTorrent users were sued in U.S. federal courts for alleged copyright infringement 
in 2010 than over the course of the entire RIAA campaign. Between January 8, 2010 and 
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January 21, 2011 a total of 99,924 individuals were sued (Ernesto, 2011, January 30; 
Moya, 2011, January 31). One commentator referred to 2010 as the year of the settlement 
letter (Anderson, 2010, October 7). The lawyers targeting these roughly 100,000 people 
do not represent the major recording companies or motion picture studios. Rather they are 
individuals who saw in the RIAA litigation campaign the potential for an alternative and 
lucrative revenue stream. 
The avalanche of new lawsuits began in May of 2010 when a lawsuit was filed 
against thousands of BitTorrent users on behalf of the producers of the independent film 
The Hurt Locker by an organization known as the US Copyright Group (USCG) 
(Sandoval, 2010, May 12). The USCG is the business arm of the law firm Dunlap, Grubb 
& Weaver. Lawyers from the group were inspired by a profit-from-piracy model of 
litigation pursued in the United Kingdom by the legal organization known as ACS:Law 
(Ernesto, 2010, November 2). USCG was doubtless also motivated by litigation occurring 
in Germany where copyright holders have targeted as many as 575,000 individuals. 
Roettgers (January 2011, 14) states, ―The goal of this type of persecution isn‘t so much to 
stop piracy, but to profit from it—and new statistics from Germany show that the strategy 
could be working, with P2P litigation becoming a multimillion dollar business‖ (¶ 1). The 
same article observes that these German copyright holders have, for the most part, 
managed to stay out of the courtroom with only 150 lawsuits becoming full-blown court 
cases. Lawyers from USCG were also impressed with a proprietary technology used by 
their German counterparts to monitor movie downloads in torrents and to capture the IP 
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addresses of BitTorrent users thought to be infringing copyright (Newton, 2010, March 
31). 
  The initial suit filed by USCG in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia was brought on behalf of Voltage Pictures, the makers of The Hurt Locker, and 
targeted 5,000 unidentified individuals (Gardner, 2010, May 28). USCG also filed a 
separate case on behalf of the makers of the film Far Cry targeting another 4,577 
unidentified individuals (Anderson, 2011, March 4). In a matter of weeks USCG sued 
more than 20,000 individuals in Washington D.C. on behalf of an ad hoc coalition of 
independent film studios (Newton, 2010, May 27). These suits did not involve the 
MPAA, nor did any major motion picture producers immediately take part. It was not 
until February of 2011 that a major film release would join the ranks of independent films 
when USCG sued 6,500 unidentified BitTorrent users on behalf of the producers of The 
Expendables (Ernesto, 2011, February 8).  
The legal lynchpin of this latest round of mass suits is permissive joinder, or the 
ability to join large numbers of ―John Doe‖ defendants into a single lawsuit.
78
 By filing 
one lawsuit, USCG incurs only one filing fee no matter how many individuals are 
included in the suit. The lawyers base the joinder on a particular technological 
characteristic of BitTorrent. Recall that previous incarnations of peer-to-peer file-sharing 
systems allowed two peers to share a file directly between them. Conversely, BitTorrent 
relies on swarm downloading in which a peer connects to a group of peers to download 
and upload individual segments of a particular file. USCG thus reasons that all 
                                                 
78 Permissive joinder is defined as ―the optional joinder of parties if (1) their claims or the claims asserted 
against them are asserted jointly, severally, or in respect of the same transaction or occurrences, and (2) any 
legal or factual question common to all of them will arise (Garner, 2006). 
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individuals participating in a torrent are collaborating together to violate copyright for a 
given file. USCG stated ―Essentially, because of the nature of the swarm 
downloads…every infringer is simultaneously stealing copyrighted material through 
collaboration from many other infringers, through a number of ISPs, in numerous 
jurisdictions around the country‖ (Anderson, 2010, June 22). And just as with the RIAA 
litigation campaign, USCG threatens defendants with the prospect of a verdict with a 
statutory maximum $150,000 per infringement in the hopes of reaching a quick out-of-
court settlement for $1,500 to $2,500 per person. Unsurprisingly, this approach spawned 
immediate resistance. 
In multiple court filings, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and Public Citizen challenged the USCG mass 
litigation campaign. These organizations argued against joinder in these cases and urged 
the courts to sever the defendants. In general, they argued that (1) the court lacked 
jurisdiction as all the cases were filed in Washington DC despite the fact that the 
defendants came from all over the country; (2) the plaintiff‘s joinder is misapplied 
because the defendants have no real connection with each other and are not part of a 
conspiracy group; and (3) a lack of specific evidence other than a collection of IP 
addresses (Anderson, 2010a, June 3). In a sense, these public advocacy groups were also 
basing their arguments on a characteristic of BitTorrent file-sharing—the absence of 
traditional social ties in swarm downloading—but in this case it was used to the 
advantage of defendants rather than their detriment. The amicus brief filed by the ACLU 
and EFF in the Far Cry case stated ―The individual Defendants still have no knowledge 
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of each other, nor do they control how the protocol works, and Plaintiff has made no 
allegation that any copy of the movie they downloaded came jointly from any of the Doe 
defendants‖ (¶ 13). 
There are a number of similarities between resistance to this latest litigation 
campaign and the history of resistance to the RIAA litigation campaign. In a move 
strikingly reminiscent of Verizon‘s struggle during the RIAA campaign, Time Warner 
Cable is fighting USCG in court, arguing that the potential burden of complying with 
over 20,000 requests for information on behalf of independent movie producers would 
threaten the ISP‘s ability to comply with more serious law enforcement requests. USCG 
responded to the cable giant by threatening to sue Time Warner for allegedly facilitating 
copyright infringement by refusing to cooperate with the plaintiff‘s request for 
information (Newton, 2010, May 27). The USCG mass lawsuits also have galvanized 
outrage among many who see the litigation as little more than an attempt at extortion. 
One individual targeted in an USCG lawsuit referred to the legal action as ―an outrageous 
scam‖ and characterized the USCG as ‖organized crime‖ (Anderson, 2010, December 7, 
¶ 2). A number of defendants have fought to keep their identities secret after being 
notified by their ISPs that they were being targeted by USCG. Some defendants sent 
handwritten motions to quash to the district court in DC (Anderson, 2010b, June 3). And 
in a move straight out of the Team Tenenbaum playbook, University of San Francisco 
law professor Robert Talbot has assembled a team of law students to defend 23 alleged 
downloaders pro bono. Professor Talbot stated ―I feel like that this is a good cause. I‘m 
always looking for ways to motivate students. They are incensed about what is going on‖ 
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(Ernesto, 2010, November 2, ¶ 8). But USCG has been undeterred by the mounting legal 
challenges to their efforts, even going so far as to sue defense attorney Graham Syfert for 
providing individuals caught up in the The Hurt Locker suit with legal self-help 
documents (for $19.95) which included motion to quash and motion to dismiss forms. 
USCG wants $5,000 for the work Syfert‘s self-help documents cost them (Ernesto, 2010, 
November 24). 
XXX litigation 
Another industry struggling to adapt to recent changes in technology is the 
pornography industry. These companies too have pursued the profit-from-piracy model 
of litigation. The first of the porn mass lawsuits came in September of 2010 when none 
other than Larry Flynt targeted 635 unidentified defendants for alleged copyright 
infringement (Cheng, 2010, September 27). Larry Flynt Publications (LFP) would go on 
to target several thousand anonymous BitTorrent users for allegedly sharing the adult 
film This Ain’t Avatar XXX (Enigmax, 2011, February 16). The suits were filed on behalf 
of LFP by Dallas-based attorney Evan Stone. In a somewhat predictable turn-of-events, 
Time Warner Cable refused to comply with Stone‘s request for information, limiting 
discovery to ten requests per month (Newton, 2010, December 29).
79
 Stone works with a 
Texas peer-to-peer monitoring organization known as the Copyright Defense Agency and 
is responsible for almost all of the peer-to-peer litigation in Texas, having filed as many 
as 16 mass lawsuits in the state on behalf of producers of pornographic films like Der 
                                                 
79 Time Warner limited discovery in the previously discussed USCG case to 28 requests per month 
(Newton, December 29, 2010). 
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Gute Onkel (Anderson, 2011, February 16, 2010, October 7). Stone also has represented 
non-pornographic clients like anime distributor FUNimation on whose behalf he filed a 




Another attorney filing mass porn file-sharing lawsuits is Kenneth Ford who 
heads up a legal group known as the Adult Copyright Group, the self-proclaimed ―market 
leader in fighting piracy of adult content‖ (Moya, 2010, December 21, ¶ 2). Between 
September and November of 2010, the Adult Copyright Group filed nine mass lawsuits in 
West Virginia targeting more than 22,000 unidentified BitTorrent users for allegedly 
sharing films like Juicy White Anal Booty 4, Teen Anal Nightmare 2, and Relax, He’s My 
Stepdad 1 (Anderson, 2010, December 17, 2010, October 7). There is also Media 
Copyright Group, an organization headed up by a Chicago attorney formerly specializing 
in family law. In September of 2010 Media Copyright Group targeted 1,200 unidentified 
individuals for sharing family-friendly films like Meat My Ass (Anderson, 2010, October 
7). Even the company which exploited the Paris Hilton sex tape is getting in on the profit-
from-piracy litigation. Without a hint of irony, the company filed suits in the District 
Court of Central California against 843 unidentified defendants for sharing 1 Night in 
Paris, a film they did nothing to produce and acquired under disputed circumstances 
(Ernesto, 2011, January 25). These are just some examples of the pornography studios 
that have attempted to make file-sharing litigation pay. 
 The titles of these pornographic films are listed here not to demean the character 
of the plaintiffs in these cases but to illustrate how the content of the copyrighted 
                                                 
80 1337 is hacker speak for ―leet‖ or ―elite‖. Leetspeak is an alternative alphabet for the English language. 
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materials in question can work to the advantage of the plaintiffs. For example, the 1,254 
people targeted by Justin Slayer International, Inc. for allegedly sharing the pornographic 
film Sara Jay in Heat are probably more inclined to settle the case quietly rather than 
endure the public spectacle of an actual court case (Ernesto, 2011, January 18). This 
reality is not lost on pornographers. Consider the comments of Allison Vivas (Cheng, 
2010, September 27), president of the adult company Pink Visual, who commented on 
the incentive provided by the risk of public humiliation:  
It seems like it will be quite embarrassing for whichever user ends up in a lawsuit 
about using a popular shemale title. When it comes to private sexual fantasies and 
fetishes, going public is probably not worth the risk that these torrent and peer-to-
peer users are taking. (¶ 6) 
In some sense these cases resemble extortion. In January of 2011 gay porn 
producers Liberty Media, through their subsidiary Corbin Fisher, began touting a 
$250,000 verdict they had extracted from a BitTorrent user. This was followed 
immediately by an announcement that they were offering a 14-day amnesty period during 
which BitTorrent users could email Corbin Fisher and arrange to make a $1,000 payment 
to the company to avoid ending up as part of a ―John Doe‖ lawsuit (Anderson, 2011, 
January 27; Enigmax, 2011, February 17, 2011, January 26). At least ten individuals gave 
Liberty Media the requested money despite no legal action of any kind having been 
initiated against them. Just the general threat of a mass lawsuit in which they might be 
caught up was enough. 
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Legal Setbacks 
In December of 2010 these mass BitTorrent lawsuits were dealt a series of 
setbacks. First in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Judge Rosemary 
Collyer told USCG to limit defendants to only those whom the court has jurisdiction 
over. For over a year USCG had attempted to join the cases of tens of thousands of 
BitTorrent users together for allegedly collaborating in the unauthorized distribution of 
the films Far Cry, Steam Experiment, Uncross the Stars, Gray Man, and Call of the Wild 
3D. The judge rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument and ordered USCG to submit a revised 
list of defendants that included only those individuals within the court‘s jurisdiction. The 
plaintiffs complied and submitted a much shorter list while also promising to make good 
on their threat to target settlement holdouts by refiling individual cases (Moya, 2011, 
January 20).
81
 Then in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 
Judge Preston Bailey dealt the Adult Copyright Company a severe blow by severing their 
mass BitTorrent lawsuit. In his ruling the judge argued that simply committing the same 
type of copyright infringement in the same manner is not a sufficient reason for joinder. 
Judge Bailey dismissed all of the subpoenas except for one and gave the Adult Copyright 
Company 30 days to refile individual complaints (Moya, 2010, December 21). Were the 
plaintiffs to refile each case individually they would incur a $350 filing fee per complaint 
for a total of $1.8 million (Anderson, 2010, December 17). And in January of 2011 the 
judge overseeing the Larry Flynt Publications BitTorrent mass lawsuits in the Northern 
District of Texas ruled the plaintiff‘s joinder was improper and dismissed the case, 
                                                 
81 In fact USCG did file individual suits in Minnesota against two previously targeted alleged BitTorrent 
users. 
 292 
leaving attorney Evan Stone and the Copyright Defense Agency with the prospect of 
filing six thousand individual cases (Enigmax, 2011, February 16). Stone fared no better 
in another case targeting 670 unidentified individuals on behalf of pornographer Mick 
Haig Production. The case was dismissed in February of 2011 after EFF and Public 
Citizen got involved (Masnick, 2011, February 11; Newton, 2011, February 1). As with 
the RIAA litigation campaign, the judges in these cases have demonstrated little patience 
for plaintiffs. The annoyance of Judge Milton Shadur was palpable in his decision to 
throw out the mass lawsuit filed by Media Copyright Group (the family law turned 
pornography attorney) after an anonymous defendant submitted an amateur motion to 
quash.
82
 The judge used the motion to dismiss the case in its entirety and ordered the 
plaintiffs to notify everyone targeted with a subpoena of the case‘s dismissal (Anderson, 
2011, February 26). 
Other anti-peer-to-peer efforts 
Thus far the MPAA has not initiated its own mass litigation campaign targeting 
individual BitTorrent users and has focused its efforts on other approaches instead. Fritz 
Attaway (2010, October 5), Executive Vice President and Special Policy Advisor for the 
MPAA stated: 
We have used slightly different tactics than RIAA in part because of the nature of 
our respective works. There are certainly other reasons as well but MPAA has 
filed end user lawsuits like RIAA has. However, they are very expensive and we 
                                                 
82 Judge Shadur issued a memo stating: ―It is an understatement to characterize [this case] as problematic 
in nature” (Anderson, February 26, 2011, ¶ 3). 
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have determined that there are other routes that provide a better return; among 
them education, working with intermediaries like ISPs to discourage infringing 
activity, and one, that is probably the most important, is encouraging the 
development of new business models that provide legitimate alternatives. All of 
these avenues we are pursuing very aggressively. Because for a number of 
reasons RIAA has focused on end-user suits and that makes sense for them. It is 
absolutely necessary we would agree that there be consequences to infringing 
behavior. If bad behavior does not result in consequences pretty soon no one 
thinks it‘s wrong. And that is not a good thing. So we agree that it is helpful to 
establish that there are consequences for infringing behavior but there are also a 
number of other things that can be done to discourage bad behavior and we are 
pursuing those as well. (¶ 11) 
One of the alternate approaches taken by the MPAA has been to target the weak 
links in the BitTorrent system—the aforementioned index and tracker sites. Beginning in 
2006 the MPAA began taking legal action against sites like TorrentBox, ed2k-it, and 
TorrentSpy, claiming that these sites facilitated copyright infringement. Also in 2006, the 
MPAA targeted one of the most popular BitTorrent index sites, isoHunt. After a lengthy 
legal battle isoHunt was issued a permanent injunction by the U.S. District Court of 
California ordering it to begin censoring its search engine based on a list of thousands of 
keywords provided by the MPAA, or to discontinue its operations in the United States 
(Ernesto, 2010, December 21). isoHunt implemented the filter but appealed the case to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the injunction amounted to an improper 
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abridgement of its right to free speech. isoHunt maintains that they provide a neutral 
service somewhat analogous to Google‘s search engine. But Google filed an amicus brief 
with the Court agreeing with the district court‘s decision that isoHunt encouraged its 
users to commit copyright infringement. Google‘s concern was that the court had 
unnecessarily reached the issue of inducement. Google contended that isoHunt clearly did 
not meet the standards for DMCA safe harbor protections. Therefore, Google felt that the 
court had unnecessarily conflated DMCA safe harbor protections with the issue of 
inducement to commit copyright infringement (Ernesto, 2011, February 20). Rather than 
finding common ground with isoHunt or other peer-to-peer systems, Google has gone out 
of its way to appease the copyright industries, even going so far as to censor its own 
search engine by banning terms like BitTorrent, uTorrent, and Rapidshare from its 
Autocomplete results (Moya, 2011b, January 26). It‘s likely that Google has been 
motivated to take sides in the peer-to-peer conflict by its own attempts to secure licenses 
for music, film, and television programming from the entertainment industry (Sandoval, 
2010, December 2). The isoHunt case is another peer-to-peer file-sharing case in which 
the conflict over legitimate and illegitimate uses of communications systems becomes 
transparent. Rather than follow any principle of free access to information, Google sided 
against peer-to-peer file-sharing for fear of being adversely affected should the courts fail 
to make the distinction. 
 In August of 2010, the MPAA renewed the focus on university and college 
campuses. Recall that after lobbying by the RIAA and MPAA in 2008 Congress inserted 
language into the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act requiring universities to 
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provide students with access to authorized music downloading services and to invest in 
network filtering systems to inhibit the spread of file-sharing on their campuses. Many in 
the academic community opposed the bill because they feared that penalties would be 
added at some point in the future for those higher education institutions which did not 
meet compliance standards. These fears were well-founded. When the Department of 
Education drafted its 2009 rules implementing the bill, schools were required to use 
technological deterrents to discourage file-sharing on their campuses. If a university takes 
federal money, failure to comply with this mandate could jeopardize funding (Anderson, 
2010, August 10). In December of 2010, the MPAA sent out letters to university 
administrators across the United States, reminding them of their obligation to protect the 
interests of the major motion picture studios. And in a move reminiscent of the RIAA‘s 
targeting of college students, the MPAA also announced that it will begin warning 
students believed to be engaging in illegal file-sharing that there will be consequences 
(Ernesto, 2010, December 5). 
 With the exception of the early criticism by a few members of Congress at the 
outset of the RIAA litigation campaign, the U.S. government has been a consistent 
resource and ally for the copyright industries. The approach to intellectual property 
adopted by the Obama Administration is marked less by change than it is by continuity. 
The U.S. intellectual property enforcement coordinator released a report in June of 2010 
entitled the Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement. The report opens 
with a quote by President Obama: ―[W]e‘re going to aggressively protect our intellectual 
property. Our greatest asset is the innovation and the ingenuity and creativity of the 
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American people. It is essential to our prosperity and it will only become more so in this 
century‖ (p. 3). Coinciding with the report‘s publication, Vice President Biden weighed 
in on file-sharing stating ―We used to have a problem in this town saying this. But piracy 
is theft. Clean and simple. It‘s smash and grab. It ain‘t no different than smashing a 
window at Tiffany‘s and grabbing [merchandise]‖ (Sandoval, 2010, June 22, ¶ 1). 
Members of Congress have also moved to give the Department of Justice increased 
powers to shut down websites which facilitate file-sharing. In September of 2010 
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and Republican Senator Orin Hatch of 
Utah proposed the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act which would 
allow the Department of Justice to file civil action against alleged pirate domain names 
and have U.S.-based domain names shut down if the courts determine them to be pirate 
sites (Sandoval, 2010, September 20). Though this particular bill died in committee, the 
Department of Justice nevertheless coordinated with the Department of Homeland 
Security‘s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to target a variety of online 
retailers of counterfeit and pirated goods in June of 2010.  The initial coordinated effort, 
the so-called Operation in Our Sites, began with the seizure of nine domain names of 
websites offering pirated copies of first-run movies. In November of 2010 another 82 
sites were seized, followed by an additional 10 in February of 2011 (Moya, 2011b, 
February 15). In conjunction with the February site seizures the Senate Judiciary 
Committee convened a hearing entitled Targeting Websites Dedicated to Stealing 
American Intellectual Property in which a number of Senators expressed their support for 
the aforementioned Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act. The site 
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seizures conducted by ICE raise a number of problems. Critics of the program claim that 
the February site seizures caused the inadvertent shut down of nearly 84,000 websites 
(Moya, 2011, February 17). The program also intrudes on the sovereignty of other 
nations in the name of protecting U.S. markets. For example, in the February 2011 wave 
ICE seized Rojadirecta.org, a site which had been ruled legal in Spain. As Moya (2011b, 
February 15) observed, ―…seizing foreign-based sites with no ties to the US opens up a 
Pandora‘s Box of possibilities in which other countries could reasonably argue for the 
seizure of US-based sites in violation of their laws‖ (¶ 10).  
 Despite the problematic sovereignty issue raised by the U.S. government‘s 
Operation in Our Sites, there have been considerable international efforts to stem the 
practice of file-sharing. In the UK there was the previously mentioned ACS: Law which 
trumpeted its revolutionary business model in December of 2009 in which it would 
profit-from-piracy by suing thousand of alleged file-sharers and pushing pre-trial 
settlement offers (Moya, 2011a, February 15).
83
 In January of 2011 the MPAA partnered 
with the Dutch anti-peer-to-peer organization BREIN to shut down 12 U.S.-based 
BitTorrent sites. BREIN itself was responsible for the shuttering of more than 600 sites 
and servers in 2010 (Moya, 2011, January 28). Also in January of 2011 Chinese 
authorities declared that anybody caught illegally distributing copyrighted materials over 
peer-to-peer networks with over 50,000 hits will face prison sentences of 3 to 7 years 
(Moya, 2011, January 25). The international music trade group, the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), issued an annual report in January 2011 
                                                 
83 ACS: Law would eventually give up the campaign after the attorney heading up the effort complained of 
email hacking, bomb threats, and death threats (Moya, 2011, January 26). 
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in which the organization encouraged increased involvement by national governments to 
stem the tide of peer-to-peer file-sharing. The IFPI promoted the adoption of the 
graduated response system in which alleged file-sharers would receive warnings through 
their ISP with incremental penalties for continued acts of unauthorized distribution of 
copyrighted materials (Anderson, 2011, January 21). And in March of 2011, the IFPI 
announced a new copyright enforcement initiative in which the organization will work 
with credit card companies MasterCard and Visa to identify infringing websites and to 
deny these sites credit card transaction services (Lasar, 2011, March 4). 
 Although the RIAA litigation campaign was officially terminated in 2008, its 
repercussions are still felt today. A number of RIAA cases are still winding their way 
through the U.S. courts—the eventual outcome of which is yet to be determined. Perhaps 
more importantly though, the RIAA litigation model has been adapted by a new crop of 
opportunist lawyers and businessmen guided as much by the desire to profit from 
copyright infringement as by the desire to deter it. However, the BitTorrent protocol 
presents the copyright industries with a different set of challenges from the FastTrack or 
Gnutella protocols. Consequently, contemporary legal efforts to combat file-sharing have 
been structured somewhat differently than previous efforts. Attorneys have targeted 
individual file-sharers differently, attempting to link the coordinated activity of swarm 
downloading with a conspiracy to commit mass copyright infringement. The MPAA and 
their allies in government have targeted BitTorrent differently, focusing their efforts 
primarily on the structural weak link of index and tracker sites. Yet, just as the RIAA was 
met with legal resistance, these most recent efforts are being resisted by ISPs, individual 
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defendants, advocacy groups, university professors and their law students, peer-to-peer 
developers, and judges who all function to place constraints on the overall effectiveness 
of such campaigns. However, not all forms of resistance find expression in the courts. 
The conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing is also conditioned by the extralegal activities 
of file-sharers who act as another constraint on the effective imposition of intellectual 
property law. Because as much as these court battles may have turned on issues of 
legitimate and illegitimate uses of the courts and communication systems, nowhere in the 
legal arena was the monopoly control of copyright holders over informational and 
cultural goods seriously challenged. Yet that monopoly control is, in fact, in serious 
jeopardy. Any attempt to understand the conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing must also 




Chapter 7 A Survey of File-Sharers 
The trajectory of capitalist development in the production and distribution over 
the Internet of music and other related commodities is determined by the establishment of 
a form of social relations amenable to capitalist accumulation. With respect to the 
commoning taking place as part of peer-to-peer file-sharing, the copyright industries must 
find a way to bring these alternative social relations within the capitalist logic or 
eliminate them. The conflict over the potentialities of those social relations occurs in 
three interrelated areas: the technological, the legal, and the social. Thus far we have 
examined the first two arenas in some depth. Generally speaking, we have seen how the 
music industry has opted to attempt to eliminate the social system of commoning rather 
than try and assimilate it. In Chapter 4 I discussed the general displacement of early peer-
to-peer systems by client-server systems out of an economic imperative for centralized 
modes of production. In Chapters 5 and 6 I detailed how the RIAA and other media firms 
attempted to mobilize legal resources in an ongoing effort to deter or eliminate the 
practice of decentralized file-sharing. Though these legal actions may have originated 
with an eye to deterrence, opportunistic lawyers and businessmen have since tried to 
make the litigation itself profitable.  But we have not given full consideration to the social 
dimension of file-sharing. We cannot attempt to fully understand the dynamics of this 
conflict without giving explicit consideration to this third arena because it is every bit as 
significant as economic imperatives or legal pressures in determining the direction of 
capitalist development in this particular field. 
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 Our current understanding of the social dimensions of file-sharing is inadequate. 
Discourse about the social function of peer-to-peer systems generally falls into two 
categories: criminality or missing markets. The criminality framing of file-sharing is a 
poorly adapted construct in which a comparison is drawn between the theft of rival goods 
and the theft of nonrival goods. Consider again the aforementioned quote from United 
States Vice President Biden: ―…piracy is theft. Clean and simple. It‘s smash and grab. It 
ain‘t no different than smashing a window at Tiffany‘s and grabbing [merchandise]‖ 
(Sandoval, 2010). Even the most cursory examination of file-sharing indicates that it is 
not clean and simple. The nonrival character of the cultural artifacts being shared in peer-
to-peer networks alone reveals the speciousness of the Vice President‘s metaphor. 
Additionally, the range of phenomena encompassed under the header piracy as a type of 
criminality calls into question the suitability of that term  as well. For example, the 
European Union has defined piracy as whatever the knowledge industry needs protection 
from (Johns, 2009). Moreover, the sharing in file-sharing renders the piracy metaphor 
hollow. The superficiality of the term with respect to file-sharing stems from the 
application of an anti-social framing to a richly social activity. 
Some academic discourses on file-sharing have adopted a missing markets 
framing in which file-sharing results from an unexpected turn in consumer demand. This 
was essentially Clay Shirky‘s (2001) position as he dismissed the civil disobedience of 
Napster users by arguing that file-sharing did not constitute a rejection of the pricing 
system per se but instead indicated a demand for lower prices. It is also the position of 
Cenite et al. (2009) who argued that peer-to-peer file-sharing results from a market 
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imperfection which could be remedied if the copyright industries would just adopt more 
convenient and efficient business models. Neither of these positions is wholly without 
merit. The problem with these analyses lies not in what they say but what they don‘t say. 
By naturalizing the market form, these approaches can only explain file-sharing as some 
sort of aberration. The structural dimension of peer-to-peer systems is largely ignored. 
The possibility of social relations premised on something radically different than market 
relations is foreclosed. Confronting file-sharing as a market imperfection obscures both 
the antagonisms produced by commodification and the development of alternative social 
relations. 
SOCIAL SYSTEM OF FILE-SHARING 
This study confronts file-sharing as a constitution of alternative social relations 
premised on a commoning of resources. These social relations are not framed as 
somehow outside of the capitalist system. In fact, they are deeply ingrained within its 
contemporary logic. Yet, they are also in contradiction with that logic. The way in which 
the music industry ultimately attempts to come to terms with that contradiction will be 
determined largely by the stubborn persistence of these social relations. In the pages that 
follow I present the results from a survey of 363 file-sharers as part of an exploration of 
the structural dimensions of file-sharing. I begin with a brief discussion of the theoretical 
framework and methodology adopted in this study. After an overview of the sample of 
file-sharers I continue to a discussion of the results of the study. At the conclusion I make 
the case that the conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing is best understood as the product 
of a conflict between two contradictory social systems, one based on commodification 
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and the other based on commoning, and that the dynamics of this conflict have 
explanatory power for understanding the trajectory of capitalist development in the 
sphere of information production and distribution. 
The purpose of this study is to begin to map the intersections of the social 
structures implicated in file-sharing. This study differs from previous work on file-
sharing in that it starts from the perspectives of file-sharers and seeks to understand how 
the class antagonism influences the eventual trajectory of capitalist development in this 
particular area. In keeping with Hardt and Negri‘s work on the commons, I approach file-
sharing as a demonstration of the paradoxical tendency of capital
84
 to produce commons 
despite a continuing drive to privatize resources. As Hardt and Negri (2009) explain: 
In the newly dominant forms of production that involve information, codes, 
knowledge, images, and affects, for example, producers increasingly require a 
high degree of freedom as well as open access to the common, especially in its 
social forms, such as communications networks, information banks, and cultural 
circuits. Innovation in Internet technologies, for example, depends directly on 
access to common code and information resources as well as the ability to connect 
and interact with others in unrestricted networks. (X) 
But these commons are not exterior to the capitalist system. They are at its heart. And 
confronted with such an intimate paradox, capitalists are left with but two choices: 
attempt to destroy the commons or attempt to bring it within the logic of accumulation. 
Much of the previous litigation and law enforcement efforts against file-sharing represent 
                                                 
84 Again, capital is used here to refer to a historically specific set of social relations in which the circulation 
of commodities is structured so that the owners of the means of production are able to accumulate wealth. 
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the former choice while calls to create a new business model respecting some new digital 
logic represent the latter. 
 Yet the fate of the commons is not determined by capitalists alone. If anything, 
the persistence of file-sharing in the face of such large-scale legal and police efforts 
betrays the impotence of capitalists to choose their own destiny. Indeed, as was 
mentioned previously, the volume of peer-to-peer traffic is predicted to double to more 
than 7 petabytes per month by 2014 despite the best efforts of copyright groups to stem 
the tide (McDaniel, 2010). Consequently, any attempt to understand the conflict over file-
sharing must include an analysis of the structure of peer-to-peer systems. I employ 
Giddens‘s (1986) structuration theory to conceptualize the structures of peer-to-peer 
systems as the rules and resources recursively implicated in the reproduction of the file-
sharing community. Hence, file-sharing is seen not as the simple product of technological 
developments or market imperatives, but as a social system relying on shared meanings 
and materials for the co-ordination and reproduction of file-sharing activities. And though 
this social system is contradictory to the logic of accumulation, it is embedded within 
capital and not exterior to it. It is simply a more developed way of conceptualizing an 
antagonistic class relation in which there is a struggle for the surplus of social wealth. 
And in keeping with Giddens, I consider individual file-sharers to be knowledgeable 
social actors capable of furthering our understanding of the conditions under which their 
activities occur. 
Peer-to-peer file-sharers do not resemble conventional portrayals of working class 
identity. Traditional Marxist interpretations of class have centered on the mode of 
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capitalist production in general and waged workers in particular. But in the current media 
landscape there is no bright line distinction to be made among producers, consumers, and 
distributors of information commodities. This is not to say that the concept of class is 
irrelevant. Quite the contrary—the more egalitarian dissemination of the means of media 
production and distribution has been accompanied by greater levels of exploitation.
85
 But 
as exploitation becomes generalized and non-localized
86
, so must our understanding of 
the working class. This is the spirit in which Hardt and Negri (2004) conceived of the 
multitude as ―all those who work under the rule of capital and thus potentially as the class 
of those who refuse the rule of capital‖ (p. 106). It is in this spirit that I assert that file-
sharers are engaged in non-localized and general struggle against the rule of the copyright 
industries. Yet the vagueness of this declaration requires additional comment. Can one 
speak of class when discussing peer-to-peer file-sharers if they are not united by shared 
proximity, socio-economic status, nationality, gender, race, ethnicity, or culture? How 
else might one explain the numerous examples of collective action taken by peer-to-peer 
file-sharers—everything from raising funds for individuals caught up in file-sharing 
litigation to the Operation Payback denial of service attacks launched by the secretive 
collective known as Anonymous targeting the IFPI, RIAA, and MPAA? Only an 
investigation of the file-sharers themselves can begin to answer these questions. 
                                                 
85 Here I am referring to Terranova‘s (2004) concept of free labor—―Simultaneously voluntary given and 
unwaged, enjoyed and exploited, free labour on the Net includes the activity of building websites, 
modifying software packages, reading and participating in mailing lists and building virtual spaces‖ (p. 74). 
86 Here I am referring to the Autonomist Marxist notion of the social factory in which the production of 
surplus value transcends its traditional home in the factory and becomes generalized throughout society. As 
Lazzarato (1996) states, ―Now, the post-Taylorist mode of production is defined precisely by putting 
subjectivity to work both in the activation of productive cooperation and in the production of the ―cultural‖ 
contents of commodities‖ (p. 143). 
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The concept of the multitude speaks to the generalized class antagonism but 
leaves much to the imagination with respect to how file-sharers relate to each other. I 
have asserted previously that the social system of commoning precedes the exercise of 
power, the imposition of the commodity form. If this is true, then the social relations of 
file-sharing must be based on something more than just resistance. In other words, the 
social cohesion among file-sharers must be derived from something in addition to the 
class antagonism. I asked Professor Charles Nesson of Harvard Law and Team 
Tenenbaum whether he thought there was a community of file-sharers. Nesson (personal 
communication, 2010) responded: 
 It‘s a good question. I haven‘t had a tangible sense of it. That is, it doesn‘t 
present itself in any strong degree. And yet I have the feeling that it‘s there. That 
is, it‘s [a] sense of knowing that a generation of kids grew up with this stuff and 
they must be interested. And if they are interested then they must be puzzled. 
Nesson‘s comment speaks to the disequilibrium experienced by those who have 
grown up immersed simultaneously in the logic of sharing and the logic of economic 
exchange. But who are these peer-to-peer natives and what shared meanings inform their 
mode of discourse? While the notion of community may appear to be as good a place as 
any to begin this investigation, there has been considerable debate over the meaning of 
community in the online context. According to Wilbur (1995), ―Community seems to 
refer primarily to relations of commonality between persons and objects, and only rather 
imprecisely to the site of such community‖ (¶ 10). This approach is useful to the extent 
that it allows for the inclusion of the non-localized spaces of the Internet. The current 
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investigation seeks to explore the non-localized structural dimensions of peer-to-peer 
systems and the ways in which they are structured to pattern social relations across time 
and space. Some critics of online community have asserted that these spaces produce 
relationships that are somehow more isolated or less-fulfilling than those of the physical 
world. For example, Willson (2001) argues that online communities foster individuation 
and compartmentalization as social interactions are conducted in physical isolation with 
others in different geographic locales. Individuals effectively detach themselves from 
their immediate surroundings while their representation of self is made superficial by the 
limits of online technology. Yet such critiques often idealize face-to-face communities 
and ignore the social isolation characteristic of modern society (Kollock & Smith, 1999). 
Moreover, as Rheingold (2000) has noted, online communities often move seamlessly 
from CMC to face-to-face interactions.
87
 Without treading too far into the debate over the 
legitimacy of online community, I simply accept that given the limited opportunities for 
social presence in online interactions, these interactions are nevertheless capable of 
creating and maintaining a limited number of strong social ties, a high number of weak 
social ties, and a sufficient number of intermediate-strength ties for collective action 
(Wellman & Gulia, 1999). I proceed on the basis of identifying those common practices, 
objects, identities, and ideas which provide social cohesion among file-sharers.  
 Peer-to-peer systems are characterized by norms of reciprocity conditioned by 
social and technological structures. Some critics have argued that such norms are more 
typical of face-to-face social interactions and that online interactions merely remove the 
demand for reciprocity (Willson, 2001). Yet, there is substantial evidence of reciprocity 
                                                 
87 Willson (2001) also acknowledges that online communities sometimes involve face-to-face interactions. 
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in online communities (Wellman & Gulia, 1999). The ability of online communities 
characterized only by weak to intermediate social ties to foster norms of reciprocity stems 
from a change in the economy of human interaction. As Kollock (1999) states, the 
―…fundamental features of online interaction…change the costs and benefits of social 
interaction in dramatic ways‖ (p. 221). First and foremost, the economy of online 
interaction negates the necessity of close social ties for collective action. Some research 
has shown that file-sharers are motivated by feelings of altruism and community spirit 
(Moya, 2010, December 9). Other researchers have pointed to motivations other than 
altruism—reciprocity, gaining prestige, a sense of efficacy within the group (Kollock, 
1999). Whatever the motivation, the viability of a file-sharing community proceeds from 
the dramatically lowered transaction costs made possible by online interactions. 
  Rheingold (2000) characterized these types of online social interactions early on 
as a gift economy. File-sharing as a social practice can be contrasted with commodity 
exchange in a number of ways. First, the exchange of commodities does not produce any 
continuing social obligation between parties. As Kollock (1999) explains, ―…gifts are 
exchanged between individuals who are part of an ongoing interdependent relationship. 
In a commodities transaction, the individuals are self-interested, independent actors‖ (p. 
221). Second, the files being shared are nonrival goods. That is to say one person‘s 
consumption does not impact another person‘s consumption. Third, the files are public 
goods in that it is difficult to exclude people from benefitting from the goods. And 
finally, the costs of participating in the social system of commoning are extremely low 
relative to the social system of commodity exchange. It is difficult for consumers as a 
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class to gain any ground in the wage struggle unless they are willing to step outside their 
assigned roles as consumers. On the other hand, the coordination costs of collective 
action through online communities can be significantly lower. Commons are readily 
established for the free dissemination of cultural artifacts. Witness the constant adaptation 
of peer-to-peer platforms in the wake of various legal assaults. Protests and offensive 
actions are mobilized with great speed and substantial impact. Consider the distributed 
denial of service attacks (DDoS) launched by Anonymous during Operation Payback 
which resulted in the shutdown of both the RIAA and MPAA websites (Enigmax, 2010, 
September 19). And physical resources are adroitly assembled through online interaction, 
as was the case with the funds raised on behalf of Patricia Santangelo and Joel 
Tenenbaum. 
METHODOLOGY 
Proceeding from the assumption that there is indeed a community of file-sharers 
capable of collective action due to the change in the economy of human interaction, I 
attempt to answer a number of questions about the structural dimensions of peer-to-peer 
systems. The questions I asked file-sharers are as follows: (1) Why do you use peer-to-
peer applications to acquire music, movies, or television programs?; (2) When do you 
own music? What should you be able to do with it when you own it?; (3) What are the 
reasons for having copyright law? What function does it serve? Are there any changes 
you would make to copyright law?; (4) How should musicians feel about peer-to-peer 
file-sharing?; (5) Do you think the major record labels or the RIAA are concerned about 
the welfare of either musicians or music fans?;  (6) Do you consider people who share 
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copyrighted materials over peer-to-peer networks to be criminals?; (7) How do you learn 
the necessary skills to be a peer-to-peer file-sharer? What resources do file-sharers have 
at their disposal?; (8) Is there a community of peer-to-peer file-sharers?; and (9) What has 
been the effect of the RIAA lawsuits targeting individual file-sharers? 
I utilized survey research to gather data from a population of peer-to-peer file-
sharers. Recognizing that as a class of people file-sharers have been the consistent target 
of both public scorn and legal action, I took the time to gain the trust of several prominent 
members of the file-sharing community. These individuals are in charge of a range of 
file-sharing forums, IRC channels, and private BitTorrent sites. I spent close to a year 
working with these individuals, sharing the results of my work on file-sharing and 
soliciting their help with the design and implementation of my research. The current 
survey was designed as a series of open-ended questions for file-sharers as part of an 
exploratory phase of my research. Respondents were free to provide as much or as little 
information as they felt comfortable with and could answer all or just a portion of the 
questionnaire. I agreed to keep the collection of background and personal information to 
a minimum. The survey was announced within the peer-to-peer file-sharing community 
with the assistance of my contacts and was available online for three weeks before being 
closed. There were both advantages and disadvantages to the design. Open-ended 
questions are appropriate to exploratory research, especially when the researcher cannot 
anticipate the range of responses. The risk associated with open-ended questions is that 
researchers may not receive adequate responses as respondents are not willing to think 
deeply enough about questions and do not provide satisfactory answers. I was assured by 
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my contacts within the file-sharing community that this risk was minimal because the 
community was highly motivated to speak out on this topic. This advice proved prescient 
as I received an unexpectedly high number of quality responses to my questionnaire. I 
view this initial phase of research as something akin to a large-scale focus group 
discussion with file-sharers. I intend to use the data gathered here to create a more formal 
survey which I will administer as part of a separate research endeavor. 
RESPONDENTS 
In total, 363 people responded to the survey. Survey respondents were asked to 
provide basic information regarding their age, country of origin, work, and the amount of 
experience they have had with peer-to-peer file-sharing applications. Of the 363 survey 
respondents 356 individuals provided information about their age. This information is 
presented in Table 7.1. While respondents ranged considerably in age from 13 to 65 years 
almost half of them were in their twenties. 
Table 7.1: Respondent Ages 
Respondent Ages (n = 356)   
Age Number Percent 
13-19 65 18.3 
20-29 171 48 
30-39 64 18 
40-49 37 10.3 
50-59 14 4 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
60-69 5 1.4 
 
This was a truly international sample with respondents coming from all over the 
globe. Of the total respondents, 346 individuals indicated their nationality. This 
information is presented in Table 7.2. Respondents from 42 countries participated in the 
survey though the majority came from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. 
The Western bias in the sample is likely due to the English format of the survey and its 
announcement in English-speaking file-sharing forums. 
Table 7.2: Nationalities 
Nationalities (n = 346)   
Country Number Percent 
United States 137 39.6 
United Kingdom 52 15.0 
Canada 32 9.3 
Australia 19 5.5 
Finland 13 3.8 
Netherlands 12 3.5 
Germany 9 2.6 
Sweden 7 2.0 
Mexico 7 2.0 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
Denmark 5 1.5 
Portugal 4 1.2 
France 4 1.2 
New Zealand 4 1.2 
Czech Republic 3 0.9 
Russia 2 0.6 
Ukraine 2 0.6 
Romania 2 0.6 
Croatia 2 0.6 
Estonia 2 0.6 
Belgium 2 0.6 
Brazil 2 0.6 
Bangladesh 2 0.6 
Malaysia 2 0.6 
Thailand 2 0.6 
Ireland 1 0.3 
Iceland 1 0.3 
Switzerland 1 0.3 
Spain 1 0.3 
Greece 1 0.3 
Cyprus 1 0.3 
Austria 1 0.3 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
Serbia 1 0.3 
Poland 1 0.3 
Bulgaria 1 0.3 
Turkey 1 0.3 
Israel 1 0.3 
India 1 0.3 
Chile 1 0.3 
Argentina 1 0.3 
Peru 1 0.3 
Philippines 1 0.3 
Senegal 1 0.3 
 
I received 346 responses indicating employment type. Respondents came from all 
walks of life—programmers and web developers, doctors, a lawyer, a meditation teacher, 
an anthropologist, an unemployed forest worker, a preacher, college and high school 
students, a taxi driver, a disabled veteran, a butcher, delivery drivers, musicians, a tour 
guide, a retired airline operations officer. In order to make sense of all these diverse 
backgrounds I made some minor modifications to the Standard Occupational 
Classification System used by the United States Department of Labor to create Table 7.3. 
While the majority of respondents appear to either be students or working within high 
tech and media industries, substantial numbers of them came from other fields. A 
significant number of respondents (7.8%) were unemployed.  
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Table 7.3: Occupations 
Occupations (n = 346)   
Occupation Number Percentage 
Student 126 36.4 




Unemployed 27 7.8 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, 
& Media/Journalism 
25 7.2 
Sales 21 6.1 
Architecture & Engineering 16 4.6 
Self-employed 14 4.0 
Business & Financial 
Operations 
9 2.6 
Installation, Maintenance, & 
Repair 
8 2.3 
Education, Training, & 
Library 
7 2.0 
Office & Administrative 
Support 
7 2.0 
Retired 7 2.0 
Manufacturing 5 1.4 
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Table 7.3 (continued) 
Food/Drink Preparation & 
Service 
5 1.4 
Healthcare Practitioners 5 1.4 
Management 4 1.2 
Personal Care & Service 4 1.2 
Transportation 3 0.9 
Life, Physical, & Social 
Sciences 
2 0.6 
Construction & Resource 
Extraction 
2 0.6 
Military 2 0.6 
Protective Services 2 0.6 
Legal 1 0.3 
Healthcare Support 1 0.3 
Building/Grounds 
Maintenance & Cleaning 
1 0.3 
Stay-at-home Parent 1 0.3 
Real Estate 1 0.3 
 
I received 362 responses indicating the level of experience with file-sharing 
applications. This information is presented in Table 7.4. Respondents had varying levels 
of experience but the majority seemed to be veteran file-sharers. Respondents with six or 
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more years of experience with file-sharing applications accounted for 67.9% of the 
sample. 
Table 7.4: Experience File-Sharing 
Experience with File-sharing (n = 
362) 
  
Years Number Percentage 
Less than 1 year 3 0.8 
1 to 2 years 15 4.1 
3 to 5 years 98 27.1 
6 to 10 years 147 40.6 
More than 10 years 99 27.3 
 
Question 1: Why Do You Use Peer-To-Peer Applications To Acquire Music, Movies, 
or Television Programs? 
When asked to explain why they use peer-to-peer applications to acquire content 
respondents cited numerous reasons. I sorted 357 responses into the 15 general categories 
presented in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5: Reasons for Using P2P 
Reasons For Using P2P Applications (n = 357)   
Reason Number Percentage 
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Table 7.5 (continued) 
Economic motivation 183 51.3 
Higher relative quality 171 47.9 
Unavailability in local markets 121 33.9 
Previewing 71 19.9 
Political motivation 60 16.8 
Time shifting 45 12.6 
Avoiding advertisements 41 11.5 
Format shifting 34 9.5 
Sharing 31 8.7 
Out-of-print content 29 8.1 
Discovery of new content 24 6.7 
À la carte selection 13 3.6 
Previously established behavior 6 1.7 
Obtaining pre-release content 4 1.1 




A very large percentage (51.3%) of the responses included some mention of 
economic factors as a reason for using peer-to-peer applications to gain access to content. 
Responses in this category typically referenced things like poverty, unemployment, and 
the high cost of some content. This category of responses points to the structural relations 
of capitalism and the antagonism of class-divided societies in which private property in 
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the means of information production and distribution result in skewed distributions of the 
surplus of social wealth. In this sense file-sharing applications become a tool of re-
appropriation. These economic factors also call into question industry claims regarding 
lost sales because without peer-to-peer systems many file-sharers simply may not have 
the financial means to acquire content. 
 Another sizeable portion of respondents (47.9%) stated that they were motivated 
to use peer-to-peer applications because of the higher quality offered by such systems. 
Respondents cited things like higher quality file formats, better selection, more reliable 
and faster content distribution, ease of use, and greater special features like language 
options. Respondents often talked of wanting to avoid theaters or trips to brick-and-
mortar stores and of the greater efficiency offered by peer-to-peer systems. Sometimes 
peer-to-peer systems simply provided access to content where none existed before. One 
respondent cited his/her lack of a credit card. Some respondents indicated that cable 
systems were not available in their area. But all of the responses in this category 
emphasized the relative quality of peer-to-peer systems in some way whether in terms of 
format, selection, or distribution. 
Many respondents (33.9%) pointed to the unavailability of specific content in 
local markets as a reason to use peer-to-peer systems. These responses included 
expatriates from Western nations and non-Westerners seeking access to content produced 
in extra-local markets. A somewhat related category was obtaining pre-release content in 
which respondents were motivated by a desire for access to content before the scheduled 
calendar release date. These respondents typically wanted access to albums or movies 
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before the first official release date. Only 1.1% of respondents cited this as a motivation. 
The inverse of the pre-release category was the out-of-print category in which 8.1% of 
respondents cited a desire to gain access to rare or older content no longer available. A 
lack of substantial demand undoubtedly accounted for the unavailability of some types of 
content. A substantial portion of respondents (19.9%) mentioned their desire to preview 
content before deciding whether or not to make a purchase. The mantra for this group of 
responses seemed to be try before you buy. Responses in this category included some 
expression of the intent to purchase. 
Another substantial motivation for using peer-to-peer systems cited by 9.5% of 
respondents was format-shifting. In general, these responses included some expression of 
dissatisfaction with Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems. Respondents sometimes 
expressed a desire to change file formats for the purpose of creating and maintaining 
digital archives of content. At other times they expressed a desire to move content across 
various playback devices in order to enjoy content in a variety of settings. A closely 
related category to format-shifting is time-shifting. This included 12.6% of respondents 
who also expressed dissatisfaction with DRM but whose motivation to use peer-to-peer 
applications was based on temporal factors like immediate and repeated access to 
content. This is analogous to a desire for on-demand access to content. Another 11.5% of 
responses expressed a desire to avoid advertisements as an incentive to use peer-to-peer 
systems. Respondents in this category often complained of so-called forced content like 
unskippable movie trailers and antipiracy warnings. A final DRM-related category was 
the á la carte selection category in which 3.6% of respondents indicated a wish to have 
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more control over their purchases. Most often this worked out as a desire to purchase 
singles or episodes rather than complete albums or series.  
All of the categories mentioned thus far could conceivably be explained by the 
market imperfection interpretation of file-sharing. However, there were a number of 
responses which transcend such a framing of file-sharing. A fairly significant portion of 
responses (16.8%) referenced political motivations for using peer-to-peer systems. Many 
of these respondents cited RIAA and MPAA litigation targeting file-sharers and peer-to-
peer systems and a desire to boycott these groups while still enjoying their content. 
Respondents often argued that artists don‘t get their fair share in payment from the 
recording industry anyway so there was little incentive to make purchases through 
authorized services. A small portion of respondents (1.7%) stated that their use of peer-
to-peer systems had been conditioned by previous experience with previous peer-to-peer 
systems. That is to say they used peer-to-peer systems simply because it was what they 
were used to. An explicit desire to share content was also cited by 8.7% of respondents 
as a motivation. The mantra for this group was the familiar sharing is caring. 
Respondents spoke of their enjoyment of the community of file-sharers, their delight in 
teaching and helping others in various peer-to-peer forums, the inherent naturalness of 
sharing among humans, and the pleasure derived from sharing cultural artifacts with 
friends, families, and strangers. Still other respondents (6.7%) cited the discovery of new 
content as a motivation. These respondents often linked this discovery process back to the 
social aspects sharing which they argued was a more effective means of distribution for 
content than marketing or advertising. And finally, a small number of respondents (0.8%) 
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cited a desire to utilize peer-to-peer systems to share public domain, open source, and 
Creative Commons content. This second group of motivations begins to reveal a social 
dimension to file-sharing which is simply lost or obscured by analyses which frame the 
phenomenon either as criminal behavior or as a missing market. In sum, all of these 
categories point to the structural dimension of domination because they all hinge on 
access to some degree. They reveal the fundamental antagonism produced by the class 
divisions of capitalist society. Those who are excluded from control over resources by the 
institutions of private property seek out alternative means with which to access those 
resources. In this sense peer-to-peer file-sharing produces a more efficient distribution of 
resources among those people who have been commonly impeded in one way or another 
in their access to informational and cultural goods.   
Question 2: When Do You Own Music?  What Should You Be Able To Do With It 
When You Own It? 
This particular question is actually comprised of two separate but related 
questions. Both questions required respondents to consider what constitutes a property 
right in music. The emphasis of the first question is on the establishment of a right(s). By 
asking them when they own music, respondents were to consider the conditions which 
must be met in order to gain access to a music commodity. Oftentimes this involves 
giving up one thing in order to gain something else. The emphasis of the second question 
was on the exercise of a right(s). Respondents were to consider what types of activities or 
uses should be encompassed by the property right which they have acquired. These 
questions were asked together in order to give respondents the opportunity to explore the 
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relationship between the conditions and the exercise of property rights in music. 
Unsurprisingly, this approach resulted in disparate and complex responses making 
systematic analysis somewhat difficult. Some respondents chose to answer one question 
and not the other. I received 327 responses to Question 2 and organized the responses 
into Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Table 7.6 concerns the establishment of property rights in music 
while Table 7.7 focuses on the enumeration of desired rights. 
Table 7.6: When Do You Own Music? 
When Do You Own Music? (n = 327)   
Circumstance Number Percentage 
Contingent on payment 143 43.7 
Contingent on noncommercial use 58 17.7 
Contingent on possession 41 12.5 
Contingent on creative authorship 18 5.5 
Contingent on attribution 17 5.2 
Contingent on no mass sharing 9 2.8 
Ownership of music is not possible 58 17.7 
 
A very large percentage of respondents (43.7%) indicated that they felt like 
property rights in music were contingent upon payment being made. Many of these 
respondents were careful to note that the exchange of money only resulted in the 
acquisition of a copy of the song and not a right to the song itself. A smaller portion of 
responses (12.5%) indicated that ownership was contingent on possession regardless of 
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how it was acquired. This could include music acquired either through sharing or 
payment.  Music streaming services were singled out by respondents as precluding the 
establishment of any feasible property rights in music. Many responses (17.7%) simply 
ruled out the possibility of the establishment of property rights in music on existential 
grounds. These responses typically asserted that no one can own music (or conversely, 
music is owned by everyone). A significant portion of respondents (17.7%) indicated that 
their property right(s) in music were contingent upon noncommercial use. That is to say 
there was a concern among these respondents that ownership of a copy of a song should 
not include the right to profit from that copy in any way. A preoccupation with 
noncommercial use was a recurring theme. In part, this was because noncommercial use 
is a way for file-sharers to frame their own activities when defending the practice. 
Another portion of responses (5.2%) asserted that a property right in music was 
contingent upon always giving the artist attribution. Some of these responses indicated 
that it was a transgression of sorts to attempt to pass off an artist‘s work as your own. A 
small percentage of responses (2.752%) indicated that the establishment of a property 
right did not include the right to indiscriminately share a song(s) with others. Responses 
in this category spoke of the necessity of preserving the distribution rights of artists for 
economic incentive. Interestingly, 5.5% of responses asserted that no property rights in 
music existed apart from the artist or composer. These responses did not make explicit 
mention of the idea-expression found in intellectual property law but instead emphasized 
the act of creative authorship as the keystone of property in music. These responses 
generally fall within the structural dimension of legitimation as they help to establish the 
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social norms and values among file-sharers which inform their particular 
conceptualizations of property in music. Overall these responses indicate a healthy 
respect among file-sharers for the moral rights of authors of creative works. Moreover, a 
very high number of respondents (43.7%) indicated that payment was a stipulation of 
ownership, again lending credence to the notion that file-sharers are not explicitly 
rejecting commodity exchange. Though it is also significant that a sizeable portion of 
respondents (17.7%) rejected the notion of property in music altogether. 
Table 7.7: What Does Ownership of Music Entail? 
What Does Ownership of Music Entail? (n = 327)   
Rights Number Percentage 
Format-Shifting 106 32.4 
Sharing with close social ties 45 13.8 
Unlimited rights 44 13.5 
Sharing with no qualification 42 12.8 
Remix/edit 41 12.5 
On-demand playback 26 8.0 
Public performance 13 4.0 
Resell original copy 9 2.8 
Access in perpetuity 4 1.2 
Sell remixes 3 0.9 
Commercial use 1 0.3 
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In answering the second question, respondents petitioned for a number of rights to 
be encapsulated by ownership. Interestingly, only 12.8% of responses indicated a demand 
for unlimited rights as part of music ownership. However, this category included a 
substantial number of the do whatever I want with it variety of responses, which in all 
likelihood does not constitute a call for truly unlimited rights, but rather is probably 
indicative of a careless response. A substantial portion of responses (32.4%) indicated 
that ownership should entail the ability to format-shift. These respondents expressed a 
desire to move songs across devices for mobility and back-up storage. Similarly, 8.0% of 
responses indicated that ownership should entail on-demand playback. These respondents 
wanted the ability to play songs as many times as they desired and whenever they 
desired. Both of these categories indicate that many file-sharers view DRM as antithetical 
to ownership. Perspectives on sharing and ownership varied. The percentage of responses 
indicating that sharing was okay as long as it was done with friends, family, and 
associates (13.8%) slightly outnumbered the responses which advocated for 
indiscriminate sharing as a part of ownership (12.8%). This may be related in some way 
to the growing popularity of private tracker sites. A related category of responses (4.0%) 
included those that indicated the public use of music at parties, clubs, or businesses 
should come with ownership. A fair number of responses (12.5%) mentioned remixes, 
mash-ups, and other edits as a component of property rights. Typically, these also 
registered a desire to use YouTube or other form of Internet delivery to post the 
transformed content. A very small percentage of responses (0.9%) specified that owners 
should also be able to sell these derivative works. And finally, a very small portion of 
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respondents (1.2%) indicated that property should entail a permanent right of access to 
the content. In other words, these respondents felt like they should only have to pay once 
for content even if formats should change or their owned copy become corrupt. 
Interestingly, only one respondent out of 327 expressed a desire to make commercial use 
of the original copy of the music by reselling copies. These responses speak more to the 
structural dimension of domination than they do to legitimation because they reflect the 
terms by which file-sharers want control over resources. Generally speaking, these 
responses indicate that file-sharers want a more active-engagement with cultural 
artifacts—many want to play them wherever and whenever they want; some want to edit 
and rearrange songs; and substantial numbers want the freedom to share these songs with 
others in a noncommercial way. It is certainly indicative of resistance to an industry 
which is determined to extract rents from every conceivable usage. 
Question 3: What Are The Reasons For Having Copyright Law? What Function 
Does It Serve? Are There Any Changes You Would Make To Copyright Law? 
Question 3 is actually a bundle of questions designed to elicit a discourse on the 
subject of copyright. Here I am concerned with exploring the structural dimensions of 
legitimation and signification. These shared beliefs and values condition how the peer-to-
peer file-sharing community confronts copyright law. These unifying themes take on real 
significance when one considers both the extent of the practice of file-sharing in the 
general population and the recursive relationship between law and social/cultural 
practices. In this light respondents were asked to consider both the current role of 
copyright law in society and the types of reforms they would like to see reflected in the 
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law. Because respondents come from many nations with diverse copyright traditions and 
because of the complexity of the responses I received, I did not attempt to organize the 
responses based on percentages. Instead, I identified a number of themes and provided 
examples of responses which typify each. I begin first with those responses commenting 
on the role of copyright law before moving on to those responses pertaining to reforms. 
 Generally speaking, respondents demonstrated a heightened awareness of the 
political economy of copyright law. Their understanding of how copyright law functioned 
across different national contexts was fairly sophisticated. Most respondents expressed 
some dissatisfaction with the current state of copyright laws. Only a handful of 
respondents did not. One such respondent was an 18 year old U.S. college student and 
file-sharer who commented: 
It‘s completely necessary to a free market. Without property rights, the capitalist 
system simply wouldn't function…Without copyrights, patents, this sort of 
protection, artists and inventors wouldn't be compensated for the art they produce, 
and thus, wouldn't produce so much of it. Copyrights are fine as they are right 
now. I just disagree with how the industry distributes their media. 
However, it was more common for respondents to engage in a critique of the status quo. 
Many of these responses obliquely referenced the so-called the balance of copyright law 
as part of the critique. For example, a 35 year old IT professor and file-sharer from the 
U.K. explained: 
The copyright law should create a short-term, artificial monopoly on copying and 
distribution of works in exchange for the works being released to the public 
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domain once that term is finished. It serves the purpose of creating an incentive to 
continuously create valuable works. 
Alternately, a 25 year old programmer and file-sharer commented on U.S. copyright law: 
The reason is the same as for having patent law: to make creativity (a.k.a. 
innovation) a viable livelihood. They both still serve that purpose. The problem is 
they do it too well, at the cost of denying people the freedom of doing what 
intelligent organisms do as a matter of biology: mimic/reproduce/copy ideas from 
which they get enjoyment/benefit. The Founding Fathers understood that 
copyright amounted to an exception placed upon liberty. They judged the 
copyright terms of that time to be a necessary evil for achieving the goal of 
having art (broadly construed) be a viable profession. The first Congress would've 
arguably been the most free of business influence and they thought [14] years was 
appropriate. If anything, copyright terms should have decreased over time as 
technology has allowed artists to be supported by larger and larger numbers of 
people at disproportionately low cost. The term of the infringement of liberty 
necessary to make art a viable livelihood has fallen through the floor. Yet in terms 
of the law, what has happened instead is precisely one of the possible outcomes 
they generally feared, factions gradually coming to have more influence on 
Congress than any realistic group of intelligent citizens. 
Some respondents similarly felt that the duration of copyright protection was too 
long. This critique of the length of copyright terms was echoed by a 35 year old French 
file-sharer who stated: 
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The original reason for the copyright law was to grant a momentary monopoly to 
give an incentive to create. Now, the function it serves is essentially (and almost 
uniquely) to give insanely long monopolies to big corporate structures, to create a 
new kind of scarcity. 
Other respondents identified the expanded duration of copyright protections with 
the protection of an outdated industrial model of information production. One 20 year old 
U.S. student and file-sharer responded that ―Copyright laws' only purpose is to prop up 
an old-fashioned, outdated industry (recording/movies).‖ Similarly a 26 year old Swedish 
IT developer and file-sharer commented on the social and economic inefficiencies 
produced by copyright: 
In practice it is an [effective] way to limit supply and keep their monetary gains. It 
keeps the public as consumers and companies as providers, and draws the line 
very strongly between them. The [publishers] are the real winners, the artists and 
the public are the losers. Copyright serves as a limiter of competition. 
A number of respondents similarly linked the imbalance of copyright protections 
to a diminished public domain and a lack of innovation. There was a sense that 
technological development and copyright law were moving in opposite directions. As a 
20 year old student and file-sharer from Denmark succinctly put it: ―Original reason for 
copyright law: HELPING innovation. Function it serves now: DESTROYING 
innovation.‖ 
 Respondents offered a number of well-considered amendments to existing 
copyright law. There were many calls for a simple rollback of the duration of 
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contemporary copyright terms. There were also a number of proposals for expanding the 
scope of fair use—particularly as it might pertain to format-shifting and on-demand 
access. Still others argued that copyright law should only be enforced with respect to 
commercial distribution and that sharing should be exempt so long as no money was 
exchanged. A 26 year old engineer and file-sharer from Brazil commented that ―If I were 
to change anything I'd remove any restrictions against sharing and reproducing for 
private [and non-profit] use.‖ A 28 year old physician and file-sharer from Cyprus 
advocated for a compulsory licensing system for consumers of music in which music 
would be distributed freely among people who paid a fixed fee. In a similar vein, other 
respondents pointed to the ideas coming out of the copyleft movement in which copyright 
holders use licensing arrangements to surrender a portion of their rights in the interest of 
facilitating the creation of derivative works. Still others considered more radical changes 
in the copyright system. A 16 year old student and file-sharer from Canada cautioned that 
―To change this approach would require a radical shift in the western mentality, and a 
distancing from capitalism.‖ This sentiment was echoed by a 25 year old technical 
services manager and file-sharer also from Canada who commented: 
This is a much deeper discussion, so in short I think the purpose of a copyright 
law is based off our current way of viewing/handling things. I would argue that 
our current ways of life are not necessarily 100% "right" and therefore the laws 
based off it are also "wrong". 
Or as a 29 year old academic and file-sharer from the U.S. put it with decidedly more 
flare: 
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[Copyright] is the product of a capitalist world view where cooperation and 
consideration of common good only occurs through coercion. It is a boot 
stomping down on humanity; blocking the conduits through which human culture 
may become enlightened. 
 These responses demonstrate a range of opinions on the way forward. There are 
numerous ideas about possible copyright reforms. Rollbacks in the duration of protection 
afforded to copyright owners, protections for format-shifting, on-demand access, and 
noncommercial sharing, compulsory licensing systems—even the complete abolishment 
of copyright law. However, there was considerably less variation with respect to the 
function of contemporary copyright regimes. Most respondents saw copyright as working 
disproportionately to the advantage of large corporations at the public‘s expense. 
Although these results were not altogether unexpected from a sample of file-sharers, their 
understanding of the political economy of copyright law is notable. 
Question 4: How Should Musicians Feel About Peer-To-Peer File-Sharing? 
Question 4 gave respondents a chance to voice their opinion on the relation 
between musicians and peer-to-peer file-sharing. The intent was to discover whether or 
not file-shares identified with musicians and perhaps identified with their exploitation by 
the music industry. Do file-sharers distinguish between industry and musicians? Are file-
sharers concerned with the welfare of musicians or the effects of their practices on 
musicians‘ livelihood? I organized 293 responses into five categories presented in Table 
7.8. 
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Table 7.8: How Should Musicians Feel About File-Sharing? 
How Should Musicians Feel About File-Sharing? (n = 293)   
Response Number Percentage 
Tool for promotion and distribution 218 74.4 
Indicator of fan approval 58 19.8 
Lost sales in general 24 8.2 
Lost sales for established or celebrity musicians and major labels 19 6.5 
Tool for leveraging donations 18 6.1 
  
An overwhelming majority of respondents (74.4%) indicated that musicians 
should welcome the advent of peer-to-peer file-sharing as a new platform for the 
promotion and distribution of their music. Respondents referred to the decentralized 
nature of peer-to-peer and its potential democratizing effect for smaller and independent 
artists who are now able to bypass the record companies. Others (6.1%) pointed to the 
prospect of using file-sharing as a tool for securing donations from fans. In this sense, 
peer-to-peer was seen, alongside digital audio workstations and cheap personal 
computers, as one in a suite of new tools allowing artists to take advantage of new 
opportunities for dramatically lowered fixed and marginal costs. A 40 year old Canadian 
file-sharer commented: 
They should see it as the best way to promote their music. Contrary to their agent 
and their music studio, P2P does not steal money from the artist. Artists have to 
realize that they no longer have a need for music industry executives. They can 
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promote their work on their own using the power of the internet. For example, 
Maria Aragon, [a] 10 year old with a YouTube account became an instant star! 
Same for Justin Bieber and Grayson Chance. If a kid can do it, anyone can! 
Similarly a 20 year old file-sharer and student from the Netherlands commented on the 
new opportunities for up-and-coming artists: 
As a musician, I feel that file-sharing is the ultimate goal of your work. As an 
artist, you are creating something either for your own enjoyment, or to see others 
enjoying it, and either way, you benefit from file-sharing. You're getting [your] 
name out there, thus more people will buy your releases, thus you will sell out 
more shows. Piracy is unstoppable without converting to a police state, so you 
may as well adjust. Piracy is not theft, it's promotion. The music industry hypes 
"stars" they themselves have created, but for proper artists piracy is the way to the 
top.  As a musician and producer I have released almost all my work online for 
free. This way I have established a fan base and by selling extended, higher 
quality versions of some of the releases, and by giving the opportunity to donate, I 
can more than break even. No one says a musician should be rich, if I would quit 
college and full time tour and work in the studio, I could easily live off it, and 
that's all one can ask for. 
Likewise a 42 year old studio technician and file-sharer from the U.K. explained: 
Speaking as someone in the music industry, I say they shouldn't mind at all—
providing it's a half-decent copy, it's just good exposure. Every sale made today is 
made by someone who either knows how to download high-quality pirate copies 
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of their music for free, or knows someone who can show them how. With very 
few exceptions, music consumers don't buy because they have to, they buy 
because they want to support the artist. Every track purchased is money they gave 
to the artist purely out of love for their music. Digital distribution (legal or 
otherwise) hurts the recording-industry's already-irretrievably-broken model of 
making fans buy 13 tracks on a CD to get the one song that they actually want –
but that's already a dead marketing strategy, regardless of file-sharing. File-
sharing cannot hurt musicians. If anything, an individual's engagement with a 
music-piracy site creates a much greater sense of community-motivated 
engagement with music and with artists in general. In the wider view, as someone 
who gets regular cheques from the PRS, I believe it's quite likely that most artists 
are now almost certainly earning more from piracy than from almost any other 
means of promotion. 
A substantial portion of respondents (19.8%) indicated that file-sharing was a marker of 
fan approval for artists. That is to say musicians should see file-sharing as a type of 
adulation. For example, a 20 year old student and file-sharer from the Middle East 
asserted that ―[Musicians] should feel great that somebody bothered to actually search 
their music so they could listen and enjoy it.‖ This sentiment was echoed by a 22 year old 
minimum wage earner and file-sharer from the U.S. who observed ―They should feel at 
least a little good that someone went out of their way to break a law to listen to their 
creations, especially since it is easy for some to be tracked and prosecuted for it.‖ 
Additionally, the potential for peer-to-peer file-sharing to be used as part of a new 
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business model based on donations was mentioned in 6.1% of responses. For example, a 
19 year old electrical engineering student from Australia commented ―What I would want 
is for every musician to have a donation website so that anyone who has downloaded 
their music and likes it can donate money to them directly instead of buying their album.‖ 
However, not all respondents were as optimistic in their assessments of the 
relationship between musicians and file-sharing. A portion of responses (8.2%) indicated 
some concern that peer-to-peer file-sharing could potentially result in lost sales for 
artists. As one 19 year old student and file-sharer from Bangladesh replied, ―[They 
should feel] threatened. I don't see how they can embrace it unless they're willing to give 
their stuff away for free.‖ Interestingly though, another portion of responses (6.5%) made 
the distinction that establishment artists would be more negatively impacted by file-
sharing because of their reliance on outmoded business models. A 24 year old 
unemployed file-sharer from the U.K. explained: 
Seems to depend on whether they‘ve already made it or not. The old successful 
artists seem to quite dislike it, seeing as they‘re so well established and well-
known already they have no need to harness the insane promotional potential of 
music filesharing. I think they also tend to be up in the inner circle with the record 
companies as it were and so [they] get roped into anti-filesharing campaigns quite 
a lot. Up-and-coming artists or even aspiring up-and-coming artists will from now 
on live or die by how they use p2p as a promotional tool. They simply cannot 
afford not to do this now if they ever want to get known outside their 
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hometown….Eventually a majority of artists should be 'self-publishing' and not 
signed to some record company. 
 These responses indicate that file-sharers are fairly uniform in their perception 
that peer-to-peer systems afford a greater number of musicians more opportunities than 
the previous models championed by the recording industry. Rather than a threat to 
musicians‘ livelihoods, file-sharers seem to view their own activities as a form of free 
labor in the service of promoting and distributing the artists they love. As a 25 year old 
software developer and file-sharer from Russia put it when asked how musicians should 
feel about peer-to-peer file-sharing, ―The same way flowers feel about bees.‖ 
QUESTION 5: DO YOU THINK THE MAJOR RECORD LABELS OR THE RIAA ARE 
CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF EITHER MUSICIANS OR MUSIC FANS? 
The purpose of this question was to explore the structural dimension of 
signification by giving respondents a forum to express their views about an industry 
which has singled them out specifically for legal action. If the conflict with the industry 
has resulted in a relatively uniform sentiment among file-sharers, then resistance itself 
becomes a resource for file-sharers as they derive social cohesion through ascribing 
similar meanings to the conflict with the industry. Given the international character of the 
sample, the question would have been better worded had it not limited the focus primarily 
to the RIAA. Nevertheless, I received 278 responses to this question. Even though I 
anticipated a strong response by file-sharers with respect to the RIAA‘s treatment of 
music fans, I was struck by the fact that respondents overwhelmingly viewed the RIAA 
as unconcerned with the welfare of musicians. In fact, not a single respondent made a 
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strong case in the affirmative on either point. Where respondents were willing to 
acknowledge concern by the record labels or the RIAA, it was always contingent on a 
concern for their own economic well-being. For example, a 22 year old U.S. soldier and 
file-sharer stated: 
Whether or not the listed groups are concerned about the welfare of musicians is 
debatable—the RIAA does put a great deal of time, effort, and capital behind 
fighting for the rights of musicians, however the record labels tend to focus on 
making money, often at the expense of the artists and the overall quality of the 
music.     
One of the more generous characterizations of the industry came from a 25 year old 
student and file-sharer from the Czech Republic who answered: 
Well, yes. They have to treat musicians good to make good music. Can it be 
better? You bet. But I don't think they're treating musicians bad. They can give 
them more money, sure.  And [the] RIAA should give them money from [the] 
lawsuits –as far as I know it's not happening. And about fans - my feelings are 
somewhere in the middle. 
The fact that none of the money received by the RIAA during the litigation campaign 
found its way into the hands of musicians was a recurring theme. A 21 year old student 
and file-sharer from Canada commented: 
In all cases where restitution or levies are collected by the RIAA or similar 
organizations, where the money is supposed to be distributed to the artists, it has 
been continuously fed into the bureaucracy. The RIAA doesn't care about the 
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artists; they feed them a pittance and treat them like shit. The RIAA treats its 
customers like criminals. 
Some responses emphasized the general economic exploitation of musicians 
under the RIAA and major labels as evidence that the industry does not have musicians‘ 
best interests at heart. A 23 year old student and file-sharer from the U.S. typified this 
sentiment by stating ―I doubt they are concerned about the welfare of musicians, 
otherwise they would pay those musicians much more than the minuscule percentage 
which I have heard they do.‖ A 25 year old file-sharer in Bangladesh agreed: ―No, they 
are not concerned with the welfare of musicians; the fact that musicians receive less than 
10% of the cost of a physical album, and the existence of 'mass-production' pop music 
confirm it.‖ 
 Predictably, there was little or no sympathy for the industry when it came to the 
treatment of music fans. A 24 year old unemployed file-sharer from the U.K. typified this 
sentiment: 
They don‘t give a rubbery fuck about either. They fuck the majority of their artists 
with contracts better described as indentured servitude, and they are actively 
contemptuous towards their actual customers who they view as nothing but 
walking wallets and not fans who like or even give a shit about what they 
produce. This is the difference between an artist and his record company I feel, 
and why the two must be separated eventually for the cultural common good. 
Suffice it to say, there was an abundance of colorful diatribes against the major 
record labels and the RIAA. The antagonism runs deep. But the anger was directed 
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specifically at the industry—not the musicians. In general, respondents identified with 
musicians. Perhaps this should come as little surprise as music fans are likely to feel 
some personal attachment to the creators of the music which they enjoy. What is 
significant though is that many file-sharers feel that they are on the same side as the 
musicians. In this sense, the free labor of file-sharing is a replacement of an older, less 
efficient mode of centralized distribution. The antagonism with the industry stems in part 
from the impact of lawsuits targeting those individuals caught up in the driftnet. Yet it 
also stems from the recording industry‘s attempts to stop the practice of commoning 
while preserving a less efficient and centralized mode of production and distribution. The 
general feeling among respondents was that the industry demonstrates no concern for the 
welfare of either musicians or fans in its quest to institute highly restrictive forms of 
social interaction. As the above quotation asserts, the artist and the record company must 
be separated for the cultural common good. Alternately a 28 year old engineer and file-
sharer from India offered the analogy of a mother and child: 
A mother‘s child starts walking; she encourages him to walk even though she 
knows that someday the child will be on his own feet and will visit her [only] 
once in a while...She is concerned about [the] child‘s safety even when child is 
taking steps to be away from her but she teaches child how to walk [anyway]. The 
music industry is concerned [that] people will start walking. But instead of 
teaching them, they are trying to cut [their] legs off. 
In the face of a digital music commons, the industry is left with two options: 
assimilation of the commons or destruction of the commons. The RIAA litigation 
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campaign and its progeny represent the latter approach. With respect to the former 
approach, the problem for the RIAA and the major labels is that there may not be a place 
for them. 
Question 6: Do You Consider People Who Share Copyrighted Materials Over Peer-
To-Peer Networks To Be Criminals? Why or Why Not? 
In much the same way as the previous two questions explored the antagonism 
surrounding file-sharing by requiring respondents to consider their relation to musicians 
and the music industry, Question 6 explores the structural dimension of signification by 
asking file-sharers to respond to a negative characterization of their social worth. I 
received 276 responses to this question. A number of respondents (6.2%) were quick to 
point out that copyright has traditionally been a matter of civil not criminal enforcement. 
A small number of respondents (9.1%) admitted that while file-sharing may technically 
run afoul of copyright law, it was a minor offense unworthy of such a serious label. These 
respondents often drew comparisons between file-sharing and minor offenses like 
jaywalking, speeding, running red lights, or an assortment of victimless crimes. An 18 
year old student and file-sharer from Belgium stated: 
Definitely not criminals. Criminals kill people, rob stores, commit fraud, etc. I'd 
place file-sharers on the same level as people who cross a red light. Yes, they 
shouldn't do it, and yes, it's about the law, but then again, you don't really care. 
The damage they cause is rather low and maybe even non-existent and you 
definitely wouldn't call the police if you observed someone doing it. 
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One 39 year old U.S. file-sharer formerly from the music industry felt that it depended on 
the type of content being shared: 
I'd consider people who share, say, cracked software, video games, & movies to 
be more criminal than music file-sharers, as those companies have a lot more 
invested in their projects/artists. 
Respondents sometimes asserted that theft was a poor metaphor used to advance 
the industry‘s argument about lost sales which was flawed due to the likelihood that 
many file-sharers wouldn‘t purchase the content anyway if it weren‘t available for free. 
Another common response (14.9%) emphasized the non-commercial nature of file-
sharing. As long as individual file-sharers were not profiting from their activities, there 
was nothing immoral about it. When asked if they thought the criminal moniker was 
appropriate, a 22 year old student and file-sharer from the U.S. responded: 
No I don't, so long as they aren't making a profit. A criminal gains something by 
doing the crime - what does a file-sharer gain? Nothing that's what. They don't 
lose anything, but they don't gain anything either by sharing files.  It's like sharing 
your bag of candy with a friend, if that bag of candy were bottomless that is. You 
never lose the candy. 
As with the above quotation, the notion of public goods theory and nonrival commodities 
figured prominently in a number of responses (18.8%). These responses argued that theft 
was impossible due to the nonrival nature of the commodities in question. As one 27 year 
old artist and file-sharer from Germany summarized, ―How can I steal something that 
cannot be owned?‖ 
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 Another group of responses (26.1%) emphasized the growing gap between law 
and cultural practices brought on by recent technological developments. The basic 
premise of these responses was that as a majority of the population adopts new methods 
for confronting cultural artifacts, these methods can no longer legitimately be considered 
criminal. A 20 year old software developer and file-sharer in the U.S. asserted: 
Laws are designated by society to curtail behavior that society as a whole frowns 
upon. A criminal breaks the law, but the law had to be first decided upon by 
society. File-sharing is socially acceptable and the laws should change to reflect 
that. If a law in place is such that a significant majority of the population is a 
criminal, then it shouldn't be a law. 
Other respondents took this same critique and framed it in a decidedly more 
political rhetoric arguing that disobedience to a socially unjust law did not constitute a 
crime. As a 20 year old security guard and file-sharer from Canada proclaimed, ―No. It`s 
civil disobedience. We can`t abide by unjust laws. We have a right to information.‖ And 
a 25 year old file-sharer in Bangladesh elaborated on the global dimension of the protest 
against copyright regimes: 
Copyright Law has continued to fail to update fair usage rights for the internet, 
which the global public has been using for at least 2 decades now. The copyright 
holders charge exploitative prices for purchase of their property, which forces the 
once-paying public to peer-to-peer systems both to satiate reasonable demand as 
well as a form of mass civil disobedience and protest. The problem is further 
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exacerbated in developing economies, where a copyrighted work's purchase can 
eliminate entire portions of an average individual's annual income… 
Still other respondents felt that the label of criminal was more appropriately applied to 
the industry and their allies in government. As one 24 year old unemployed file-sharer 
from the U.K. responded: 
As I said I did and I may still have some moral reservations about what I do, had I 
not known that the companies I‘m ripping off are some of the most fucking evil in 
the world. How dare those cocksucking american corporations get the 
cockingsucking american goverment to pressure my goddamn supposedly 
sovereign british government to implement preferential laws on their behalf in 
what can only be described as a rape of the democratic process which millions 
have died to secure for us (going as far as to actually write the goddamn 
legislation and telling our lawmakers to do as their told and pass it). Who the 
FUCK do they think they are? 
 Interestingly, another group of respondents (24.3%) indicated that they felt like 
their actions were, if anything, socially desirable. While the term criminal implies some 
antisocial behavior, these respondents were just as likely to argue that sharing should be 
encouraged. As a 32 year old file-sharer from Belgium imaginatively explained: 
From a religious point of view, I think file-sharing is the modern-day equivalent 
of the miracle Jesus performed with those loaves and fishes (and the one at the 
wedding in Cana, too). I'm pretty sure the fishmongers and bakers (and wine-
sellers) weren't too happy with Jesus "copying" their fish and bread (and wine) 
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and "seeding" it with five thousand people (or with the invitees to the wedding). 
I'm sure they lost a lot of sales (after all, if you want bread you go to the baker, 
you don't just copy a loaf and share it with everyone), and those people did indeed 
get fed without paying.   Why we consider that a miracle and filesharing a crime 
is still beyond me. 
 Ultimately the vast majority of respondents seemed uncomfortable with, if not 
totally opposed to, the criminal label. Their reasons emphasized the unique character of 
information commodities and the poor fit of criminal metaphors. They also saw their 
activities as distinctly noncommercial and therefore not criminal. Respondents also 
pointed to the disproportionality of the reaction to file-sharing relative to serious crimes. 
One 25 year old German file-sharer shared a German word which captures the 
outlandishness of the whole debate: Raubmordkopierer. Roughly translated it means 
burglar-murderer-copier. A 32 year old media manager and file-sharer from Finland 
offered some alternative monikers in lieu of criminal or pirate: trailblazers, pioneers, 
necessary deviants, revolutionaries. 
Question 7: Tell Me About The Actual Practice of File-Sharing. How Do You Learn 
the Necessary Skills To Be a Peer-To-Peer File-Sharer? What Resources Do File-
Sharers Have At Their Disposal? Are There Websites or Other Internet Resources 
Which Provide the Information Necessary To Use Peer-To-Peer Networks 
Effectively? 
The intent of this question is to begin to uncover the structures directly implicated 
in the practice of file-sharing. These systems involve more than the handful of peer-to-
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peer platforms mentioned thus far. File-sharers rely on a range of resources to coordinate 
their file-sharing activities. File-sharers are invited to reveal these resources so that I can 
begin to map the intersecting resources implicated in file-sharing. I received 277 
responses to this question. I have organized the resources mentioned by respondents into 
the five broad categories which follow.  
(1) Common Web Resources 
The most striking aspect of the resources implicated in peer-to-peer file-sharing is 
their abundance and ubiquity. A 45 year old unemployed file-sharer in the U.S. vividly 
explained: 
The tools for peer to peer file-sharing are quite literally everywhere….The 
internet in regard to this matter is like a secluded parking lot and you start looking 
around and you see money just lying around then you see a sign next to the 
parking lot that tells you not to pick up the money because you could be fined 
some big huge amount or spend time in prison. There's the sign but you don't see 
any cops around, and sometimes you see other people walking by and they pick 
up a wad or two of bills and go on their way. Maybe you exercise self control and 
leave the parking lot without picking up any money. You wander around some 
more and find more and more places just littered with money, but there are these 
annoying signs saying not to pick it up. How long is it going to be before you pick 
up some of that money just to see what happens if for no other reason? Because 
you can wander around this place for years and keep coming across all this money 
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lying around and the only thing that says that it can't be yours are those signs. 
That is about how easy file-sharing on the internet is. 
 Many respondents indicated that the learning curve associated with file-sharing is 
negligible. File-sharing applications have become increasingly easy to use and there 
exists a wealth of readily available online tutorials. A mantra common among 
respondents was Google is your friend. A working knowledge of Google‘s search engine 
is all that‘s required to learn the ins-and-outs of file-sharing. Sites like YouTube and 
Wikipedia were cited by a number of respondents as good sources for tutorials and 
general file-sharing information, as were the FAQs provided by many peer-to-peer 
application developers on their own websites. All in all, there are no high barriers to entry 
into the world of peer-to-peer file-sharing. 
(2) General Tracker and Index Sites 
In comparison to previous generations of file-sharing applications, BitTorrent 
users are saddled with the additional chore of figuring out how to locate torrent files. Yet 
here too there are abundant resources available to file-sharers. Torrent indexes are 
maintained by a number of websites for file-sharers to search through. Indexing is not to 
be confused with tracking. Recall that tracker websites facilitate communication between 
peers attempting to access a torrent. In practice though, many websites function as both 
BitTorrent indexes and trackers. There are an abundance of BitTorrent tracker/index sites 
helping to coordinate file-sharing activities. The Swedish website The Pirate Bay is a 
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well-known example of a BitTorrent index.
88
 The previously discussed isoHunt is also a 
familiar BitTorrent tracker. Demonoid is another celebrated BitTorrent tracker founded 
by an anonymous Serbian file-sharer. Many of these websites provide users with a 
number of extra resources including IRC channels dedicated to file-sharing topics, private 
messaging, search-based RSS feeds, and discussion forums. File-sharers can locate many 
of these sites using a reference site like www.torrentresource.com which maintains a 
large list of torrent websites. 
(3) Dedicated Peer-to-Peer Forums 
In addition to the discussion forums provided through BitTorrent tracker and 
index sites, there are a number of websites dedicated to the topic of file-sharing. These 
sites provide discussion forums, news articles, editorials, and tutorials, all dedicated to 
the topic of file-sharing. Zeropaid.com is a website launched in 2000 that provides news 
and discussion forums as well as a host of software applications to assist users in 
everything from playback to format-shifting. Also launched in 2000 is Slyck.com, 
another website dedicated to file-sharing which provides news, reviews, editorials, and a 
discussion forum. p2pnet.net is a news website dedicated to covering stories involving 
peer-to-peer file-sharing. I asked Jon Newton, the founder of p2pnet.net, about the site‘s 
inception. Newton (personal communication, December 28, 2010) explained: 
I started p2pnet.net as a music (not file) sharing site, with MIDI (Musical 
Instrument Digital Interface) as the medium. The idea? Post mp3s (or other 
                                                 
88 At one time The Pirate Bay functioned also as a tracker, but the site discontinued those services in late 
2009 (Mennecke, 2009, November 17). 
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formats) of music under a Creative Commons license so other people could hear 
it. MIDI files are tiny so you can email them to someone else who can add a lead 
guitar line, say, or maybe improvise on the keyboard section. That person can 
then email the new version to someone else, and so on. Or if you'd made an mp3, 
someone else could add to it, record the results and pass it on. Then mix it. And 
jam to it. Do whatever you want with it. Except use it for commercial purposes 
without prior agreement. That was in 2002 and a lot of stuff that's routine now 
hadn't happened back then. Then I got interested in the way Vivendi Universal, 
EMI, Warner Music and Sony Music were screwing their own customers and 
p2pnet went way off topic and became a digital news and advocacy site. 
TorrentFreak.com is another popular example of a dedicated peer-to-peer forum. 
Started in 2005, TorrentFreak is a blog dedicated to providing news, tutorials, and other 
useful information for file-sharers. I also asked TorrentFreak‘s founder, who goes by the 
alias Ernesto Van Der Sar, about the site‘s beginnings. Ernesto (personal communication, 
December 9, 2010) explained: 
TorrentFreak was started in 2005 as a weblog where I intended to share some tips 
and tricks on how to use BitTorrent. In the months that followed I started to focus 
more on writing short news items related to file-sharing and BitTorrent. In the 
years that followed the weblog slowly turned into one of the most authoritative 
news sources on file-sharing and copyright issues. The focus of our articles has 
always been on providing fresh news or a unique analysis of current events and I 
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believe this attracts both file-sharing users and followers of the digital copyright 
debate. 
(4) Anonymity 
File-sharers use a variety of resources to mask their activities. For example, many 
file-sharers funnel their Internet traffic through a different IP address by using a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) service, effectively hiding their activity.  VPN services work 
over the Internet and encrypt information between two networked devices which are not 
on the same private network, obscuring their transmissions from intermediate networks. 
File-shares also often use seedboxes to hide their activities. A seedbox is a private 
dedicated server that allows file-sharers to remotely control a peer-to-peer client for 
uploading and downloading. Once the seedbox has acquired a file, the user can then 
download it using a secure FTP connection. File-sharers may also access the distributed 
overlay network known as Tor to mask their activities. Tor uses a client application and a 
network of servers utilizing multiple layers of encryption to thwart attempts at traffic 
analysis. VPNs, seedboxes, and Tor are all used by file-shares in an attempt to conceal 
their IP address in swarm downloads with varying degrees of success. One last 
anonymizing application cited by a number of respondents is the open source program 
PeerBlock. This software functions to block packets originating from a list of host 
addresses. The lists are frequently updated and include suspected hosts for Internet 
snoops and the media industry‘s copyright trolls. 
 351 
(5) Private Tracker and Index Sites 
Private trackers are BitTorrent trackers which restrict their use to members who 
have registered with the site, most often through an invite-only system. Most of these 
sites enforce some minimum upload-to-download ratio while offering higher access 
speeds, more vibrant communities, and safer downloads. Private sites are in some sense 
an evolution of public tracker sites as BitTorrent users adapt to increased threat levels. A 
21 year old student and file-sharer from the U.S. explained: 
Private torrent sites…are places where many people with similar interests gather, 
and someone who wants to can quickly learn how it works, and how to follow the 
quality control rules. Such torrent sites are basically libraries of media (whether it 
be music, movies, or TV shows), with better quality and organization, and more 
choices of content and format, than any existing store, online or physical. 
One of the first private sites was Oink.cd which was established in 2004 before 
being shut down in 2007 by British and Dutch authorities following an investigation by 
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) (Phan, 2007, October 
26). The site‘s closure made little difference however. On the same day Oink was closed 
another popular private tracker dedicated to music, What.cd, was founded. Today there 
are numerous private tracker sites dedicated to a variety of content types. For example, 
www.thebox.bz is dedicated to British television shows, www.blackcats-games.net is 
dedicated to games, and www.bakabt.com is dedicated to amine. The role of private 
trackers is increasingly central to coordination of file-sharing activity and to the sense of 
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community among file-sharers. As a 24 year old unemployed file-sharer in the U.K 
revealed: 
What I and a lot of people like I think is the sense of community and the social 
aspect to the whole thing. You can go on what.cd and discuss your favorite band 
with other fans who will also help you with technical stuff. Or you can go to 
iTunes and get reamed for 99 pence per track and be made to feel that you‘re a 
mindless cog in a consumerist machine handing the money over to a faceless 
monolith of a company who doesn‘t give a shit about how you feel about the 
band.    The social aspect to the whole p2p scene is a very important part I think, 
perhaps one of the main driving forces behind it in fact. 
In general, respondents revealed a variety of web-based resources in addition to 
the peer-to-peer client application which they use to coordinate their activities. Some of 
these resources function primarily as a decentralized appendage of the file-sharing 
application, allowing users to locate and access content. Other resources help users 
conceal their activities from prying eyes. And still other resources keep the community of 
file-sharers up-to-date on any number of social and technological developments. 
Question 8: Is There a Community of Peer-To-Peer File-Sharers? If So, What 
Evidence Is There of Its Existence and What Do You Think Holds It Together? If 
You Do Not Think There Is a Community of Peer-To-Peer File-Sharers, Please Tell 
Me Why You Feel That Way. 
Here respondents are invited to further consider the social aspects of file-sharing. 
There was no formal definition of community provided for survey participants as the 
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intent was not to arrive at some generalizable conclusion. Instead, this question is in 
keeping with the previous question to some extent in that it continues the exploration of 
the social structures implicated in peer-to-peer file-sharing. I received 267 responses to 
Question 8—out of which only 15 (5.6%) definitively ruled out the possibility of a 
community of peer-to-peer file-sharers. For example, a 40 year old self-employed file-
sharer from Canada dismissed the notion of community by invoking BitTorrent‘s 
structural coercion to enforce sharing: 
There is no community per say as all those file-sharers don't know each other. 
They are just random people who want the same thing. Sharing happens most of 
the time by obligation. [BitTorrent] will share the pieces you have while you 
download other pieces. You really don't have a choice. 
However, other respondents looked beyond the immediate functions of the 
BitTorrent clients. For example, a 32 year old student and file-sharer from Germany 
commented: 
There certainly is a community of people talking about this and being active, even 
politically active, that are in some way interconnected. But the actual file-sharing 
is mostly done by people who do engage in common communal activities. They 
mostly don't even know each other. Their only interaction is in the practice of file-
sharing itself. But this practice has all the hallmarks of social structure. It has 
clear roles: seeders and leechers, to use torrent terminology, administrators of 
boards or servers, and the people who write the software. It has norms that are 
enforced, often focused on keeping out people who only leech without 
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contributing, but often also general rules of etiquette. It has the awarding of social 
status for people who share a lot or who introduce certain desired content into a 
particular group. Which already makes the second point: The file-sharing is done 
in more or less selective and exclusive interaction groups, often centered around a 
certain piece of p2p tech or certain kinds of content and those groups certainly 
qualify as communities. 
Some respondents (7.5%) qualified their belief in a community of file-sharers by 
drawing a distinction between active and non-active members. Respondents pointed to 
the hierarchy among leechers, seeders, and release groups. For example, a 21 year old 
filmmaker and file-sharer from the U.S. argued: 
There absolutely is a community. Commenters on Pirate Bay torrent listings or 
TorrentFreak posts are members of the P2P community. Members of forums such 
as Suprbay are members of the P2P community. Members of local Pirate Parties 
are absolutely members of the P2P community as P2P is the entire foundation for 
the Pirate movement. Casual file-sharers who don't get involved in these 
community hubs or don't think very much about the freedom issues surrounding 
by P2P are not necessarily members of the community, but they can be as soon as 
soon as they become active. 
Many respondents (28.5%) were hesitant to speak of a single peer-to-peer file-
sharing community.  Instead, they described it as a collection of a large number of small 
communities. A 42 year old file-sharer from the U.K. responded: 
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"A" community?  No.  There are many, many, many communities of file-sharers, 
all interested in different things.  I know this, because I'm in a number of them 
myself.  We hang out on the 'net and have a laugh or a cheer when times are good 
or a rant or a cry when times are bad.  Same as the rest of civilization, really. 
Similarly a 17 year old student and file-sharer from the U.S. commented: 
…the actual file-sharing occurs in smaller communities. For example, there are 
many private torrent sites have forums and chat rooms to create a community. In 
small sites, community is very important: If someone isn't sharing enough (i.e. has 
a small ratio) they will usually be removed from the community. IRC is another 
great example of where file-sharing communities can prosper. IRC is supports 
chat and file transfers, so it's a perfect place for file-sharers to talk while they 
share files. 
Respondents were also keen to point out that there was considerable variation in 
these smaller communities from forum to forum, site to site, and platform to platform. A 
25 year old file-sharer in the Netherlands explained: 
There are many communities. Each focused around a favorite way of file 
distribution (like usenet, or specific torrent sites) or type of content (for example 
rock music, high-quality copies of movies, or the latest TV shows). Many active 
file-shares will probably belong to at least several of these communities, piecing 
together the parts of his own preferences. 
A number of respondents (28.5%) pointed to the participation in public tracker sites, 
forum discussions, comments and reviews as evidence of community. Still other 
 356 
respondents (16.5%) pointed to the closed groups and private tracker sites with their 
highly regulated social norms as evidence of community. 
Respondents also attributed social cohesion to more artifactual causes. A number 
of respondents (7.5%) argued that particular peer-to-peer systems, methods, distribution 
channels, protocols and tools provided a degree of social cohesion. Other respondents 
(22.5%) argued that particular media content or genres provided the social cohesion 
among group members. For example, a 39 year old file-sharer from the U.S. spoke of a 
private community dedicated to comic books and the dedication of enthusiasts who scan 
and preserve old and obscure comics. A 25 year old technician and file-sharer from the 
U.S. spoke of a file-sharing community known as fansubs who are dedicated to the 
translation of anime. And a 20 year old student and file-sharer from the U.S. spoke of the 
American-based fans of Dr. Who who have no way of accessing the program except 
through their collective efforts as file-sharers. It may be tempting to dismiss the social 
cohesion produced by these shared interests as superficial. However, as a 41 year old 
financial analyst from the U.S. demonstrated, nothing could be further from the truth: 
I know that I regularly visit a "niche" community that provides content based on 
shared interests. As a gay man, the gay p2p community isn't just a community of 
file-sharers, as there is content and discussions related to social and political 
issues. The members of the community are from all over the world, and [are] a 
melting pot of ideas, thought and opinion. The fact that they have gay themed 
films, television shows, and pornography is almost an after thought. Years of 
social and political derision and pressure holds the gay torrent community 
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together. There are large online gay communities all over the web that do not 
have the p2p component, so I don't believe it solely reflects p2p file-sharers. Most 
people in the global gay community remain obsessed with the government 
sanctioned discrimination we experience daily, regardless of whether you live in 
the US or Djibouti. We are horrified that whether you live in Kenya or Egypt that 
you can be executed for who you love, or subjected to corporal punishment for 
self expression. There are kids in Ghana inspired by Glee, and lesbians in Latvia 
livened by episodes of the L Word, and for them p2p file-sharing is the only way 
they can access this content. If one person in our global community can endure 
the oppressive political regimes and bigoted social climate, and finds some 
inspiration from positive role models in films, television episodes, and music that 
these p2p services provide, I say AMEN to that! 
However, can we say that the phenomenon of sharing alone provides the basis for 
social cohesion? Is there an ideology of commoning lurking among some file-sharers? 
Many respondents (22.5%) indicated that an ethos of sharing provided social cohesion 
among file-sharers. Consider the comments of a 26 year old file-sharer from the U.S. who 
stated: 
It is for sure a community. We mostly all share the idea and belief that 
information and ideas cannot and should not be owned by one person. Proof of 
this is that as you can see that many people risk being jailed and fined to share 
this information and ideas with the rest of the community. We all try to help each 
other. 
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Or consider the comments of a 31 year old unemployed Scandinavian file-sharer who 
asserted that: 
A friendly community not run by greed is flowering. The reason why there are so 
many and still around after so many years is people are free to share, free to speak 
their mind. Free to be the person the "real" world will never see. People got an 
online identity that can become more real than their real lives. The respect for 
being a good uploader, a good sharer, a helpful person on the forums, it‘s all 
about freedom, respect and kindness. 
These comments and others speak to the gift economy which undergirds the social 
structure of the peer-to-peer community. The ethic of sharing provides a framework of 
social cohesion on to which a multitude of communities of shared interests can be 
grafted. Or as one unemployed 34 year old Canadian file-sharer put it in a clever play on 
Richard Stallman‘s famous statement, ―There is a community, free—as in beer—holds it 
together.‖ 
 But this tradition of free and decentralized access also occasionally spills out of 
the file-sharing community and manifests as the collective political actions of groups like 
the Piratpartiet or Anonymous. In fact, a small portion of respondents (6.7%) pointed to 
real world political parties like the Pirate Party as strong evidence of community among 
file-sharers. An even larger percentage of respondents (11.2%) argued that antagonism 
felt by file-sharers toward groups like the RIAA and MPAA provided the necessary 
social cohesion for community. In other words, the coercive exercise of power by media 
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trade organizations has been sufficient to constitute file-sharers as a class of people 
actively engaged in struggle. 
Question 9: What Has Been the Effect of the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) Lawsuits Targeting Individual File-Sharers?  
The final question asked respondents to reflect on the impact of file-sharing 
litigation. Again, considering the diversity of the nationalities of survey participants, the 
question would have been better worded had it not emphasized a U.S. trade organization. 
Nevertheless, I received 275 responses, the vast majority of which were well-thought out 
deliberations on the relationship between law and the practice of file-sharing. I organized 
the responses into the six categories which appear in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9: What Has Been the Effect of File-Sharing Litigation? 
What has been the effect of file-sharing litigation? (n = 275)   
Response Number Percentage 
Minimal effect 146 53.1 
Increased antagonism 121 44 
Greater P2P innovation 89 32.4 
Abuse of court resources 45 16.4 
Some limited deterrence 36 13.1 
Missed business opportunity 34 12.4 
Mitigated by pre-established behavior or practices 15 5.5 
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By far the largest category of responses (53.1%) included those which indicated 
that file-sharing litigation had minimal impact. These responses ranged from those which 
asserted no discernable effect at all to those which argued that the litigation had actually 
increased the amount of file-sharing. Futility seemed to be a recurring theme as many 
respondents drew comparisons to the war on drugs. A 22 year old soldier file-sharer from 
the U.S. observed: 
There are, and will forever be, more people sharing files than any litigator, or 
threat of litigation, can hope to target. All the court cases against file-sharers, even 
if counted as one cohesive effort, amount to trying to stop a rainstorm by shooting 
individual drops of water. 
Some indicated that the global dimension of file-sharing also mitigates the ability 
of litigation to influence behaviors in spite of the establishment of a global intellectual 
property regime. For example, a 19 year old student and file-sharer from Bangladesh 
offered: 
…you really can't stop it unless there is a change in the mindset of the population. 
Laws for example work so well in the USA is because the general population 
feels it their duty to follow them and be a good citizen. Whereas in our country, 
no matter what laws and how many police officers you have, the Bangladeshi 
people don't follow laws because they are blatantly crass and don't have it in their 
mindset. You can't stop p2p unless you can convince the general population that it 
is really really bad. 
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Other responses seemed to indicate that as long as there was a demand for better 
terms of access to content, file-sharing would thrive. This category of responses (12.4%) 
emphasized the lost business opportunity on the part of the content industries for not 
embracing file-sharing early on. A 34 year old PC technician and file-sharer from the 
U.S. typified this position in stating: 
When tech changes, the smart thing to do is get in quick and ride the wave, not 
pretend you can stop the raging water. Apple capitalized with iTunes to the 
squealing torment of the distributors because the recording industry is led by 
sloths. 
Or as an 34 year old financial analyst and file-sharer from Australia put it:  
Until something is done to make music/tv/movies—even games—more readily 
available in ALL regions and priced accordingly (e.g. they sell the same thing for 
different amounts in different regions for no good reason), p2p will never end. 
Targeting individuals or groups will not stop the "need" that is there, which is the 
root cause. 
Many respondents (5.5%) also emphasized the futility of litigation in the face of a 
cultural habit of file-sharing taking root among younger generations. For example, a 24 
year old office clerk and file-sharer from the U.K. commented ―[Today‘s] youth when 
older will pirate more as they now believe that data on the net is a free right.‖ And there 
were those respondents who felt like litigation campaigns targeting file-sharing were 
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likely to achieve the exact opposite of their intended effect. A 36 year old programmer 
and file-sharer from Canada observed: 
The [irony] is that the RIAA has single handedly increased the number of people 
in the file-sharing community. In the early days, every PR announcement of a site 
or individual being sued only increased the public awareness of file-sharing in 
general. 
Still, there was a portion of the responses (13.1%) which indicated that the 
litigation likely did deter some number of file-sharers from participating in peer-to-peer 
networks though the number was likely to be small. A 32 year old file-sharer from 
Finland commented: 
Lawsuits won't stop large numbers, but warning letters might: as long as you are 
flying "under the radar" with the illusion that nobody knows, why NOT carry on? 
But even a single letter, with or without the threat or penalties, would make me 
drastically reduce my activities, because of the feeling of "I'm being watched!!!! 
How much can they see and what?" And the same would go for a lot of the non-
hardcore downloaders, especially the children, the older adults, the women. Only 
young adult males would remain in a "fuck it!!!" mode… 
Similarly, another category of responses (16.4%) included those which 
emphasized the abuse of court resources and immediate impact to those caught up in the 
driftnet of lawsuits. For example, a minimum wage earner and file-sharer in the U.S. 
stated: 
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…I would say they've made some people REALLY broke. People they know may 
or may not have continued to download illegally after that, a few might not 
because of the stories, but as it shows, a lot of people still do, obviously don't 
care, and are going to continue to do it until they're slapped on the hand as well. 
 A large portion of the responses (44%) included those which characterized the 
litigation as unjust and asserted that the whole episode had served to deepen the 
antagonism felt toward the industry. As one 22 year old student and file-sharer from the 
U.S. said: 
The effect has been annoyance, disgust and unpopularity. I think at this point they 
could even be more hated than the IRS and their employees. If I were to meet one 
on the street, I would tell them to go to hell and walk away so that I don't do 
something else. If their addresses and phone numbers were ever made public, you 
can bet that they would be harassed nonstop. Nobody fears them. Targeting large 
numbers of file-sharers won't work either, it will just incite the mob and sooner or 
later somebody will do something stupid. I have heard in the times I went into the 
Pirate Bay forums, how much people want to set fire to the RIAA employee 
houses, and how much they want to bomb their headquarters. Would you really 
want to test that? I wouldn't. 
Some respondents indicated that the outrage at the litigation campaign served as a 
resource to strengthen the file-sharing community. As one 22 year old retail worker and 
file-sharer from the U.S. observed: 
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The lawsuits have galvanized file-sharers, and made many people who were not a 
part of this cultural movement more aware of what is happening. The lawsuits 
have not resulted in more music being purchased, but neither have they caused 
less to be sold. I also doubt that many file-sharers have been discouraged from 
their activities. Instead, prominent members of the file-sharing community have 
become politically active in fighting against the industry and their influence. 
The above sentiment was extended by a final category of responses (32.4%) in 
which respondents spoke of the greater levels of peer-to-peer innovation stemming from 
litigation campaigns and other legal attacks. Respondents mentioned better peer-to-peer 
applications, the adoption of new measures to maintain anonymity, and the reliance on 
private tracker sites. For example, a 24 year old student and file-sharer from Canada 
commented on the development of better peer-to-peer platforms in the wake of file-
sharing litigation: 
At the same time, the lawsuits against the companies who produced the software 
needed to share (e.g., Napster, KaZaa, Grokster, LimeWire, etc.) have then 
fostered further innovation and development in new software programs, making 
the RIAA's life more difficult. Peer-to-peer file-sharing has often been compared 
to hydra, an analogy which I think is apt. 
Another file-sharer, a 16 year old from the United Kingdom, offered a detailed 
description of the security measures taken by file-sharers in response to the attacks: 
The effect of busts (raids) against individual file-sharers have only made the file-
sharing scene stronger, using more advanced levels of protection from BNC's 
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(bouncers), FiSH (1060-bit encryption) and using Explicit/Auth TLS SSL 
encryption for any kind of information sent over the internet. So on IRC (internet 
relay chat) you connect to a server using 256-bit SSL encryption and then on top 
of that you set a FiSH key to encrypt anything said over that network, whether it 
is in a channel or a private message (everyone else who is meant to be there will 
know the decryption key (Fish Key), but for people trying to wire tap/sniff the 
network all they will get will be random characters so two levels on encryption is 
necessary to make sure no one who is not meant to know what is being said does 
not. When connecting to a topsite you have an addline, an addline is a setting for 
your account that only lets you connect from a certain IP, or if you are dynamic it 
will be set with wildcards such as 72.123.*.* - all passwords used are different for 
every single thing you log into and are randomly generated 7-21 character 
passwords including symbols, numbers and regular characters  example: bds-
Reyx42kL*v0+Y\_)b  also when connecting to IRC your IP will be hidden with a 
BNC as mentioned above, no one ever goes near any network without hiding it, it 
is obviously your personal identity on the internet.  
The increased reliance on private tracker sites was also cited by numerous respondents as 
a direct result of the targeting of file-sharers. These private tracker sites are an interesting 
counterpoint to the increased reliance on anonymity detailed above the cumulative effect 
of which has been a more decentralized and anonymous file-sharing community with 
emerging pockets of stronger social ties. 
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CONCLUSION 
This survey begins to reveal a more nuanced understanding of file-sharers than 
those offered by previous analyses framed by criminality or market terminology. It is true 
that file-sharers in most legal contexts are violating the law. It is also true that many of 
the complaints enumerated by file-sharers fall within the theoretical field of market 
analysis. Yet it is also true that file-sharers engage in a highly social activity 
characterized not by amorality but by an abiding respect for musicians and each other. It 
is also true that the antagonism produced by the industry‘s attempts to eliminate the 
commons serves as a resource for its constant innovation and vitality. In this sense we 
can also speak of a resistance commons in addition to the various dedicated forums, 
technological tools, and user demands which define the coordinated activity of file-
sharers. 
Contemporary peer-to-peer systems have a long and rich history reaching back to 
the advent of the Internet itself. As social systems they have tremendous explanatory 
power for the trajectory of capitalist development in the sphere of information production 
and distribution. But their study must exceed the lens of both legal and economic 
analysis. The conflict between commoning and commodification is over the social 
surplus of information production, and both sides in this conflict are used to having it 
their way. But the attempt by capital to extinguish the commons created by file-sharers 
has potentially served to deepen the antagonism, driving further peer-to-peer innovation. 
This only makes the paradox of commoning more difficult for the music industry to 
resolve. Having failed to stem the tide of file-sharing, there is no guarantee the music 
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industry can now bring the practice of file-sharing back into the logic of accumulation. 




Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This dissertation has attempted to identify and explain the competing 
conceptualizations of the social relations implicated in the conflict over peer-to-peer file-
sharing. These social relations have been constructed to facilitate either the 
commodification or the commoning of informational and cultural artifacts. Until this 
study, peer-to-peer file-sharing has been analyzed primarily through the lens of 
commodification. Because of this, scholars tend to see the practice of file-sharing as 
some sort of aberration—an unwanted and unforeseen byproduct of the otherwise orderly 
development of technology. Mainstream portrayals of file-sharing have adopted a 
criminality framing to explain these activities. Many politicians and industry 
representatives see file-sharers as pirates or thieves engaged in an unscrupulous 
enterprise to get something for nothing at the cost of denying an income to the producers 
of informational and cultural goods. Relying on specious comparisons to theft in rival 
goods and lost sales, they see in file-sharing evidence of the perverse qualities of 
digitization that imperil ―conventional‖ market dynamics. Alternately, scholars from the 
copyright reformist tradition have largely framed file-sharing as a manifestation of 
missing markets. According to this perspective, file-sharing appears as a market 
imperfection resulting from the content industries‘ failure to produce a market adequate 
to the current technological milieu. Yet the reformist agenda of these scholars and their 
overriding concern with rescuing capitalism from its own crises has resulted in an 
avoidance of serious scholarship on the topic of file-sharing. This explains why 
participatory culture is celebrated by scholars like Lessig (2004) and Benkler (2006) who 
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simultaneously distance themselves from or denigrate the practice of file-sharing as theft. 
And finally political economists working from an orthodox Marxist perspective have 
been hindered by two problematic tendencies. First, having long failed to acknowledge 
the productive role which information plays in the process of accumulation, there is a 
preoccupation with the ideological content of informational and cultural goods. And 
second, to the degree that political economists have now extended their gaze to the 
infiltration of informational and cultural goods into the domestic sphere, the assumed 
capitalist domination over labor in the factory is now seen to encompass the whole of 
society. From this perspective the practice of file-sharing is inevitably co-opted and of 
little threat or concern to the capitalist logic of accumulation.  
While all these perspectives may shed light on the process of commodification, 
they do so at the expense of normalizing the market form and obscuring the defiant and 
creative character of peer-to-peer systems. Despite the mainstream and reformist 
characterizations of peer-to-peer file-sharing as theft, it is not an antisocial behavior—it 
is a richly social and innovative system for the allocation of informational and cultural 
goods among large numbers of people. Nor is it simply an aberration of the market 
playing catch-up with the fast pace of technological development—the market is not the 
only or best choice for the production and distribution of informational and cultural 
goods. In these final pages of the dissertation the significance of the findings of this study 
are summarized and contextualized. First the theoretical approach taken as a part of this 
research project is addressed, with an explanation of why a combination of structuration 
theory and Autonomist Marxism was utilized to explain the conflict over peer-to-peer 
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file-sharing. This summary describes how the practice of file-sharing is an articulation of 
the larger social dynamic of immaterial labor. The relationship between commodification 
and commoning is also further explained. In addition, the concept of class and how it 
relates to both the social systems of commodification and commoning is addressed. This 
is followed by a review of the history of the conflicts over peer-to-peer models with an 
eye to explaining the centrality of class antagonism to these conflicts. Attention is given 
to the ways in which intellectual property law has functioned to facilitate market stability 
at the expense of foreclosing the radical potential of technologies with respect to the 
production and distribution of informational and cultural commodities. This historical 
analysis is then extended to the current conflict over file-sharing as the structural 
dimensions of the RIAA litigation campaign and its offspring are reviewed. These legal 
conflicts were largely restricted to issues of the appropriate and inappropriate usage of 
communication infrastructure and court resources. In order to address the issue of 
appropriate and inappropriate uses of informational and cultural goods the discussion 
then turns to the analysis of the practice of file-sharing itself. The findings of the survey 
of BitTorrent users are reviewed with particular emphasis given to the topics of class 
constitution and the role of the gift economy within file-sharing communities. The 
conclusion ends with a review of the significant contributions of this research project as 
well as a discussion of its limitations and prospects for future research. 
In order to establish a new perspective of file-sharing this study asked: what 
competing conceptualizations of social relations motivate conflicts over peer-to-peer file-
sharing? In answering this question this study utilized a combination of theoretical 
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approaches with the goal of mapping the structures by which the practices of individual 
file-sharers are coordinated into translocal relations. Anthony Giddens‘s (1986) 
structuration theory was used to conceptualize both the practice of law and file-sharing as 
recursive in nature. Structuration theory provided a framework to explore structure along 
the dimensions of signification, domination, and legitimation. Moreover, this theory 
allowed me to analyze commodification and commoning as two separate social systems 
each with its own set of relatively bounded social practices. Autonomist Marxism was 
used primarily to explore the interaction between these two systems and to explain the 
trajectory of capitalist development in the sphere of information production and 
distribution as being conditioned by class antagonism. With regard to the production and 
distribution of music, the social system of commodification has worked to mitigate 
competition among firms, resulting in a small number of wealthy renters and suboptimal 
outcomes in the production and distribution of music goods. The copyright litigation 
campaigns targeting individual file-sharers represent an attempt by the content industries 
to preserve these monopolistic conditions. As one 22 year old student from the United 
States put it in the survey: 
These lawsuits are a tragedy of the commons. The interests of the few are out-
weighing the many. 
Peer-to-peer file-sharing, as an alternative social system which breaks with commodity 
exchange, is capable of achieving more desirable results for a greater number of people 
through the commoning of resources. In this sense file-sharing also represents something 
which transcends class antagonism. This is why structuration theory was integral to this 
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study and not just a mere adjunct to Marxian theory. Structuration theory provided a 
language to analyze the creativity and innovation of file-sharing communities as 
something more than resistance. Structuration theory also afforded a means to analyze 
structural impediments to the litigation campaigns which were not immediately related to 
class struggle (for example the hostility of judges to these campaigns). 
 Although the initial inspiration for this study stemmed from the significance and 
novelty of the RIAA‘s mass litigation campaign, it was immediately apparent that the 
structures which condition file-sharing are not confined to the courtroom. Therefore, this 
research includes analyses of both the litigation and the actual practice of file-sharing as 
well as the points of intersection between the two. With respect to file-sharing litigation 
this study found that the conflict centered primarily on two issues. The initial challenges 
to the RIAA litigation involved the legitimate and illegitimate uses of communications 
infrastructure. ISPs sought to evade liability for the actions of file-sharers while 
simultaneously avoiding having to release customer information which they feared might 
upset their customer base. In addition, the issue of legitimate and illegitimate uses of 
court resources figured prominently as jurists expressed concern about the burden placed 
on federal dockets as well as the tremendous disadvantage and liability endured by 
defendants in these cases. With respect to the structural analysis of file-sharing, this study 
analyzed the practice both in terms of its relation to commodification and as an 
autonomous social arrangement among individuals seeking to establish new terms for 
access to informational and cultural goods. File-sharing was contextualized in relation to 
the political economy of information production and distribution in general and the music 
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industry in particular. File-sharing was presented as one in a long line of conflicts over 
peer-to-peer distribution models. This history was traced from the inception of early peer-
based Internet models of communication to the rise of the client/server model in the 
1990s to the resurgence of peer-to-peer among contemporary file-sharing communities. 
Lazzarato (1996) defined immaterial labor as that labor which produces the 
informational and cultural content of commodities. Hardt and Negri (2006) have argued 
that immaterial labor entails new forms of autonomous cooperative social arrangements 
among people. These new social relations are facilitated by recent technological 
developments which allow for the production and maintenance of commons of 
informational and cultural artifacts in networked environments. Firms in the information 
sector rely on social arrangements in which generalized human interaction produces the 
cultural knowledge, language, code, and information necessary to sustain accumulation. 
That is to say, we have reached a stage in the development of the productive forces89 
wherein a particular contradictory movement has emerged. Immaterial labor signals a 
separation of labor from explicit capitalist control as the production of surplus value 
becomes generalized throughout society. Capitalists are left to glean value from these 
cooperative social arrangements. But this process is contingent, as Hardt and Negri 
(2006) assert that immaterial labor simultaneously invests labor with a means of exodus 
from capital and normal commodity structures. The commons make exodus possible. 
And any subtraction from the coercive class relation threatens the continuity of 
commodity exchange. As a result, where firms are unsuccessful in their attempts to glean 
value from autonomous cooperative social arrangements they are compelled to eliminate 
                                                 
89Productive forces are defined as the synthesis of labor and the means of production. 
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the avenues for exodus. I have argued in this dissertation that peer-to-peer file-sharing is 
an articulation of this larger development in social relations as immaterial labor takes on 
greater significance in the economy as a whole. 
 The relationship between the social system of commodification and the social 
system of commoning is of particular concern to this study. Giddens (1986) cautioned 
that social systems rarely have easily specifiable boundaries. Yet structure, when 
regarded as the rules as resources which recursively reproduce social relations, may have 
institutionalized features which are relatively stable across time and space. In this sense 
two social systems can be distinguished by sets of relatively bounded social practices. 
And while the social systems of commodification and commoning are in some sense 
contradictory, there is still considerable overlap between them. That is to say, the practice 
of commoning does not necessarily preclude that of commodification. The free labor of 
producing and maintaining pools of information in various online wikis, the work which 
goes into the open source software movement, even the interactions among youth 
belonging to various subcultures or groups—all can be mined by capitalists seeking to 
glean value from commons produced by autonomous social cooperation. Of the 
contradictory relationship between the two systems, one can say that the practice of 
commoning represents a crisis for commodification, a potential for rupture in the social 
relations of commodity exchange because the social relations of commoning demonstrate 
the potential for an alternative ordering of society. With respect to the file-sharers 
discussed as a part of this study, there exists a range of discursive meaning attached to the 
practice of file-sharing. In other words, as file-sharers engage in the process of 
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commoning they continually make meaning out of their activities. Most of the file-
sharers represented in this research did not speak explicitly of commoning as a means of 
exodus from the system of commodity exchange, although they alluded to the injustices 
of a system that cheats artists, is overpriced, and inhibits their ability to access hard-to-
locate or commercially unavailable materials. Even so, this does not invalidate the theory 
of exodus or the contradiction and larger crisis represented by immaterial labor. The 
resistance of file-sharers, no matter how it is framed, has at its root the antagonism of the 
capitalist class relation. And though the struggle is not organized in the previous fashion 
of traditional labor struggles this is because the production of surplus value in 
informational and cultural goods has been generalized throughout society. 
 In this context the file-sharer does not appear as a radicalized worker; rather, the 
worker surrogate, the user or participant, generally operates in a context which is unique 
from many forms of previous class struggles. Therefore, this dissertation put a great deal 
of emphasis on the constitution of class in the context of file-sharing.  Marx (1978d) 
argued that class signified a group of individuals sharing common relations to both labor 
and the means of production. More specifically, he argued that under the capitalist mode 
of production the working class was alienated from not only its own labor power but the 
instruments of production as well. In fact, this alienation serves as the foundation of 
capitalist society: 
The existence of a class which possesses nothing but its capacity to labour is a 
necessary prerequisite of capital. It is only the domination of accumulated, past, 
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materialised labour over direct, living labour that turns accumulated labour into 
capital. (208-209) 
Moreover, Marx asserted that the worker is trapped in this social relation with capital 
because his ―sole source of livelihood is the sale of his labour power‖ and to leave this 
class relation is to ―[renounce] his existence‖ (p. 205). 
 Marx (1991) acknowledged that class distinctions were not always perfectly 
defined. However, he asserted that there was a consistent effort to alienate workers from 
the instruments of production. Consider the following quote from his unfinished chapter 
on class: 
We have seen how it is the constant tendency and law of development of the 
capitalist mode of production to divorce the means of production ever more from 
labour and to concentrate the fragmented means of production more and more into 
large groups, i.e. to transform labour into wage-labour and the means of 
production into capital. (1025) 
What distinguishes the conflict over file-sharing from the economic landscape of Marx‘s 
time is not the disappearance of class. It is as central to the conflict today as it was in the 
second half of the 19
th
 century. The distinguishing feature of the current technological 
milieu is the ascendancy of immaterial labor in the processes of production. Although the 
generation of surplus value has been generalized throughout society as Tronti (1971) has 
argued, the attempt to constitute people—in this case file-sharers—as a class is still as 
apparent as it ever was—as is the resistance to that coercive exercise of power. Marx 
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(1978) argued that the working class seeks to transcend this exercise of power by 
annihilating the class distinction itself: 
The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled to abolish itself and thereby its 
conditioning opposite—private property—which makes it a proletariat. (133) 
Marx argued that the working class seeks to destroy the class antagonism altogether: 
Within the antagonism as a whole, therefore, private property represents the 
conservative side and the proletariat the destructive side. From the former comes 
action aimed at preserving the antagonism; from the latter, action aimed at its 
destruction. (134) 
The conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing embodies all of the dynamics laid out 
so long ago by Marx.  The ascendancy of immaterial labor has ruptured the ability of 
capitalists to effectively alienate people from either their own labor or the instruments of 
production. File-sharers quite possibly represent the most brazen attempt yet to annihilate 
the class distinction through a steady undermining of property rights in informational and 
cultural goods. For the reasons given by respondents in this study—financial pressure, a 
desire for better terms of access, an ethos of sharing—file-sharers have created a 
commons better-suited to their informational and cultural needs. In such a state they exist 
as a multiplicity of diverse singularities engaged in the creation and maintenance of a set 
of social relations autonomous of the wage relation. File-sharers are only re-constituted 
as a class when the content industries seek to force them back into the social system of 
commodification through the application of force. Absent this coercion, file-sharers 
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appear as a multitude of communities constructed around an endless variety of genres and 
tastes.  
As I have stated throughout this study, the working class is a class which seeks its 
own annihilation. File-sharers are an innumerable collection of singularities until 
constituted as a class for exploitation by capitalists. It would be an error to dispense with 
the concept of class as it would lead us to miss many of the important dynamics which 
determine the trajectory of capitalist development in information production and 
distribution. In fact, this study of file-sharing demonstrates that the relationship between 
the social systems of commodification and commoning is defined by class antagonism. 
The potential for file-sharers to constitute themselves outside of the class relation has 
been met with retaliation. For example, in the courts the content industries have sought to 
re-constitute file-sharers as a class through the process of joinder. Yet even this action 
demonstrates the contingency of the capitalist attempts to constitute these individuals as a 
class. Unforeseen structural impediments—namely a concern about the potential abuse of 
court resources—largely derailed the industries‘ attempts to constitute file-sharers as a 
class. Joinder was denied in a number of cases because of the tremendous burden it might 
place on the courts. The result was a radical increase in the associated filing fees for 
plaintiffs. Extremely high statutory awards were rejected in both the Tenenbaum and 
Thomas-Rasset cases on both constitutional and common law grounds. And the award of 
attorney‘s fees to defendants dramatically raised the financial liability for plaintiffs 
seeking to file cases against alleged file-sharers. Other unforeseen structural impediments 
emerged outside of the courtrooms as file-sharers continually developed the practice of 
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file-sharing to better protect themselves from potential lawsuits. These developments all 
can be seen as part of a larger social dynamic of potential rupture in the sphere of 
information production and distribution that has been playing out for many years now.  
 The history of the conflict over peer-to-peer communication predates the recent 
skirmishes over contemporary file-sharing applications. Generally speaking, the 
economic landscape of media firms has been marked by trends in growth, integration, 
globalization, and concentration of ownership since the 1980s. These trends have resulted 
in oligopolistic conditions in many media markets. These dynamics are themselves the 
result of an economic rationale in which market stability is pursued through obtaining 
greater market share. This study has argued that this is representative of an exodus on the 
part of firms from the coercive laws of competition. Such is the norm of the current 
period of monopoly capitalism. Raising barriers to market entry and lowering transaction 
costs allows firms to systematize the allocation of resources free from the strictures of 
competition. Internally integrated systems arise for the management of information 
production and distribution, placing larger media firms at a tremendous advantage 
relative to smaller competitors. Competition becomes little more than a rhetorical device 
used to further the political ends of a neoliberal agenda. With regard to the music 
business, record companies are currently characterized by vertical supply chains in which 
publishing, recording, manufacturing, and distribution are all housed under the same roof. 
The result is a multi-billion dollar industry headed up by just four firms which are 
themselves the properties of immense transnational media conglomerates. 
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The relation between copyright law and the music industry is of special 
significance to this study. Intellectual property provisions are the glue which holds the 
integrated supply chains together. As is the case for many media industries, the music 
industry has been characterized by high levels of economic concentration and integration 
as well as an unmistakable reliance on intellectual property regimes. This dissertation has 
illustrated how industrial change consistently shaped, and was shaped by, intellectual 
property opportunities and control.  Beginning in the late 19
th
 century with the 
technological developments of Berliner and Edison, the recording industry was from the 
outset an oligopoly in which three firms90 enjoyed a patent monopoly until 1917. The 
Copyright Act of 1909 established rights in mechanical reproductions (though not 
recorded music) and created a statutory limit to the royalties paid by recording companies 
to music publishers. The compromise between these two groups allowed the music 
industry to flourish by the end of the 1920s. Around the same period broadcasters 
emerged as a significant economic player. With the help of the 1909 establishment of 
rights in mechanical reproduction, broadcasting functioned as a lifeline to keep music 
publishers afloat through the economic downturn of the 1930s. However, lacking 
copyright protections and an equivalent revenue stream, the recording industry went 
through significant industrial restructuring during this same period. Only with the post-
World War II economic boom and the birth of rock and roll in the 1950s did recording 
companies eventually displace music publishers as the key player in the music industry. It 
was at this time that the RIAA emerged to facilitate technological standardization within 
the recording industry. Soon thereafter, the RIAA looked to copyright as a means to 
                                                 
90 These three firms were Edison, Victor, and Columbia. 
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combat piracy in music recordings. Copyrights in recorded music were recognized in 
1972 and the compact disc was introduced in 1982. As sales of recorded music peaked in 
the 1990s, the music industry was dominated by the Big Five record companies which 
became the Big Four in 2004.91 
Over the course of the 20
th
 century, the music industry was characterized by 
increasing growth, integration, globalization, and concentration in ownership—all made 
possible by a copyright regime tailored to produce market stability while avoiding the 
worst effects of unbridled market competition. But the story of capitalist development in 
the production of music is not solely a tale of competition among firms. High levels of 
integration also created opportunities for crisis. Each stage in the production and 
distribution chain was dependent on the proper function of every other stage. Should the 
music industry lose control of any point the entire chain was threatened. This is precisely 
why the emergence of contemporary peer-to-peer systems is significant to the trajectory 
of capitalist development in the sphere of information production and distribution. 
 As previously mentioned, the tendency toward disintermediation or exodus from 
capital preceded contemporary file-sharing platforms which are themselves grounded in a 
long history of peer-based communication systems. The practice of commoning in 
recorded music extends back at least as far as the 1940s when amateur jazz and opera 
aficionados became the unofficial stewards of cultural artifacts neglected by the record 
labels of the day. But file-sharing also has its roots in the moral economies of early 
hacker communities. Perhaps extending all the way back to the radio amateurs of the 
                                                 
91 The Big Five were Time Warner, Sony, Bertelsmann, EMI, and Universal. Further concentration in 
ownership resulted in just four when Sony purchased Bertelsmann in 2004. 
 382 
1900s, belief systems premised on sharing and open access as the keys to scientific and 
technological progress brought hacker groups into recurring conflicts with media 
industries. The development of Internet peer-based systems is one in a long line of 
conflicts. The enhanced autonomy offered by recent technological developments allows 
people to do more for themselves and in loose coordination with others. The Internet 
started largely as a peer-based system for the sharing of resources among researchers. 
Though the emergence of the World Wide Web in the 1990s signaled the growing 
prevalence of the client/server model of information distribution, peer-based systems 
have never been effectively displaced. FTP sites and BBS systems persisted while new 
peer-to-peer networks like Napster, as well as successor systems such as BitTorrent, were 
introduced to enormous success. 
The popularity of Napster and its progeny derived from the relatively 
decentralized character of the associated search, storage, and communication operations. 
The particular development of these peer-based technologies was fueled in part by 
escalating legal conflicts with the content industries. Early on these legal conflicts 
centered on the issue of the legitimate and illegitimate use of communication systems. 
The record industry was aided by a host of legislation passed before the legal battles with 
file-sharing systems commenced. This legislation included the No Electronic Theft Act of 
1997 which allowed for the criminal prosecution of copyright infringement even in cases 
where there was no commercial benefit to the defendant(s) and the Digital Theft 
Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999 which dramatically 
increased the allowable statutory damages in cases of copyright infringement. Laws such 
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as these were clearly driven by concerns about the implications of recent technological 
developments in both digital file formats and Internet communication.  For example, 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. in 2001 turned on the issue of legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of communication systems. Napster‘s brokered communication and 
centralized search database proved a relatively easy legal target for the major record 
labels. Plaintiffs in the case against Napster alleged contributory and vicarious 
infringement under the DMCA, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
receptive to their arguments. Because the court simply affirmed a preliminary injunction 
ordered by the lower court, Napster‘s arguments concerning fair use and substantial 
noninfringing use were never decided. In fact, the issue of fair use would not play an 
important role in any file-sharing case. The rights of copyright holders have been 
consistently treated as inviolate by the courts in peer-to-peer cases. In this sense the issue 
of legitimate and illegitimate uses of cultural and informational goods in the context of 
file-sharing has not been deemed worthy of the courts‘ consideration. The courts thus far 
have functioned to strengthen the legitimation and signification of private property rights 
in informational and cultural goods.  
Subsequent generations of file-sharing platforms responded to the Napster ruling 
with increasing decentralization of the associated search, storage, and communication 
operations. With each iteration these second generation file-sharing platforms attempted 
to make themselves increasingly difficult to target in court while still providing the 
structures necessary for a viable system of commoning. Gnutella, which emerged in 2000 
as an open source project developed under a General Public License, was a networking 
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protocol for a distributed search. In theory, Gnutella was a purely decentralized peer-to-
peer system. However, freeriding and the resulting decision to adopt a two-tier overlay 
approach meant that, in practice, Gnutella was not a purely decentralized system. In 2001 
the FastTrack protocol was introduced and adopted by clients like Grokster, iMesh, 
Kazaa, and Morpheus. Unlike Gnutella, FastTrack was not developed as an open source 
project, but like Gnutella, it adopted a centralized/decentralized topology of supernodes 
to improve the scalability of the system. FastTrack suffered from significant amounts of 
freeriding and was plagued by weak hashing algorithms which allowed the content 
industries to sabotage the network by introducing corrupted content. In 2001 the RIAA 
sued FastTrack clients Kazaa, Grokster, and MusicCity for alleged copyright 
infringement. Both the district and appellate courts found in favor of the defendants based 
on the Betamax defense of substantial noninfringing use. At issue was the legitimate and 
illegitimate use of communication systems (though again the industry‘s hold over cultural 
and informational goods was not directly challenged in the courtroom). However, the 
content industries were temporarily buoyed when the RIAA appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court which held that the defendants were liable for inducing copyright 
infringement despite the presence of substantial noninfringing uses. Other peer-to-peer 
companies like Aimster, AudioGalaxy, Scour, and Limewire also found themselves 
caught up in file-sharing litigation around this same time. Although the content industries 
scored a number of important legal victories against the purveyors of file-sharing 
applications, it was not enough to stem the tide of file-sharing. Eventually, this led to the 
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RIAA‘s fateful decision to begin targeting individual file-sharers in addition to ISPs, 
entrepreneurs, and software developers. 
The RIAA litigation campaign began in 2003 when the RIAA served Verizon 
with an initial subpoena in an effort to identify the account holders associated with the IP 
addresses it had turned up during its investigations. Although Verizon successfully 
resisted the subpoenas in the long run, the lower court compelled the ISP to hand over its 
customer information, which the RIAA immediately used to begin targeting individuals 
in court for alleged copyright infringement. The thousands of subsequent cases which 
flooded the district courts resulted in very bad press coverage and Congressional criticism 
of the RIAA at the outset of the campaign. At issue were the legitimate and illegitimate 
uses of court resources. Many critics were concerned that defendants only received notice 
from their ISPs well after legal action had been initiated against them. The courts‘ 
jurisdiction was also called into question by both the ISPs and the judges in these cases. 
The RIAA responded by adopting a slight modification to their tactics in which they gave 
defendants advance notification of impending legal action. Nevertheless, the suits during 
the 2003-2007 period resulted primarily in default judgments, summary judgments, and 
settlements in the RIAA‘s favor. In 2007 the RIAA began a deterrence and education 
initiative in which it began targeting alleged file-sharers on university and college 
campuses across the nation. As part of the initiative the RIAA asked universities and 
colleges to forward pre-notification letters to their students. The response of universities 
to the RIAA‘s request varied but a number of schools and students fought back. Even in 
those cases where the schools did not openly resist the RIAA considerable legal resources 
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were often mobilized on behalf of targeted students in order to help them avoid more 
costly judgments against them.  
Despite the tens of thousands of cases decided or settled in the RIAA‘s favor, a 
small number of important cases in which defendants decided to fight back helped to 
limit the effectiveness of the RIAA‘s campaign. Ultimately, a series of decisions turning 
on issues of the legitimate and illegitimate uses of court resources worked against the 
RIAA‘s efforts. For example, the RIAA‘s investigatory practices were challenged in a 
number of cases. In fact, the RIAA eventually ditched its investigatory arm MediaSentry 
in the wake of these decisions. The issue of making available was also raised in a number 
of cases and persistently threatened to pull the rug out from under the RIAA litigation 
campaign. Perhaps more significantly, the issue of attorney’s fees was decided in favor of 
the defendants in the Santangelo, Andersen and Foster cases. These cases dramatically 
increased the financial burden of the RIAA litigation campaign and when combined with 
the drawn out and expensive Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset cases, may have helped 
bring the campaign to an end in 2008. The Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset cases are 
ongoing as of this writing and the judges in each case have drawn into question the ability 
of plaintiffs to secure extraordinarily high statutory damages against alleged file-sharers. 
Again, in all of these instances the decisions have turned on the legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of court resources—not on the issue of the legitimate and illegitimate 
uses of informational and cultural goods. 
Possibly the most significant impact of the RIAA campaign has been its use as a 
model by other content producers for further litigation against alleged BitTorrent users. 
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In 2010 tens of thousands of cases were filed against individuals for alleged copyright 
infringement—more than were ever sued during the RIAA litigation campaign. 
Organizations such as the US Copyright Group, Adult Copyright Company, Media 
Copyright Group, and Copyright Defense Agency have sprung up in the United States to 
represent an assortment of independent movie studios and pornographers. These groups 
built on the RIAA model of file-sharing litigation as they attempted to profit from piracy, 
hoping to secure millions of dollars from individuals in out-of-court settlements. Thus far 
their plans have been met with resistance in a fashion similar to the resistance to the 
RIAA campaign. Judges in a number of these cases have refused to allow plaintiffs 
joinder, dealing a major blow to the future of such legal actions by dramatically raising 
the filing fees for mass copyright cases. In all of these cases, whether as part of the 
original RIAA litigation campaign or subsequent efforts, the resistance in the legal arena 
is narrowly confined to questions of the proper uses of communication systems and court 
resources. Resistance in the legal arena centers primarily on the rights of the owners of 
communications infrastructure or the perceived abuse of the legal process by the content 
industries. Both judges and ISPs have chafed under the demands of content producers 
who they feel have overreached in their quest to target individual file-sharers. As 
individuals have been targeted by these groups, attorneys and judges have worked to 
ensure that defendants have adequate legal resources with which to defend themselves. 
That being said, nowhere in any of these cases is the actual practice of file-sharing 
defended, only the hapless individuals caught up in mass copyright lawsuits. 
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The issue of the legitimate and illegitimate use of informational and cultural 
goods only emerges once the investigation turns to the social system of commoning in 
general and the practice of file-sharing in particular. This study confronts file-sharing as a 
set of social relations premised on the commoning of resources through peer-to-peer 
systems. While these practices are in some sense inconsistent with the processes of 
commodification, the social system of commoning does not exist somewhere outside of 
the capitalist system. Peer-to-peer systems are an outgrowth of a contradictory dynamic 
within a capitalist logic of accumulation increasingly dependent on immaterial labor. 
Nevertheless, the social practices which constitute file-sharing are relatively bounded 
across time and space. By surveying 363 file-sharers from 42 countries and a variety of 
backgrounds this study begins to map the structures which undergird these social 
relations of commoning. There are many communities within the general population of 
file-sharers, each with its own distinct set of interests, rules and practices. These various 
file-sharing communities rely on commonly available web resources, general tracker and 
index sites, private tracker and index sites, dedicated peer-to-peer forums, and a variety 
of anonymity resources for social cohesion in a hostile legal and technological 
environment. The tradition of free and decentralized access to cultural goods—the so-
called gift economy—unites them all. These individuals are motivated to share artifacts 
in peer-to-peer environments primarily because it affords them greater access to their 
culture on terms more favorable than those offered by commodity exchange. Whether it 
is lower prices, format-shifting, on-demand playback, higher quality file formats, or hard-
to-find content, the social system of commoning simply affords file-sharers access to 
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quality goods more efficiently than does the social system of commodification. The 
motivation for better access constitutes one of the key structural features of file-sharing 
systems as individuals vie for control over resources. 
The class antagonism produced by the contest for the surplus of social production 
has long been a general structural feature of capitalist society. The same is true of file-
sharing systems wherein the continued legal attacks by the RIAA and other copyright 
groups have engendered considerable resentment within file-sharing communities. Most 
of the file-sharers contacted as a part of this study downplayed the potential of litigation 
to diminish overall levels of file-sharing activity. They also emphasized the antagonism 
created by file-sharing litigation. The political economic awareness of the file-sharers 
contacted as a part of this study is considerable. When asked about whether the RIAA or 
record labels are concerned about the welfare of either music fans or musicians the 
general response was ―no‖ except where the interests of musicians overlapped with the 
financial interests of the major labels. In fact, the file-sharers represented in this study 
were very careful to align their interests with those of musicians whom they wish to 
support. The antagonism demonstrated in this study is reserved solely for the record 
labels, the RIAA, and other large media firms. These groups are perceived as little more 
than surplus eaters, devouring the value produced by the interactions among musicians 
and fans of music. To the extent that the industry is not capable or satisfied to glean value 
from the file-sharing commons they have decided to attack the commons directly. Yet 
respondents also pointed to the increasing sophistication of peer-to-peer systems as a 
result of the need to stay one step ahead of the legal efforts of the copyright industries. 
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The file-sharers in this study see copyright law largely as a tool of the copyright 
industries and echo many of the concerns of critical legal scholars about the loss of 
balance in copyright law. The fact that file-sharers as a class of people have not found 
legal representation in the courts as a part of any litigation targeting individual file-
sharers is significant to the structural ordering of file-sharing communities. But rather 
than a detriment to the structural cohesion of these communities, one might say that the 
lack of representation and the perceived injustice of these campaigns has only further 
deepened and strengthened the structures of file-sharing. Injustice is a resource which 
drives peer-to-peer innovation both technologically and socially. 
The major contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. First, 
unlike past research this dissertation confronts file-sharing as something other than 
criminal activity or a market aberration. Instead, file-sharing is theorized as the 
constitution of a set of social relations alternative to those premised on commodity 
exchange. The conflict over file-sharing is explained largely as the product of class 
antagonism as the content industries seek to re-constitute file-sharers as a consuming 
class. Accordingly, there are two possible courses of action for capitalists. The first is to 
extinguish the commons created by file-sharers and to eliminate the avenues of exodus 
from the class relation. This course of action is embodied by the mass copyright litigation 
campaigns detailed extensively in this study. This study asserts that these efforts were, in 
large part, stymied by unforeseen structural impediments as a general concern over the 
potential abuse of the legal process derailed much of the litigation. However, the 
litigation campaigns also generated structural developments outside of the legal arena. 
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Resistance and hostility directed at the content industries has served as a resource for file-
sharing communities. As a 20 year old student from the United States commented: 
It's the opposition from the RIAA and MPAA, along with their government 
minions, that solidify us. Not only is P2P inherently communal, but we have an 
us-against-them feeling. 
In this sense the constitution of file-sharers as a class can work against the coercive 
exercise of power as much as it may contribute to the division of labor. File-sharers when 
constituted as a class represent a dangerous enemy to capitalists—especially when one 
considers that the instruments of production are not under the exclusive control of 
capitalists. Class antagonism drives the technological development of peer-to-peer 
systems as file-sharers go deeper while strengthening the structures which provide them 
social cohesion. 
 The second course of action for firms is to woo file-sharers back into social 
relations premised on commodity exchange by providing better terms of access to 
informational and cultural goods. This is the familiar call by reformists and technologists 
for media firms to adopt innovative business models respecting the new digital logic. But 
this accommodation is not done by the good nature or forward-thinking of capitalists. 
Rather it is the product of class struggle. It is an accommodation to the file-sharers—not 
the digital commodity. As a 32 year old file-sharer from Finland stated: 
 
Y'know, Spotify has eliminated 95% of my music downloading: I am happy to 
pay 10 euros a month for the convenience! The rest of my downloading will 
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disappear the very moment the "Spotify of video"…emerges. Documentaries, 
porn, indie films, foreign films, TV-series-the-moment-they-come-out...and all 
totally void of commercials. Y'know, the stuff a pirate is used to! :) I am sure that 
[this] time will come, it is just a matter of... time. But this is only BECAUSE of 
piracy: such convenient services have been based on p2p tech and erected to fight 
piracy... so there is no question in my mind about piracy being not illegal as 
such—it is necessary trailblazing in order to balance the situation so that everyone 
benefits: the artists, the producers AND the consumer. 
This is exactly why it is so critical to include class antagonism in the analysis of capitalist 
development. It is exactly where the political economists have gotten it wrong. Should a 
new business model become ascendant and file-sharing activity recede, it is evidence of 
successful class struggle. It is capitulation in the face of overwhelming resistance to 
unacceptable terms of access. This type of class struggle is a structural component of all 
capitalist development. 
 While this dissertation makes a number of contributions with respect to theorizing 
class antagonism and resistance as part of the conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing, there 
is another dimension to file-sharing introduced as part of this research. That is to say, 
there is an aspect of file-sharing which transcends the class relation. Recall that Foucault 
(1982) asserted power was only exercised over free subjects. In this light, this dissertation 
began a cursory investigation of those structures implicated in file-sharing which are 
something other than a simple reaction to the alienation necessary for capitalist 
accumulation. This is what Barbrook (2000; 2003) refers to as the gift economy—an 
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ethos of sharing which provides a structural order to file-sharing independent of class 
antagonism. Consider the comments of a 22 year old file-sharer from the United States: 
There are small communities. They are usually evident by forums and common 
users on specific sites. Usually what holds the community together is the desire to 
share. There are definitely those who want to grab a file and leave, however, an 
active community makes sure that there are no viruses, provide support for getting 
files to work if it has the wrong file extension, and generally work to do the best 
they can to keep the community friendly. Despite common beliefs, people online 
are about as good as they are on the streets. They'll help each other and make 
friends, friends we may never see, but still seem to stay friends despite an ocean 
of separation. 
This dissertation only scratches the surface of these structural dimensions to file-sharing. 
It is a phenomenon that requires an analytical approach which goes beyond the common 
Marxist formulations of class and class antagonism. It is why this study incorporates 
structuration theory into the approach.  
 
Future research needs to examine these social dimensions of file-sharing in much 
greater detail. As already stated, this study only begins to map the surface of a highly 
social yet elusive and complex set of practices. It is my hope that this study will serve as 
the foundation for future research in this area. In particular, I plan to build on the results 
of the survey featured in Chapter 7 to create a more standardized questionnaire. As the 
generalizability of this study was limited by both the questionnaire design and the sample 
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of file-sharers, I expect to engage with file-sharing communities again in the future in an 
attempt to discern the extent to which file-sharers activate the various structures 
identified by this study. Moreover, this research must be extended to file-sharing 
practices at the margins of peer-to-peer systems. The current study dealt primarily with 
BitTorrent users while largely ignoring the numerous and varied file-sharing practices 
which lie outside of the BitTorrent universe. The intersection of file-sharing activities 
with global social, cultural, legal and economic structures must also be analyzed. The 
analysis of all these structural dimensions and the many diverse file-sharing communities 
will be critical to understanding file-sharers when constituted as something other than a 
class. This type of analysis is also vital to understanding the trajectory of capitalist 
development and the decision of the content industries to either co-opt the free labor of 
file-sharers or to eradicate their avenues for exodus. Resistance in common among file-
sharers is an obvious mover of peer-to-peer innovation in both technological and social 
terms. Should the social relations of commodification be made palatable enough to win 
over a substantial portion of the population of file-sharers, the dynamic of struggle in this 
arena will change. Either way, the trajectory of capitalist development in the production 
and distribution of informational and cultural goods will have been conditioned by the 





APPENDIX A: INFORMANTS FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
INDIVIDUALS SIGNIFICANCE 
Ray Beckerman Beckerman maintains important blog detailing the 
RIAA litigation campaign and is a member of the 
EFF. He is also the lead attorney in UMG v. Lindor, 
Elektra v. Santangelo, among others. 
Charles Nesson Nesson is a member of the Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society at Harvard University and is 
currently guiding a team of Harvard law students 
who are providing legal defense for a 25-year old 
graduate student at Boston University in Sony BMG 
Music Entertainment et al v. Tenenbaum. 
John G. Browning Browning is a graduate of the University of Texas 
Law School and a member of the Dallas office of 
Gordon & Rees where he represents defendants in 
civil cases with the RIAA. 
Camara and Sibley Houston law firm representing Jammie Thomas-
Rasset 
Representative Howard Berman Berman is Chairman of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and oversaw a congressional 
hearing on piracy after the Fox film “Wolverine” 
was leaked to the Internet before the film’s release. 
Representative Lamar Smith Smith is a member of the House Committee on 
Science and Technology and is an outspoken 
advocate for expanding the DMCA’s restrictions on 
technological bypass of copyright protections. 
John Malcolm Malcolm is the director of MPAA’s worldwide anti-
piracy campaign and is involved in the MPAA’s 
“outreach” programs to universities and ISPs to help 
them address piracy issues. 
Keith Bolcar Bolcar is a special agent in charge of FBI’s cyber 
division in Los Angeles which meets regularly with 
studio executives to share intelligence and discuss 
security issues. 
Department of Justice Representative as-of-yet to 
be determined 
From the Intellectual Property Division—attorneys 
charged with defending the United States from 
alleged intellectual property violations and possibly 
prosecuting criminal cases of alleged copyright 
infringement. 
Kerry Gonzales Pleaded guilty to felony copyright infringement for 
disseminating an unauthorized copy of “The Hulk” 
in 2003. 
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Marc D. Hoaglin Charged with felony copyright infringement under 
the Family Entertainment Copyright Act for 
uploading an unauthorized copy of Star Wars 
Episode III Revenge of the Sith one day before the 
film’s release. 
Tanya Andersen She is the defendant in Atlantic v. Andersen. 
Christopher Brennan He is the defendant in Atlantic v. Brennan. 
Patricia Santangelo She is the defendant in Elektra v. Santangelo. 
Rhonda Crain She is the defendant in Sony v. Crain. 
Joel Tenenbaum He is the defendant in Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum. 
Jammie Thomas-Rasset Minnesota mother ordered to pay nearly $2 million 




APPENDIX B: CASE LAW AND STATUTES 
CASE SIGNIFICANCE 
ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT v. 
SANTANGELO (White Plaines, NY, 2005) 
This was the first time the RIAA’s “making 
available” theory was challenged. The judge 
dismissed the case with prejudice, leaving the door 
open for Santangelo to recover attorney’s fees. The 
RIAA then filed a separate case against 
Santangelo’s children. 
ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT v. BARKER 
(New York, NY, 2008) 
“Making available” was rejected in this case. There 
are a number of important briefs filed by the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Computer & 
Communications Industry Association and U.S. 
Internet Industry Association, and the Department 
of Justice. 
CAPITOL RECORDS v. THOMAS (Duluth, MN, 
2009) 
This is the only RIAA case to go to a jury. RIAA 
was awarded $222,000 based on sharing 24 songs, 
but verdict was set aside by the judge for “manifest 
error of law” because of RIAA’s proposed jury 
instructions which advised that merely “making 
available” constituted copyright infringement. The 
judge also questioned the excessiveness of the 
statutory damages against an “individual” since all 
cited cases involved commercial entities. Retrial 
award was even more significant and the case 
received a significant amount of media attention. 
Amicus briefs filed by Progress and Freedom 
Association, MPAA, 10 copyright law professors, 
Intellectual Property Institute of William Mitchell 
College of Law, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Computer & Communications Industry Association 







ATLANTIC RECORDING v. HOWELL (Phoenix, 
AZ, 2008) 
This case involved the examination of the 
defendant’s hard drive. Amicus Curiae filed by 
Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
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CAPITOL RECORDS v. FOSTER (Oklahoma, 
2007) 
Amicus briefs filed by Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union, 
Public Citizen, and AALL. The case was dismissed 
with prejudice leaving the door open for Debbie 
Foster to recover attorney’s fees. The judge also 
ruled that plaintiffs failed to proved contributory or 
secondary infringement. 
SONY v. CRAIN (Beaumont, TX,2007) Ms. Crain countersued Sony alleging that the 
record company illegally employed unlicensed 
investigators in the State of Texas. Argued that this 
illegal collection of evidence amounted to “civil 
conspiracy” under Texas law. 
UMG v. LINDOR (Brooklyn, NY, 2008) Marie Lindor challenged the RIAA to explain why 
it demands $750 per track in damages, arguing due 
process jurisprudence prohibits excessive statutory 
awards. This amounts to an unconstitutional 
violation of due process. 
SONY BMG MUSIC v. TENENBAUM (Boston, 
MA, 2009) 
Boston University graduate student ordered to pay 
$675K to plaintiffs. Defendant openly admitted 
sharing music files over p2p network. Was 
represented by group of Harvard law students. 
STATUTE SIGNIFICANCE 
Copyright Act of 1976 Remains the primary basis for copyright law in the 
United States. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act  Criminalization of circumvention of technology 
which protects copyright. 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
International agreement administered by the World 
Trade Organization which sets minimum standards 
for intellectual property protections. 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 Chapter 1: Introduction to File-Sharing Litigation 
The Introduction provides the reader with a brief summation of the 
litigation campaign and related developments. In addition, the problematic 
of property rights in information is introduced. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Chapter 2 begins with a critique of the existing political economy 
approaches to the study of the production of information. Autonomist 
Marxism and structuration theory are introduced as alternative approaches 
which may resolve some of the problems characteristic of existing 
approaches. The theoretical framework employed as a part of this study is 
developed by surveying various theoretical treatments of power, 
resistance, class struggle, the state, technology, and social relations. 
 Chapter 3: Design and Methodology 
The third chapter details the application of structuration theory to the 
research question. This includes an explanation of Giddens’s three 
structural dimensions—signification, domination, and legitimation—and 
their relation to the social system of commoning. Subsidiary research 
questions are also introduced. The remainder of the chapter explains the 
two core components of the research project: the analysis of file-sharing 
litigation and survey research on file-sharers. 
 Chapter 4: Political Economy of Copyright Law and File-Sharing Technology 
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The fourth chapter puts the legal conflict over peer-to-peer file-sharing 
into historical context. Recent developments in copyright law are 
explained by providing a brief overview of not only the history of the 
American approach to intellectual property law, but also its relation to the 
economic development of the music industry. The second half of the 
chapter contextualizes the development of peer-to-peer file-sharing 
technology as part of the transition from the industrial to the post-
industrial economy. This is done by briefly surveying the development of 
peer-to-peer technology starting from the inception of the Internet to the 
emergence of contemporary file-sharing platforms. 
 Chapter 5: The RIAA Litigation Campaign 
This chapter provides an in-depth historical examination of the RIAA 
litigation campaign targeting individual file-sharers. Numerous cases and 
developments are highlighted to identify the effective limits to the overall 
success of the legal effort. 
 Chapter 6: BitTorrent Litigation 
This chapter updates readers on the more recent developments in file-
sharing litigation. It begins with a look at the BitTorrent file-sharing 
platform and then proceeds to an examination of the attempts by various 
copyright groups to build upon the RIAA litigation model. Again, 
numerous cases and developments are highlighted to demonstrate the 
effective limits to the overall success of these legal efforts. 
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 Chapter 7: Survey of File-Sharers 
Chapter 7 analyzes the structural dimensions of the file-sharing 
community by presenting the results of an online survey of file-sharers. I 
attempt to identify those rules/resources which are implicated in the 
practice of file-sharing while also investigating the impact of file-sharing 
litigation on the peer-to-peer community. 
 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The findings of this dissertation are summarized and contextualized in 
Chapter 8. The theoretical approach taken as a part of this study is re-
introduced and reconsidered. The history of the conflict over file-sharing 
and its structural dimensions are reviewed. This chapter concludes by 
arguing that peer-to-peer file-sharing is an articulation of the larger social 
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